How the US-Iran Draft Memorandum May Test Treaty-Making, Ratification and Sanctions Law

Mediators are presently facilitating a fresh round of negotiations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning a draft memorandum that is intended to bring an end to the ongoing armed confrontation between the two nations, and the draft document reportedly contains provisions for a multi-billion-dollar reconstruction package designed to revitalize Iran’s war-torn economy, thereby linking the cessation of hostilities to substantial economic assistance. In addition, the memorandum proposes a temporary non-aggression arrangement under which both parties would refrain from offensive military operations for a defined period, creating a provisional security corridor in the region. The draft further stipulates that negotiations concerning Iran’s nuclear programme would be postponed to a later phase, indicating a strategic sequencing of diplomatic priorities that separates conventional conflict resolution from nuclear non-proliferation discussions. All of these elements are being discussed within the broader context of regional stability, international trade routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, and the desire of external powers to secure a durable peace settlement that could open the way for extensive foreign investment. The involvement of unnamed mediators reflects an attempt to provide neutral channels for dialogue, aiming to bridge the considerable mistrust that has historically impeded direct communication between the two governments. While the precise financial scale of the reconstruction effort is described only in broad terms as multi-billion, the statement that the package could reach a figure of $300 billion underscores the magnitude of the economic incentive offered to facilitate a cessation of hostilities. The combined components of economic reconstruction, a temporary non-aggression pact, and deferred nuclear negotiations together form a complex diplomatic blueprint that, if enacted, would raise numerous questions regarding its legal status under international treaty law, the domestic ratification processes of the United States and Iran, and the compatibility of the proposed measures with existing sanctions regimes.

One question is whether the draft memorandum, as described, attains the legal status of a treaty under international law, given the absence of explicit language indicating an intention to create binding obligations, because the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, and the determination of treaty status hinges on the parties’ apparent intent, the specificity of obligations, and the presence of provisions concerning enforcement and dispute settlement.

Another important legal issue is whether the United States, under its constitutional framework, would be required to obtain Senate advice and consent before the memorandum could acquire binding force, since the Constitution vests the power to conclude treaties in the President but mandates that any treaty become effective only after ratification by a two-thirds majority of the Senate, and this procedural requirement may shape the domestic legal viability of the economic reconstruction commitments embedded in the draft.

A further question concerns the procedural requirements within the Islamic Republic of Iran for approving an international agreement of this magnitude, especially with respect to parliamentary oversight and the role of the Supreme Leader in foreign policy decisions, because Iranian law provides that international treaties must be ratified by the Majlis and, depending on the subject matter, may also require endorsement by the Guardian Council, thereby raising potential legal hurdles to the implementation of the temporary non-aggression arrangement and the deferred nuclear negotiations.

Perhaps the most immediate practical legal obstacle is the compatibility of the proposed multi-billion reconstruction package with existing United Nations and unilateral sanctions regimes, and whether any waiver or licensing would be required from the United States Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, because sanctions law typically prohibits the transfer of designated goods and services to sanctioned entities, and any large-scale investment in Iran would likely need a specific exemption or a comprehensive amendment to the sanctions framework to avoid violation of domestic and international prohibition regimes.

A further legal concern is the enforceability of the temporary non-aggression arrangement, including the mechanisms for monitoring compliance, the potential for invoking dispute-settlement procedures under customary international law, and the consequences of a breach for the parties’ obligations, because non-aggression pacts generally lack a dedicated enforcement body, yet breaches may give rise to claims before an international tribunal or may trigger reparations under the principle of state responsibility, thereby creating a nuanced legal landscape for assessing compliance.

Finally, the deferral of nuclear talks raises questions about whether the sequencing of issues may affect the overall legality of the agreement, and whether future negotiations could be constrained by the earlier commitments made in the draft memorandum, because the principle of pacta sunt servanda obliges parties to honor existing obligations, and any later alteration of the nuclear negotiation framework could be scrutinised for consistency with the prior economic and security commitments, potentially influencing both domestic legal review and international legal accountability.