Som Chand Sanghvi vs Bibhuti Bhusan Chakravarty

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 90 of 1961

Decision Date: 21 January 1964

Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, K. Subbarao

In this case the Court observed that the appellant, Som Chand Sanghvi, had lodged a complaint against the respondent, Bibhuti Bhusan Chakravarty, who held the position of Assistant Commissioner of Police in Calcutta. The complaint alleged that the respondent had committed an offence under section 348 of the Indian Penal Code, described as wrongful confinement for the purpose of extorting a confession or forcing the restoration of property. According to the appellant’s allegations, after being arrested under sections 1208 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, the respondent allegedly refused to grant bail unless the appellant paid a specified sum of money or provided a written acknowledgment that the sum would be paid to the complainant. The Chief Presidency Magistrate subsequently issued a process based on the complaint. On revision, the Calcutta High Court set aside the process, holding that sanction from the State Government under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should have been obtained before proceeding against a public servant. The appellant appealed the High Court’s decision by special leave, contending that the High Court had improperly decided the merits of the case without any material before it, and therefore its judgment could not be sustained.

The Court held that, for the purpose of determining whether section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was applicable, it must restrict its analysis to the specific allegations articulated in the complaint, but this limitation does not preclude the Court from looking beyond the mere form of the allegations to ascertain their substantive content. The Court further held that the sanction of the appropriate authority was indeed required for the prosecution of the respondent under section 197. The question of whether a person charged with an offence should be released on bail lies within the discretionary jurisdiction of the responding officer. If the officer, while exercising that discretion, acts illegally by conditioning bail on the appellant performing an act to which the appellant is not bound, such conduct is attributable to the officer in his official capacity as a public servant. The judgment therefore affirmed that the respondent’s conduct in refusing bail under the stated conditions could not be distinguished from his official duties, and that the High Court’s quashing of the process was erroneous because the requisite sanction had not been obtained.

According to the appellant, a complaint was lodged on July 28 1960 by Manoharlal Seth against the appellant and two other persons, Fatehlal and Jaichand, alleging offences punishable under sections 120B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and also under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint asserted that the three accused had induced Manoharlal Seth to purchase a bar of brass for a price of Rs 6,000 by representing that the article was gold, thereby deceiving him. Following the lodging of the complaint, the police initiated an investigation. The appellant explained that he had become acquainted with Manoharlal Seth through his business dealings. Their relationship was initially friendly, but later significant differences emerged between them. As a result of those differences, Manoharlal Seth allegedly warned the appellant that unless the appellant settled the dispute on Manoharlal’s terms, the respondent, who was a friend of Manoharlal, would be used to create trouble for the appellant. Manoharlal Seth claimed that this motive was the reason he had filed the complaint against the appellant for cheating. It was accepted by both parties that the complaint was false, and it was eventually dismissed by the Presidency Magistrate, 8th Court, Calcutta, on January 2 1961.

The appellant further narrated that on August 3 1960, at approximately six o’clock in the morning, Sub‑Inspector Kundu of the Burrabazar Police Station, together with another Sub‑Inspector, S. Bhattacharya, arrived at the appellant’s residence, conducted a search of the house and arrested him. The appellant asserted that the two officers possessed no warrant for either the search or the arrest. When he inquired about the basis of their action, the officers informed him that they were acting under the orders of the respondent. After being arrested, the appellant was taken to the Burrabazar Police Station at about seven a.m., and subsequently to Jorasanko Police Station, where he was produced before Sub‑Inspector T. K. Talukdar, who was in charge of that station. From there he was moved to several locations in Calcutta, with a rope tied around his waist by Sub‑Inspectors Kundu and Bhattacharya, and was eventually presented at about twelve noon before the respondent in the respondent’s office at Lalbazar. In that office the respondent threatened the appellant, demanding that he settle the dispute with Manoharlal Seth by paying Rs 5,000 or by acknowledging in writing his intention to pay that amount to Manoharlal Seth. Later that afternoon, at approximately three-thirty p.m., the appellant’s brother, Iswarilal, accompanied by a lawyer named Chakravarthy, visited the respondent’s office to seek bail for the appellant, arguing that the alleged offence was bailable. The respondent refused to grant bail, stating that bail would not be released until the sum of Rs 5,000 was paid to Manoharlal Seth. The appellant reported that he remained detained at Lalbazar Police Station until eight p.m., after which he was transferred back to Jorasanko Police Station and confined in the lock‑up for the remainder of the night. On the following day, August 4 1960, the appellant was again produced before the respondent at Lalbazar, where the respondent repeated his earlier threats and, after obtaining the appellant’s fingerprints and taking his photographs, proceeded with further actions.

After his photographs were taken, the appellant was taken to the court of the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate where he was released on bail at about 2‑30 p.m. On August 19 1960 the appellant preferred a complaint before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, invoking sections 348 and 220 of the Indian Penal Code and section 13C of the Calcutta Police Act, 1866. In regard to two of the persons named as accused in that complaint, namely S. I. Kundu and S. I. Talukdar, the magistrate decided to issue process against them under section 220 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 13C of the Calcutta Police Act. With respect to the respondent, the magistrate decided to issue process against him under section 348 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent filed a revision application, and the High Court set aside the process that had been issued against him by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate. The High Court, acting for the respondent, held that before any proceeding could be taken against the respondent, sanction of the State Government under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code ought to have been obtained, and the High Court upheld that contention. Counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court, in quashing the process, had proceeded to decide the merits of the case even though no material had been placed before it for that purpose, and therefore the High Court’s judgment could not stand. It is true that, for the purpose of considering whether section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code applies, the Court must confine itself to the allegations set out in the complaint. However, that requirement does not mean that the Court may ignore the substance of those allegations or be incompetent to ascertain their true nature. The substantive allegation in this case is that the respondent, when the appellant was produced at the respondent’s office in Lalbazar, asked the appellant to restore Rs 5,000 to Manoharlal Seth, who had lodged a cheating complaint against the appellant and two others, and that the respondent declined to release the appellant on bail. The appellant’s grievance, as recorded in his complaint, is that the respondent said bail would not be granted unless the appellant either paid the amount or acknowledged in writing his liability to pay that amount. Assuming that allegation to be true, the matter essentially reduces to the respondent’s refusal to grant bail and his insistence that the appellant settle the dispute with Manoharlal Seth. It cannot be disputed that the decision to grant or refuse bail to a person charged with an offence falls within the discretion of the respondent, and if, while exercising that discretion, the respondent acted illegally by conditioning bail on an act that the appellant was not obliged to perform, the respondent was acting in his capacity as a public servant. Accordingly, sanction of the appropriate authority for the respondent’s prosecution was required under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Counsel for the appellant.

In this case, the petitioner argued that the appellant’s detention inside the respondent’s office was illegal and, as a result, the respondent could not be regarded as having exercised any lawful authority over the appellant. The Court found it difficult to accept the proposition that the detention was illegal because the detention occurred as part of the investigation of the complaint filed by Manoharlal Seth, which led to the appellant’s arrest and his being taken to the respondent for interrogation. The Court noted that it was not contested that an investigation into Manoharlal Seth’s complaint had been ordered, although the parties differed on whether the order had come from the respondent himself or from the Deputy Commissioner of Police. The Court observed that the source of the order was of little relevance to the question of legality. The Court also clarified that the appellant’s counsel, Mr. Ghose, had not argued that the detention was unlawful merely because the initial arrest had been made without a warrant. The Court reminded that a police officer is authorized by law to arrest a person suspected of committing an offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code without obtaining a warrant. On that basis, the Court concluded that the High Court was correctly empowered to set aside the proceeding. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, and the appeal was dismissed.