Assessing Criminal Liability for Coal Use in NCR Brick Kilns Amidst CAQM Prohibition: Evidence, Defences and Enforcement Challenges

Despite a formal prohibition issued by the Central Authority for Quality Management (CAQM) that explicitly bars the use of coal in brick kilns operating within the National Capital Region, investigative observations continue to document the ongoing combustion of coal in a substantial number of these kilns as reported by the Centre for Sustainable Environment (CSE). The kiln proprietors, as reflected in the study, uniformly assert that a fuel mixture comprising twenty to thirty percent coal combined with seventy to eighty percent biomass is indispensable for maintaining the thermal efficiency and structural integrity of brick production, thereby justifying continued reliance on coal notwithstanding the regulatory interdiction. The research further outlines a series of procedural and technological recommendations designed to facilitate adherence to the ban, indicating that systematic changes in fuel procurement, kiln design, and monitoring mechanisms could enable compliance without sacrificing operational viability.

One question is whether the continued combustion of coal in violation of the CAQM prohibition constitutes a criminal offence under the applicable environmental regulatory framework, and if so, what evidentiary standards must the enforcing authority satisfy to secure a conviction. The answer may depend on whether the statutory instrument defining the prohibition expressly categorises non‑compliance as an indictable conduct, thereby requiring the prosecution to establish the factual occurrence of coal burning beyond reasonable doubt through inspection reports, sampling data, or sworn testimonies.

Another crucial issue is the allocation of the burden of proof, specifically whether the onus lies on the enforcement agency to demonstrate that each kiln operator deliberately disregarded the ban, or whether a presumption of culpability arises once coal usage is detected, potentially shifting evidential responsibilities onto the owners to prove adherence to permissible fuel mixes. A fuller legal assessment would require clarification on whether any statutory provision creates a rebuttable presumption of fault, which would compel kiln owners to produce documentary evidence of fuel procurement, blending ratios, and operational logs to negate the inference of intentional violation.

A further question concerns the procedural safeguards accorded to kiln proprietors, including the right to receive a prior notice of alleged non‑compliance, an opportunity to be heard before any punitive action is imposed, and the availability of an accessible appeal mechanism within the administrative hierarchy. The legal significance of these safeguards may hinge on the principle of natural justice, which obliges the authority to provide a fair opportunity to contest the allegations, thereby ensuring that any subsequent penalty or criminal proceeding is not predicated on unchallenged administrative determinations.

Perhaps the more important legal issue is whether owners can invoke a necessity or business continuity defence, asserting that the blended fuel composition is essential for maintaining production efficiency and that alternatives are technologically or economically unviable, thereby seeking mitigation of liability. The viability of such a defence would likely be examined in light of the study’s recommendation of alternative compliance steps, requiring the court to weigh the credibility of the claimed technical indispensability against the availability of feasible substitutes and the proportionality of the regulatory objective.

One might also ask whether the statutory penalty regime associated with the CAQM ban—potentially encompassing fines, seizure of equipment, or imprisonment—satisfies the constitutional test of proportionality, particularly where the environmental harm is balanced against the economic impact on small‑scale brick manufacturers. A competing view may argue that stringent penalties are justified to achieve the broader public interest in air quality improvement, and that any challenge to the severity of the sanction must demonstrate that the punitive measures are grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offence and the offender’s culpability.

Finally, the legal position would turn on whether affected kiln owners may seek judicial review of the enforcement action, contending that the CAQM prohibition or its implementation lacks adequate procedural basis, exceeds statutory authority, or violates constitutional rights to livelihood and due process. The prospects of success in such a review would depend on the court’s assessment of whether the regulatory scheme provides sufficient legislative backing, whether the authority exercised its discretionary powers within the confines of the law, and whether the owners have exhausted all statutory remedies before approaching the judiciary.