Union Of India (Uoi) vs Abdul Jalil And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 5 May, 1964

Coram: M. Hidayatullah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the matter titled Union of India versus Abdul Jalil and others, decided on 5 May 1964, the Supreme Court heard a bench consisting of Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The respondents in the several criminal appeals before this Court had earlier been prosecuted before magistrates in the State of Tripura for offences alleged under section 26(1) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. After being found guilty, they received sentences that combined terms of imprisonment with monetary fines. Their subsequent applications for relief were initially presented to the learned Sessions Judge of Tripura, whose judgments dismissed the appeals. Unhappy with those dismissals, the respondents filed criminal revision petitions before the Judicial Commissioner of Tripura. The Judicial Commissioner, after considering the matters collectively, granted a common judgment that set aside the convictions and ordered the respondents’ acquittal. Dissatisfied with the acquittal orders, the Union of India invoked the special leave jurisdiction of this Court under article 136 of the Constitution and filed appeals against the Commissioner’s orders. While the case involved a total of eleven criminal appeals, it was necessary to note that three of those appeals—identified as Criminal Appeals 40, 41 and 45 of 1962—had become ineffective. In the case of Appeals 40 and 45, the notices intended to inform the respondents of the filing of the appeals could not be delivered because the individuals were reported to have departed for Pakistan, rendering the proceedings unable to continue. Regarding Appeal 41, the records indicated that the accused had died before the appeal could be heard, resulting in the automatic termination of that appeal. Consequently, the Court’s present consideration is limited to the remaining eight appeals that remain before it.

The statutory provision at issue is the material portion of section 26(1) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, which reads in full: “26. (1) Any person who – (a) makes any fresh clearing prohibited by section 5, or who, in a reserved forest – (d) trespasses or pastures cattle, or permits cattle to trespass; (e) ………………… (f) fells, girdles, lops, taps or burns any tree or strips off the bark or leaves from, or otherwise damages, the same; (g) ………………… (h) clears or breaks up any land for cultivation or any other purpose; ……………… shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both, in addition to such compensation for damage done to the forest as the convicting Court may direct to be paid.” The magistrate’s findings recorded that certain respondents were convicted of offences falling under clause (a) and clause (d), while others were found guilty of violations of clause (d) together with clause h. All parties agreed that, to constitute an offence under section 26(1), the prohibited acts must have been carried out in an area that is legally designated as a “reserved forest” within the meaning of the Act. The Court observed that, had it been established that the land where the alleged activities occurred was indeed a reserved forest, the respondents’ culpability would have been essentially established, and the convictions affirmed by both the magistrate and the Sessions Judge of Tripura would have been sustained.

The Court observed that the central issue before it, although not the only one, was to determine whether the tract of forest where the respondents allegedly performed the prohibited acts qualified as a “reserve forest” under the statute. Before addressing that question, the Court found it useful to set out briefly the factual background that gave rise to the prosecutions. The offences alleged to have been committed by the various respondents were said to have occurred in three separate forest areas situated in the former Indian State of Tripura. These three tracts were identified as the Garjichhera reserve, the Chandrapur reserve and the North Sonamura reserve. In April 1958 a Forest Department officer conducted a circuit inspection of these areas and reported that the accused had cleared portions of the forest, reclaimed land, dug tanks for cultivation and erected homesteads on the cleared sites. On the basis of those findings, the prosecution alleged that the accused had committed offences punishable under section 26(1)(a) and (h), and in certain cases also under sections 26(1)(d) and (h), or under sections 26(1)(d), (f) and (h). Accordingly, the accused were brought before the magistrates having jurisdiction over the matters. The accused admitted that they had constructed and were residing in homesteads at the locations where they were discovered, and they advanced the sole defence that they were entitled to occupy the land on the basis of a claim of jote rights. However, none of the accused produced any evidence to substantiate such a claim of jote rights, nor did they demonstrate any lawful title to trespass, plough, cultivate or erect dwellings on the lands in question. The learned magistrates held that the prosecution had proved its case, that the accused had failed to establish the defence, and consequently found the accused guilty and imposed the appropriate sentences. The convicted respondents subsequently filed appeals before the Sessions Judge of Tripura. In those appeals the respondents contended that the forest tracts comprising the Garjichhera, Chandrapur and North Sonamura reserves were not “reserve forests” within the meaning of the Indian Forest Act. To establish that the three reserves were indeed “reserved forests” under the Indian Act, the prosecution relied on two facts. First, it pointed to a Forest Act promulgated by the ruler of the State of Tripura (referred to as Act 2 of 1257 TE 1297 T.E.), which contained provisions broadly analogous to those in the Indian Act. Second, it cited section 5 of the Tripura Act, which empowered the State Government to demarcate the boundaries of forest areas by issuing notifications in the State Gazette. Three such notifications were issued in the Tripura State Gazette in the years 1346 and 1349 T.E., corresponding to the calendar years 1936 and 1938, thereby defining the boundaries of the three forest reserves.

The three notifications that had been published in the Tripura State Gazette defined the boundaries of the Garjichhera, Chandrapur and North Sonamura forest reserves. The prosecution argued that, because the Tripura Forest Act had been superseded by the Indian Forest Act through certain legislative provisions, the notifications issued under the Tripura Act continued to operate and therefore converted those three reserves into “reserved forests” as understood under the Indian Forest Act. Although the Court would later set out the exact wording of the Act and of the notifications, it was sufficient at this stage to note that the lands where the respondents had felled trees and erected their homes were, without dispute, situated within one of the three defined reserves. The respondents identified in Appeals 39, 43, 47 and 49 had entered the Garjichhera reserve without permission; those in Appeals 42, 46 and 48 had entered the Chandrapur reserve; and the respondent in Appeal 44 had been found to have committed a similar intrusion in the North Sonamura reserve. When the three notifications were placed before the learned Sessions Judge, he held that, by virtue of those notifications, the three forest areas had become “reserved forests” under the relevant provisions of the Indian Forest Act. Accordingly, he affirmed the Magistrate’s conviction of the accused and dismissed the appeals filed by the several accused.

Following the Sessions Judge’s decision, revisions were filed before the Judicial Commissioner of Tripura. The same legal issue was again examined: whether, considering the language and provisions of the Tripura Forest Act, the notifications that delineated the boundaries of the three reserves could be regarded as creating “reserve forests” within the meaning of the Indian Forest Act. The learned Judicial Commissioner arrived at a conclusion opposite to that of the Sessions Judge, holding that the notifications did not make the three areas “reserved forests” under the Indian Forest Act and, on that basis, ordered the acquittal of the accused. The correctness of the Judicial Commissioner’s conclusion is the matter that the present appeals challenge. The core question for the Court, therefore, was whether the lands where the alleged offences were committed fell within “reserve forests” as defined by the Indian Forest Act. According to the terminology of that Act, “reserve forests” are those tracts of forest land that have been constituted as “reserve forests” under Chapter II of the Act, which comprises sections 3 to 27 and is titled “Of Reserved Forests”. Section 3 empowers the State Government to declare any forest land or waste land that is owned by the Government, or over which the Government has proprietary rights, or any portion of forest produce to which the Government is entitled, as a “reserved forest” in the manner subsequently prescribed. Section 4 requires that, once the State Government decides to constitute land as a “reserved forest”, it must issue a notification in the Official Gazette specifying the location, limits and other relevant details of that land.

The Court explained that under the Indian Forest Act a land could become a “reserved forest” only after a series of statutory steps were completed. First, the State Government was required by Section 4 to issue a notification in the Official Gazette that described the limits of the land and declared the intention to constitute that land as a reserved forest. Section 6 then mandated that the notification issued under Section 4 be published in several prescribed places so that anyone who might be affected could learn of it and raise objections. Following the publication, Section 7 directed a Forest Settlement Officer to conduct an enquiry into any claims made by persons responding to the publication under Section 6. Section 9 provided that rights of persons who did not make any claim under Section 6 would be deemed extinguished. If claims were made and were found to be valid, Section 11 authorized the acquisition of those rights or of the lands concerned in the manner prescribed by the Land Acquisition Act. The Act further allowed appeals to be filed against the orders and provided for their hearing before appellate authorities. After the enquiry and the settlement of claims, Section 20 required the State Government to issue a second notification in the Official Gazette that precisely specified, by reference to boundary‑marks or other means, the limits of the forest to be reserved and declared the forest to be reserved from a date fixed by that notification. Sub‑section (2) of Section 20 stated: “From the date so fixed such forest shall be deemed to be a reserved forest.” Section 21 then required that the notification be translated and published in every town or village near the forest. Finally, Section 26 prohibited certain acts within a “reserved forest” and prescribed punishments for violations of those prohibitions, the essential provisions of which the Court had already summarized. From these provisions, the Court concluded that only the notification under Section 20, issued after compliance with the procedural requirements of Sections 4 through 11, created a forest area that was legally a “reserved forest” under the Act.

The Court observed that the forests in the former State of Tripura had not been declared “reserved forests” by a notification issued under Section 20 of the Indian Forest Act after observing the procedure prescribed in Chapter II. Consequently, the Court needed to examine how that result had been arrived at. The Court noted the existence of the Tripura Forest Act, enacted by the ruler of Tripura, under which certain provisions were made for the preservation of forest areas in the State and under which three areas had been notified as “reserve forests” for the purpose of that Act. The Court indicated that a detailed examination of those provisions would be necessary, but that such an examination would be deferred until after the Court completed its narrative of the constitutional changes that brought the State of Tripura into the Union of India and the legislation that accompanied those changes.

In order to understand the legal background, the Court examined the legislation that accompanied and accomplished the constitutional changes affecting Tripura. Tripura had formerly been a native State, and its ruler entered into a merger agreement with the Governor‑General of India, thereby merging the State with the Dominion in 1949. Under paragraph 5 of the Tripura Administration Order 1949, issued on 15 October 1949 and made pursuant to the powers conferred by the Extra‑Provincial Jurisdiction Act 1947, every law that was in force in the State of Tripura immediately before the Order came into effect was continued to operate until a competent legislature or authority either repealed or amended it. Subsequently, the Constitution of India became operative on 26 January 1950, and under that Constitution Tripura was designated a Part C State of the Union of India. By virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution, all laws that were in force in the territory of India—including the Tripura Forest Act insofar as it applied to the former territory of Tripura—were deemed to remain in force until they were expressly repealed or amended by competent legislation. The next step was the enactment of the Part C States (Laws) Act 1950 by Parliament. Section 3 of that Act stipulated that the Acts and Ordinances listed in the Schedule to the Merged States (Laws) Act 1949 were to be extended to, and to remain in force in, the State of Tripura just as they had been generally in force in the territories to which they previously applied immediately before the commencement of the Part C States (Laws) Act. Among the enactments listed in the Schedule was the Indian Forest Act 1927, which therefore became applicable to Tripura. Section 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act 1950 provided that any law which, immediately before the Act’s commencement on 15 April 1950, was in force in any of the States that included Tripura and corresponded to an Act extended to that State by the Part C States (Laws) Act, was deemed to be repealed. However, the operation of that repeal was subject to two provisos, and it was the second proviso that required construction for the purpose of these appeals. The second proviso read as follows: “Provided further that, subject to the preceding proviso, anything done or any action taken, including any appointment or delegation made, notification, order, instruction or direction issued, rule, regulation, form, bye‑law or scheme framed, certificate, patent, permit or licence granted or registration effected, under such law shall be deemed to have been done or taken under section 2 or, as the case may be, under the corresponding provision of the Act or Ordinance as now extended to the State by section 3, and shall continue in force accordingly, unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under the said section 2 or, as the case may be, under the said Act or Ordinance.” Finally, the Court stated that the precise issue for consideration in these appeals was whether, as a consequence of the operation of sections 3 and 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, the legal position of the forest areas in Tripura was affected in the manner asserted by the parties.

In interpreting the proviso that had been quoted, the Court examined whether the three forests that had previously been notified under the Tripura Act of 1257 (T.E.) could be regarded as “reserved forests” within Chapter II of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. It was first noted that when the Indian Forest Act was extended to the State of Tripura in 1950 the Government could have created “reserved forests” by following the procedure laid down in Chapter II, a step that was not taken. Instead, the Government appeared to have assumed that the areas notified as “reserved forests” under the Tripura Act automatically qualified as “reserved forests” under the Indian Forest Act. It was further acknowledged that the Tripura Act, which had been continued by the Tripura Administration Order of 1949, ceased to exist after the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950 came into force, because the Indian Forest Act, being the “corresponding law,” was deemed to have repealed the Tripura Forest Act by operation of section 4 of that enactment. Moreover, the provisions of the Tripura Forest Act that had been used to issue the notifications creating those forest areas were, under the proviso to section 4, considered to have been done “under the corresponding provision of the Act as now extended to the State by section 3.” Consequently, the question arose as to which specific provisions of the Indian Forest Act corresponded to those of the Tripura Act, for the purpose of deciding whether the earlier notifications should be treated as having been issued under the Indian legislation. After reviewing the relevant sections of the Tripura Forest Act, the learned Judicial Commissioner concluded that, at most, the appropriate corresponding provision of the Indian Forest Act was the classification of the land as a “protected forest” under Chapter IV, and not as a “reserved forest” under Chapter II. Accordingly, because the offence for which the accused were prosecuted was punishable under section 26, the Commissioner held that the accused could not be found guilty, since there was no legal or effective notification of the area as a “reserved forest” under section 20 of the Indian Forest Act. The Commissioner therefore ordered the acquittal of the accused. The present appeals challenge the correctness of that conclusion. The principal submission of the Attorney‑General, appearing for the Union of India, was that the notifications which had constituted the three forests as “reserved forests” under the repealed Tripura Forest Act II of 1257 (1297?) T.E. must be deemed to have been taken under Chapter II of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, which the Attorney‑General argued was the provision corresponding to the repealed Tripura Act. The validity of this submission is now the subject of detailed consideration.

The Union argued that the notification which declared the three forests as reserved forests under the repealed Tripura Forest Act should be treated as having been made under Chapter II of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, because that chapter was the provision that corresponded to the repealed Tripura legislation. The validity of this contention required examination. Before addressing that principal issue, the Court considered a subsidiary point that might be raised to show that the Tripura notification could not be regarded as a notification under section 20 of the Indian Forest Act. One argument, which had apparently persuaded the learned Judicial Commissioner, was that Chapter II of the Indian Forest Act contains a detailed and mandatory procedure that must be complied with before any land may be declared a “reserved forest” under that Act. The Tripura Forest Act, by contrast, makes no provision for such a procedure before an area is notified as a “reserved forest” or is constituted as one. The argument therefore asserted that, because the procedural requirements of the two statutes were not identical, a notification issued under the repealed Tripura Act could not be treated as a notification under a “corresponding provision” of the Indian Forest Act, the emphasis being on the expression “corresponding provision”. The Court was unable to accept this submission as correct.

The Court then explained the scheme of the Part C States (Laws) Act. Under section 3 of that Act, certain statutes are extended to the Part C States. If, on the date of such extension, the State does not have a law in force that is pari materia and covers the same field as the extended statute, then section 4 does not operate and there is no repeal of any pre‑existing law. In the present case, if that were so, the law then applicable in the native State of Tripura would have continued to operate by virtue of section 5 of the Administration of Tripura (Laws) Order, 1949, promulgated on 15 October 1949, and later by article 372 of the Constitution. Accordingly, to the extent that section 4 of the Part C States (Laws) Act did not bring about a repeal, the Tripura legislation would have remained in force. It is only because the Indian Forest Act, which was extended to the territory by section 3, was deemed a “corresponding law” that the Tripura Forest Act could be considered repealed. For the purpose of effecting repeal under section 4, the sole inquiry is whether any existing law of the State “corresponded” to a law that was extended under section 3. As previously agreed, the Tripura Forest Act corresponded to the Indian Forest Act, 1927; consequently, the Tripura law was deemed to have been repealed.

The Court first examined the consequence of extending the Indian Forest Act to the State of Tripura. Assuming that such extension caused the Tripura Forest Act to be repealed, the next issue was whether a notification issued under the Tripura Act could be regarded as a notification made under “the corresponding provision” of the Indian Forest Act. For this determination the Court held that the preliminary steps or procedural requirements that ordinarily precede a notification were irrelevant; the only question was whether the particular notification could be said to fall under a provision that corresponded to a provision in the extended Indian Forest Act. The Court explained that if the notifications had been issued after complying with the formalities prescribed by the Tripura law and if those notifications remained in force by virtue of the proviso to section 4, then the notifications must be treated as having been validly made under the Indian Forest Act. Applying this test, the Court observed that the absence of any prescribed preliminaries in the Tripura law before a forest could be declared a reserved forest did not defeat the characterization of such a declaration as a notification under the Indian Forest Act of 1927. The Court then turned to the question of whether the notification under the Tripura Act could be considered a notification under Chapter II or section 20 of the Indian Forest Act, since the prosecution’s case depended entirely upon that characterization. To resolve this, the Court said it was necessary to analyze the provisions of the Tripura Act and to compare them with the corresponding provisions of the Indian Forest Act. The Court began its analysis with the Tripura Act itself. The preamble of that Act, after noting that certain classes of trees had been regarded as protected from time immemorial, declared that it was expedient to consolidate the law so as to bring order to the supervision of protected trees and to place the law on a sound footing. This, the Court observed, indicated that the Act was intended to protect particular species of trees rather than to reserve an entire area of forest for the protection of all trees within it. The Court noted that a later reference would be made to Chapter IV of the Indian Forest Act, titled “Of Protected Forests,” which likewise aims to protect specific trees within designated areas. Returning to the Tripura Act, the Court highlighted section 3, which provides for the repeal of earlier laws and saves only those rules or customs that are not inconsistent with the new Act. The Court identified section 4 as a key provision, under which seven classes of trees are specified as being deemed protected throughout the independent State of Tripura. Finally, the Court described the structure of the Tripura Act, noting that it is divided into seven chapters, the first of which is headed “Of protection of Rakshita Bana,” a term that has been translated as “Protected Forests.”

Section 5 of the Tripura Act provides that the boundaries of a “Rakshita Bana” shall be determined and that notice of those boundaries shall be displayed in every police station, government office, market, port and any other public place within the independent State. Section 6 then prohibits any person from engaging in “Jhum” cultivation, also known as shifting cultivation, within a radius of half a mile from a Rakshita Bana. Sections 9, 10 and 11 enumerate the activities that are forbidden in the notified forest areas. They state respectively that no person shall set fire to hills in a manner that could harm a Rakshita Bana; no person shall enter a Rakshita Bana while carrying fire; and no person shall enter a Rakshita Bana bearing an axe or any other weapon that could be used for cutting trees without first obtaining permission. Chapter II, which begins with section 12, is titled “Of Gradual Development of Rakshita Banas.” The provisions in sections 12 through 17 address the cultivation and management of protected trees. Section 12 directs that each year protected species such as sal and other valuable trees shall be cultivated either by sowing seeds or by any other suitable method. Section 13 requires that suitable sites be selected at regular intervals, after obtaining the necessary sanctions, to implement the measures of section 12. Section 14 permits the removal of any tree in a Rakshita Bana that is not listed in section 4 if that tree is deemed detrimental to the growth of the protected species. Section 15 mandates that whenever an old tree specified in section 4 is felled, a new tree must be planted in its place. Section 16 bars any person from cutting any tree within the reserved forest in any manner that might cause damage to the block. Finally, section 17 allows for the selective cutting of densely growing trees of a specific type mentioned in section 4, when such dense growth interferes with the general development of the forest, provided the cutting is carried out out of necessity.

Chapter III is headed “Of Penalties,” and it contains the punitive provisions for violations of the Act. Section 18 makes it an offence to kindle fire in a forest, punishable by imprisonment. Section 19, which received particular emphasis, provides that any person who felled a tree within the limits of a Rakshita Bana shall be liable to rigorous imprisonment for up to three months, a fine of up to Rs. 500, or both. Section 20 further stipulates that any person who cuts a tree specified in section 4 outside the limits of a reserved forest shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for up to two months, a fine of up to Rs. 200, or both. These penal provisions are intended to safeguard the protected trees enumerated in the earlier sections of the Act.

In this matter the Court observed that section 20 makes it an offence to cut any of the protected trees enumerated in section 4 even when such cutting occurs outside the area that has been declared a forest under section 5. The sole distinction, the Court noted, is that if the cutting takes place inside the notified forest boundaries the penalty imposed is more severe. The Court further explained that the remaining chapters of the Act deal with the duties and conduct of officials, and that those chapters are of little relevance to the issues raised in the present appeals. From the summary of the statutory provisions, the Court concluded that the purpose of the Tripura Act is essentially to protect the seven specific species of trees listed in section 4. The notification made under section 5 is intended to define the zones in which those particular trees are to receive protection. The penal clauses that were enacted are meant to give effect to that protective objective. The Court recognized that section 16 imposes a prohibition on cutting any tree in a forest where such cutting would cause damage to any block, and that section 19 prescribes punishment for cutting any tree within a forest area. However, the Court stated that, when read together with the other provisions of the Act and with the overall purpose of the legislation, these penal measures were primarily and essentially designed to ensure the effective safeguarding of the trees specified in section 4.

Turning to the question of whether Chapter II of the Indian Forest Act can be regarded as corresponding to the Tripura Act, the Court examined whether the notification made under section 5 of the Tripura Act could be treated as a notification under Chapter II or as an application of section 20 of the Indian Forest Act. After outlining the various provisions of Chapter II and their objectives, the Court observed that the chief aim of that Chapter is the creation of reserved forests. In such reserved forests, all private rights within the reserved area are extinguished by acquisition and compensation, the entire area is devoted to silviculture, and every tree is protected from injury under the penal provision of section 26. In other words, the reservation contemplated by Chapter II concerns the forest area as a whole rather than the protection of particular species or specific trees. The Court then addressed a submission that tried to infer a broader meaning from the wording of the notification under section 5 of the Tripura Act, which delineates the boundaries of several forests. The Court noted that the three notifications issued were substantially identical in form and therefore it is sufficient to reproduce the one that sets out the boundaries of the Garjichhera reserve. The relevant conditions of that notification were then recorded for further consideration.

The notification specified that jhum cultivation would not be allowed in the forest area. It further provided that the land which had previously been settled within the forest would continue to be regarded as validly settled, and that plough cultivation could be carried out on that settled portion. The notification declared that any fallow Taluka land lying inside the notified boundaries would be treated as lying outside the reserve. Until any further order, the notice prohibited the cutting of every kind of tree within the reserve, although it allowed the cutting and export of unclassified forest products. Except for the settled portion, the notice barred the grazing of all animals elsewhere in the reserve, and it also prohibited any form of hunting within the reserve. The Court observed that particular emphasis was placed on condition number five, which forbade all tree cutting. The Court noted that this condition was essentially a verbatim reproduction of section sixteen of the Tripura Act and that it did not extend beyond the operation of that statutory provision. Consequently, the Court could not accept the argument that the clause transformed the notified area into a reserved forest of the same character as those created under Chapter II of the Indian Forest Act. The Court reasoned that, because the notification was issued under the Tripura Act, it should be interpreted in light of the tree‑cutting prohibition contained in that Act, and it reiterated its earlier finding that section sixteen of the Act was intended to protect the trees listed in section four. Apart from that, the Court pointed out that clause five nevertheless permitted the cutting of certain forest produce, a category that the government apparently considered would not interfere with the purpose of protecting the specified trees. The Court noted that the other two notifications did not allow the cutting of bamboo and similar material without a government permit, but it held that this distinction did not affect the overall analysis. Turning to Chapter IV of the Indian Forest Act, the Court explained that the correspondence between the Tripura Act and the provisions of Chapter IV became clear. Section 30 of Chapter II, which corresponds to section four of the Tripura Act, authorises the State Government, by means of a Gazette notification, to (a) declare any tree or class of trees in a protected forest as reserved from a date fixed in the notification; (b) declare that any portion of such forest specified in the notification shall be closed for a term not exceeding thirty years, with the rights of private persons over that portion suspended during the closure, provided that the remainder of the forest remains sufficient and conveniently located for the exercise of the suspended rights; or (c) prohibit, from a specified date, the quarrying of stone, the burning of lime or charcoal, the collection or processing, or the removal of any forest‑produce in any such forest and

In this case the Court explained that Section 31 required the Government to publish a notification under Section 30 together with any regulations made under Section 32 for protected forests, meaning areas in which particular trees received special protection. Section 33 then prescribed penalties for any person who violated a notification issued under Section 30 or any rule made under Section 32. The provision listed several specific offences: (a) the felling, girdling, lopping, tapping or burning of any tree that had been reserved under Section 30, or the removal of bark, leaves or any other damage to such a tree; (b) the quarrying of stone, burning of lime or charcoal, or the collection, processing or removal of any forest‑produce in contravention of a prohibition under Section 30; (c) the breaking up or clearing of any land in a protected forest for cultivation or any other purpose, contrary to a prohibition under Section 30; (d) the setting of fire in the forest or kindling a fire without taking reasonable precautions to prevent its spread to any tree reserved under Section 30, whether the tree was standing, fallen or felled, or to any closed portion of the forest; (e) the failure to extinguish a fire that the offender had kindled while in the vicinity of any such tree or closed portion; (f) the felling of any tree or the dragging of timber in a manner that caused damage to a tree reserved under Section 30; (g) permitting cattle to damage any such tree; and (h) the infringement of any rule made under Section 32. Any person committing any of these offences could be punished with imprisonment of up to six months, a fine of up to five hundred rupees, or both. The Court further observed that Chapter IV of the Indian Forest Act was designed to protect particular trees and to set apart specific areas as protected forests so that the growth and maintenance of those trees could be ensured. The purpose of the reservation provisions in Chapter IV was therefore judged to be essentially the same as the purpose sought by the Tripura Act. The Court noted a distinction: the Tripura Act made it an offence to cut protected trees even outside a forest, a provision that did not exist in the Indian Forest Act. Consequently, any provision that corresponded to the repealed Tripura Forest Act would be found in Chapter IV, not in Chapter II. Because the prosecutions were based on offences under Section 26, the Court agreed with the Judicial Commissioner that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate that the accused had committed an offence under the appropriate provision, since the three forests involved had not been notified as reserved forests under a provision corresponding to Chapter II.

The Court held that the Judicial Commissioner was correct in determining that the provision of the Indian Forest Act which corresponded to the Tripura Forest Act, under which the boundaries of the three forests had been fixed, was the provision relating to a “protected forest” in Chapter IV rather than the provision concerning a “reserved forest” in Section 20 of Chapter II. Consequently, the order that had acquitted all of the respondents was affirmed as proper, and the appeals were dismissed. The Court further observed that, given its view of the principal issue, it was unnecessary to examine any other legal defences that might have been available to the accused. It noted that the accused had been found guilty of offences punishable under Section 26(1)(a), (d) and (h). Regarding the offence under clause (a), the Attorney‑General conceded that a necessary condition for liability was the existence of a notification under Section 4, because Section 5, which is referred to in Section 26(1)(a), provides that after a notification is issued, no right may be acquired over the notified land except by succession, grant, or a written contract made on behalf of the Government, and that no fresh clearing may be carried out except in accordance with rules made by the State Government. In the absence of such a notification, the Court concluded that the accused could not be held guilty of violating Section 26(1)(a).

The Court then turned to the offences under clauses (d) and (h). It explained that the issues to be considered would have been whether, if those provisions were not offences under Tripura law, the accused could still be prosecuted on the basis of (i) the extension of the Indian Forest Act to the State of Tripura, and (ii) the notification issued under the Tripura law being deemed to be a notification under the corresponding provision of the Indian Act. The Court found it unnecessary to examine these questions because it had already concluded that the notification made under Section 5 of the Tripura Act created the area in question only as a protected forest under Chapter IV of the Indian Forest Act, and not as a “reserved forest” under Section 20 of Chapter II. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed. The appellant, who had undertaken to pay the respondents’ costs upon admission of the appeals, was directed to fulfil that undertaking. One hearing fee was also ordered, and the appeals were dismissed.