Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel vs Dabhi Ajithkumar Fulsinji And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 506 of 1964

Decision Date: 09/10/1964

Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal

In this case the matter was styled Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel versus Dabhi Ajithkumar Fulsinji and others and was decided on 9 October 1964 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice J. R. Mudholkar and the bench included Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice Raghubar Dayal. The petitioner was Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel and the respondents were Dabhi Ajithkumar Fulsinji together with other respondents. The decision was recorded under the citation 1965 AIR 669 and 1965 SCR (1) 712. The case also appears in several citator reports including F 1967 SC1182 (10), E 1968 SC 102 (4), F 1971 SC1262 (42), R 1971 SC2025 (52, 53), F 1972 SC 43 (2), R 1972 SC1954 (9), RF 1972 SC2195 (17) and R 1985 SC 89 (10). The substantive provision that formed the core of the dispute was section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which defines a corrupt practice involving the use of a religious symbol in election campaigning. The issues that arose before the Supreme Court concerned the right of a respondent to support a judgment on grounds that had been found against by the High Court, the purity of the election process, and the duty of both the Election Tribunal and the High Court to investigate allegations of corrupt practice.

The first respondent contended that the election of the appellant to an Assembly seat should be set aside on two principal grounds. First, it was alleged that the appellant had committed a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act by employing the Dhruva star, a religious symbol, as his election symbol and by circulating pamphlets that described the qualities of that star. Second, it was claimed that the nomination paper of the second respondent had been improperly accepted because the nominee had not attained the required age of twenty‑five years. The Election Tribunal rejected the allegation of corrupt practice but set aside the election on the basis of the age defect. On appeal, the Gujarat High Court rejected the age ground but set aside the election on the first ground, finding that the use of the Dhruva star constituted a corrupt practice. The Supreme Court, on appeal by special leave, made several holdings. It held that an election dispute differs in important respects from a private dispute because the constituency itself is a party to the matter; therefore the Election Tribunal must protect the constituency’s interests and must investigate any allegation of corrupt practice to determine whether the allegation is proved. However, where a party does not challenge the Tribunal’s findings, the High Court has no further duty to revisit those findings, as noted in paragraph 715 C‑E. The Court further held that the use of the Dhruva star and its description in the pamphlet did not amount to a corrupt practice under the statutory provision; the proposition that voters would automatically associate the symbol with a highly religious figure and thereby have their religious sentiments aroused was considered too speculative, as articulated in paragraph 723 A. Finally, the Court observed that once special leave is granted, an appeal lies before the Supreme Court, and while hearing such an appeal the Court exercises its civil jurisdiction where the matter originates from civil proceedings, as set out in paragraph 724 A‑B.

While hearing the appeal, the Court asserted that it possessed full authority to resolve every issue raised by the judgment under review, even though no specific rule such as Order XLI, rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure was expressly cited. The Court explained that it could create an appropriate procedure for the hearing by drawing on the general framework provided by the Code of Civil Procedure and selecting those provisions that were most suitable for the case. To remedy any procedural shortfall, the Court said that it was proper to rely on the Code’s general provisions. The Court supported this approach by referring to earlier decisions, including Jagdev Singh Sidhaniti v. Pratap Singh Daulta and Others (AIR 1965 SC 183) and Shubnath Deogram v. Ram Narain Prasad, and noted that the observations in Singh (AIR 1965 SC 141) were followed. The Court disapproved of the observations made in Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra & Others ([1955] 1 SCR 509, page 519) and mentioned Sri Baru Ram v. Shrimati Prasanni and others ([1959] SCR 1403) as a reference.

This matter was listed under civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 506 of 1964, filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 11 and 12 March 1963 of the Gujarat High Court in First Appeal No. 428 of 1962, which had affirmed the original decree. Counsel for the appellant, identified only by their role, represented the appellant, while counsel for the respondent represented the first respondent, and counsel for respondent No. 2 and the Intervener appeared on behalf of those parties. The judgment was delivered by Justice Mudholkar. The central issue for determination was whether the appellant could be held guilty of a corrupt practice under subsection (3) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, by virtue of describing his election symbol—a star—as the “Dhruva star” in pamphlets that he or his agents published and by setting out the qualities of the Dhruva star. The election to the Assembly seat involved three candidates: the appellant, respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2. The appellant received 20,062 votes, the first respondent obtained 15,190 votes and the second respondent secured 7,093 votes, resulting in the appellant’s declaration as elected on 26 February 1962. Following this outcome, the first respondent filed an election petition before the Election Commission, challenging the appellant’s election on five specific grounds: (1) the second respondent was alleged not to have reached the age of twenty‑five at the time of nomination scrutiny, rendering his nomination improper and materially affecting the election result because his votes would have otherwise gone to the first respondent; (2) the appellant and his agents were accused of committing corrupt practices by bribing voters and exerting undue influence; (3) the appellant and his agents were said to have procured bus number GTA 7673 for transporting voters from the village of Sodpur to and from the polling stations; (4) the appellant and his agents were alleged to have issued and widely distributed leaflets bearing the word “star” prefixed by “Dhruva,” intending to invoke religious sentiment and persuade voters to support him on religious grounds; and (5) the petition claimed that certain notifications issued by the Governor of Gujarat and the Election Commission had not been issued in accordance with the applicable legal provisions.

In the election petition the first respondent alleged, among other matters, that the appellant and his agents had procured bus number GTA 7673 to transport voters between the village of Sodpur and the polling booths. The first respondent also asserted that the appellant and his agents had prepared and widely circulated leaflets bearing a star symbol preceded by the word “Dhruva” with the intention of giving a religious impetus to the campaign and urging voters to cast their votes in the name of religion. Additionally, the first respondent contended that certain notifications issued by the Governor of the State of Gujarat and by the Election Commission had not been issued in accordance with the law.

The Election Tribunal examined these allegations and rejected every claim relating to corrupt practices made against the appellant. The Tribunal concluded that the distribution of the leaflets did not constitute a corrupt practice. Likewise, the Tribunal dismissed the first respondent’s challenge to the validity of the notifications issued by the Governor and the Election Commission. However, the Tribunal found that the nomination paper of the second respondent had been improperly accepted because the second respondent had not attained the age of twenty‑five at the date of scrutiny. The Tribunal held that this error had materially affected the result of the election and, on that basis, set aside the appellant’s election.

On appeal, the High Court overturned the Tribunal’s finding concerning the age of the second respondent. The High Court observed that the second respondent had indeed attained the age of twenty‑five on 6 January 1962, which occurred before the date of scrutiny, and therefore he was duly qualified to contest the election. Nonetheless, the High Court affirmed the Tribunal’s ultimate decision that the appellant and the Swatantra Party to which he belonged had committed a corrupt practice. The High Court specified that the corrupt practice consisted of appealing to the electorate on religious grounds and employing a religious symbol to further the appellant’s electoral prospects.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice K. T. Desai. In his judgment, citing page 245 of the paper book, he remarked that there were several other points on which the election of the Swatantra Party candidate had been challenged before the Election Tribunal. He noted that the counsel for the first respondent had limited his arguments to the allegation of a corrupt practice committed by the Swatantra Party with the consent of its candidate and had not advanced any of the other points. Chief Justice Desai explained that, although the Court could have examined those additional matters, it was unnecessary because the election was already liable to be declared void on the basis of the corrupt practice proven to have been committed with the appellant’s consent. He described this observation as noteworthy, given that the Tribunal had itself found against the first respondent on the other points, yet the first respondent had chosen to rely solely on the single issue that ultimately succeeded before the High Court.

In this case, the Court observed that the issue which finally received the endorsement of the High Court was the sole point on which the first respondent relied. The Court recognized that a dispute concerning an election differs in certain respects from a private dispute between litigants because the interests of the constituency are also implicated; consequently the Election Tribunal bears the responsibility of protecting those interests and, where allegations of corrupt practices are made against any candidate, it must investigate those allegations and determine whether they are substantiated. The Tribunal, after its examination, concluded that the other alleged corrupt practices were not proven. Because the counsel who appeared for respondent No 1 did not contest those findings, the High Court had no further obligation to reassess their accuracy. In the same manner, the Tribunal had rejected the first respondent’s claim that certain notifications were invalid, and the counsel for that respondent chose not to challenge that determination. The Court explained that the validity of a particular notification does not affect the question of the purity of the election, and therefore, when a party raises such a contention but elects not to pursue it, the matter ceases, leaving neither the Tribunal nor the High Court bound to investigate the issue. Accordingly, the Court limited its review in this appeal to two specific questions: first, whether the High Court’s view concerning the effect of the appellant’s use of the Dhruva star was correct; and second, whether the nomination of the second respondent as a candidate had been improperly accepted. The Court then turned to the statutory framework set out in Section 123 of the Act, which enumerates the acts deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of the legislation. Sub‑section (3) of that section provides: “The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act (3) The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language or the use of, or appeal to, religious symbols or the use of, or appeal to, national symbols, such as the national flag or the national emblem, for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate.” This provision addresses two categories: an appeal made on the basis of religion, caste, or similar grounds, and the use of, or appeal to, religious or national symbols. Both categories are prohibited in the electoral context. The allegation before the Court was that the appellant and his agents had violated this provision by employing or appealing to a religious symbol. Consequently, the central question for determination was whether the Dhruva star qualifies as a “religious symbol.” The Court referred to its earlier decision in Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Pratap Singh Daulta & Ors., noting that the inquiry must be conducted in two parts: first, whether the symbol possesses any special religious significance, and second, whether its placement on leaflets and pamphlets distributed during the campaign amounts to the use of a religious symbol.

In examining the matter, the Court considered two branches of enquiry: first, whether the symbol employed possessed any special religious significance; and second, whether its presentation on leaflets and pamphlets that were distributed amounted to the use of a religious symbol. The Court explained that if the Dhruva star lacked religious significance, then employing it in the manner described would not transform the conduct into the use of a religious symbol. The High Court had previously held that the Dhruva star represented a symbol of the Hindu religion. The Court observed that, should it be determined that no particular object or creature could be regarded as a religious symbol among Hindus, then the use of such an object in an election would fall outside the prohibition contained in section 123(3) of the Act. It emphasized that the purpose underlying the prohibition is to stir up religious sentiment by the use of or appeal to a religious symbol, and that conduct which does not tend to arouse such sentiment would not breach section 123(3). The Court noted that it was not disputed that the Election Commission had allotted the star as the election symbol of the Swatantra Party, which had nominated the appellant as its candidate. It was also undisputed that, in some of the leaflets and pamphlets distributed by or on behalf of the appellant, the election symbol of the Swatantra Party was described as the star Dhruva or the Pole Star. Moreover, it was undisputed that certain pamphlets, as referenced in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 183, set out characteristics associated with the star Dhruva, stating that “Dhruva means eternal. Dhruva means firm. Dhruva means guide. Dhruva means determined. Dhruva means one devoted to religion.” In Exhibit 63, which contained a translation of the appellant’s election manifesto, the text further read: “for free religion, free agriculture and free commerce, vote for none else but the ‘Dhruvano Taro’ that is Swatantra Party, at the coming elections.” The Court observed that no pamphlet or leaflet was alleged to have been distributed by or at the instance of the appellant that made a direct appeal to the religious sentiments of voters. Consequently, the short question before the Court was whether describing the election symbol as the Dhruva star and specifying its attributes could be said to have violated the provisions of sub‑section (3) of section 123. The Court then turned to the issue of whether the mythological figure Dhruva held any significance in the religious beliefs or practices of Hindus. It remarked that the High Court had examined the Vishnu Purana, the Mahabharata and the Bhagavata to extract the story of Dhruva and to describe his qualities, particularly his steadfast devotion to the creator, but that such detailed analysis appeared unnecessary because it led nowhere. In brief, the Court summarized that the story of Dhruva held that, as a result of his unwavering devotion and complete surrender to God, Dhruva obtained a boon that placed him in a unique position in the firmament, a position fixed in relation to the other celestial bodies, as promised to him in the Puranas.

The Court observed that the promise of Dhruva’s position in the sky was said to endure until the destruction of the universe, and that this description demonstrated that Dhruva was never elevated to the status of a deity. In other words, he did not become one of the thirty‑three crore gods that are said to compose the Hindu pantheon. Consequently, the Court questioned how linking Dhruva with the electoral star could be treated as an appeal to Hindu religious feeling. It noted that the five attributes commonly linked with Dhruva are indeed noble, but the Court found that none of those attributes is unique to Hinduism. The value of those qualities to a Hindu, the Court said, would be the same as the value of the same qualities to a person of any other faith or belief system. Accordingly, the Court expressed the view that the High Court had no justification for reading into the appellant’s symbol any meaning beyond what the symbol plainly conveyed. The Court acknowledged that, in a Hindu marriage ceremony, the bride and groom are indeed pointed to the Dhruva star and urged to remain steadfast in their mutual loyalty, drawing a parallel with Dhruva’s devotion to Vishnu. It also recognised that in a few other Hindu rites the example of Dhruva is cited or reference is made to his qualities. However, because Dhruva is not considered a deity or a Godhead, the Court held that any reference to him cannot possess religious significance, even for an orthodox, illiterate or otherwise religiously inclined Hindu. The Court further examined the claim that the phrase “Dharma‑priya” – a descriptor of Dhruva appearing in the leaflets and pamphlets – confers religious importance on the Dhruva star. While noting that the word “dharma” can denote religion, the Court pointed out that it can also signify duty. The High Court had interpreted the term to mean “one devoted to religion,” relying on passages from the Vishnu Purana, the Bhagavata and the Mahabharata, and on testimony that the Dhruva star is worshipped during marriages and house‑warming ceremonies. The Court concluded that such evidence merely establishes that Dhruva is revered as a great devotee of Vishnu, not that he is a divine being. It emphasized that worship of mortal figures is commonplace in the country and does not automatically acquire religious significance. Such mortal worship, the Court said, often stems from fear of authority or the hope of reward rather than from genuine religious sentiment. The Court further rejected the assertion that merely remembering or repeating Dhruva’s name has religious efficacy, observing that no evidence had been presented to show that this belief is widespread among Hindus. Therefore, the Court found no basis for holding that the simple mention of the Dhruva star would stir religious sentiment among Hindu voters. The Court then referred to the earlier decision in the case of Sidhanti, wherein the use of pennants bearing the inscription “Aum” or “OM” was held not to fall within the prohibition of Section 123(3) of the Act.

In its discussion, the Court observed that the syllable “Aum” does not in itself constitute a religious symbol, although it possesses great spiritual and mystical significance. According to the Upanishads, the primordial sound “Aum” gave rise to the phenomenal universe, and the universe both exists in and ultimately dissolves back into “Aum,” thereby encompassing God, Ishwara and the Supreme Brahman; consequently, the syllable is regarded as sacred by Hindus. Nevertheless, the Court held that the use of pennants bearing the inscription “Aum” did not amount to the use of, or an appeal to, a religious symbol. In the same vein, the Court stated that the distribution of pamphlets featuring a symbol lacking any religious sanctity could not be considered a use of, or an appeal to, a religious symbol. The Court further noted that the Election Commission had assigned the star as the official emblem of the Swatantra Party, and questioned whether that star would become a religious symbol merely because the leaflets described it as the “Dhruva star.” Referring to Webster’s New World Dictionary, the Court explained that a symbol is something that stands for or represents another thing, giving examples such as a dove representing peace and the cross representing Christianity. The star, standing alone, functioned as the Swatantra Party’s emblem, and the Court held that it would not become a religious symbol unless, like the cross, it were widely regarded as a symbol of the Hindu religion through its association with Dhruva. The Court observed that it is impossible to declare any particular object, bird or animal as a “symbol of the Hindu religion,” because the basic concept of Hinduism holds that the supreme being pervades every inanimate object, plant, creature and person, rendering the entire creation a manifestation of the divine. Accordingly, the Court reasoned that no single object can be said to represent the Hindu religion. While acknowledging that various deities in the Hindu pantheon are linked with specific objects—such as Shiva with a trident and a coiled cobra, Vishnu with the serpent Shesha and the eagle as his vehicle, and Lakshmi with the lotus—the Court concluded that the use of a lotus, cobra, trident or similar item as an election symbol does not necessarily constitute an appeal to the religious sentiments of the electorate. Finally, the Court recalled its earlier determination in Shubnath Deogram v. Ram Narain Prasad & Ors., where the appellant who had

In the earlier case, the appellant had been elected to the Bihar Legislative Assembly. He belonged to the Ho community, which is classified as an Adibasi group, and the voters in his constituency were predominantly members of the Ho community as well as members of the Munda and Oraon communities. The Election Commission had assigned the emblem of a cock to the political party that supported the appellant. Although a cock did not constitute a religious symbol for the Adibasis, it was an essential element of the religious ceremonies that they performed while worshipping certain deities. The party distributed leaflets written in verse, and these leaflets employed the image of a cock to appeal for votes from the electorate. The majority of the judges held that the leaflet contained an appeal to voters on the ground of religion, and consequently they found the appellant guilty of a corrupt practice falling within sub‑section (3) of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act. The court’s conclusion was not based merely on the fact that the cock symbol had been used; rather, it was based on the manner in which the appeal for votes was framed through the cock. The leaflet included a passage in which the cock said, “Give me chara in the shape of voter I am victorious. Do not forget me, otherwise I tell, your sons of men will suffer eternal miseries.” The court interpreted this passage to mean that the deities would be pleased if the voters complied, because the cock was intended for sacrifice to those deities, and that the deities would be displeased if the voters failed to do so. Accordingly, the case was distinguished from the present matter. The court also quoted the observations of Justice Subba Rao on the meaning of the expression “appealing to the religious sentiment.” At page 965, Justice Subba Rao explained that a distinction must be drawn between canvassing on the basis of religion and seeking votes by using graphic or picturesque language that employs analogies from religious lore. He illustrated that a candidate may address an electorate comprising Hindus, Muslims, Christians and others, and say that he would sacrifice his life for his constituency just as Christ sacrificed his life to redeem the world, or that, like Rama, he would defeat corruption and nepotism, or that he would sacrifice himself as a goat before Kali to bring happiness and prosperity. Although such similes are drawn from religion, they do not constitute a direct or indirect appeal for votes on religious grounds. The court cited this judgment to emphasize that a reference to prophets, religions, deities, their qualities or deeds does not automatically amount to an appeal to the religious sentiment of the electorate.

The Court explained that merely invoking religious sentiment is insufficient to constitute an appeal to the electorate’s religious feelings; a further element must be demonstrated, a point that the majority of judges who decided the earlier case had expressly recognised. For example, if illiterate, orthodox or fanatical voters are told that their religion will be endangered or that they will endure miseries or calamities unless they cast their vote for a specified candidate, such a statement clearly amounts to an appeal to religious sentiment. In the same way, a statement that the wrath of God or a deity will be visited upon voters who fail to vote in a particular manner, or that blessings from God or a deity will be granted to those who vote in a prescribed way, also constitutes an appeal to religious sentiment. Likewise, if voters are urged to support a candidate whose election symbol is linked with a particular religion—such as the Cross being associated with Christianity—this would involve the use of a religious symbol for the purpose of obtaining votes. However, where no distinct symbol can be tied to a religion, as is the case with Hinduism, the mere use of a symbol even if it is associated with a deity cannot, without additional factors, be treated as a corrupt practice within the meaning of subsection (3) of section 123 of the Act. The Court illustrated that when an object, plant, bird or animal associated with a deity is employed in a manner that suggests votes are being solicited in the name of that deity, or that the deity’s displeasure will result if a voter does not comply with the appeal, such usage may be characterised as an appeal in the name of religion. By contrast, a symbol standing alone, without any accompanying exhortation, cannot be regarded as an appeal in the name of religion. The Court further discussed how election literature should be interpreted, referring to its earlier decision in Kultar Singh v. Mukhtiar Singh. In that case the issue was whether, on a fair and reasonable construction, a poster issued by an Akali candidate for the Punjab Legislative Assembly election amounted to a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Act. The poster declared that at a critical juncture it was the duty of the predominantly Sikh electorate to uphold the honour of the Panth, refrain from criticising the weaknesses of the Panth’s leaders, and defeat the opponents of the Panth in the general elections. The Court observed that the Akali Dal was recognised as a political party for electoral purposes even though all its members were Sikhs. It then noted: “So long as law does not prohibit the formation of such parties and in fact recognises them for the…”

In considering the purpose of election and parliamentary life, the Court observed that it is necessary to remember that an appeal made by candidates of parties such as those reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 141 may, if successful, lead to the election of those parties and, in an indirect manner, may be influenced by considerations of religion, race, caste, community or language. The Court noted that this infirmity cannot perhaps be avoided so long as parties are permitted to function and are recognised even though their composition may be predominantly based on membership of particular communities or religions. Consequently, the Court explained that when assessing whether a specific appeal made by a candidate falls within the mischief of section 123(3) of the Act, courts should not be overly zealous in reading into the words used in the appeal anything more than can be attributed to them on a fair and reasonable construction. The Court emphasized that the purport and effect of such appeals must be determined in a fair, objective and reasonable manner.

The Court further observed that in reading election documents it would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that the electoral atmosphere is usually surcharged with partisan feelings and emotions, and that the use of hyperboles, exaggerated language, metaphors and extravagant expressions in attacking opponents is part of the political “game.” Accordingly, when the effect of speeches delivered or pamphlets distributed at election meetings is examined in the cold atmosphere of a judicial chamber, some allowance must be made, and the impugned speeches or pamphlets must be construed in that light. The Court affirmed that election literature should neither be judged strictly nor taken literally, and that the greater reason for this approach is that courts ought not to read more into such literature than what appears on its face.

However, the Court criticised the High Court for having read more into the pamphlets than the pamphlets actually contain. According to the Court’s reading of the judgment of Desai C.J., the High Court appeared to equate the “Pole Star” with the devotion of Dhruva, to describe Dhruva as a highly religious person, and to interpret the leaflet’s statement that Dhruva stands for five things as a reference to his religious qualities. The High Court then inferred that such a reference would bring to the voter’s mind the religious virtues of Dhruva and that the symbol was intended to evoke religious sentiment and affect the voters’ religious susceptibilities. The Court pointed out that it had already explained what Dhruva stands for and held that to conclude that voters who saw or read these leaflets were likely to conjure up the picture of a highly religious person, thereby arousing their religious sentiments, was a far‑fetched conclusion that could not be justified. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court was in error in reversing the Tribunal’s judgment on this point.

The appellant was represented by counsel who argued that the first respondent lacked the standing to question the correctness of the finding because the respondent had not filed an appeal against that finding. The objection was grounded in the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra & Ors., a decision that also involved an election‑related appeal. The respondent’s counsel attempted to uphold the Tribunal’s order by relying on grounds that the Tribunal itself had rejected in favor of the appellant. The Supreme Court, however, refused to allow that line of argument, holding that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to appeals that arise under special leave granted pursuant to Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court expressly stated that no appeal had been filed on behalf of the respondents and therefore the Court could not entertain a re‑argument of the issue. The same principle was later invoked by the appellant in the matter of Sri Baru Ram v. Shrimati Prasanni & Ors., where the respondents’ counsel, Mr Doabia, contested the earlier decision. In that case the Court observed that the contention had some apparent merit but that it was unnecessary to resolve the point in the pending appeal. The Court explained that the objection raised by Mr Aggarwal presumed that the first respondent should have first filed a petition for special leave to appeal the High Court’s finding on the specific question. If that requirement were satisfied, the respondent’s later application for leave to raise additional grounds could be treated as a petition for special leave to appeal that finding, and the delay in filing could be condoned, as noted on page 1417 of the report.

The Division Bench that considered the present matter expressly followed the earlier Division Bench on the ground that it felt bound by the prior decision. The present Court, however, expressed the view that the earlier decision did not correctly reflect the true legal position. It emphasized that once special leave is granted, a formal appeal is created before the Supreme Court, and the Court exercises its civil jurisdiction in hearing that appeal. Although the Supreme Court’s own Rules of Court do not contain a provision directly comparable to Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure—which would allow a party to support the judgment appealed against on a ground already rejected by that judgment—the nearest analogous rule is Order XVIII, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules. That rule requires parties to submit a statement of case. Sub‑rule (1) of Order XVIII, Rule 3 mandates that Part I of the statement set out the parties’ contentions as well as the points of law and fact that arise in the appeal, while Part II must contain the propositions of law that the party intends to rely upon, together with the authorities supporting those propositions. The Court indicated that there is no justification for limiting the application of this rule solely to those points that were decided in the party’s favour. Consequently, the Court affirmed that it possesses the authority to address all issues arising from the judgment under appeal, even in the absence of a specific provision mirroring Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that it may devise appropriate procedural measures, drawing upon general procedural law, to remedy any procedural deficiency.

The Court explained that the statement of case must contain the legal propositions that a party wishes to rely upon in support of its contentions, together with the authorities that back those propositions. The Court observed that there was no justification for restricting the application of this rule solely to those contentions that relate to points which the lower judgment had decided in the party’s favour. It further stated that, while hearing an appeal, the Court possessed the authority to consider every point that arose from the judgment that was being appealed, even though there was no specific rule comparable to rule XLI, paragraph 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the absence of such an express provision, the Court could fashion an appropriate procedure for the hearing. The Court added that the most suitable way to remedy any deficiency was to draw on the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and to adopt those provisions that were applicable to the case. The Court also noted that, ordinarily, a party who had obtained a favorable judgment in the lower court would not be granted special leave to appeal that judgment. Consequently, considerations of justice required that, in appropriate circumstances, the Court should allow a party who finds himself in that position to support the judgment in his favour even on grounds that had been rejected by the lower court. The Court then indicated that, in Vasisht Narain Sharma’s case (1), a too‑narrow view of the Court’s powers had been taken and that it was now overruling the preliminary objection raised by Mr S T Desai. Regarding the age of the second respondent, the Court held that the High Court had fully examined the evidence and had correctly rejected the entries in the birth and death register kept by the police, as recorded in Patel, and had instead accepted the school certificates that stated the respondent’s date of birth, referencing (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 509. The Court observed that no further comment was necessary because the counsel for the first respondent had not seriously contested the High Court’s finding. On this basis, the Court concluded that no ground existed to set aside the appellant’s election, to allow the appeal, to overturn the decisions of the High Court and the Election Tribunal, and therefore the election petition was dismissed with costs awarded throughout. The appeal was allowed.