Shivacharana Singh T.G. and Ors vs State Of Mysore

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Writ Petition (civil) 184-195 of 1963

Decision Date: 13 March 1964

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, J.C. Shah, N.R. Ayyangar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, S.M. Sikri

The Court recorded that the matter entitled Shivacharana Singh T.G. and Others versus State of Mysore had been decided on 13 March 1964 by a bench of the Supreme Court of India consisting of Chief Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Justice J. C. Shah, Justice N. R. Ayyangar and Justice S. M. Sikri. The case was filed as Writ Petition (civil) numbers 184‑195 of 1963, with Shivacharana Singh T.G. and several co‑petitioners challenging the State of Mysore. The petitioners sought relief under article 32 of the Constitution, contending that note 1 to rule 285 of the Mysore Civil Services Rules, 1958 was unconstitutional because it had been framed by the Governor of Mysore under the proviso to article 309 of the Constitution. Although twelve petitions were filed together, the Court noted that the factual circumstances differed among them, but the legal questions were common. Consequently, the Court elected to present the factual matrix of writ petition number 194 of 1963 and to decide that petition on its merits, holding that its decision would govern the remaining petitions in the group. The primary petitioner was born on 17 May 1914 and entered the police service of the former State of Mysore on 28 November 1934. He was promoted to sub‑inspector in 1939 and to police inspector in 1948. On 31 July 1961 the petitioner received a notice from the Government of Mysore stating that, in the public interest, the Government considered it necessary to retire him under note 1 to rule 285, and that his retirement would take effect from 15 November 1961. The petitioner argued that rule 95(a) entitled him to remain in service until attaining the age of fifty‑five, which would have been on 17 May 1969, and therefore the notice amounted to premature retirement. He maintained that the order was invalid because it relied on the contested note 1 to rule 285, which he claimed was constitutionally infirm. After receiving the notice, the petitioner lodged a formal representation with the Government, asserting that the proposed action was unjust and illegal, emphasizing his exemplary service record, and pleading that he should not be forced to retire nearly eight years early. The Government, however, did not accept the representation and, on 14 November 1961, issued a final order terminating the petitioner’s service effective from 15 November 1961.

In this matter, the Court explained that the factual backdrop involved a final order issued on November 14, 1961 which terminated the petitioner’s service effective from November 15, 1961. That order formed the basis of the petition that was before the Court. The Court then turned to the statutory framework governing retirement of government servants. Rule 95(a) of the applicable service rules unequivocally stated that the ordinary superannuation date for a government servant was the day on which the servant reached the age of fifty‑five years. The same rule also empowered the Government to keep a servant in service beyond that superannuation date provided that the servant was physically fit and that the continuation of service was justified on grounds of public interest. When the Government chose to retain a servant beyond the age of fifty‑five, the order had to specify the public‑interest reasons, and the servant could then be kept in service up to the age of sixty years.

The Court further described Rule 285, which dealt with the granting of a retiring pension. Under Rule 285 a retiring pension was payable to a servant who was allowed to retire after completing thirty years of qualifying service, or a shorter period if a special class of servants was so prescribed. The Court noted the content of Note 1 to Rule 285, which provided that, in special circumstances, the Government could require any servant to retire after the servant had completed twenty‑five years of qualifying service or upon attaining the age of fifty years, if such retirement was deemed necessary in the public interest. The note required the competent authority to give the servant a written notice at least three months before the intended retirement date. The note also stipulated that a servant who retired or was retired in this manner would receive a retiring pension not exceeding a specified proportion of the servant’s average emoluments and subject to the maximum limits laid down in Chapter XIX of the rules.

From these provisions, the Court concluded that although the normal retirement age under Rule 95(a) was fifty‑five, Rule 285 gave the Government the authority to compel premature retirement when the public interest demanded it. However, the exercise of that power was limited to servants who had either completed twenty‑five years of qualifying service or had reached the age of fifty. In other words, ordinary superannuation occurred when a servant either turned fifty‑five or completed thirty years of service, whereas premature compulsory retirement could be imposed on a servant who satisfied either of the two earlier conditions. The Court also affirmed that a servant who was compulsorily retired under Note 1 to Rule 285 was entitled to the pension prescribed in that note.

The petitioner, represented by counsel, argued that the rule permitting such premature retirement was unconstitutional because it violated Article 14 and Article 16(1) of the Constitution. The Court stated that this contention could no longer be entertained, as a long series of decisions of this Court had already settled the validity of the rule. The Court mentioned that a recent Special Bench had examined similar issues in the case of Moti Ram Deka v. North‑East Frontier Railway, and that earlier authorities, beginning with Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, had firmly established the law on compulsory premature retirement. Consequently, the Court held that the contention raised by the petitioner was no longer open for consideration.

In the decision of Moti Ram Deka v. North‑East Frontier Railway, Civil Appeals Nos. 711‑714 of 1962 and 837‑839 of 1963, dated 5 December 1963, the Court addressed the issue of compulsory retirement. The Court stated that the question of compulsory retirement had already been settled by several earlier decisions of this Court.

The Court then reviewed the relevant precedents, beginning with Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1954 (2) LLJ 139). It observed that the validity of rules allowing compulsory premature retirement of Government servants was a matter of settled law and did not require reconsideration. The majority judgment in that case allowed for one narrow exception: the Court might need to examine the validity of a compulsory retirement rule if, after fixing an appropriate superannuation age, the rule permitted a permanent servant to be retired at an unusually early stage of his career.

The Court explained that this particular consideration did not arise in the present petition because note 1 to rule 285 stipulated that a Government servant could be subject to compulsory retirement only after completing either twenty‑five years of active service or attaining the age of fifty years. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the point raised by Sri Venkataranga Ayyangar was already decided by earlier judgments and could not be reopened.

Nevertheless, Sri Venkataranga Ayyangar attempted to rely on observations made by the Court in General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari (1962 AIR (SC) 36). That case dealt with the validity of certain railway circulars and required an examination of the scope and effect of various provisions of Article 16 read with Article 14 of the Constitution. The issue of compulsory retirement was not before the Court in that case.

In discussing Article 16(1), the Court observed that a narrow construction of the phrase “matters relating to employment” would produce anomalous results. It further noted that the State could not prescribe different salary scales, leave terms, or superannuation conditions for the same or similar posts. Sri Venkataranga Ayyangar relied on these observations, but the Court found them irrelevant to the present petition because the matter before it did not involve disparate compulsory retirement rules. The impugned note applied uniformly to all Government servants, and therefore the observations from the Rangachari case did not affect the issue under consideration.

In this case, the Court observed that the statutory provision under scrutiny could not be subjected to a challenge on the grounds of Articles 14 or 16(1) of the Constitution. For that reason, the Court concluded that the observations quoted by Sri Venkataranga Ayyangar did not lend any support to his line of argument. The petitioner, through his petition, alleged that the Home Minister Sri Channabasappa had caused the premature termination of his government service and had done so on the basis of mere whims and fancies. The petitioner described the termination order as both arbitrary and illegal, and he further contended that his service record had been entirely free from any blemish, thereby making the Government’s conclusion that his compulsory retirement was required in the public interest untenable. The Court examined the allegations and found them to be vague, unspecific and lacking any concrete factual matrix. Consequently, the Court held that even if the impugned circular or note were deemed valid, the order of retirement could not be successfully challenged on the basis that it was not justified on the merits, or that it was illegal or arbitrary. The Court emphasized that the question of whether the petitioner’s retirement served the public interest is a matter reserved to the State Government, and that the judiciary does not normally intervene unless there is clear proof of bad faith, mala fides or arbitrariness. The Court also noted that the petitioner had not produced any documentary evidence or witness testimony to demonstrate that the decision was driven by personal bias, caprice or extraneous considerations. In the absence of such material, the Court could not hold that the order suffered from the vice of mala fides. Accordingly, the Court dismissed all of the petitions numbered 184 to 195 of 1963 and entered an order that no costs would be awarded to either party.