Assessing Whether Delayed Implementation of Assam Accord Border Provisions Invites Judicial Review of Executive Action

A statement made by Himanta Biswa Sarma asserted that the effective implementation of the border management provisions contained in the 1985 Assam Accord only commenced in the year 2025, marking a significant shift from earlier phases of incomplete execution. He further criticized the historical approach that concentrated border fencing efforts exclusively on the state of Assam, arguing that this selective strategy left adjoining border states such as Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram and West Bengal exposed to unregulated cross‑border movement that facilitated illegal entry and associated challenges. According to the same declaration, recent developments have produced substantial progress in constructing physical barriers along the borders of Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram and West Bengal, thereby addressing the earlier lacunae and expanding the security net beyond the erstwhile focus on Assam alone. This articulation of policy evolution and acknowledgement of prior shortcomings is presented as a factual update on the status of border infrastructure, highlighting both the delayed commencement of comprehensive implementation and the newly achieved extensions of fencing across multiple northeastern states.

One question that naturally arises from the ministerial pronouncement concerns whether the border management provisions embedded in the 1985 Assam Accord constitute a legally enforceable duty upon the Union and State governments, or whether they remain merely political commitments without substantive judicial enforceability; the answer may depend on the nature of the Accord, the presence of any statutory incorporation, and the extent to which courts have historically treated such accords as sources of enforceable rights. A competing view may argue that, given the Accord’s status as a political settlement rather than a statute, the courts are likely to regard it as a non‑justiciable instrument, limiting the scope for direct mandamus relief but still permitting scrutiny of executive action for arbitrariness or abuse of power under the Constitution’s provisions on equality and the right to life. Perhaps the more important legal issue is whether the prolonged delay in implementing fencing across the identified border states creates a violation of the constitutional guarantee that every person has the right to live with dignity and safety, thereby furnishing a ground for a writ petition seeking directions to accelerate fence construction in the interest of public order and security.

Perhaps a court would examine whether the executive’s earlier focus on fencing solely within Assam generated a legitimate expectation among citizens of the adjoining border states that comparable protective measures would be forthcoming within a reasonable timeframe; the legal position would turn on whether the government, by public statements or policy documents, created an enforceable expectation that could be protected under the principle of legitimate expectation, a doctrine derived from administrative law principles that may compel the administration to honour its promises or, at the very least, provide cogent reasons for deviation. The procedural significance lies in the requirement that any departure from a legitimate expectation must be justified by a rational, non‑arbitrary policy shift, and a failure to meet this standard could be construed as a breach of natural justice, potentially warranting the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the authorities to commence or complete fencing works within a specified period. A fuller legal assessment would require clarity on whether any formal notification, gazette order or budgetary allocation explicitly pledged fence construction timelines for Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram and West Bengal, as such documentary evidence would bolster claims of enforceable expectations.

Another possible view is that the delay in fence implementation raises issues of proportionality and reasonableness under the Constitution’s guarantee of equality before the law, because the selective deployment of security infrastructure may be perceived as discriminatory against citizens residing in the less‑protected border states, thereby creating an unequal burden of security risks; the legal analysis would hinge upon whether the state can demonstrate that the differential treatment is objectively justified by legitimate security considerations, a test that courts typically apply when assessing the fairness of administrative actions that affect fundamental rights. The question may also invoke the doctrine of the rule of law, requiring that executive actions, even those derived from political accords, be exercised in a manner that is not arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory, and that the courts retain supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that the executive adheres to constitutional standards while executing policy decisions related to border management. If later facts reveal that the fence construction in the newly mentioned states proceeded under substantially different standards or funding mechanisms, the question may become whether such variations amount to unjustified differentiation warranting judicial intervention.

Perhaps the procedural consequence may depend upon whether affected individuals or state governments choose to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the delay as an administrative action that is ultra vires the duties imposed by the Accord, assuming such duties are deemed to have statutory force; the legal position would turn on the court’s willingness to interpret the Accord as creating a binding obligation that, although not codified, has attained the character of an enforceable public law rule, thereby allowing the court to issue directions to the Union and State authorities. A competing view may be that any claim of enforceability would be dismissed as premature if the government can demonstrate that the fencing project is ongoing, that logistical constraints have contributed to the timeline, and that the policy is being implemented in a manner consistent with the overall objectives of the Accord, thus satisfying the criteria of reasonableness and the absence of arbitrariness. The safer legal view would depend upon whether the petitioners can substantiate that the delay has resulted in concrete harm, such as increased illegal movement, loss of life or property, thereby establishing a cause of action that satisfies the threshold for judicial review of executive inaction.

One further consideration is whether the Union’s responsibility for external affairs and the State’s duty to maintain public order under the Constitution create a shared obligation to secure the international border, implying that both levels of government may be subject to joint scrutiny if the border fencing remains incomplete; the answer may depend upon the allocation of powers between the Centre and the State concerning border management, a question that courts routinely resolve by interpreting the constitutional scheme of distribution of legislative and executive competencies. Perhaps the more important legal issue is whether the failure to complete fencing across all eight border states constitutes a breach of the Union’s duty under Article 245 to exercise its powers for maintaining the integrity of the nation’s frontiers, thereby opening a pathway for a writ of mandamus directing the Centre to allocate necessary resources or issue appropriate regulations to expedite the construction work. The legal analysis would therefore need to assess the interplay between the constitutional allocation of powers, the political nature of the Assam Accord, and the practical implications of delayed border infrastructure on national security and citizens’ fundamental rights.