Rani Ratna Prova Devi Rani Saheba vs State of Orissa and Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Writ Petitions Nos. 79, 80 of 1963 and 140 of 1962

Decision Date: 23 January, 1964

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the writ petitions filed by Rani Ratna Prova Devi Rani Saheba of Dhenkenal against the State of Orissa and another respondent, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 23 January 1964. The bench that heard the matter consisted of P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, J.C. Shah and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioners challenged the operative provisions of the Orissa Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act, 1958, together with the rules framed under that Act. The petitioners owned three hundred two private lands in the State of Orissa that, prior to the enactment of the impugned Act, were not liable to rent. After the Act came into force, the lands were assessed for rent by revenue officers in accordance with the newly framed rules. The petitioners therefore claimed a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the assessment orders. The Legislature had passed the Act because it deemed it expedient to provide for the assessment of rent with respect to the private lands of persons included in the definition of the word “Ruler” prescribed by section 2(h) of the Act. Section 2(h) defined a “Ruler” as the ruler of a merged territory in the State of Orissa and included his relatives and dependants. The petitioners argued that the provisions of the Act, particularly sections 5 and 6, contravened Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court held that section 6 of the Act did not violate Article 14 because it laid down fair and equitable tests for determining the rent payable on the private lands of the Rulers. The legislature had prescribed the method of determining the rent, and the relevant factors specified in section 6 were just and substantially similar to the considerations generally taken into account at the time of a survey settlement for determining the proper revenue assessment on ryotwari lands. The Court observed that the problem of levying assessment on these private lands had to be dealt with by the legislature on an ad‑hoc basis. Since the settlement of rent and assessment introduced by the Act was being applied to these lands for the first time, those lands could not be treated as comparable in every respect with lands that were governed by the rates prescribed under the previous settlement.

The Court observed that the rates which had been prescribed under the earlier settlement formed a point of reference in the present dispute. In examining the validity of a statute that is challenged under article fourteen, the Court reiterated the well‑established rule that a legislature may enact class legislation so long as the classification it employs is rational and bears a reasonable connection to the purpose the law seeks to achieve. Accordingly, if a challenger cannot demonstrate that the classification is irrational or lacks a nexus with the intended objective of the impugned Act, the statutory provision enjoys a presumption of constitutionality. The Court explained that this presumption assists the State in arguing that the failure of the challenger to overturn it undermines the allegation that the Act is invalid. Moreover, when the material presented before the Court in relation to article fourteen is unsatisfactory, the Court may permit the State to rely upon the initial presumption of constitutionality.

The Court rejected the argument that the Act was void because its definition of the term “Ruler” conflicted with article 366‑22 of the Constitution. It noted that section 2(h) of the Act indeed provides a broader definition of “Ruler” than that contained in article 366‑22. However, the Court stressed that the definitions in article 366 are intended primarily for interpreting constitutional provisions themselves, unless a different context requires otherwise. The purpose behind the Act’s expansive definition was to identify and describe the lands to which the operative provisions of the Act would apply. In this sense, the broader, inclusive definition was deemed appropriate and consistent with the legislative intent.

The Court further held that the Act fell entirely outside the ambit of article 31 of the Constitution. The Act neither sought to deprive the Rulers of their property nor endeavoured to acquire or requisition such property. Instead, the Act was characterised as a simple measure that authorised the levy of a tax on agricultural lands. In support of this view, the Court referred to the decision in Pratap Kesari Deo v. State of Orissa, AIR 1961 Orissa 131, which had adopted a similar approach.

The judgment originated in original jurisdiction and concerned writ petitions numbered 79 and 80 of 1963 and petition 140 of 1962, all filed under article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioners in the first two petitions included representatives for the petitioner, while counsel for petition 140 1962 comprised additional legal representatives. Respondents were represented by senior counsel including the Additional Solicitor‑General and other counsel. Interveners in petition 140 1962 were also assisted by counsel. The judgment was dated 23 January 1964 and was delivered by Justice Gajendragadkar. The petitioners, in all three petitions, had approached the Court under article 32 seeking a declaration that the operative provisions of the Orissa Private Lands of Rulers (Assessment of Rent) Act, 1958 and the rules made thereunder were unconstitutional and ultra vires, and they also sought relief to set aside the revenue assessments made under those rules.

The petitioners argued that the Act of 1958, together with the Rules made thereunder, were unconstitutional and exceeded the authority of the legislature. They asserted that the private lands possessed and enjoyed by each of the three petitioners had been assessed by revenue officers in accordance with those Rules, and that such assessments should be declared void. Accordingly, the petitioners requested a writ of certiorari, or any appropriate order, to quash the assessment orders issued under the Act. The first petitioner, identified in Writ Petition No. 140 of 1962, was the Patrani Saheba of Keonjhar, who occupied eight villages named Mangalpur, Barigan, Nua Rampas, Nilung, Ghutru, Mohadijore, Patang and Anara in Keonjhar district. These eight villages had been granted to her as a maintenance provision many years earlier and had been entered in the village records as Khoraki Posaki, meaning Maintenance Grant lands, since the settlement of 1918. She had continued to hold the villages without paying any assessment, and she contended that the provisions of the Act that permitted the levy of assessment on her lands were invalid and contrary to the Constitution. In her petition she pointed out that, from time to time, successive governments had chosen not to levy any assessment on her lands, thereby acknowledging her right to enjoy the villages rent‑free. Nevertheless, the Revenue Officer of Keonjhar later issued an assessment on the eight villages, claiming authority under the Rules made pursuant to the Act. The petitioner appealed the assessment to the Board of Revenue, but the Board dismissed her appeal and upheld the assessment. The assessment levied against her amounted to approximately Rs. 9,000, and it was demanded that she pay the amount retrospectively from the year 1958.

The second petitioner, whose case was presented in Writ Petition No. 79 of 1963, was Smt. Rani Ratna Prova Devi, the wife of the former ruler Raja Sankar Pratap Singh Deo Mahindra Bahadur of Dhenkanal State. At the time when Dhenkanal State merged with the Indian Union, she possessed and enjoyed lands in five villages as a proprietor, and no assessment had ever been levied on those lands before the present controversy. The Revenue Officer of Dhenkanal, invoking the provisions of the Act, assessed rent on all of the lands that she held, thereby imposing a liability that she had never previously faced. She contested the assessment before the appropriate appellate authority, but her appeal was rejected, prompting her to file the present writ petition seeking a declaration that the Act and the assessment order were unlawful. The third petitioner, represented in Writ Petition No. 80 of 1963, was the former ruler of Dhenkanal, who at the date of the state's merger owned private lands comprising 89 acres, 18 decimals and five kadis in Niz‑garh Town. Those lands had historically been exempt from rent payment, yet revenue officials assessed rent on them under the provisions of the same Act. The former ruler also attempted to set aside the assessment before the appellate authority, but he was unsuccessful, leading him to join the present proceedings to challenge both the validity of the Act and the specific assessment order.

In this matter, the petitioner was unable to persuade the Appellate Authority to set aside the order of assessment, and consequently filed the present writ petition challenging both the validity of the Act and the assessment order. The Court observed that the facts underlying the three petitions seeking relief were substantially similar and that the petitions raised common points of law, which justified hearing them together and disposing of them by a single judgment. The Act that is the subject of challenge was enacted by the Orissa Legislature because it was considered expedient to provide for the assessment of rent on the private lands of Rulers in the State of Orissa. The Act obtained the Governor’s assent on 21 May 1958 and was subsequently published in the State Gazette on 6 June 1958. It is composed of fifteen sections, and its principal object is to authorise the levy of rent in respect of private lands owned by persons who fall within the definition of “Ruler” prescribed in section 2(h). Section 2(e) defines “Private land” as any land held on the date of merger by a Ruler that is free from the payment of rent, while section 2(h) defines a “Ruler” as the ruler of a merged territory in the State of Orissa and expressly includes his relatives and dependents. Accordingly, the definition of “Ruler” is inclusive, bringing within its sweep the relatives and dependents of the ruler; as a result, private lands held by such relatives or dependents by virtue of grants made by the ruling Prince or otherwise fall within the mischief of the operative provisions of the Act. Section 2(i) provides that any other expressions used in the Act but not defined therein shall have the meanings assigned to them under the tenancy laws that are in force in the relevant areas. Section 3 contains the principal operative provision and stipulates that, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, custom, contract or agreement to the contrary, private lands held by a Ruler shall, from the date of commencement of the Act, be liable to assessment and the levy of rent as provided in the Act. The effect of this provision is to render private lands that were previously exempt from rent or assessment liable to pay the same, thereby extinguishing the former exemption and treating those lands like any other lands in the State that are subject to assessment and rent. Section 4 provides for the appointment of Revenue Officers, and sections 5 and 6 deal respectively with the classification of lands, the prescription of maximum rates of rent, and the procedure for determining the rent. Under s.

Section 5 required that the lands be placed into three categories: irrigated‑wet land, rain‑fed‑wet land and dry land. It further provided that, subject to the provisions of section 6, the amount of fair and equitable rent that could be assessed for each of those three categories could not exceed the maximum amount that the State Government might prescribe from time to time.

The proviso attached to section 5 dealt with a special situation in which the tenants of the Ruler already possessed occupancy rights. In such cases the proviso stipulated that the rent payable by the Ruler for those lands must be calculated as a proportion of the rent that the Ruler actually received from his tenants, and that proportion too would be prescribed by the State Government.

Section 6 listed the considerations that had to be taken into account when determining the rates of fair and equitable rent. Those considerations were set out in clauses (a) through (e). Clause (a) required the authority to look at the nature of the soil and the general productivity of the land. Clause (b) directed the authority to consider the class under which the land was assessable. Clause (c) mandated that the market value of the land be taken into account. Clause (d) instructed the authority to examine the prevailing rates of rent being charged for similar lands in the neighbourhood. Clause (e) allowed for any other matters relating to the land that might be prescribed by the Rules.

Thus, while section 5 dealt with the classification of the Ruler’s private lands and authorized the State Government to prescribe a ceiling for the rent that could be levied, section 6 set out the specific factors that the revenue officer must bear in mind in arriving at a fair and equitable rent. Clause (e) made clear that, in addition to the factors enumerated in clauses (a) to (d), the Rules could introduce further matters that the authority would have to consider.

The remaining provisions of the Act concerned the procedures for levying and recovering assessment, but those provisions were not relevant to the petitions that were before the Court.

The petitioners raised their first contention that sections 5 and 6 of the Act were invalid because they violated article 14 of the Constitution. To support that argument they referred to certain facts set out in writ petition number 79 of 1963.

The Court observed that section 6 expressly prescribed the considerations that the Act deemed relevant, and therefore a revenue officer was bound to keep those considerations in mind when fixing the fair and equitable rent for any particular parcel of land. The writ petition pointed out that, as a result of applying the relevant factors enumerated in section 6, the rates fixed by the preliminary pattas for the petitioners’ lands were invariably higher than the rates of rent that were applicable under the Revisional Settlement Khatian.

Relying on those facts, the petitioners argued that the revenue officers, in calculating rent for the private lands of the Ruler, arrived at figures that were generally higher than the rent that would have been determined if the rates prevailing under the Settlement for other lands had been applied. This discrepancy formed the basis of their claim that the provisions of the Act introduced an unlawful discrimination between the petitioners’ lands and other assessable lands in the State of Orissa.

In this case, the petitioners argued that if the rates currently applicable under the existing settlement for other lands were applied, the rent determination would be lower than that imposed on their lands. They contended that the relevant provisions of the Act therefore introduced an illegal discrimination between their lands and other lands liable to rent assessment in the State of Orissa. The petitioners further argued that it could not be a valid reason for levying a higher assessment on the private lands of the Ruler that those lands were exempt from assessment until the enactment of the Act. The legislature possessed the authority to make the private lands of the Rulers liable to rent assessment, but once those lands were included in the assessable class, they should be treated in the same manner as other assessable lands in Orissa. That concise statement formed the basis of the challenge to the validity of the Act under Article 14 of the Constitution. At first glance, the contention appeared to have some merit. However, the Court was not convinced that the petitioners' plea could overturn the initial presumption of constitutionality in favor of the statute. In considering the question, it was necessary to remember that a survey settlement had already been made for the other assessable lands and that settlement was intended to remain in force for a specified period. Generally, when a settlement is finalized and assessment is levied based on it, the assessment cannot be altered by an executive order during the fixed period, although the legislature may enact a fresh assessment law within that period if it chooses. In the present case, the legislature seemed to conclude that introducing a fresh settlement for all other assessable lands was neither necessary nor expedient, and therefore it enacted the present statute solely with respect to the private lands of the Rulers. That historical fact could not be ignored. When dealing with the private lands of the Rulers on that basis, the legislature was required to prescribe a method for determining the rent payable on those lands. The factors specified in section 6 were found to be just and substantially similar to the considerations normally used in a survey settlement to assess revenue on ryotwari lands. Counsel for the petitioners raised an additional argument before the Court, questioning whether the market value of land, which section 6 listed as a relevant factor, had also been taken into account in the earlier settlement. No evidence was presented to the Court on this point, and consequently the Court was unable to reach a conclusion on the issue.

In assessing whether the consideration mentioned in section six was taken into account during the earlier settlement, the Court observed that no material had been placed before it to determine either the presence or absence of such a factor. Consequently, the Court could not decide the effect that the omission, if any, might have on the validity of the challenged statute. Nonetheless, having examined the factors prescribed by section six, the Court held that it was reasonable to conclude that the statute laid down fair and equitable criteria for fixing the rent payable on the private lands of the Rulers. Because no evidence was offered to show a material departure from those criteria, the Court found it difficult to accept the argument that section six violated Article fourteen of the Constitution.

The Court noted that the legislature had been required to address the problem of levying assessment on these private lands on an ad hoc basis. The Act introduced a settlement of rent and assessment that was being applied to those lands for the first time, and therefore those lands could not be said to be identical in every respect to the lands that had been governed by the rates fixed under the earlier settlement. This distinction, the Court said, could support the view that the Act did not contravene Article fourteen, for if the two categories of land were not similar in all particulars, a claim of discrimination between them could not be sustained. The Court further pointed out that in 1959 the Orissa Legislature enacted Act No 3 of 1959 to consolidate and amend the laws relating to survey, record of rights and settlement operations in the State. After the settlement operations required by that later Act were completed, assessment of all assessable lands – including the private lands at issue – would be made on the basis prescribed by the 1959 Act. Accordingly, the operation of sections three, five and six of the impugned Act was limited to the period from June 1958, when that Act came into force, until the date on which the assessment determined under the provisions of the later Act actually became applicable to all lands. The Court held that this temporal limitation was another factor to be considered when examining the validity of the impugned Act. Finally, the Court observed that the petitioners’ allegations challenging the validity of the Act were somewhat vague, and the materials they relied upon were insufficient, inadequate and unsatisfactory. The State’s response was likewise not helpful or satisfactory. The Court therefore noted that where a challenge to a statute’s validity is made under Article fourteen and the challenger fails to produce satisfactory evidence, the matter becomes difficult for the Court to resolve.

Because the petitioner did not produce satisfactory evidence to support his challenge, the task of deciding the issue became very difficult. In examining the constitutionality of a statute under Article 14, the well‑established principle that the legislature may enact class legislation must be observed, provided that the classification relied upon is rational and bears a reasonable nexus to the purpose intended to be achieved by the statute. Consequently, when the challenger fails to demonstrate that the classification is irrational or lacking such a nexus, the presumption of constitutionality remains in favour of the State. The State may then argue that the challenger’s inability to rebut this initial presumption weakens the claim of invalidity. In every instance where the material presented before the Court concerning Article 14 is unsatisfactory, the Court is entitled to permit the State to rely on the doctrine of the initial presumption of constitutionality; this is precisely what occurred in the present proceedings. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the petitioners had not shown that the impugned Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution.

The petitioners also contended that the Act was invalid because its definition of the term “Ruler” conflicted with the definition provided in Article 366(22) of the Constitution. Article 366(22) characterises a “Ruler” of an Indian State as the Prince, Chief, or other person who entered into any covenant or agreement referred to in clause (1) of Article 291 and who, at the relevant time, is recognised by the President as the Ruler of the State, and it further includes any person recognised by the President as the successor of such Ruler. The definition of “Ruler” contained in section 2(h) of the Act is broader than the definition in Article 366(22); it expressly includes the dependents and relatives of the Ruler, whereas the constitutional definition does not. However, it must be remembered that the definitions in Article 366 are intended solely for the purpose of interpreting the constitutional articles themselves, unless the context demands otherwise. Therefore, the argument that the Act’s definition of “Ruler” is inconsistent with the definition in Article 366(22) lacks substance. Moreover, it is erroneous to assume that the Act creates any provision concerning Rulers in a general sense. The Act’s true purpose is to authorise the levy of assessment and rent on lands situated in Orissa, and those lands are the private lands of the Rulers as defined by section 2(h). Consequently, there is no doubt that the definition of “Ruler” was employed merely to identify the lands to which the operative provisions of the Act would apply.

The Court explained that the term “Ruler” was introduced in the statute solely to identify and describe the particular lands to which the operative provisions of the Act would apply. The levy contemplated by the Act concerned only the private lands of the Rulers, and the legislature chose a concise wording that described those lands as the private lands of the Rulers. Consequently, the definition of “Ruler” was drafted in a broad and inclusive manner. The Court observed that, had the legislature expressly stated that both the private lands of the Rulers and the private lands of the Rulers’ dependents and relatives were subject to the assessment authorized by section 3, the petitioners would have had no ground for objection, because a comprehensive definition of “Ruler” would then have been unnecessary. The Court further noted that it was an established fact that the Orissa Legislature possessed the constitutional competence to enact the statute under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, and therefore it was unreasonable to contend that the method employed by the Act to describe the lands liable for assessment created any defect in the Constitution itself. Accordingly, the Court was satisfied that the allegation that the definition of “Ruler” conflicted with article 366(22) and consequently rendered the entire Act void lacked any substance. The Court turned to the third plea raised by the petitioners, namely that the Act violated the provisions of article 31 of the Constitution. The Court held that this contention was wholly misplaced. Article 31(1) concerns deprivation of property except by authority of law, and cannot be applied to any provision of the Act; article 31(2) deals with compulsory acquisition or requisition, which was also irrelevant to the present legislation. The Court explained that the statute merely authorized the levy of an assessment on lands that had previously been exempt, and that article 31(5)(b)(i) expressly provides that nothing in clause (2) shall affect any law the State may enact for the purpose of imposing or levying a tax or penalty. Thus, by imposing an assessment on the private lands of the Rulers, the Orissa Legislature did not intend to dispossess the Rulers of their property nor to acquire or requisition it; it merely introduced a tax on agricultural lands, a measure that falls completely outside the scope of article 31. The Court observed that the High Court of Orissa, in the case of Pratap Kessari Deo v. State of Orissa & Ors., had rejected a similar challenge to the Act and had affirmed its validity. The Court agreed with that view, concluded that the petitions were untenable, dismissed them, ordered costs, and directed the payment of one set of hearing fees.