How the West Bengal Post-Poll Violence PIL Challenges Police Duty to Register FIRs and the Scope of High Court Judicial Review

During proceedings of a public interest litigation that has been instituted before the High Court regarding alleged incidents of post-poll violence in West Bengal, former Chief Minister Ms Mamata Banerjee rose to address the judges and articulated her perspective on the characterization of the state’s governance and on law-enforcement practices. She emphatically denied that West Bengal could be described as a ‘bulldozer state’, contending that such a label misrepresents the democratic processes and administrative restraint that she maintains are operative within the state’s political and law-order framework. Further, she asserted that the police force in the state has not been filing First Information Reports in connection with the reported post-poll disturbances, implying a failure in the procedural duty imposed upon law-enforcement agencies under prevailing criminal procedure statutes. The statements were made in the context of the petition’s request that the Court examine whether the alleged absence of FIRs constitutes a denial of the victims’ right to an effective remedy and whether the judiciary may exercise supervisory jurisdiction to compel the police to initiate formal investigations. By raising both the political label and the procedural shortfall before the High Court, the former chief minister’s intervening remarks introduce questions concerning the scope of judicial review over executive actions, the statutory obligations of police to register complaints, and the appropriateness of employing a public-interest litigation as a vehicle for redressing alleged systemic lapses in law-enforcement response. Consequently, the High Court’s forthcoming deliberations will likely need to balance the principles of federalism, the autonomy of state administrative machinery, and the constitutional guarantee of equality before law while determining the appropriate remedial directions, if any, that may be issued against the alleged non-registration of FIRs.

One question is whether the High Court, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may issue a writ of mandamus directing the police to register First Information Reports when a petitioner alleges that the police have neglected that statutory duty. The legal foundation for such a direction rests on Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which imposes an obligation on any officer receiving information about cognizable offences to record an FIR without delay. However, the Court may also weigh the principle that law-enforcement agencies possess discretion in the investigative stage, and any directive must be confined to ensuring compliance with the procedural prescription rather than prescribing investigative strategy.

Perhaps the more important legal issue is whether the alleged non-registration of FIRs amounts to a violation of the victims’ right to a fair and effective remedy guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to include access to a criminal justice process. The Court may consider whether the procedural breach, if proven, creates a substantive impediment to the victims’ ability to seek redress, thereby invoking the doctrine of state liability for failure to perform a statutory duty. If the High Court finds that such a failure persists, it could order a supervisory direction compelling the police to open investigations, subject to the safeguards provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Another possible view is that by invoking the term ‘bulldozer state’, the petitioner is challenging the propriety of executive action that may be perceived as heavy-handed or arbitrary, raising a constitutional question about the limits of state power under the doctrine of proportionality and the requirement of reasoned decision-making articulated in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on administrative law. The Court could examine whether any alleged use of excessive force or coercive measures, even if not explicitly detailed in the petition, falls within the ambit of unlawful state action that infringes the equality clause of Article 14 or the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. Such an inquiry would necessarily involve a balancing of the state’s interest in maintaining public order against the individual’s constitutional safeguards, and may result in directives that restrain the deployment of indiscriminate enforcement tactics.

Perhaps the procedural significance lies in the fact that a former chief minister has intervened in the petition, either as a respondent or an amicus, which raises the question of locus standi in a public-interest litigation and whether personal or political interests suffice to establish standing in matters concerning alleged systemic failures of state institutions. The High Court may apply the well-settled principle that a petitioner must demonstrate a direct interest or a genuine concern for the public at large, and the presence of a former political leader does not automatically confer a broader right to defend the reputation of the government. Nonetheless, the Court might consider the intervenor’s intimate knowledge of administrative processes as a factor that could enhance the petition’s credibility and potentially influence the scope of any remedial order.

A fuller legal conclusion would require clarification on whether any specific complaints have been formally recorded by the police, whether internal logs indicate a systematic refusal to register FIRs, and whether the petitioner has exhausted alternative avenues such as approaching the state police complaints authority before resorting to judicial intervention; nevertheless, even in the absence of such detailed records, the High Court possesses the authority under Article 226 to issue interim directions aimed at preventing a denial of justice, provided that the claim is made in good faith and the relief sought is proportionate to the alleged breach.