Unilateral Sanctions and International Law: How India’s Critique Raises Questions of UN Charter Compliance, WTO Obligations, and Domestic Judicial Review

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, addressing the BRICS gathering, openly condemned the deployment of what he described as unilateral coercive measures and sanctions, arguing that such actions impose a disproportionate burden on developing nations and cannot serve as a viable substitute for substantive diplomatic engagement. He further expressed deep concern regarding the escalating West Asia crisis, emphasizing that uninterrupted maritime traffic remains essential for global trade and that any disruption could exacerbate the humanitarian and economic challenges faced by the region's populace. In the same statements, he called for a sustained ceasefire in Gaza, reiterating India’s longstanding policy of supporting a negotiated two-state solution as the only realistic pathway to lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Jaishankar warned that the practice of imposing coercive economic instruments without multilateral endorsement undermines the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the obligations of sovereign equality and non-intervention, thereby threatening the collective security architecture that underpins the international order. He concluded by urging major powers to prioritize diplomatic channels over punitive measures, contending that a cooperative approach is indispensable for preserving global stability and ensuring that the interests of vulnerable economies are not marginalised by extraterritorial coercion. His remarks also highlighted the potential economic fallout for developing nations that are heavily reliant on maritime supply chains, noting that any impediment to shipping routes could exacerbate trade deficits, heighten inflationary pressures, and undermine efforts to achieve sustainable development goals across the Global South. By framing the issue within the broader context of the West Asia conflict, he suggested that the resolution of geopolitical tensions is intrinsically linked to the re-evaluation of coercive sanction regimes, thereby calling for a multilateral dialogue that addresses both security concerns and the equitable distribution of economic burdens.

One primary legal question emerging from the minister’s condemnation is whether the imposition of unilateral coercive sanctions by a sovereign state conforms to the United Nations Charter’s prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Article 2(4) of the Charter explicitly obliges members to refrain from measures that would infringe upon the sovereign equality of other nations, a provision that could be interpreted to limit extraterritorial economic coercion absent a Security Council mandate. Nevertheless, proponents of unilateral sanctions argue that they represent a legitimate exercise of a state’s inherent right to protect its national security and foreign policy objectives, a justification frequently invoked in the context of preventing the proliferation of weapons and supporting human-rights objectives. The legal tension therefore pivots on whether the security-related rationale sufficiently outweighs the Charter-based prohibition on coercive measures that lack multilateral endorsement, a balance that courts have historically struggled to articulate with precision.

Another salient legal issue concerns the compatibility of unilateral sanctions with the World Trade Organization’s trade-related obligations, particularly the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions embodied in Article II and Article III of the Marrakesh Agreement. Developing economies, which already grapple with limited access to global markets, may argue that such coercive measures constitute a disguised trade barrier that contravenes the WTO’s commitment to non-discriminatory market access and thus warrant a settlement request before the Dispute Settlement Body. Precedents such as the United States – Steel Safeguards case demonstrate that the Appellate Body has scrutinised unilateral trade-related restrictions for their consistency with WTO provisions, suggesting that a similar legal avenue could be pursued against coercive financial sanctions that affect trade flows. However, the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism traditionally limits its jurisdiction to measures that fall within the definition of “trade-related” under Article 1, and the classification of sanctions aimed primarily at political objectives may trigger a jurisdictional hurdle that would need to be addressed in any prospective litigation.

Domestically, the minister’s criticism raises the question of whether the Indian government possesses the legal authority to counteract or mitigate the effects of foreign unilateral sanctions that impinge upon Indian trade and strategic interests. The Constitution vests the conduct of foreign affairs primarily in the executive, yet the Supreme Court in cases such as Kesavananda Bharati has affirmed that even executive actions must conform to constitutional principles, including the protection of fundamental rights that could be indirectly affected by economic coercion. Consequently, if Indian entities suffer material loss or if access to essential commodities is obstructed, affected parties might seek judicial review on the ground that the government’s failure to intervene violates the right to livelihood under Article 21, thereby opening a procedural avenue for domestic courts to assess the adequacy of state response. Nonetheless, the judiciary has traditionally exercised restraint in matters touching upon foreign policy, invoking the doctrine of non-justiciability, which could limit the court’s willingness to intervene unless a clear violation of enforceable rights is demonstrable.

From an international legal standpoint, the principle of proportionality embedded in the UN Charter and customary international law may provide a normative basis for contesting sanctions that are excessive relative to the purported security objectives. States adversely affected by such measures could invoke Article 103 of the Charter to assert that the obligations arising from a bilateral or multilateral treaty, including commitments to free navigation of international waters, supersede unilateral coercive actions that jeopardise maritime traffic. Should diplomatic negotiations fail, affected countries may resort to filing a claim before the International Court of Justice, invoking the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to protect the freedom of navigation and to challenge the legality of coercive measures that threaten safe passage. In practice, the enforcement of an ICJ judgment depends on the willingness of the offending state to comply, a factor that underscores the political dimensions of legal recourse and the necessity for multilateral diplomatic pressure to complement judicial mechanisms.