Ramchandra Rambux vs Champabai And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 758

Decision Date: 17 February, 1964

Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, K. Subbarao

Ramchandra Rambux versus Champabai and others was decided by the Supreme Court of India on 17 February 1964. The judgment was written by Justice J. R. Mudholkar, who also sat on the bench together with Justice Subbarao K. The case is reported in 1965 AIR 354 and in the 1964 volume of the Supreme Court Reporter at page 814. The matter concerned the genuineness and credibility of a will and the surrounding circumstances that might affect the assessment of that credibility.

In the suit filed by the appellant, the claimant sought to establish ownership over the property of a deceased person identified as R. The appellant asserted that R had executed a will bequeathing almost his entire estate to the appellant and that the will deliberately excluded R’s widow and daughters. The alleged motive for this exclusion was said to be the strained relationship that had arisen between R and his wife during the latter part of his life. The widow denied that any such will had been executed and challenged its authenticity. The trial court examined the evidence, found the will to be genuine, and decreed in favour of the appellant. The respondent appealed to the High Court, which reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the will was not genuine. The High Court’s conclusion was based on its assessment of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances presented in the case. The appellant then obtained a certificate of appeal and raised the matter before this Court.

The Court observed that when evaluating the credibility of a witness, it may not limit itself merely to the manner in which the witness testified or to the witness’s demeanour. It is also permitted to consider the surrounding circumstances and the probabilities that emerge from those circumstances, so that a correct impression of the witness’s trustworthiness can be formed. The Court explained that this issue cannot be decided by considering the evidence in isolation from the surrounding facts, nor can it be decided without reference to the nature and contents of the document itself. Further, the Court held that the party who produces the will must satisfy the Court of its genuineness by eliminating every suspicion that may naturally arise from the various circumstances surrounding the instrument. In support of this principle, the Court referred to several authorities, including Surat Kumar Bibi v. Sakti Chand (1928) L.R. 56 LA 62, Krishno Opal v. Baidyanath AIR 1939 Cal. 87, Chote Narain Singh v. Ali Ratan Koer (1894) L.R. 22 I.A. 12, H. Venkachala Iyengar v. N. Thaimmajamma [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 426, Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee C.A. No. 295 of 1960, dated 13 September 1963 (non‑reportable) and Tyrell v. Painton (1894) P. 151. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Mudholkar, who addressed the question presented for consideration in the appeal that had been allowed by a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay.

In this appeal the question presented to the High Court of Bombay was whether a will allegedly executed by a man named Ramdhan on 23 May 1947 was authentic or a fraudulent fabrication. According to the document, Ramdhan purportedly bequeathed virtually all of his estate to the appellant. The estate comprised sixteen fields of land assessed at a revenue of Rs 425 per annum, five houses, a shop, and movable assets that included eight hundred tolas of gold, one thousand tolas of silver, cash amounting to Rs 50,000, a further sum of Rs 15,000 due from debtors, as well as cattle, agricultural implements, utensils and other items. The will seemingly excluded Ramdhan’s widow, Sitabai, and his three married daughters, namely Champabai, Rambhabai and Rajubai. The appellant was identified as the grandson of one of Ramdhan’s three predeceased uncles, and it was alleged that the exclusion of the widow and daughters resulted from strained relations that had developed between Ramdhan and his wife during the latter’s final days. Ramdhan died on 31 October 1948, after which Sitabai, who had lived with him throughout his life, took possession of the entire property. The appellant did not initially disturb her possession; he claimed to have allowed Sitabai to remain in possession on his behalf and that she managed the estate satisfactorily for a period of time. Subsequently, however, Sitabai is said to have, in blatant disregard of the appellant’s interest, transferred portions of the property to her daughters and to strangers, despite her knowledge that the property had been bequeathed to the appellant and that, under the will, she was entitled only to a maintenance allowance of Rs 40 per month. It may be noted that Ramdhan was a resident of Peepalgaon in the district of Parbhani, and the whole of his property, both movable and immovable, was situated in Peepalgaon. In response to these allegations, the plaintiff instituted a suit in the District Court at Parbhani. Sitabai denied that the will had been executed by Ramdhan and also denied any relationship between Ramdhan and the appellant. She asserted that, following Ramdhan’s death, she had exclusive possession of the property, that she was a helpless widow without a male heir, and that the appellant had fabricated a false will in order to lay claim to Ramdhan’s property. While she admitted that the description of the immovable property in the plaint was correct, she challenged the accuracy of several items of movable property listed therein. During the pendency of the suit, an individual named Madanlal was joined as a party on the basis of his claim to be the adopted son of Ramdhan; he likewise contested the authenticity of the will, claiming that he had been adopted by Ramdhan in the month of Chait, Samvat 1999, in accordance with the prevailing custom in the State of Udaipur. Sitabai died while the suit was ongoing, and her daughters – Champabai, Rambhabai and Rajubai – together with Ram Pershad, one of Sitabai’s sons‑in‑law who was alleged to have taken possession of the property after her death, were entered on record as her legal representatives. The trial court ruled in favour of the appellant, holding that the appellant was indeed related to Ramdhan as he claimed and that the will executed by Ramdhan was genuine; it also rejected Madanlal’s claim of adoption. On the basis of these findings the trial court decreed the appellant’s suit. The legal representatives of Sitabai subsequently appealed to the High Court, which held that the will presented by the appellant was not genuine and consequently dismissed his suit.

The Court noted that after the death of Sitabai, her legal representatives were entered into the record as her heirs. The trial Court had found in favour of the appellant, accepting his claim that he was related to Ramdhan and concluding that the will allegedly executed by Ramdhan was authentic. The trial Court also rejected Madanlal’s assertion that he had been adopted by Ramdhan, and on this basis it granted decree to the appellant. Dissatisfied with that decision, the legal representatives of Sitabai appealed to the High Court. The High Court examined the matter afresh and held that the will produced by the appellant was not genuine; consequently it dismissed the appellant’s suit. To support the validity of the will, the appellant produced his own testimony, that of the scribe Venkat Rajaram, and the testimonies of three attesting witnesses identified as Raja Kaniahprasad, Rasheeduddin Ahmed and Wamanlal. In addition, the appellant called witnesses who alleged that the property bequeathed to him under the will had been entrusted by him to Sitabai after Ramdhan’s death. The respondents, on the other hand, adduced evidence indicating that Ramdhan could not have been present in Hyderabad on the alleged date of execution, 23 May 1947, because he remained until the afternoon of the preceding day at a village situated approximately three hundred miles from Hyderabad. After reviewing the entire body of evidence presented by both sides, the High Court concluded that the will had been prepared under highly suspicious circumstances and that the appellant’s evidence failed to establish the genuineness of the document. The High Court observed that the surrounding facts suggested that the alleged will was “in all probability” a false instrument created without Ramdhan’s knowledge.

The Court further observed that the standard of proof required in such disputes is the one articulated by the Privy Council in Sarat Kumari Bibi v. Sakhi Chand, which mandates that when a will is drawn up under circumstances that arouse the Court’s suspicion that it does not reflect the testator’s intention, the burden rests on the party offering the will to dispel that suspicion. According to the High Court, the evidence presented by the appellant was so unsatisfactory that it could not be given any effect. Mr Dadachanji, however, contended that the High Court erred in its approach to the evidence. He argued that the High Court first considered the various surrounding circumstances and then assessed the credibility of the witnesses based on those circumstances, a method he regarded as improper. To substantiate his objection, he cited the observations of Justice Biswas in Kristo Gopal v. Baidya Nath, wherein it was remarked that the learned Judges seemed to have formed the notion that the will was not genuine and, having formed that view, examined the testimony of each witness with a suspicious eye, leading to the criticism he now raised.

The Court observed that the trial judge examined the testimony of each witness with a suspicious eye and noted that no other explanation could account for the criticism that the judge directed at himself. The Court further recorded that the learned judge bolstered this observation by quoting Lord Watson’s remarks in Chotey Narain Singh v. Mt. Ratan Koer (1928) L.R. 56 I.A. 62; A.I.R. 1939 Cal 87; 22 I.A. 12; 23 134‑159 S.C.‑52, wherein Lord Watson stated that “The theory of improbability remains to be considered; and the first observation which their Lordships have to make is that, in order to prevail against such evidence as has been adduced by the respondent in this case, an improbability must be clear and cogent. It must approach very nearly to, if it does not altogether constitute, an impossibility.” The Court then reported that the learned judge continued with the following observation: “In a case where attesting witnesses are produced and they give clear and cogent testimony regarding execution, one should require very strong circumstances to repel the effect of such testimony. It will not do to talk airily about circumstances of suspicion. It is no doubt true that a person who takes it upon himself to dispute the genuineness of a will cannot be expected to prove a negative in many cases. At the same time, the difficulty in which, on his own seeking, he places himself, will not relieve him of the burden‑it may be a heavy burden‑of displacing the positive testimony on the other side. If he rests his case on suspicion, the suspicion must be a suspicion inherent in the transaction itself which is challenged and cannot be a suspicion arising out of a mere conflict of testimony.” The Court further noted that the learned judge went on to state that, even if evidence showed that a will had actually been made, it would be inappropriate to inquire into any occasion or motive for its execution, and that applying such a test in every case would likely prevent any will from being proved. The Court then set out the precise questions it needed to answer: first, whether a will in fact existed, meaning whether Ramdban had executed a will during his lifetime; and second, whether the document relied upon by the appellant was indeed a will executed by Ramdhan and properly attested by witnesses. The Court explained that the appellant could establish these facts only by presenting evidence of the proper execution of the will by Ramdhan and of its attestation. The central issue, according to the Court, was the credibility of the witnesses who claimed that the document not only bore Ramdhan’s signature but also represented his actual disposition, that it was executed by him, and that the attesting witnesses had witnessed the execution. Finally, the Court clarified that, in assessing the credibility of those witnesses, it was not limited solely to the manner in which the witnesses testified or to their demeanour, but was also entitled to consider the surrounding circumstances and the probabilities that emerged from the evidence as a whole.

In assessing the credibility of the witnesses, the tribunal was permitted to examine not only the testimony itself but also the surrounding circumstances and the probabilities that may influence a proper judgment of trustworthiness. The Court stressed that the issue could not be decided by isolating the evidence presented in the courtroom from the contextual facts that have also emerged during the trial or from the characteristics and substance of the document in question. The observations of Lord Watson were not interpreted to require that the testimony concerning the execution of the document be evaluated in isolation from the attendant circumstances. Rather, the Court understood Lord Watson to state that when a substantial and consistent body of testimony indicates that the testator executed a will, such evidence should not be readily discarded on the ground of improbability. Addressing the method of proving a will, the Court referred to the decision in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma and Others, observing that, as with proof of other documents, it is unreasonable to demand mathematical certainty in establishing a will. The appropriate standard is the ordinary test of whether a prudent mind would be satisfied by the evidence. The Court also noted a distinctive feature of wills: a will originates from the death of the testator, and when it is produced before a court the testator, having already passed away, cannot confirm its authenticity, thereby adding a solemn dimension to the determination of whether the document is indeed the deceased’s final testament. Nevertheless, the inquiry into the proof of a will commences in the same manner as the proof of any document. The party who produces the will must present satisfactory evidence that the testator signed the instrument, that at the relevant time the testator possessed a sound and disposing mental state, that the testator comprehended the nature and effect of the dispositions, and that the signature was affixed of his own free will. Generally, when the evidence supporting the will is disinterested, adequate, and sufficient to demonstrate the testator’s sound mind and lawful signature, the court may rightfully find in favour of the party offering the will. In other words, the burden upon the proponent is considered fulfilled by proving the essential facts just described. However, the Court recognised that certain situations may arise where the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. For example, the alleged signature of the testator may appear shaky or doubtful, and evidence presented by the proponent concerning the authenticity of the signature may not dispel the doubt created by its appearance.

In situations where the signature of the testator does not eliminate the doubt created by its appearance, and where the dispositions made in the will appear unnatural, improbable, or unfair in view of the surrounding circumstances, or where the will otherwise suggests that the dispositions were not the result of the testator’s free will and mind, the Court stated that all legitimate suspicions must be completely removed before the document can be accepted as the testator’s last will. The presence of such suspicious circumstances imposes a heavy initial burden on the propounder; if that burden is not satisfactorily discharged, courts will be reluctant to treat the document as the last will. The Court also observed that, apart from these kinds of suspicious circumstances, if it appears that the propounder played a prominent role in the execution of a will that confers substantial benefit on him, that situation is itself regarded as a suspicious circumstance. Consequently, the propounder is required to dispel the suspicion by producing clear and satisfactory evidence. In other words, the propounder must satisfy the conscience of the Court that the document on which he relies is indeed the last will and testament of the testator. This principle has recently been reaffirmed in a judgment of this Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee and others v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee (1) (Civil Appeal No. 295 of 1966 decided on 13 September 1963). In that case, Justice Wanchoo, speaking for the Court, observed that the mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from the mode of proving any other document except for the special attestation requirement prescribed by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. He further explained that the onus of proving the will rests on the propounder, and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution, proof of testamentary capacity and the testator’s signature as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. However, where suspicious circumstances exist, the propounder must explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the will can be accepted as genuine. When a caveator alleges undue influence, fraud, or coercion, the onus shifts to the caveator to prove such allegations. Even in the absence of such specific pleas, if the surrounding circumstances give rise to doubt, the propounder must satisfy the conscience of the Court. Suspicious circumstances may relate to the genuineness of the testator’s signature, the condition of the testator’s mind, dispositions that are unnatural, improbable, or unfair in light of relevant circumstances, or any other indication in the will that the testator’s mind was not free.

The Court indicated that any legitimate suspicion concerning a will must be entirely removed before the document can be accepted as the testator’s final testament. When the individual who propounds the will also participates in its execution and stands to receive a substantial benefit, that fact becomes an additional circumstance that must be considered. In such a situation, the propounder bears the responsibility of eliminating the doubts by presenting clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder is able to dispel the suspicious circumstances, the Court would be prepared to grant probate, even where the will appears unnatural or cuts off certain close relatives either wholly or partially. These settled principles guided the Court’s examination of whether the appellants had succeeded in proving that the will had been properly executed and attested. In the case of Sarat Kumari Bibi (1), which the High Court relied upon and which was also cited in Venkatachala Lyengar’s case (2), the court found that a beneficiary named Jamaluddin had taken an active role in preparing the will. Consequently, the rule articulated by Lindley and Davey L.J.J. in Tyrrell v. Painton (3) was applied: when circumstances exist that could arouse the Court’s suspicion, the burden rests on the propounder to remove that suspicion and to prove affirmatively that the testator understood and approved the contents of the document. The High Court examined the entire body of evidence offered by the propounder to establish that the will had been duly executed by Ramdhan, and it also considered several attendant circumstances. Firstly, the will was purportedly executed at Hyderabad, a location where the appellant lives and practices as a medical doctor, rather than at Peepalgaon, where Ramdhan resided. Secondly, the evidence showed that on the day before the alleged execution, Ramdhan had been at Ghanegaon until the afternoon; Ghanegaon lies eight miles from Peepalgaon, and the nearest railway station is twenty miles away from Peepalgaon. The will is said to have been executed at about noon, making it highly improbable—though not impossible—that Ramdhan could have arrived at the place of execution by that time. Thirdly, the will was executed in the appellant’s house, and there was no evident reason for choosing that particular time, as there was no indication that Ramdhan’s health was poor. Moreover, the property involved was considerable, yet instead of engaging a trained lawyer to draft the will, the parties enlisted a layperson named Venkat Rajaram, whose profession was described as “Jagirdari.” The scribe as well as the attesting

In this case the Court observed that the individuals who signed as witnesses were not personal friends of Ramdhan, although they claimed to know him, but they appeared to be either friends or neighbours of the appellant. The appellant, however, asked the Court to accept that all these witnesses had been gathered by Ramdhan after his arrival in Hyderabad on the morning of 23 May. The Court found this suggestion to be highly unlikely because Ramdhan would not have possessed sufficient time to locate and obtain the signatures of those persons on the same day. Moreover, no explanation was offered as to why Ramdhan would have chosen only the friends and acquaintances of the appellant and not his own friends. The High Court further noted that the document purported to be the will was written on a very flimsy paper. The language of the document was an elaborate form of Urdu, which the appellant alleged had been dictated by Ramdhan. While the evidence showed that Ramdhan could speak Urdu, it also demonstrated that he was unable to read or write in Urdu. Consequently, the Court inferred that the Urdu he could speak was the simple, unlettered variety rather than the high‑flown form containing many Persian words, some of which indeed appeared in the document. The signature of Ramdhan was written in Modi script, a fact that would not be expected if he were proficient in Urdu. When the reverse side of the sheet was examined, the Court observed that the lower portions of the page contained increasingly cramped lines and that the spacing between lines diminished, even though there was ample space for Ramdhan’s signature to have been placed lower on the paper. From this observation it was reasonable to infer that the signature had already been present before the will was written. The condition of the paper and the manner in which the signature appeared suggested that a sheet already bearing Ramdhan’s signature had been provided to the scribe for the preparation of the alleged will.

The Court also considered the substantive content of the will and found it to be highly irregular. Although Ramdhan owned property valued at several lakhs of rupees, the will made no provision for a dwelling for his wife and allotted her a mere maintenance allowance of forty rupees per month. The bequests to his daughters were described as paltry, even though the daughters were married into prosperous families. In the absence of a male heir, customary practice would ordinarily require a father to allocate a substantial portion of his estate to his daughters, but this will left almost the entire property to a distant relative. The Court noted that this distant relative had neither been raised by the testator nor had he cared for Ramdhan during his later years. The appellant explained that the unusual allocations were due to a strained relationship between Ramdhan and his wife. It was further alleged that the relationship had deteriorated to such an extent that Ramdhan suspected his wife of attempting to poison him, a claim that the Court found to be part of the appellant’s narrative supporting the purported will.

In this case, the Court observed that the appellant claimed Ramdhan had suspected his wife, Sitabai, of attempting to poison him. Despite this suspicion, the Court noted that Ramdhan continued to reside with Sitabai until his death and did not make any arrangement for any other person to control the cash, gold, and silver ornaments estimated to be worth a few lakhs of rupees in the event of a sudden death. The Court further found no evidence that anyone other than Sitabai prepared Ramdhan’s food. To support the appellant’s allegation that Ramdhan and Sitabai were not on good terms, the primary evidence presented was that of the appellant himself, who had apparently taken an active role in procuring the execution of the document presented as Ramdhan’s will. The Court held that, irrespective of the appellant’s denial of involvement, the circumstances indicated his participation, especially because the will was drafted not only in Hyderabad, where the appellant lives and works, but also in his own house, with the individuals involved being either his friends or his neighbours. The Court emphasized that these circumstances must be considered when evaluating the testimony of the witnesses relating to the execution of the will. Moreover, the appellant was required to satisfy the Court’s conscience regarding the genuineness of the will by dispelling all suspicions naturally arising from the aforementioned circumstances. The Court found that no evidence was offered to achieve this, and the suspicion generated by the circumstances remained unremoved. The Court recounted that counsel for the appellant had presented the evidence of the appellant, the scribe, and three attesting witnesses, all of which had been critically examined by the High Court, which nevertheless rejected them for reasons stated in its judgment. The Court saw no basis to depart from that assessment. The Court also reiterated that the appellant had not provided any specific reason why Ramdhan would have thought of executing a will long before his death. If the purpose of the will had been to prevent his property from falling into Sitabai’s hands, the Court reasoned, Ramdhan would have taken steps to keep the movable assets out of her reach, such as arranging for their safekeeping or registering the will to preclude successful challenges to its authenticity. However, no such precautions were taken. Additionally, there was no irrefutable evidence that the will was produced immediately after Ramdhan’s death, which would be expected if it were genuine. Conversely, the Court noted a circumstance suggesting that the appellant had not even contemplated asserting a claim based on Ramdhan’s will until long after the death, namely the fact that Sitabai continued to possess the cash, gold, silver, and other movables after Ramdhan’s demise. While the appellant explained that he allowed her to retain possession on his behalf, the Court found this explanation wholly incredible. The appellant further stated that he filed suit because he discovered Sitabai disposing of portions of Ramdhan’s movable property in favour of her daughters and strangers after Ramdhan’s death, implying that Sitabai was more concerned with her daughters than with the appellant. The Court concluded that if the appellant had a genuine claim to Ramdhan’s property, he would not have permitted Sitabai to remain in possession of the movables; at the very least, he would have obtained from her a detailed list of the items and an admission that she held them only on his behalf and had no right to them.

In this case, the Court observed that Sitabai continued to hold the cash, gold, silver articles and other movable property even after Ramdhan had died. The appellant claimed that he had permitted Sitabai to retain possession on his behalf, but the Court found this explanation to be completely unbelievable. The appellant further stated that he filed the suit because he discovered Sitabai disposing of portions of Ramdhan’s movable assets in favour of her daughters and unrelated persons following Ramdhan’s death. This admission implied that, in the appellant’s view, Sitabai was more concerned with the interests of her daughters than with his own. The Court noted that if the appellant truly possessed a legitimate claim to Ramdhan’s estate, he would not have allowed Sitabai to remain in control of the movable property. Instead, the appellant should have secured from her a written inventory describing the assets and an acknowledgment that she held them solely at his direction and possessed no ownership rights. The Court explained that, had Sitabai refused to provide such a document, the appellant would naturally have commenced immediate legal proceedings to recover possession of the assets. The absence of any such inventory or acknowledgment therefore added another factor that undermined the authenticity of the alleged will. Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court was correct in rejecting the testimony of the attesting witnesses, the scribe, and the appellant concerning the execution of the will by Ramdhan. Accordingly, the Court upheld the High Court’s judgment, dismissed the appeal, and ordered that the costs of the appeal be borne by the appellant.