Tansukh Rai Jain vs Nilratan Prasad Shaw And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 538 of 1964

Decision Date: 4 November 1964

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, J.R. Mudholkar

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India considered an appeal filed by Tansauk Rai Jain against Nilratan Prasad Shaw and others, the judgment being delivered on the fourth day of November 1964. The opinion was authored by Justice Raghubar Dayal and was pronounced by a bench consisting of Justices Raghubar Dayal, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah and J. R. Mudholkar. The citation for the decision appears as 1966 AIR 1780 and 1965 SCR (2) 6, and it is also reported in the Supreme Court Reporter as 1978 SC 215 (30). The constitutional provision at issue was Article 254(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India, together with the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, specifically section 64A, and the question was whether the Bihar amendment, section 64A of the Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act of 194‑9 (Bihar Act 27 of 1950), was rendered void or impliedly repealed by the central provision.

The headnote explains that the Bihar State Legislature, by enacting Act 27 of 1950, inserted a section 64A into the Motor Vehicles Act, granting the State Government the authority to revise orders issued by any authority or officer in proceedings under Chapter IV of the Act. Later, by Act 100 of 1956, Parliament introduced another section 64A into the central legislation, providing that revisions would lie to the State Transport Authority from the non‑appealable orders of the Regional Transport Authority. Respondent No 1, who was the appellant in the original writ petition, challenged an order of the State Government made under the Bihar provision, which had granted a stage‑carriage permit to the petitioner and set aside an earlier decision of the Appellate Authority in favour of Respondent No 1. The High Court held that the Bihar provision did not apply to stage‑carriage permits for inter‑State routes, and therefore it found the State Government’s order to be invalid.

The petitioner then obtained a certificate and appealed to this Court. Before the appeal was heard, this Court already decided another case in which it held that there was nothing in the Bihar provision to exclude its application to inter‑State stage‑carriage permits, thereby reversing the High Court’s earlier view on that point. Consequently, Respondent No 1 was allowed to raise a fresh ground of challenge, arguing that the central section 64A, by virtue of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution, had either rendered the Bihar provision void or had impliedly repealed it. The argument advanced was that the central provision was exhaustive, covered the same subject matter as the Bihar provision, and that the two provisions were directly repugnant.

The Court held that the central section 64A could not be described as exhaustive. While the central provision provided for revision by the State Transport Authority of the non‑appealable orders of the Regional Transport Authority, it did not confer finality on those orders and left room for the Bihar Legislature to introduce further remedial measures. Moreover, the scope of the central provision could be varied by the State Government, which possessed powers under section 68 to determine which orders of the Regional Transport Authority would be appealable. The Court further observed that it could not be said that the central and Bihar provisions covered the same field. The central provision dealt solely with revisions against the orders of the Regional Transport Authority, whereas the Bihar provision had a much broader operation, giving the State Government power to revise orders of any authority or officer in proceedings under Chapter IV, including those of the State Transport Authority and the Appellate Authority. The language of the Bihar provision was very general; when read literally, it conflicted with both section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the central section 64A, as it could encompass cases that were open to appeal under the former and to revision under the latter. To the extent of this conflict, the Bihar provision was held to be void, but the Court noted that the provision, as a whole, was not entirely displaced.

The analysis observed that the scope of the Central provision could be expanded or reduced by the State Government because the State possessed authority under section 68 to decide which orders of the Regional Transport Authority were subject to appeal, as noted in the record citations. The Court further stated that it could not be said that the Central provision and the Bihar provision covered the same field. The Central provision dealt solely with revisions of orders issued by the Regional Transport Authority, whereas the Bihar provision operated much more broadly, granting the State Government power to revise orders of any authority or officer under Chapter IV of the Act. Such orders could include those of the State Transport Authority, the Appellate Authority, and other authorities and officers, as reflected in the cited excerpts. The Court then examined the language of the Bihar provision, describing it as very general. When read literally, the Bihar provision appeared to conflict with both section 64 and the Central provision because it could encompass cases that were open to appeal under section 64 and also to revision under the Central provision. To the extent of this conflict, the Bihar provision was held to be void. However, the Court clarified that the provision as a whole was not void nor had it been repealed by the Central provision; its effect was limited only to the extent that revisions against orders of the Regional Transport Authority that were not appealable must be taken to the State Transport Authority. The Court relied upon the authorities cited in Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the decision in S. K. Pasari v. Abdul Ghafoor, and the case of Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pandey, as referenced in the record. In the present matter, the State Government of Bihar had revised the order made by the Appellate Authority, and the Court found that the State was competent to do so. Consequently, the High Court was held to have been in error when it concluded otherwise. The judgment proceeded to set out the civil appellate jurisdiction, noting that this was Civil Appeal No. 538 of 1964, arising from the judgment and order dated 25 September 1963 of the Patna High Court in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 1381 of 1962. Counsel for the appellant and counsel for respondent No. 1 were identified, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Raghubar Dayal. The appeal, granted a certificate by the Patna High Court, raised the question of whether section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, as introduced by the Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1949 (Bihar Act XXVII of 1950)—referred to as Bihar section 64A—was inapplicable to proceedings for granting permits for inter‑State routes. The Court noted that this issue had already been decided in S. K. Pasari v. Abdul Ghafoor, where it was held that Bihar section 64A applied to stage‑carriage permits for inter‑State routes. The respondent sought, relying on the observations in Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pandey, permission to challenge the validity of the Bihar provision on the ground that Parliament, by the later Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956, had introduced another central provision that implicitly repealed the Bihar provision.

In this matter, it was observed that the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act of 1956, designated as Act No 100 of 1956, had introduced a new provision termed section 64A into the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, which the Court referred to as the Central section 64A. The implication of this introduction was that the earlier Bihar enactment of section 64A, created by the Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act of 1949, should be considered repealed by necessary implication. The Court also noted a related civil appeal, numbered 306 of 1964, which had been decided on 4 May 1964, and a reported decision from 1963 cited as volume 3 of the Supreme Court Reports, page 523. The factual backdrop involved the appellant, Tansukh Rai Jain, who was one of the original applicants for a stage‑carriage permit covering an inter‑State route between Bihar and Orissa. The State Transport Authority of Bihar initially granted the permit to United Motor Works & Co. Ltd. Dissatisfied, the appellant together with the first respondent, Nilratan Prasad Shaw, challenged this decision before the appellate authority, namely the Deputy Minister of Transport of Bihar, who overturned the original order and awarded the permit to Shaw. Subsequently, invoking Bihar’s section 64A, the appellant filed a revision before the Bihar Government. The Transport Minister, relying on that provision, annulled the appellate authority’s decision and reinstated the permit in favour of Jain. In response, Shaw filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking to quash the Transport Minister’s order and to restore the appellate authority’s grant. The High Court permitted the petition, holding that Bihar’s section 64A did not apply to stage‑carriage permits for inter‑State routes and consequently that the Bihar Government lacked authority to revise the appellate order. The respondent argued that the provisions of Bihar’s section 64A were inconsistent with those of the Central section 64A and therefore void under clause 1 of Article 254 of the Constitution. It was further contended that the Central Act, enacted by Parliament after the Bihar amendment, had effectively repealed Bihar’s section 64A through the power conferred by the proviso to clause 2 of Article 254, rendering any repugnant portion of the state provision invalid. The argument continued that because the Central legislation was later than the state law, the main part of clause 2 of Article 254 would not preserve the Bihar provision even though it had received Presidential assent, as that clause applied only when the central law preceded the state law. Accordingly, the Court indicated that the central issue to resolve was whether Bihar’s section 64A was repugnant to the Central section 64A. The Court recalled the criteria for identifying repugnancy between a state statute and a parliamentary statute, as articulated in Deep Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, namely: (1) a direct conflict between the two provisions; (2) Parliament’s intention to enact an exhaustive code on the subject matter that supplants the state legislation; and (3) whether both statutes occupy the same legislative field.

The test for determining whether a provision of a State law is repugnant to a provision of a law made by Parliament was set out on the basis of three principles. The first principle required an enquiry as to whether there existed a direct conflict between the two provisions. The second principle examined whether Parliament had intended to lay down an exhaustive code on the subject matter, thereby replacing the Act of the State Legislature. The third principle considered whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupied the same field. With these principles in mind, the two relevant provisions were compared, namely Central provision 64A and the corresponding provision 64A in the State of Bihar. Central provision 64A authorised the State Transport Authority, either on its own motion or on an application, to call for the record of any case in which a Regional Transport Authority had made an order and no appeal lay. If the State Transport Authority found that the order was improper or illegal, it could pass such order as it deemed fit. The provision further stipulated that the State Transport Authority could not entertain an application from a person aggrieved by a Regional Transport Authority’s order unless the application was made within thirty days of the order, and that no order could be passed prejudicial to any person without giving that person a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Bihar provision 64A allowed the State Government, on an application made to it, within thirty days of the passing of an order in any proceedings taken under the Chapter, to call for the records of such proceedings and, after examining those records, to pass such order as it thought fit. The words “subordinate to it” that originally appeared in Bihar provision 64A were omitted by the Motor Vehicles (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1953 (Bihar Act 1 of 1954), a change that was not noted when Bihar provision 64A was quoted in the earlier Pasari case.

The next step required an examination of whether any direct conflict existed between Central provision 64A and Bihar provision 64A. Such a conflict could arise, to a certain extent, if Bihar provision 64A were construed literally. The language of Bihar provision 64A was very general and gave the State Government the power to revise any order made in the course of proceedings under Chapter IV and to pass any order it thought appropriate. However, the provision had to be interpreted, wherever possible, so as not to clash with the Central Act. The power of revision vested in the State Government was to be exercised only when the Central Act did not provide any remedy against the orders that were sought to be revised. Certain orders had been made appealable under section 64 of the Act, and consequently the power of revision under the State provision would arise and be exercised only after the appellate remedy under the Central provision had been exhausted. This approach aimed to ensure that the State provision would not operate in a manner that conflicted with the Central legislation, preserving the hierarchy established by the constitutional provision on repugnancy.

In the present case, the Court observed that the revisional power granted under the Bihar provision could not be invoked where the aggrieved party had not first appealed against the order in question. In a similar vein, the Court explained that such power would be available only with respect to orders that are not appealable after the aggrieved individual has already pursued a remedy under the Central provision of section 64A. Accordingly, a person who is dissatisfied with an order cannot rely on the Bihar provision unless he has first sought redress under the Central section 64A. The Court further held that if the wording of Bihar section 64A were capable of covering matters that are already subject to appeal and revision under the Central provisions of section 64 and section 64A, then a direct conflict would arise with the Central Act, rendering Bihar section 64A void to that extent. The respondent argued that Bihar section 64A must be regarded as wholly void because the Central section 64A was intended to provide a comprehensive code dealing with all revisions. It was also submitted that both statutes occupy the same field and therefore the Bihar provision should be impliedly repealed, citing the permissibility of such implication under the proviso to clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution. The Court cautioned that implication of repeal is not to be inferred lightly; Parliament, being aware of the Bihar provision and the constitutional clause, would have expressly stated its intention if it intended to repeal. Moreover, no express statement of repeal appears in the Central provision or any other part of the Act.

The Court further noted that the mere fact that the Central provision deals with revisions of non‑appealable orders of the Regional Transport Authority does not, by itself, demonstrate an intention to repeal the Bihar provision. The language of Bihar section 64A, the Court explained, is exceedingly broad and extends to any order issued by any authority or officer in the course of proceedings under Chapter IV of the Act. The only limitation placed on the State’s revisional power by this provision is that the State may not act suo motu; it may act only when an aggrieved person files an application seeking revision. Such applications may concern orders of the State Transport Authority, the Regional Transport Authority, or any other designated authority or officer. While Central section 46A authorises revisions of orders of the Regional Transport Authority, it does not contemplate revisions of orders of the prescribed authority to which appeals under section 64 may be made. Consequently, Central section 64A can bar the State Government from entertaining revisions of non‑appealable orders of the Regional Transport Authority, but it does not extinguish the operation of Bihar section 64A with respect to other orders. The Court observed that the Act does not provide that an order passed by the State Transport Authority in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would be final.

In considering whether the jurisdiction created by Central section 64A was intended to be final, the Court observed that the statute contains no provision expressly stating that such jurisdiction would be conclusive. The Court explained that if Parliament had inserted such a clause, it could be argued that the intention was to prevent other authority from interfering with a revision order issued by the State Transport Authority. Because the statute lacks any such expression, the Court inferred that Parliament did not intend to bar interference with revision orders. The Court further noted that section 64 does not contain an exhaustive list of all orders that are appealable. Its clause (1) provides that a person aggrieved by any other order may appeal if that order is described as ‘prescribed.’ The term ‘prescribed’ is defined in the legislation as an order that is prescribed by rules made under the Act. Section 68 empowers the State Government to make rules for giving effect to the provisions of Chapter IV, which comprises sections 42 to 68. Sub‑section (2) of that provision enumerates the matters on which rules may be made, and clause (za) specifically mentions ‘any other matter which is to be or may be prescribed.’ Consequently, the State Government has authority to frame rules that designate certain orders as appealable under section 64, thereby removing those orders from the category which otherwise falls within the ambit of Central section 64A.

The Court explained that orders made appealable by State rules would not be open to revision under Central section 64A because that provision authorises revision only against orders that are not appealable. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Parliament could not be said to have intended the provisions of section 64A to be exhaustive. The Court held that Parliament did not intend to repeal the power granted by Bihar section 64A to the State of Bihar to revise orders issued by authorities or officers in proceedings under Chapter IV. The Court further observed that the provisions of Bihar section 64A and Central section 64A can be complied with simultaneously. However, the Court noted an exception when an application is made to the State Government by a person aggrieved by an order of the Regional Transport Authority that is not appealable under section 64. In that limited circumstance, the Court held that the State Government is precluded from exercising its power under Bihar section 64A against the Regional Transport Authority’s order. The Court added that the State Government may later exercise that power after the State Transport Authority has disposed of any revision made to it. The Court therefore stated that a revision, in the first instance, against non‑appealable orders passed under Chapter IV must be directed to the State Transport Authority. The Court explained that this is because Parliament must be understood to have varied the provisions of Bihar section 64A in that respect. As a result, the Court held that Bihar section 64A is neither void nor repealed by Central section 64A. The Court added that its scope is limited only to the extent that revisions against non‑appealable orders of the Regional Transport Authority must be preferred to the State Transport Authority.

In the matter that came before the Court, the State Government of Bihar exercised its authority to revise an order that had previously been issued by the appellate authority. The Court examined whether the State Government possessed the power to make such a revision and determined that it indeed had the competence to do so. By contrast, the learned High Court had taken the position that the State Government lacked authority to revise the appellate order and had consequently set aside that revision. The Court found that view to be mistaken. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal that had been filed by the petitioner, ordered that the costs of the proceedings be awarded against the respondent, and expressly set aside the operative part of the judgment of the High Court. The effect of setting aside the High Court’s order was to revive the order originally issued by the State Government of Bihar, which had granted a permit to the appellant identified as Jain. By restoring that order, the Court ensured that the permit previously granted by the State Government of Bihar to Jain was reinstated and could be relied upon. In sum, the appeal was allowed, the High Court’s order was nullified, and the permit granted by the State Government of Bihar to the appellant Jain was restored.