How the Seven India-UAE Agreements May Test Constitutional Limits on Executive Power, FDI Rules and Defence Procurement Law

During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s brief state visit to the United Arab Emirates, the two governments formalised a suite of seven bilateral accords that together aim to deepen strategic cooperation across multiple sectors. The accords, as publicly disclosed, focus predominantly on enhancing India’s energy security through arrangements for the development of strategic petroleum reserves and a reliable supply of liquefied petroleum gas from the Gulf partner. A parallel component of the partnership comprises a substantial defence collaboration that promises joint exercises, technology transfer and potential co-production of indigenous weapon systems, thereby signalling a deepening of military ties between New Delhi and Abu Dhabi. Additional agreements envisage cooperative development of India’s maritime sector, including joint initiatives in port infrastructure, shipbuilding and naval logistics, which are intended to strengthen the Indian Ocean region’s commercial and security architecture. A further technological dimension was introduced through an agreement to establish a high-performance supercomputer cluster on Indian soil, a move that is projected to boost research capacity in areas ranging from climate modelling to artificial intelligence. The United Arab Emirates also pledged a cumulative investment of five billion United States dollars into a portfolio of Indian projects, a financial commitment that is expected to flow across energy, defence, maritime and technology sectors. Collectively, the seven accords represent a multifaceted expansion of Indo-UAE relations, intertwining energy security, defence cooperation, maritime development and advanced computing, and they set the stage for significant economic and strategic interaction in the years ahead. The public announcement of these agreements underscored both governments’ intent to translate diplomatic goodwill into concrete projects, thereby creating a legal framework that will require adherence to domestic statutes governing foreign investment, defence procurement and strategic resource management.

One question is whether the executive’s unilateral execution of the seven bilateral accords, particularly those affecting defence and strategic resources, complies with the constitutional requirement that certain international agreements receive parliamentary approval under Article 263 of the Indian Constitution. The legal position would turn on whether these pacts are deemed to create obligations that impinge upon the legislative domain, thereby triggering the need for tabling before Parliament and allowing for a subsequent vote on ratification to satisfy the doctrine of separation of powers.

Another possible view concerns the five-billion-dollar investment commitment, where the legal issue may centre on compliance with the Foreign Exchange Management Act and the Foreign Direct Investment policy, which prescribe procedural approvals for inbound capital and sector-specific caps that must be satisfied before any funds can be mobilised. A fuller legal assessment would require clarity on whether the projects covered by the agreement fall within the ‘automatic route’ for foreign investment or whether they demand prior government clearance, and whether any conditions attached to the UAE’s financial pledge comply with the requirement for transparent reporting under the Companies Act and the Securities and Exchange Board of India regulations.

Perhaps the more important legal issue is whether the defence partnership, which envisages joint exercises and technology transfer, adheres to the statutory framework governing defence procurement, notably the Defence Procurement Procedure and the requirement that any joint venture with a foreign entity obtain the approval of the Ministry of Defence and meet the ‘Make in India’ criteria. If the agreements bypass the mandated competitive bidding process or fail to disclose the financial terms, a competing view may argue that affected domestic manufacturers could invoke the principle of natural justice and seek judicial review on the ground of procedural unfairness and violation of statutory duty.

Perhaps the administrative-law issue lies in the strategic petroleum reserves and LPG supply agreements, which may require conformity with the Petroleum Act and the Oil Industry Development Board’s regulations, and any failure to secure the necessary clearances could render the agreements ultra vires and susceptible to challenge in an appropriate forum. A fuller legal conclusion would require clarification on whether the government has issued the requisite licences under the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act for the planned LPG imports and whether the strategic reserve arrangements respect the mandatory public-interest test embedded in the National Energy Policy, which could otherwise invite a writ petition on grounds of procedural infirmity.

The overarching legal perspective may therefore pivot on whether the cumulative effect of the seven accords respects the constitutional separation of powers, statutory compliance regimes and the procedural safeguards enshrined in administrative law, because any deviation could render the agreements vulnerable to judicial scrutiny. A safer legal view would depend upon the government publishing detailed memoranda of understanding, obtaining the necessary legislative and regulatory approvals, and ensuring that all affected stakeholders are accorded a fair hearing, thereby fortifying the accords against potential challenges in the courts.