How the UAE’s Call for a Gulf Joint Military Response Raises Complex Questions of Collective Self-Defence, Regional Treaty Obligations, and International Law

In the wake of a series of attacks attributed to Tehran, the United Arab Emirates formally appealed to the member states of the Gulf region for a coordinated military response, indicating its perception that a collective defence posture was necessary to counter the perceived threat. The United Arab Emirates’ overture was met with an unequivocal refusal by both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Qatar, each articulating a stance that the proposed campaign did not constitute a conflict in which they were willing to become parties, summarised succinctly in the phrase ‘not their war’. The divergence of positions between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, as well as Doha, has reportedly generated palpable tension within the Gulf Cooperation Council framework, straining diplomatic channels and intensifying a sense of frustration within the United Arab Emirates regarding the perceived lack of solidarity among regional partners. Analysts note that the refusal by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to engage in a joint operation may have broader implications for intra-regional security dynamics, potentially reshaping the calculus of collective threat perception and influencing future cooperation on matters of defence and crisis management across the Arabian Peninsula. The situation underscores the delicate balance that Gulf states must navigate between responding to external aggression and maintaining internal cohesion, a balance that is further complicated by differing national interests, strategic calculations, and the overarching imperative to adhere to international legal norms governing the use of force. Consequently, the diplomatic impasse has prompted observers to question whether the Gulf Cooperation Council possesses the requisite institutional mechanisms to enforce collective security commitments when member states diverge on the interpretation of their mutual defence obligations.

One question is whether the United Arab Emirates’ solicitation of a coordinated military response can be framed within the ambit of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which recognizes an inherent right of individual and collective self-defence only when an armed attack against a member state has occurred and subsequent measures are necessary, proportionate, and reported to the Security Council. Perhaps the more important legal issue is whether the refusal by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to join the proposed operation undermines any collective self-defence claim, given that under customary international law the right of collective self-defence is exercised by a group of states acting in concert, and the absence of such concerted participation may preclude the invocation of a collective defence exception to the prohibition on the use of force. Another possible view is that the United Arab Emirates could invoke the Gulf Cooperation Council’s own charter, if any, to argue that its member states have a binding obligation to assist one another in the event of external aggression, thereby transforming the diplomatic refusal into a breach of a regional treaty, though the precise content of such a charter is not disclosed in the available facts.

Perhaps the constitutional concern, in the broader sense of international law, is whether external pressure on Saudi Arabia and Qatar to engage militarily could be viewed as a violation of the principle of non-intervention, which obliges states to refrain from coercive measures that affect the internal or external affairs of another sovereign state, especially when such measures are not sanctioned by a United Nations resolution. The answer may depend on whether the United Arab Emirates’ request was merely a diplomatic invitation or whether it constituted a coercive attempt to bind other states to a specific military course, a distinction that under customary international law can determine the applicability of state responsibility for unlawful interference. A fuller legal conclusion would require clarification on whether any regional security pact imposes affirmative duties on Gulf states to assist one another, and whether the absence of such assistance triggers liability under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, a cornerstone of treaty law.

Perhaps the procedural significance lies in the existence of any dispute-resolution mechanism within the Gulf Cooperation Council framework that could be invoked to adjudicate disagreements over collective defence obligations, because such mechanisms, if present, would provide a quasi-judicial forum for interpreting the scope of mutual assistance clauses and for holding recalcitrant members accountable. The answer may depend on whether the Gulf Cooperation Council’s charter, assuming it contains an enforcement article, permits the imposition of sanctions or other remedial measures against a state that fails to honour a collective security commitment, a question that would likely be examined by the Council’s senior committee or by an arbitral tribunal if the charter provides for such recourse.

A comparative perspective for Indian readers highlights that under India’s own legal framework the right to collective self-defence is recognised through the Constitution’s provision for external affairs and through statutes implementing the United Nations Charter, whereby any Indian decision to join a regional coalition would require parliamentary approval or executive compliance with constitutional safeguards. Thus, while the Gulf states navigate the delicate balance between sovereign discretion and treaty-based obligations, Indian jurisprudence would likely subject any analogous request to a rigorous assessment of constitutional propriety, statutory authority, and the requirement of transparency before committing armed forces abroad.