Shiv Prasad Chunilal Jain vs The State Of Maharashtra

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal Nos. 150 and 185 of 1961

Decision Date: 26 February 1964

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, J. R. Mudholkar

In the matter styled Shiv Prasad Chunilal Jain versus The State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court rendered its judgment on 26 February 1964. The bench comprised Justice Raghubar Dayal and Justice J.R. Mudholkar. The decision was recorded in the law reports with the citations 1965 AIR 264 and 1964 SCR (6) 920. The case concerned the interpretation of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, in the context of whether a person must be physically present at the actual commission of a crime when several persons act in furtherance of a common intention.

During a trial by jury, the appellants were jointly charged with accused No. 1 under Sections 471 and 467 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The first of these charges alleged that, in furtherance of a common intention to cheat the railway administration, accused No. 1 had fraudulently used a forged railway receipt. The second charge was framed in the alternative; it first accused all the defendants under Section 467 read with Section 34 because accused No. 1 had forged the bill portion. In the alternative, accused No. 1 was charged under Section 467 alone, while the appellants were charged under Section 467 read with Section 109 for abetting accused No. 1 in that offence. Charges numbered three through six were similarly framed in the alternative. The jury returned a unanimous verdict finding all the accused guilty of the various offences read with Section 34. However, the jury’s verdict did not record findings on the five alternative charges against accused No. 1 concerning the substantive offences, nor on the appellants with respect to the offences read with Section 109. The Sessions Judge accepted the jury’s verdict and convicted the accused of the offences read with Section 34. Their subsequent appeals to the High Court were dismissed. By way of special leave, the appellants appealed to this Court, principally contending that the Sessions Judge had misdirected the jury on the requirements of Section 34. They urged that the offences were actually committed by accused No. 1, that the appellants were not present when accused No. 1 presented the forged railway receipts, and that although the appellants may have performed other criminal acts and taken delivery of the goods, they could at most be guilty of abetment. Consequently, they argued that Section 34 could not be invoked against them because its provisions were inapplicable to the circumstances of the case. For Section 34 to apply, it is necessary that an accused actually participated in the commission of the crime either by performing an act that forms part of the criminal act or by doing something that indicates participation at the time the crime was committed.

In this case the Court explained that for section 34 of the Indian Penal Code to apply, the accused must have actually taken part in the commission of the offence, either by performing an act that constitutes an essential element of the crime or by doing something that clearly shows participation at the time the crime was being carried out. The Court held that only accused number one performed the various acts that formed the offences for which he was convicted. The appellants, who were accused numbers two and three, did not take part in the actual commission of those acts. Any actions they may have undertaken before the commission of the acts did not constitute an ingredient of the offences committed by accused number one, and therefore they could not be said to have participated in the criminal act that gave rise to the offences. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellants could not be held liable under section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for acts that were solely carried out by accused number one, even if those acts were carried out in furtherance of a common intention shared by the three accused. Accordingly, the convictions of the appellants for the various offences read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code were set aside. The Court referred to the authorities in Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. The King Emperor (1929) L.R. 52 I.A. 40, Shree Kantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State of Bombay [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1177 and Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desi v. State of Bombay [1960] 3 S.C.R. 319. The matter was before the criminal appellate jurisdiction as Criminal Appeals Nos. 150 and 185 of 1961, both filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 19 June 1961 of the former Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 218 and 242 of 1961 respectively. Counsel for the appellants and respondents were instructed, and the judgment was delivered on 26 February 1964 by Justice Raghubar Dayal. Shiv Prasad Chunilal Jain, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1961, was identified as accused number three, while Pyarelal Ishwardas Kapoor, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 185 of 1961, was identified as accused number two; both had been tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, together with a third accused, Rameshwarnath Brijmohan Shukla, who was accused number one at trial. Because the two appeals arose from the same judgment, they were disposed of by a single judgment, referring to the appellants as accused numbers three and two respectively. The factual background leading to the convictions involved a large consignment of iron angles sent in early February 1959 from Gobind Garh to Raypuram under railway receipt number 597481, dispatched in an open wagon bearing E.R. number 69667. The wagon’s labels were altered at Itarsi railway station, and the consignment was diverted to Wadi Bunder under a label indicating that the iron angles had been dispatched from Baran to Wadi Bunder under railway receipt number 43352 dated 6 February 1959.

According to the record, the railway wagon carrying the iron angles reached Wadi Bunder on 16 February 1959. The following day, on 17 February, the wagon was unloaded by the two persons identified as Baburao Gawade (P.W.I) and Shridhar (P.W. 14). On 18 February, the individual designated as accused No. 1 obtained the delivery sheet of the accompanying bill and signed it using the name of Shri Datta. He further presented the forged railway receipt numbered 43352 to the railway authorities, paid the required charges of Rs 1,500, and obtained the physical delivery of the iron angles, signing the Railway Delivery Book also in the name of Shri Datta. After receiving the material, accused No. 1 arranged for its transportation to the godown of the National Transport Company located at Sewri, where the items were stored. The entry in the company’s ledger recorded the receipt of the goods in the account of accused No. 3, and a subsequent entry noted that the goods were to be received in the account of accused No. 2. This latter entry was made on the basis of a chit, identified as Exhibit Z8, which had been supplied by accused No. 1 and instructed that the goods be entered under the name of accused No. 2. On 24 February 1959, accused No. 2 signed an application, marked as Exhibit K, addressed to the head office of the National Transport Company, requesting that the stored goods be delivered. Accused No. 1 subsequently retrieved the iron angles from the company’s godown on two occasions, first on 26 February and again on 3 March 1959.

A complaint lodged by the original consignee, who claimed non‑receipt of the iron angles dispatched from Gobind Garh, prompted an official enquiry that eventually led to the prosecution of the three accused. The prosecution framed six separate charges. The first charge alleged that all three accused, in furtherance of a common intention to deceive the railway administration, had fraudulently or dishonestly used the forged railway receipt No. 43352, thereby violating sections 471 and 467 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The second charge was presented in the alternative; it accused all three of an offence under section 467 read with section 34 for the alleged forgery of the bill portion, while alternatively charging accused No. 1 solely with a breach of section 467 and charging accused Nos. 2 and 3 with abetting that breach under section 467 read with section 109. Charges three through six were similarly framed in the alternative: initially all three accused were charged with certain offences read with section 34, and alternatively accused No. 1 was singled out for a specific offence with the other two accused charged as abettors under section 109. The trial proceeded before the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay, with a jury present. The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict against all three accused for the various offences read with section 34. The jury’s verdict did not address the five alternative charges listed against accused No. 1 for substantive offences nor the alternative charges against accused Nos. 2 and 3 under section 109.

The Court recorded that the trial judge had accepted the jury’s verdict and had convicted accused No. 1 for the substantive offences and accused Nos. 2 and 3 for the offences read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge then affirmed the convictions on the basis of the offences read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Both accused Nos. 2 and 3 appealed to the High Court, but their appeals were dismissed. After obtaining special leave from this Court, the two appellants again filed appeals. The principal ground raised by the appellants was that the learned Sessions Judge had misdirected the jury concerning the requirements of section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellants argued that the substantive offences had been actually committed by accused No. 1 on 18 February, and that neither accused No. 2 nor accused No. 3 had been present when accused No. 1 presented the forged railway receipt, committed the other criminal acts, or received the iron angles. Consequently, even if the two appellants had agreed with accused No. 1 to cheat the railway administration by dishonestly obtaining the iron angles through the forged receipt, they could at most be guilty of abetment of the offences. The appellants maintained that they could not be held guilty under section 34 because its provisions did not apply to their situation. They further contended that for section 34 to apply to an accused, that person must have actually taken part in the commission of the crime, either by performing an act that forms part of the criminal conduct or by doing something that indicates participation in the criminal act at the time it was committed. To support this position, the appellants relied upon the decisions in Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. The King Emperor and Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay. The learned Sessions Judge had instructed the jury as follows: “If you conclude that there was a common intention in the minds of all three accused and that accused No. 1 acted in furtherance of that common intention, then all the accused would be liable for the offences proved against accused No. 1 by virtue of section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, and it would be no defence to say otherwise. Therefore, first consider for yourselves what offences are proved against accused No. 1. Next, ask yourselves whether it is proved—perhaps by circumstantial evidence—that a common intention existed among all three accused and that the acts of accused No. 1 were done in furtherance of that common intention. If your answer is ‘yes’, then all three accused would be guilty of the charges proved against accused No. 1 under section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.” The appellants contended that this direction to the jury was erroneous because it failed to consider that accused Nos. 2 and 3 were not present at the time the substantive offences were committed by accused No. 1.

In this appeal, the court observed that the learned Sessions Judge had erred because he failed to consider that accused numbers two and three were not present at all at the time when the various offences were actually committed by accused number one. The appellants relied on two earlier decisions to support that contention. The first of those authorities, referred to as Shreekantiah’s case (2), involved three persons who had been convicted on several counts under section 409 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for committing criminal breach of trust of certain goods entrusted to them as government servants who were in charge of a stores depot. The case was reported in L.R. 52 I.A. 40 and in the 1955 volume of the Supreme Court Reporter at page 1177. In the facts of that case, the goods had been illegally removed from the depot and handed over to a person who was not authorised to receive them. The prosecution alleged that the accused had conspired to defraud the Government of those properties and that, in furtherance of that conspiracy, they had arranged to sell the goods to the unauthorised recipient. Notably, accused number one in that case was not present when the goods were loaded and was also not present when the goods were allowed to pass out of the depot gates; in other words, he was not present at the moment the offence was committed. Justice Bose, delivering the judgment of the Court, remarked at page 1189 that if the accused was not present, he could not be convicted under section 34. The judge added that the accused could have been convicted for abetment if the jury had returned a verdict on that ground, because there was evidence of abetment and the charge of abetment was legally correct. However, the jury had ignored the abetment portion of the charge, and therefore the court could not determine whether the jury had believed that part of the evidence. While discussing the misdirection given to the jury and the requirements of section 34, the learned judge observed at page 1188 that the misdirection lay in telling the jury that even if a person “may not be present when the offence is actually committed” and even if he remains “behind the screen”, he could still be convicted under section 34 provided it was proved that the offence was committed in furtherance of a common intention. The judge explained that this view was incorrect, because the essence of section 34 requires the person to be physically present at the actual commission of the crime. The second authority, Shreekantiah’s case (1), was described as being practically similar to the present matter. In that case, both accused numbers two and three denied having been present at the railway station on 18 February when the various offences were committed, and no witness testified that accused number three was present. The presence of accused number two, however, was asserted by the witness Babu Rao Gawade, identified as PW‑1. That witness had not made the same statement to the police during the investigation. The learned Sessions Judge, in his summing‑up, concluded that under those circumstances it was for the jury to decide whether to accept the witness’s statement.

The Court observed that the issue before the jury was whether to accept the testimony of the witness who had appeared in Court. It was also noted that there existed additional evidence linking accused number two to the criminal transaction, and that the jury had to consider whether it believed that accused number two had been present at the railway station on February eighteenth. The Court then referred to the earlier decision in Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai versus The State of Bombay, where the matter of Shreekantiah’s case was examined and subsequently distinguished on the facts. In that earlier case, two persons who were directors of a company had been found guilty of an offence under section 409 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for committing a criminal breach of trust in relation to certain cloth that had been supplied to them. It was alleged that one of those directors was not employed at the factory at the time when the goods were allegedly removed, and consequently it was argued that he could not be held liable for the misappropriation of those goods by invoking section 34. Justice Shah, delivering the judgment, explained at page three hundred twenty‑six that the core of liability under section 34 lies in the existence of a common intention that animates the offenders and leads them to commit a criminal act in furtherance of that common intention. He further stated that the physical presence of the person sought to be held liable under section 34 is not, according to the wording of the statute, a condition of its applicability. The Court clarified that a common intention represents a meeting of minds to commit an offence, and that participation in the commission of the offence in furtherance of that common intention brings section 34 into operation. However, the Court emphasized that such participation does not always require the person’s physical presence at the scene. While offences involving physical violence generally require the offenders to be present at the scene for joint liability to attach, this requirement does not apply to offences that consist of disparate acts that may be performed at different times and places, as indicated by the citations to the 1960 and 1955 Supreme Court reports. The Court then turned to the facts of Shree Kantiah’s case, noting that the misappropriation was carried out by removing goods from a Government depot, and that on the occasion of that removal the first accused was not present. Consequently, the Court found it doubtful that the first accused had participated in the commission of the offence, and held that participation by him was not established. The observations made in Shree Kantiah’s case, as they relate to section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, were therefore to be read in the context of the facts that had been proved and were not intended to create a universal rule.

Applying the foregoing principles to the present matter, the Court found that accused number one alone had performed the series of acts on February eighteenth, 1959, which formed the basis of the offences for which he was convicted. Accused numbers two and three had not taken part in the actual commission of those acts. The Court noted that whatever actions the two alleged co‑accused might have undertaken before the commission of the acts in question could not be said to constitute an ingredient of the offences committed by accused number one. Consequently, the Court concluded that the two co‑accused could not be regarded as having participated in the criminal act that amounted to the offences, and therefore could not be held liable under section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the acts performed solely by accused number one, even if those acts were carried out in furtherance of a common intention shared by all three.

The Court held that the acts described did not constitute an ingredient of the offences committed by accused No. 1. Accordingly, the Court found that accused Nos. 2 and 3 could not be said to have participated in the commission of the criminal act that gave rise to those offences. Because participation could not be established, the Court concluded that the two accused could not be held liable under section 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the acts that were carried out solely by accused No. 1, even though those acts might have been committed in furtherance of a common intention shared by all three accused. As a consequence, the convictions of the appellants, namely accused Nos. 2 and 3, for the various offences read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code were set aside.

The Court noted that initially it had not heard counsel for the appellants on the alternative charge of abetment, a charge for which the jury’s verdict had not been recorded by the Sessions Judge. The Court decided that it was unnecessary to remit the matter for additional proceedings on those abetment charges. Instead, after granting a further hearing to the counsel for the appellants, the Court chose to dispose of the case finally. During that hearing, the Court examined the allegations that the appellants had abetted accused No. 1 in the commission of the offences enumerated in charges Nos. 2 to 6. The Court did not undertake a full discussion of the evidentiary record; rather, it merely noted the facts that had been established by the evidence or admitted by the accused.

Regarding the question of whether accused No. 2 had abetted the offences committed by accused No. 1, the Court listed several relevant facts. First, accused No. 1 was the servant of accused No. 3, and the shop of accused No. 3 was the place where accused No. 2, a broker, operated. Second, accused No. 2 was engaged in the trade of non‑ferrous goods. Third, on 17 February 1959, accused No. 2 accompanied Baburam Gavade, identified as plaintiff‑witness 1 and a clearing agent, to inspect the goods. Fourth, the godown register showed that angle irons had been received in the accounts of Shiv Prasad Bimal Kumar and Pyare Lal, identified as accused No. 2. Fifth, accused No. 2 had drafted a letter, marked as Exhibit K, addressed to the National Transport Company requesting the issuance of a delivery order for the angle irons so that he could take delivery of them. Sixth, accused No. 2 possessed a note, Exhibit Z‑7, which he handed to the police during the investigation.

The Court also set out facts pertaining to the alleged abetment by accused No. 3. It reiterated that accused No. 1 was an employee of accused No. 3. It further observed that the angle irons had been stored at the depot of the National Transport Company at the direction of accused No. 1. Finally, the godown books recorded the receipt of the angle irons in the account of accused No. 3, although a subsequent entry indicated that they had also been received in the account of accused No. 2. This additional entry was made on the basis of Exhibit Z‑8 received from the source identified in the record.

In this case, the Court recorded that the last lot of the goods had been delivered at the godown on 18 February 1959. The Court noted that the majority of the writing on Exhibit Z‑7, except for a signature of an unknown person and the date beneath it, had been made by accused No 3. The document read: “To Piaraya Lal c/o M/s. Sheopershad Bimal Kumar, Bombay. 1. RR. No. 43351, dated 4‑2‑59 Ashoknagar to Carnac Bridge. 2. RR. No. 43352, dated 6‑2‑59 Baran to Wadi Bunder. I have received the material of the above RR which I have handed over to you for clearance. Sd./‑ Yashwant 24‑2‑1959.” The State argued that the diversion of the wagon from its proper route at Itarsi railway station indicated the involvement of a fairly large and well‑funded organization, and that such a diversion could not have been effected merely by accused No 1, who was an employee of accused No 3, a substantial merchant. The State further asserted that a sum of about Rs 1,500 had been paid to the railway authorities before the angle irons could be taken delivery of, and that accused No 1 could not have been in a position to make that payment. It was also contended that accused No 1 would not have stored the goods with the National Transport Company unless the storage was on behalf of his master, accused No 3. Accused No 2 admitted that he had gone to see the goods on 17 February but said that he lost interest in them because they were iron angles while his business dealt in non‑ferrous goods. He explained that he had signed Exhibit K at the direction of accused No 3, who had represented that accused No 1 had mistakenly stored the goods in the name of accused No 2, and that accused No 3 had shown him Exhibit Z‑7, which he retained. Accused No 3 denied any involvement in the matter and claimed that he had written Exhibit Z‑7 only at the request of accused No 2, who could not write in English or Hindi. The Court then turned to the evidence to decide whether accused Nos 2 and 3 had abetted the offences committed by accused No 1. It observed that the original version of Exhibit Z‑7 did not contain the initial line “To, Piaraya Lal C/o”. That line had been added later, as shown by the use of a different pen, possibly different ink, and the unusual placement of “C/o” outside the normal line with “M/s. Sheopershad Bimal Kumar”. Consequently, the Court concluded that the document had first been prepared by accused No 3 to demonstrate that a third person had entrusted him with the railway receipt, and that the later addition altered its original meaning.

With the railway receipt numbered 43352 dated 6 February 1959, a third person had received the material to which the receipt related. In its original form the document indicates that the firm M/s Sheopersbad Bimal Kumar, of which accused No 3 is the proprietor, obtained this receipt from the third person in order to clear the goods with the railways. This explanation accounts for accused No 1 taking delivery of the goods on 18 February, placing them with the National Transport Company under the account of accused No 3, and the corresponding entries recorded in the godown register. Himmatlal, identified as PW 13 and the godown‑keeper, issued receipt Exhibit PI which states: “We have today received the under‑mentioned goods for storage with us in our godown No IPL on behalf of and under lien to Shiv Prasad Bimal Kumar.” The receipt clearly shows that the goods were stored on behalf of Sheopersbad Bimal Kumar, i.e., accused No 3. The expression “under lien” is particularly significant because it demonstrates that the storage was not merely a consequence of the angle irons being sent by accused No 1, who was an employee of accused No 3, but rather indicates a specific transaction between accused No 3 and the National Transport Company for the storage of the articles. Himmatlal’s note further confirms his earlier entry that the goods were received on account of Sheopersbad Bimal Kumar and that, upon receiving Exhibit Z‑8 from accused No 1, he recorded the words “Account Pyare Lal” in the entries relating to those goods. The fact that accused No 3 was in a better financial position to fund the transaction than accused No 1 is consistent with the conclusion drawn from the original contents of Exhibit Z‑7. Apart from the later addition of the first line to Exhibit Z‑7, there appears to be no reasonable justification for the receipt to have been drafted in this particular manner if it had been prepared at the request of accused No 2. There was no need to list the address of Pyare Lal as “c/o M/s Sheopersbad Bimal Kumar.” Consequently, the later insertion in the document must have served the purpose of showing that railway receipt 43352 was dealt with by accused No 2 rather than accused No 3. It may be noted that certain witnesses, who during their police statements referred to actions of accused No 3, testified in court that those acts were carried out by accused No 2. No reliance can be placed on any of those witness statements, and this observation is mentioned only to illustrate that it aligns with the initial attempt to portray the receipt as being handled by accused No 2.

In this case the Court observed that the document which had originally been prepared to indicate that accused No. 3 had handled the forged railway receipt had been altered so as to suggest that the receipt had instead been dealt with by accused No. 2. The Court noted that accused No. 2 had been acting in the capacity of a broker and had signed Exhibit K. Consequently, the Court held that accused No. 2 must have understood the language in which he signed the document. The Court further stated that it was not mandatory for Exhibit Z‑7, the receipt, to be written in English or Hindi even if accused No. 2 was not familiar with either language. On this basis, the Court declined to accept the explanation offered by accused No. 3 regarding his recording of Exhibit Z‑7. The Court accepted, as admitted by accused No. 3, that he himself had prepared the document. The Court explained that the document referred to the forged receipt, which had been used to obtain delivery of iron angles. By drafting such a receipt, accused No. 3 demonstrated his concern with the procurement of the iron angles by his employee, accused No. 1.

The Court reasoned that once the forged receipt was traced to accused No. 3 on the basis of his own handwriting, the logical inference was that he had passed the receipt to his employee, accused No. 1, for the purpose of securing delivery of the goods from the railway authorities. In doing so, accused No. 3 had assisted accused No. 1 in obtaining the goods and in committing the various offences connected with that objective. The Court further observed that the receipt had been endorsed in the name of Datta rather than in the name of accused No. 1, which indicated that accused No. 3 was aware that the receipt was not a genuine document for the intended goods. Had he believed the receipt to be authentic, the Court held, he would have endorsed it in the true name of his employee, and the employee would not have taken delivery under a false name. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, accused No. 3 had abetted the commission of the offences charged as Nos. 2 to 6 by accused No. 1. The Court then turned to the points favourable to accused No. 2, noting that he did not deal in non‑ferrous metals and therefore would not have had an interest in the transaction after learning on 17 February that the goods were ferrous, not non‑ferrous. Moreover, the goods were not recorded in his name in the accounts of the National Transport Company’s godown; instead, they were initially stored in the name of accused No. 3, which further supported his defense.

In this case the Court observed that accused No. 1 did not store the iron angles in the account of accused No. 2. Instead he sent an intimation that the goods should be stored in the name of Pyare Lal with the last lorry that transported the iron angles to the godown. The Court noted that Pyare Lal had no previous dealings with the National Transport Company. The direction recorded in Exhibit Z‑8, which read “Please give a receipt in the name of a/c Pyare Lal”, was of particular importance. The direction was not a claim that the goods belonged to Pyare Lal or that they should be stored on his account; the natural expectation would have been that the receipt itself would be issued solely in the name of Pyare Lal and in no other name. Consequently, the Court inferred that accused No. 1 intended only the receipt to bear Pyare Lal’s name for certain purposes. Himmat Lal, who maintained the godown’s books, therefore made an entry that matched the receipt; he wrote the words “account Pyare Lal” beneath the original note “account Sheopershad Bimal Kumar”. However, Himmat Lal did not indicate in receipt Exhibit P that the goods were stored on behalf of Pyare Lal, but rather noted that they were stored on behalf of and under lien to Sheopershad Bimal Kumar. Accused No. 2 signed the letter Exhibit K authorising the delivery order. He explained that he signed it only after accused No. 3 insisted and claimed that his employee had mistakenly stored the goods in his name. The Court found this explanation implausible because there was no reason for accused No. 1 to store the goods in accused No. 2’s name by mistake. Although accused No. 2 might have suspected irregularity, the Court held that he could have dispelled such doubt by examining receipt Exhibit Z‑7, which showed that the goods had been cleared by accused No. 3 on behalf of a certain person who had passed on that receipt. The Court further observed that accused No. 2 was under an obligation to accused No. 3 and might therefore have been unable to resist the request to sign Exhibit K. Accused No. 3 required a letter signed by Pyare Lal even though the goods had not been shown to be stored in Pyare Lal’s account, nor in the accounts of both Sheopershad Bimal Kumar and Pyare Lal. It was significant that accused No. 2 himself did not take delivery of the goods. Accused No. 1 took delivery in two separate lots and each time signed the receipt in the name of Pyare Lal. The Court concluded that if accused No. 2 had been a party to the dishonest acquisition of the goods from the railway, there would have been no occasion for such duplication of names regarding the party on whose behalf the goods were stored.

In this case the Court observed that the document identified as Exhibit Z‑7 was not produced on behalf of the National Transport Company, nor was it a document that had to be created expressly for the purpose of establishing a commitment, and it was not held by accused No. 2 as a matter of right. The Court noted that accused No. 2 retained the receipt in his personal possession for his own protection and that he produced the document during the investigation for that very purpose. The Court further considered that when accused No. 3 sought to remove his doubts after being asked to sign the letter marked Exhibit K, it appeared that accused No. 2 himself proposed that the receipt marked Exhibit Z‑7 be addressed in his own name, because only in that circumstance could the receipt be of any assistance to him. On the basis of these facts, the Court held that the evidence did not establish the complicity of accused No. 2 in the various offences alleged to have been committed by accused No. 1 beyond the threshold of reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal filed by Pyare Lal and acquitted him of all offences for which he had been convicted. In contrast, the Court dismissed the appeal filed by accused No. 3, Shiv Prasad Chunilal Jain, and upheld his conviction for the offences charged under Section 3 of the Indian Penal Code as well as those charged under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, thereby maintaining the sentences imposed on him. The Court also recorded that Appeal No. 185 was allowed, whereas Appeal No. 150 was dismissed, with the conviction and sentence in the latter case remaining unchanged.