State of Rajasthan vs Leela Jain

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 245 of 1962

Decision Date: 16 September 1964

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, A.K. Sarkar, R.S. Bachawat

In this matter the Supreme Court of India heard an appeal titled State of Rajasthan versus Leela Jain, which was decided on 16 September 1964. The judgment was authored by Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, and the bench was composed of Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Justice A. K. Sarkar and Justice R. S. Bachawat. The petitioner was the State of Rajasthan and the respondent was Mrs. Leela Jain. The decision was recorded under the citation 1965 AIR 1296 and 1965 SCR (1) 276, with additional citator references to 1968 SC 59, 1973 SC 1034, 1973 SC 1461 and 1985 SC 582. The case concerned the Rajasthan City Municipal Appeals (Regulation) Act of 1950, specifically section 4(1) and its proviso, which dealt with the scope of State Government revisional jurisdiction over municipal matters.

The factual background revealed that Mrs. Leela Jain owned a plot of land in the city of Jaipur and erected certain structures on it. These structures differed from the building plans that had been approved by the Municipal Council. Despite a directive from the President of the Municipal Board to halt any unauthorised construction, Mrs. Jain completed the works and the President subsequently ordered the matter to be compounded by imposing a monetary fine upon her. Because the Jaipur Municipal Act did not provide a specific right of appeal against the President’s order, a neighbour who was adversely affected by the unauthorised constructions approached the State Government. Acting under the proviso to section 4(1) of the Rajasthan City Municipal Appeals (Regulation) Act, 1950, the State Government set aside the President’s order. Mrs. Jain then filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Rajasthan High Court. The High Court held that the President’s order was not liable to be revised by the State Government. Dissatisfied with this finding, the State of Rajasthan appealed to the Supreme Court by way of special leave. The Supreme Court held that the appeal should be allowed. It explained that the primary purpose of the Act was to establish a uniform forum for hearing municipal appeals that were to be decided by an authority other than the municipal body itself, thereby ensuring consistency across the various cities of Rajasthan. Under section 3 of the Act, any appeal that was provided for was to be disposed of by the Commissioner. The Court observed that where no specific appellate mechanism existed, as in the present case, the order of the municipal authority and the order of the Commissioner would become final, subject only to revision by the State Government under the proviso to section 4(1). The Court emphasized that when the language of the statute is clear, it is inappropriate to rely on the preamble or the long title to infer that the Legislature did not intend to allow governmental interference in municipal affairs. To do so would effectively remove the phrase “order passed by a Municipal authority” from the proviso, a phrase that carries ordinary meaning and significance. The Court’s reasoning is recorded at paragraphs 278H, 281E‑H, 282C‑F, 283H and 285B‑D. The judgment affirmed the revisional jurisdiction of the State Government over the municipal order and therefore allowed the appeal.

No. 65 of 1957. Counsel for the appellant were M. M. Tewari, K. K. Jain and R. N. Sachthey. Counsel for respondent No. 1 were S. P. Sinha, V. Kumar and Naunit Lal. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Ayyangar. The appeal presented before the Supreme Court involved a very narrow question concerning the correct construction of the proviso to section 4(1) of the Rajasthan City Municipal Appeals (Regulation) Act, 1950, and the appeal proceeded by virtue of special leave granted by this Court. The factual background of the dispute can be summarised as follows: the respondent, Mrs Leela Jain, owned a plot of land in Jaipur. Under the applicable provisions of the Jaipur Municipal Act, 1943, she was required to submit building plans to the Municipal Council, obtain the Council’s approval, and then construct the building in strict accordance with the approved plans. Mrs Jain did submit her plans and the plans received sanction; however, it was later reported that during the course of construction she made certain variations from the plan that had been approved by the municipal authorities. A neighbour, identified as D. D. Goswami, claimed that these unauthorised variations adversely affected his property. Acting on Goswami’s complaint, the Municipal Council ordered an inquiry, after which a report was filed stating that Mrs Jain had indeed effected variations from the sanctioned plan. The President of the Municipal Board considered the report and, on 19 September 1956, issued an order directing Mrs Jain to cease the unauthorised construction immediately. Despite this order, it was alleged that Mrs Jain continued the work and completed the construction. When the Municipal authorities became aware of this continued work, they invoked section 210 of the Jaipur Municipal Act, 1943, and issued an order for action against her. Section 210 provides that where an owner or occupier is required by the Act to execute any work and fails to do so, the Municipal Board may cause the work to be executed and may recover the cost of such execution from the defaulting person. The record does not clearly specify the exact nature of the work that Mrs Jain was required to carry out and allegedly failed to execute, but it is clear that an order under section 210 was issued on 26 September 1956. Subsequent to that order, Mrs Jain made representations to the President of the Municipal Council, and on 24 October 1956 the President, by order recorded as L2Sup. /64‑5, ordered that the case against her be compounded upon payment of a fine of Rs 101 to the Municipal Council. It is reported that Mrs Jain paid the fine, although the fact of payment appears to be contested and remains a point of controversy.

In this case, Shri D. D. Goswami, who lived next door to the respondent, was dissatisfied with the order that compounded the breach of the building bye‑laws. Although the Jaipur Municipal Act did not provide a mechanism for appealing such a compounding order, Mr Goswami approached the State Government and requested that the order be set aside. The State Government, asserting that it could act under the proviso to section 4 of the Rajasthan City Municipal Appeals (Regulation) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), issued an order nullifying the President’s decision.

The respondent then turned to the Rajasthan High Court, invoking original jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India, and sought a writ of certiorari to quash the State Government’s order. While the respondent advanced several arguments challenging the validity of the State Government’s order, the learned High Court judges limited their consideration to a single issue. They examined whether the President of the Municipal Council’s order, being final and not appealable under the City of Jaipur Municipal Act, could be subjected to the State Government’s revisional power under the proviso to section 4(1) of the Act. Accepting the respondent’s contention that the President’s order was beyond the scope of the State Government’s revisional authority, the High Court granted the writ petition and issued the relief sought by the respondent.

The State, having obtained special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court, now poses an appeal before this Court. To understand the arguments presented concerning the construction of the proviso to section 4 of the Act, it is necessary to examine the principal provisions of the Act itself. The Act is concise, containing only five sections, and its long title states that it was enacted “to provide for and secure uniformity in the forum for Municipal appeals pertaining to the cities of Rajasthan.” The preamble reiterates this purpose, emphasizing the need for a uniform forum for municipal appeals across the various cities of Rajasthan, including the city of Jaipur, which is the focus of the present dispute.

The central objective of the Act, as expressed in both its long title and preamble, is to establish a single, consistent forum for hearing municipal appeals that arise under the diverse municipal statutes operating in different Rajasthan cities. The statute designates the Commissioner as the authority that constitutes this forum. Section 2 of the Act defines “Commissioner” to mean either the Commissioner or an Additional Commissioner of the Division within the local limits where a municipal authority exercises its jurisdiction. Furthermore, section 2(iii) provides a technical definition of “Municipal appeal,” indicating that the term refers to an appeal from an order of a municipal authority that is made under any municipal law and is directed to an officer or authority other than the municipal authority itself.

In this case, the Court explained that a “Municipal appeal” meant an appeal from an order of a Municipal authority that was made under any Municipal law and that was directed to any officer or authority other than a Municipal authority. In other words, the term referred to an appeal that arose under a Municipal law but was to be heard by an outside authority, that is, a designated Government officer. The Court then observed that Sections 3 and 4 of the Act were crucial to the rival constructions advanced by the parties, and therefore the Court set out the provisions in full. Section 3 dealt with “First Municipal appeals.” Sub‑section (1) provided that, notwithstanding anything contained in any Municipal law, whenever such a law allowed a Municipal appeal, that appeal—subject to the time limit prescribed by the law—must be filed before the Commissioner. Sub‑section (2) stipulated that all Municipal appeals that were pending at the commencement of the Act and that were before any officer or authority other than the Commissioner were to be transferred to the Commissioner for disposal. Sub‑section (3) required that, in any Municipal appeal falling under this section, the Commissioner must follow the procedure laid down in the applicable Municipal law, and that the Commissioner’s decision, subject to the provisions of Sections 4 and 5, would be final and conclusive. Sub‑section (4) allowed the Commissioner, by order, to suspend all proceedings to enforce the order that was appealed against, as well as any prosecution for a breach of that order, whenever an appeal under this section was pending at the commencement of the Act or had been preferred thereafter. Section 4 dealt with “Second Municipal appeals and revisions.” Sub‑section (1) declared that, notwithstanding anything contained in any Municipal law, no Municipal appeal could lie from any order passed in appeal under the earlier provision, but it added a proviso that the Government, either on its own motion or on an application by a Municipal authority or any aggrieved person, could call for the record of any case in order to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or expediency of any order passed by a Commissioner or a Municipal authority, and could then pass such orders as it considered fit and reasonable. Sub‑section (2) provided that any Municipal appeals from orders made in appeal by any officer or authority other than a Municipal authority that were pending at the commencement of the Act were to be transferred to the Government and disposed of in accordance with the proviso to sub‑section (1). Sub‑section (3) stated that the provisions of sub‑section (4) of Section 3 would, mutatis mutandis, apply also to appeals and applications under this section. The Court then noted that Section 5 contained only a saving clause, which, although not very relevant to the present dispute, was quoted for completeness. Section 5 declared that nothing in the Act would affect any power other than the power to entertain, hear and determine Municipal appeals that was vested in the Government by any Municipal law. The Court identified that the controversy between the parties turned on the meaning and effect of the expression “or a municipal authority” that appeared in the proviso to Section 4. The Court also mentioned that the expression “a Municipal authority” was defined in Section 2 (iv) of the Act and that it was a matter of common ground that the definition applied to the President of the Municipal Council who had passed the order that was subsequently set aside by the State Government.

According to the definition, the President of the Municipal Council who issued the order that was later set aside by the State Government qualified as a Municipal Authority. Before addressing the submissions made to the Court, it was considered useful to summarise the reasoning employed by the learned Judges when they concluded that the State Government lacked jurisdiction to entertain a revision of the Chairman’s order of the Municipal Council. The learned Judges observed that the order of the Chairman was not made under the provisions of the City of Jaipur Municipal Act that allowed an appeal either to a Municipal authority or to an external party. In their first line of reasoning, the learned Judges examined the long title, the preamble and the operative part of the enactment, except for the specific wording of the proviso. They held that these components indicated that the legislation was not designed to alter the substantive rights of the parties; rather, it was intended solely to create a new forum for hearing and disposing of appeals that already existed under the applicable Municipal enactment. They further noted that, as was admitted, an order issued by the President of the Municipal Council for compounding an offence under a Municipal bye‑law was final under the City of Jaipur Municipal Act and was not subject to any appeal or other form of interference. Consequently, the learned Judges reasoned that the Act could not be intended to give the Government a right to intervene in such orders. This conclusion was derived from a textual construction of the statute. The learned Judges also advanced a second line of reasoning. They observed that the City of Jaipur Municipal Act was enacted to confer upon the inhabitants of the municipal area and their representatives on the Municipal Council the right of local self‑government. To read the Act as permitting the Government to intrude upon that local autonomy, especially where the Municipal Act rendered an order final and immune from challenge, would contradict the basic concept of self‑government. The construction adopted by the learned Judges therefore gave no effect to the words “or other municipal authorities” contained in the proviso. In their view, those words had no meaning and were effectively rejected as inconsistent with the theory of local self‑government. With due respect to the learned Judges, the Court could not agree that it was permissible to omit or delete words from the operative part of a statute when those words possessed ordinary meaning and significance, merely because the Court considered them inconsistent with the statute’s spirit. Unless a word is meaningless or absurd, it is contrary to sound principles of statutory construction to refuse to give effect to a provision on the vague ground that applying its ordinary meaning would produce consequences that do not align with the intended purpose of the legislation.

The Court observed that it was not permissible to disregard or delete words from the operative part of a statute merely because, in the Court’s view, they conflicted with the perceived spirit of the legislation. It held that, unless the words were meaningless or absurd, a sound principle of construction required giving effect to the statutory provisions. This applied even when the ordinary meaning of those words produced results that seemed inconsistent with the Court’s notions of propriety or justice. The Court stated that, of course, if other provisions in the same statute conflicted with certain words, the Court could prefer one provision and reject the other on the basis of repugnancy. It further observed that such a situation of direct conflict between statutory provisions did not arise in the present case. The Court explained that when statutory language was reasonably capable of more than one interpretation, the object and purpose of the statute could guide interpretation. A general overview of the statute’s provisions and the context in which the words occurred might lead a court to adopt either a more liberal or a more strict construction, whichever better aligned with the underlying purpose. The Court then said it could not accept the rejection of words in an enactment merely because they did not fit the context or the purpose derived from the preamble or long title. It clarified that although the preamble could be used to resolve ambiguity or to fix the meaning of words that had multiple meanings, it could not be employed to declare operating provisions redundant or unintended. The Court warned that if this rule of interpretation were applied strictly to assert that the Act intended to provide only a forum for appeals, then the entire proviso would have to be discarded. This would include the portion of the proviso that provided for revisions against the orders of a Commissioner, which extended beyond the long title and preamble that made no reference to revisions. Accordingly, the Court concluded that it was not possible to reject the words “or a municipality authority” by reference to the preamble and the long title in the case of the Act under consideration. Turning to the statutory provisions, the Court noted that under section 3 of the Act, appeals from municipal authorities to outside authorities designated as “municipal appeals” were to be filed before and decided solely by the Commissioner. It observed that any appeals pending before authorities designated by the various municipal enactments were directed to be transferred to the Commissioner for disposition, as provided in section 3(2). The Court then described section 4(1), which reiterated and reinforced the finality of the Commissioner’s orders declared by section 3(3). Section 4(1) used the words “notwithstanding anything contained in any municipal law,” even when a municipal law permitted a second appeal or other proceeding against an order passed by an outside authority in a municipal appeal as defined by section 2(3). However, the Court said that this finality was not absolute, as indicated by section 3(3), because it could be jeopardized by a revision to the State Government, which was effected by the proviso to section 4(1). The Court noted that if the learned Judges of the High Court were correct, the proviso had done nothing more than that. Finally, the Court identified the question for its consideration as whether any effect could be given to the words “the Government may on its own motion or on the application of a municipal authority or of any aggrieved person call for the record of any case …”. The Court further asked whether any effect should be given to those words for the purpose of considering the correctness of any orders passed by a municipal authority.

In this case, the Court examined whether any effect could or should be given to certain words of the statute. The words read: “the Government may on its own motion or on the application of a Municipal authority or of any aggrieved person call for the record of any case …”. The purpose of that power was to consider the correctness … of any orders passed by … a Municipal authority.” Before discussing that issue, the Court found it convenient to set aside the arguments raised by counsel for the respondent. Counsel contended that because the phrase appeared in a proviso, it must be construed differently from how it would be interpreted if it were an independent provision. The Court noted that this line of argument also formed part of the reasoning of the learned Judges of the High Court. Those judges had cited several authorities, including a decision of the Privy Council and another of this Court, where the construction of a proviso had been examined. Those authorities could be summarised briefly. In some of the cited cases, the question that arose was whether the terms of a proviso could be invoked to determine the scope of the principal provision to which the proviso related. The Court observed that this approach and its limitations did not need further elaboration, because it was not the principle under examination in the present matter. Counsel also referred to other decisions in which the issue was whether a proviso was redundant, that is, enacted ex abundanti cautela. The Court recognized that no such principle of redundancy applied to the proviso currently before it.

As for the general principle of construing a proviso, the Court stated that a proviso normally functions to limit the main part of a section and to carve out something that would otherwise be included in the operative part. The Court found that this description did not fit the proviso found in section 4(1) of the Act, because the operative words of the main part of section 4(1) expressly prohibited all appeals from the Commissioner’s appellate orders. The Court concluded that the primary purpose of the present proviso was, instead, to provide a substitute or an alternative remedy for the remedy that the main part of section 4(1) barred. Consequently, there was no need for the proviso to carve out any portion of the area covered by the main part while leaving the remainder untouched. The Court held that the proviso therefore was not a proviso in the accepted sense but an independent legislative provision that supplied an alternative to the prohibition created by the main part of the section. Moreover, the Court found that the proviso was not co‑extensive with the main part of section 4(1) but extended to a wider field than the main provision. If its function…

The Court observed that the respondent’s counsel argued the proviso was intended solely to offer an alternative remedy to a further appeal from the Commissioner’s orders, and therefore the phrase “or other municipal authority” should not be part of the provision. The Court explained that accepting this submission would require reading the proviso as if the words “or other municipal authority” were omitted, a step that could not be justified under any recognized rule of statutory construction because the words have clear meaning and can be given effect without conflicting with any other operative part of the Act. The Court then considered the alternative suggestion put forward by the respondent’s counsel, which proposed that the words “orders passed” be limited to those orders that were appealable under a municipal law. The counsel contended that the legislature’s intention was merely to create a uniform forum for hearing appeals that, under the various municipal statutes of the State’s municipalities, were already subject to appeal, and that it would be inconsistent with that purpose to allow the Government to revise orders that, according to the relevant municipal law, were final and not subject to any appeal. While acknowledging that this argument was plausible, the Court found it unsound on a proper construction of the language used. The Court illustrated that if the counsel’s reading were adopted, the clause would read: “The Government may … call for any record of any case … of any appealable order passed by a Commissioner or by a municipal authority and may pass such orders.” This construction would be impossible because there are no appealable orders of the Commissioner, s. 4(1) expressly prohibiting all appeals. Moreover, the phrase “orders of” is not repeated before “a municipal authority”; hence the word “order” cannot be given one meaning—‘orders declared final by this Act’—when referring to the Commissioner and a different meaning—‘orders subject to appeal under municipal law’—when referring to a municipal authority. The Court further noted that it would be anomalous for s. 3 to provide a forum for appeals that fall under the Municipal Act while simultaneously creating a parallel provision for State Government revision of the same matters without clearer wording. Consequently, the Court held that further examination of this issue was unnecessary.

In this matter, the Court considered the effect of a municipal authority’s order that was not subject to appeal. It observed that such an order occupied the same position with respect to finality as an order issued by the Commissioner, because sections 3(3) and 4(1) of the relevant Act expressly declare those Commissioner orders to be final. Accordingly, the Court found it more reasonable to interpret the phrase “orders of a municipal authority” as encompassing a final order that is not open to a municipal appeal, thereby placing it in the same category as the Commissioner’s appellate orders that the Act declares final. The Court acknowledged that this interpretation could enable the State Government to intervene extensively in municipal affairs and to issue revision orders on matters that, under the applicable municipal law, were deemed final and not appealable. This possibility had attracted the strong attention of the learned Judges of the High Court, and it formed the principal basis of their construction of the proviso. While the Court did not disregard the potential consequences of such an interpretation, it held that these considerations could not override clear statutory language. The Court explained that rejecting the alternative construction did not require omitting the words “or other municipal authorities” or rewriting the section to achieve a preferred outcome; such amendment, it said, was beyond the Court’s jurisdiction in matters of construction and should be left to other branches of Government. Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court had erred in holding that the State Government lacked power to entertain a revision against the order of the President of the Municipal Council and to set aside that order on that ground. The respondent, in a writ petition under Article 226, challenged the State Government’s order not only on the ground of excess jurisdiction but also on several additional grounds. The High Court, after siding with the respondent, had remarked that the Government’s order was without jurisdiction and must be quashed solely on that basis, without addressing the other grounds raised. Counsel for the respondent highlighted this passage and submitted that, should the appeal be allowed on the Court’s construction of the proviso to section 4(1), the matter should be remanded for further consideration of the remaining objections.

The Court concluded that the proceedings must be returned to the High Court so that it can examine each of the additional objections that were raised by the parties. Although counsel for the appellant suggested that the Supreme Court could resolve those remaining points, the Court declined to accept that request. In the Court’s view, the appropriate procedure required the High Court to consider the other objections on their merits, based on the pleadings and applicable law. The Court emphasized that it was not expressing any opinion as to whether any of those issues actually arise or what their merits might be. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the earlier order of the High Court granting the writ petition was set aside. The matter was then remanded to the High Court with directions that it must dispose of the case in accordance with law and in conformity with this judgment. The Court further ordered that the costs incurred by the parties in this Court would follow the result of the appeal and that the High Court would determine the cost allocation in its final order. The Court reiterated that the allowance of the appeal and the remand of the case did not prejudice either side and that the matter would proceed anew before the High Court.