State of Madras vs G. Sundaram

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Appeal (civil) 400 of 1964

Decision Date: 9 October, 1964

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, R. Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar

In this appeal the State of Madras, having obtained a certificate from the Madras High Court, sought to determine whether the High Court, while exercising the jurisdiction granted by Article 226 of the Constitution, could examine the propriety and correctness of a factual finding that had been reached by the Government on the basis of an inquiry conducted by the Tribunal appointed under the Madras Civil Services (Disciplinary Proceedings Tribunal) Rules, 1948. The Tribunal Rules had been framed by the Governor of Madras for the purpose of dealing with complaints against government servants of the State. The central issue before the Supreme Court therefore concerned the scope of the High Court’s power to review the findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunal and accepted by the Government.

The respondent, G. Sundaram, held the position of Inspector of Police in the Madras State on 30 August 1951. On that date he was alleged to have demanded a bribe from a man named Munuswamy Chetty. Munuswamy approached the authorities and agreed to cooperate in a trap that had been arranged in advance. According to the scheme, Munuswamy paid the respondent Rs 750 after nightfall on 4 September 1951, following a pre‑arranged signal that was given to the officers who were conducting the trap. The Government ordered an inquiry to be held, as recorded in Government Order No. 911 (Home) dated 8 March 1952. The Tribunal conducted the inquiry and submitted its report on 17 July 1952. In its report the Tribunal found that two of the charges—specifically charges numbered 1 and 4—were proved and consequently recommended that the respondent be dismissed from service. In explaining the recommendation the Tribunal stated that, without even considering the misconduct alleged under Charge IV, the only punishment that would adequately address the misconduct under Charge I was dismissal from service.

Charge I alleged that the respondent, motivated by corrupt intentions and abusing his position and authority, had threatened Munuswamy with prosecution for perjury, demanded Rs 1,000 from him on 30 August 1951, and ultimately received Rs 750 from him in the early hours of 4 September 1951 at the respondent’s residence in Vaniyambadi. Charge IV comprised seven separate items. The Tribunal found that presents presented by three Sub‑Inspectors had indeed been received personally by the respondent, that presents referred to in three other items had been given but that it could not be proved that the respondent had knowledge of those presents, and that the seventh item was not proved. Subsequently, the Government, by an order dated 25 June 1953, directed that the respondent be compulsorily retired from service rather than dismissed, thereby deviating from the Tribunal’s recommendation of dismissal.

The punitive order was issued by the Tribunal, and the Government passed the final order after it had examined the Tribunal’s findings and recommendations, considered the respondent’s reply to the show‑cause notice, and taken into account the Tribunal’s reaffirmation, when consulted about a possible modification of the punishment, that its original recommendation was the respondent’s dismissal. Subsequently, the respondent filed a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court, challenging the Government’s decision to retire him compulsorily. He raised several grounds, including the claim that the Government lacked authority to impose compulsory retirement under the Madras District Police Act, 1859 (Central Act XXIV of 1859), herein referred to as the Police Act, read with the Madras Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1950, hereinafter the Police Rules, and contended that there was no acceptable evidence to support the Tribunal’s findings that had been accepted by the Government. The learned single judge hearing the petition rejected both of these contentions. He held that the Government possessed the jurisdiction to impose compulsory retirement and that the Tribunal’s findings were based on admissible evidence of the alleged receipt of a bribe by the respondent. The judge could not accept the argument that the record contained no evidence at all to support the factual conclusion reached by the Tribunal. The record did not show that the finding on Charge IV had been challenged before the single judge, and consequently he dismissed the writ petition. The respondent then filed a Letters Patent Appeal, which the High Court allowed. The High Court again rejected the argument that the Government lacked competence to order compulsory retirement, but it concluded that the evidence concerning the respondent’s demand for and receipt of a bribe from Munuswamy was insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had actually demanded and accepted the bribe. The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding the evidence on Charge IV, noting that even if that charge were proved, it would not, by itself, justify the severity of the punishment imposed. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the single judge’s order and directed the issuance of a writ quashing the Government’s order of compulsory retirement. The State of Madras then sought leave to appeal this decision to this Court. The High Court granted a certificate of appeal, holding that the question of whether a High Court, in a petition under article 226, could review the findings of a disciplinary Tribunal and determine the guilt of a government servant on the charges presented, involved a matter of general public importance.

In this matter the Court observed that a High Court exercising jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution does not have the authority to sit as an appellate body and to re‑evaluate the factual findings recorded by a competent Tribunal that has conducted a departmental inquiry in accordance with the law. The only circumstance in which the High Court may intervene is when it is demonstrated that the findings of the Tribunal are not supported by any evidence at all. This principle was expressly affirmed in the decision of State of Orissa v. Murlidhar, reported in 1963 AIR (SC) 404, where the Court explained at page 408 that the question of whether the evidence relied upon by the Tribunal was satisfactory and sufficient to justify its conclusion does not fall within the scope of a writ petition. The Court further observed that although the High Court initially adopted this approach, it later appeared to be persuaded to examine the evidence independently, which the Court declared to be unreasonable and illegitimate. A similar and emphatic view was expressed in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao, 1966 AIR (SC) 1733. At page 1726 the Court stated that the High Court, in proceedings under article 226, is not a Court of appeal over the decision of authorities conducting departmental inquiries against public servants. Its role is confined to determining whether the inquiry was held by a competent authority, whether the prescribed procedure was followed, and whether the rules of natural justice were observed. Where some evidence has been accepted by the authority tasked with the inquiry and that evidence can reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty of the charge, the High Court is not authorized to re‑examine that evidence or to reach an independent finding on its merit. The Court further clarified that the departmental authorities, provided the inquiry is otherwise properly conducted, remain the sole judges of fact, and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence on which they base their findings is not a matter that can be canvassed before the High Court in a writ proceeding under article 226.

The Court therefore concluded that the High Court was not empowered to consider whether the evidence before the Tribunal and the Government was insufficient or unreliable to establish the charge against the respondent. The High Court could only examine whether any evidence existed at all that, if accepted by the Tribunal, would establish the charge. The adequacy of that evidence to sustain the charge is not a question for the High Court when it is exercising its jurisdiction under article 226. This principle was reiterated in Union of India v. H. C. Goel, 1964 AIR (SC) 364. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court erred in re‑appreciating the evidence before the Tribunal and in recording a conclusion that the evidence did not establish the charges against the respondent. This error constitutes the sole ground upon which the Division Bench allowed the Letters Patent Appeal, as all other points raised by the respondent had been rejected.

In this appeal, the Division Bench had allowed the Letters Patent Appeal on the ground that the High Court’s order was justified, while it had rejected all other points that the respondent had raised. The respondent now sought to sustain the High Court’s decision that was under challenge by contending that the findings recorded by the High Court on those other points were erroneous, and therefore the appeal should be dismissed. The Court therefore examined each of those points individually. The respondent argued that he was governed by the Police Act and that an order of compulsory retirement was equivalent to an order of dismissal, which, according to the respondent, could be passed only by one of the officers named in Section 10 of the Police Act and not by the State Government, which he claimed possessed no power to pass such an order. Section 10 of the Police Act provides: “Subject to the provisions of Article 811 of the Constitution and to such rules as the State Government may, from time to time, make under this Act, the Inspector‑General, Deputy Inspector General and District Superintendents of Police may at any time dismiss, suspend or reduce to a lower post, or time scale, or to a lower stage in time scale, any officer of the Subordinate Police whom they shall think remiss or negligent in the discharge of his duty or otherwise unfit for the same and may order the recovery from the pay of any such Police Officer of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by his negligence or breach of orders.” The Court first observed that an order of compulsory retirement does not amount to an order of dismissal and therefore does not fall within the language of that section. The Court further noted that the provisions of Section 10 are subject both to the safeguards of Article 311 of the Constitution and to the rules framed by the State Government under the Police Act. If, in the circumstances of this case, a compulsory retirement were to be treated as a dismissal, the constitutional requirement of Article 311—that the respondent could not be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed him—had been satisfied, because the respondent had been appointed to the Police Service in 1929 by an authority subordinate to the State Government, rendering the State Government competent to dismiss him. The Court then explained that the Police Rules were framed by the State Government in the exercise of the powers conferred by Section 10 of the Police Act and by certain other provisions, including the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Rule 2 of the Police Rules enumerates the various penalties that may be imposed on members of the service and lists “compulsory retirement” in clause (g) as one such penalty. Rule 4 specifies the authority that may impose any of the penalties prescribed in Rule 2 on a member of the service identified in column 1 of the Schedule to the Rules, and states that the authority shall be the one specified in the corresponding entry under columns 2 to 8, or any higher authority.

The Court observed that Rule 4 provides that the authority empowered to impose any of the penalties enumerated in Rule 2 is the authority named in the corresponding entry of columns 2 to 8 of the Schedule, or any authority that is higher in the hierarchy than that specified. According to the Schedule, the authority that may order compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal of an Inspector of Police serving in the districts is the Deputy Inspector‑General of Police. The Court noted that the State Government occupies a position above the Deputy Inspector‑General of Police and that this hierarchy cannot be denied. The respondent, however, contended that the “higher authority” referred to in Rule 4 should be understood as the authority higher in rank under the Police Act, namely the Inspector‑General of Police, and that only the Inspector‑General could exercise the power to order compulsory retirement. The Court rejected this contention, holding that the language of Rule 4 does not limit the higher authority to the rank of Inspector‑General and that the State Government, being superior to the Deputy Inspector‑General, retains the power to issue such an order.

The Court further held that the State Government is authorised to pass the various orders of punishment listed in the Schedule, a conclusion drawn from Rule 5 which delineates the forum for appeal against any order imposing a penalty under Rule 2. Clause (c) of Rule 5 provides that an appeal lies to the Governor when the State Government passes an order imposing a penalty specified in Rule 2. Accordingly, the Court concurred with the High Court that the State Government possessed the competence to order the compulsory retirement of the appellant. The Court also addressed the respondent’s argument that the Government lacked power to refer the case to the Tribunal and act upon its report, asserting that the enquiry should be conducted solely under the Rules. Additionally, the respondent argued that even if a Tribunal enquiry were permissible, the procedure followed by the Tribunal differed from that prescribed by the Rules in a manner prejudicial to the police officer’s interests. The Court indicated that it need not elaborate on these points because it had previously considered substantially identical arguments in Jagannath Prasad Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1962 (1) SCR 151 : 1961 AIR (SC) 1245. In that case, the appellant, a Deputy Superintendent of Police, challenged his dismissal on the grounds that the Governor lacked authority under Section 7 of the Police Act V of 1861 to pass the order, and that the mode of enquiry adopted by the Tribunal was prejudicial when compared with the alternative procedure permitted by the Rules, rendering the Tribunal’s proceedings void under the equal‑protection clause of the Constitution. The Court noted that Section 7 of that Act is practically identical to Section 10 of the Madras Act, and that the rule‑making power under both statutes rests with the State Government.

The Court observed that the authority to make rules under the Police Acts rested with the State Government, and that the regulations issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh were known as the Police Regulations. The Uttar Pradesh Government exercised the powers conferred, among other things, by Section 7 of the Police Act of 1861 to frame the Administrative Tribunal Rules, just as the Governor of Madras exercised the powers conferred by Section 211 of the Government of India Act, 1935, together with all other powers that enabled the Governor to make rules, to frame the Madras Tribunal Rules. Those gubernatorial powers also included the power provided under Section 10 of the Police Act. The Court then referred to the earlier decision in Jagannath Prasad Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported at 1962 (1) SCR 151 and 1961 AIR (SC) 1245, and quoted the judgment at page 159 (page 1250 of AIR), which held that, by virtue of Article 313, the Police Regulations as well as the Tribunal Rules continued to operate after the commencement of the Constitution so long as they were not inconsistent with constitutional provisions. The Court further explained that the authority vested in the Inspector‑General of Police and his subordinates by Section 7 of the Police Act was not exclusive, because it was subject to the Government of India Act, 1935, and to the Constitution, which made the tenure of all provincial civil servants a matter of pleasure of the Governor of the province. Consequently, the contention that the Governor lacked the power to dismiss the appellant and that such power could only be exercised by the Inspector‑General of Police and the officers named in Section 7 of the Police Act was found to be untenable. The Court applied the same reasoning to the present case, concluding that the Tribunal Rules were applicable to the respondent, that the Governor possessed the authority to retire the respondent compulsorily, and that, accordingly, the Governor could refer the investigation of the allegations against the respondent to the Tribunal.

The Court then carefully compared Rule 8 of the Tribunal Rules with Rule 3(b) of the Police Rules and found that the procedural requirements set out in both rules were substantially identical. The Court noted that the police officer against whom proceedings were instituted was supplied with the proper charges, that the enquiry was conducted in his presence, and that the officer was entitled to cross‑examine each witness who gave evidence in person, to call any additional witnesses he deemed necessary, to submit a written statement of defence, and to argue his case orally. The Court held that this procedure, taken as a whole, satisfied the requirements of natural justice and that there was no allegation of any irregularity in the enquiry that could have prejudiced the respondent. The only distinction identified by the Court was that the Tribunal Rules did not contain a provision for an appeal against an order issued by the Government, whereas the Police Rules provided for such an appeal under Rule 5. The Court further observed that if the order in question was one of compulsory retirement issued by the State Government, the appropriate avenue for appeal was to the Governor.

The Court observed that when a compulsory retirement order is issued by the State Government, the appropriate forum for appeal is the Governor of Madras. It further noted that the Tribunal Rules contain no provision expressly stating whether an order issued by the Government, which has the power to impose a penalty after a Tribunal inquiry, is appealable. Consequently, there is no reason to conclude that Rule 5 of the Police Rules, which provides a right of appeal against a Government order, cannot be applied in such circumstances. Rule 5 may therefore operate to permit an appeal against a retirement order that is based on the findings of a Tribunal, just as it would against an order arising from any other authorized inquiry. The statutory scheme does not identify a specific authority tasked with investigating complaints against a police officer under those rules, but it does allow an appeal against any penalty described in Rule 2. That penalty class includes an order made by the Government after it has examined the Tribunal’s report, and the appeal therefore proceeds to the Governor. Thus, the absence of an express limitation in the Tribunal Rules does not defeat the operation of the Police Rules in providing appellate recourse.

The record in this case demonstrated that the respondent filed an appeal to the Governor of Madras seeking reinstatement, and that the Governor dismissed that appeal. Accordingly, the argument that the Tribunal’s inquiry was prejudicial and that the respondent was therefore deprived of a fair hearing lacks any substantive foundation. Because the Tribunal Rules do not bar an appeal against a State Government order, and because the respondent indeed pursued such an appeal, the contention of prejudice cannot succeed. The Court therefore concluded that the High Court erred in setting aside the Government’s order of compulsory retirement on the ground that the Tribunal’s evidence did not prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In light of this error, the appeal was allowed, the judgment of the lower court was set aside, and the Government order dated 25 June 1953 retiring the respondent was reinstated. Furthermore, the Court specified that no costs would be awarded to either party in connection with this decree. The decision thereby restores the original administrative action and confirms the applicability of the Police Rules’ appeal provision to Tribunal‑derived orders.