Ramachandra Narasimha Kulkarni vs State Of Mysore

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 202 of 1962

Decision Date: 01/04/1964

Coram: K. Subba Rao, K. C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal

In the matter of Ramachandra Narasimha Kulkarni versus the State of Mysore, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 1 April 1964. The opinion was authored by Justice K C Das Gupta, with Justice Raghubar Dayal also constituting the bench. The parties are identified as the petitioner, Ramachandra Narasimha Kulkarni, and the respondent, the State of Mysore. The decision is reported in the citations 1964 AIR 1701 and 1964 SCR (7) 606. The case concerns the interpretation of the Post Offices Act, 1898 (VI of 1898), specifically Section 53, regarding the offence of wilfully detaining postal articles.

The appellant, who served as a registration clerk in a post office, was prosecuted on the allegation that he stole half of a ten‑rupee note that was enclosed in a registered letter. The prosecution further alleged that he altered a petition accompanying the letter, exchanged the petition, and detained the registered letter for one day with the purpose of committing the theft and effecting the alteration. Accordingly, the appellant was charged under Sections 52, 53 and 54 of the Post Offices Act, 1898. At trial before the Sessions Judge, the appellant was acquitted of the offence under Section 52 but was convicted of the offences under Sections 53 and 55. On appeal to the High Court, the conviction under Section 55 was set aside, while the conviction under Section 53 was upheld. The appellant then appealed to this Court, contending that even if he detained the envelope, the detention could not be described as “wilful” unless it was shown that he acted with a specific purpose. He argued that the prosecution had failed to prove any such purpose and therefore the charge under Section 53 should not stand.

The Court, speaking through Justices K Subba Rao and K C Das Gupta, held that the meaning of the words “wilful” or “wilfully” must be determined by a careful examination of the legislative scheme and the context in which the terms appear. The Court referred to the earlier authorities of Re Young and Harston (31 Ch. D. 174), Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills ([1933] (2) K.B. 669), United States of America v. Harry Murdock (78 Law Ed. 689), Hudson v. Official Liquidator (A.I.R. 1929 All. 826), In re T M K Govindarajulu Chetty (1951 2 S.T.C. 27) and In re Jayarama Chettiar (I.L.R. 1949 Mad. 121). The Court observed that a comparison of the various sections of the Act demonstrates that the legislature regarded wilful detention of postal articles as a more serious offence than any of the offences enumerated in Chapter X, and accordingly prescribed a comparatively severe punishment. Consequently, it was reasonable to infer that when the word “wilfully” was employed in Section 53, the legislature intended that the detention would be punishable only if it was carried out for some purpose, not merely through negligence or inadvertence.

In the opinion of the majority, the word “wilfully” would apply only where the detention of a postal article was carried out for some purpose. The prosecution, however, affirmed that the purpose in the present case was the theft of a ten‑rupee note, yet the evidence did not establish that such a purpose existed. Moreover, the detention was not shown to have been deliberate. Consequently, the majority concluded that the appellant could not be said to have detained the article wilfully.

In a dissenting judgment, Justice Raghubar Dayal explained that the legislature expressly states the purpose behind an act when it wishes that purpose to form an element of the offence, as it does, for example, in section 52. He observed that if the terms “wilful” or “wilfully” were intended in the Act to be synonymous with an act performed deliberately and for a particular purpose, the legislature could have substituted the expression “wilful” for the broader phrase “for any purpose whatsoever.” The legislature did not do so, although it employed the term in section 53. Justice Dayal further noted that the simple act of detaining a postal article by any person other than a postal officer is punishable only with a fine under section 67, whereas a higher punishment is provided under section 53 because the offender is a postal officer who possesses the opportunity to detain articles and who acts contrary to his official duties. He clarified that the expression “wilfully” in section 53 signifies “intentionally and deliberately” and does not include accidental or negligent conduct. Applying the facts of the case, Justice Dayal found that the appellant deliberately detained the registered letter, with his intention and deliberation directed toward retaining the letter and preventing its forwarding on the day it should have been mailed. He argued that every intentional and relevant act must be performed with some purpose or object, and therefore the appellant obtained the letter wilfully and was guilty of the offence under section 53. The dissent cited several authorities, including Taylor v. Vergette, Reg. v. Senior, Tamboli v. Great India Peninsular Railway Company, Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills Ltd., Hudson v. Official Liquidator, and T. N. K. Govindarajulu Chetty, to support this reasoning.

The Court noted that on 18 October 1955 a registered letter containing half of a ten‑rupee note and a petition on behalf of one Muppayyagonda arrived at the Haveri Post Office at 4.30 p.m. from the Branch Post Office at Kabbur. At that time the appellant, who was a registration clerk at Haveri, retained the registered envelope instead of dispatching it the same day as required. He dispatched the envelope only on the following day. The prosecution alleged that the appellant removed the half‑rupee note from the envelope, and to conceal his misconduct he altered the petition inside the envelope as well as the list of registered articles. According to the prosecution, these alterations were discovered when the Reserve Bank of India, to which the envelope was addressed, made inquiries after finding that no note had been enclosed with the petition. The appellant admitted that the envelope had been received at Haveri on 18 October 1955 and that he had not dispatched it on that date. He explained that the envelope arrived at about 5.30 p.m., which was too late for dispatch on the same day, and that he had duly dispatched it on 19 October. After considering the evidence, the Sessions Judge held that the charge under section 52 of the Indian Post Office Act for theft of the currency note and for secreting the registered articles had not been proved, and therefore acquitted the appellant of that charge. However, the Judge found that the appellant had fraudulently altered the list of registered articles, thereby committing an offence under section 55, and that he had willfully detained the envelope, constituting an offence under section 53. Consequently, the appellant was convicted of the offences under sections 53 and 55 and was sentenced to two months’ imprisonment for each charge, with the sentences directed to run concurrently.

The High Court of Mysore, on appeal, set aside the conviction under section 55, concluding that the prosecution had not established that the appellant had altered the list of registered articles. The High Court nevertheless affirmed the conviction under section 53, holding that the appellant’s willful detention of the envelope had been proved, even though the alleged alterations were not. The appellant, Ramachandra Narasimha Kulkarni, then appealed the High Court’s decision. Counsel for the appellant argued that because the prosecution had failed to prove either the theft of the note or the alterations in the list of registered articles, the appellant could not be said to have committed any offence under section 53. The counsel contended that even assuming the envelope was detained by the appellant, the element of “wilful” detention required a specific purpose, which the prosecution had not demonstrated. Since the purpose alleged—namely, theft of the note and subsequent alteration to conceal it—had not been established, the counsel maintained that the detention was at most inadvertent or due to mere carelessness, and therefore could not satisfy the statutory requirement of wilful detention.

It was submitted that the prosecution alleged the appellant’s purpose was to steal the currency note and, in order to conceal that theft, to alter the list of registered articles; however, the learned counsel argued that neither of those purposes had been proved. Accordingly, the counsel maintained that the detention of the envelope must be regarded as having occurred without any deliberate intention, resulting merely from inadvertence or simple carelessness, and that such a circumstance could not amount to a wilful detention. The counsel further explained that the terms “wilful” and “wilfully” appear in numerous statutes and have been examined by courts both in this country and abroad, with the meaning assigned to them varying according to the context in which they are used. In some cases, any intentional act has been described as a wilful act, as observed in the decision cited as Re Young and Harston (1). In other authorities, the word has been said to imply bad conduct or improper action, though it does not necessarily carry a connotation of blame, as noted in Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills (2). The term has also been interpreted to mean that the act was performed with a corrupt motive, without a justifiable excuse, or in a stubborn, obstinate, or perverse manner, as illustrated in United States of America v. Harry Murdock (3). Certain judgments have emphasized the need for deliberation or a reckless disregard of duty in order to classify conduct as wilful, for example in Hudson v. Official Liquidator (4) and In re T.N.K. Govindarajulu Chetty (5). In the latter case, the Madras High Court held that a false return could not be considered a wilful submission unless the dealer deliberately prepared the return knowing that a taxable item was being excluded. By contrast, another bench of the same High Court took a different view in In re Jayarama Chettiar (6), holding that when a taxpayer, under the mistaken belief that an item was not taxable, nevertheless omits it from the return while fully aware that the omission is being made, the omission is wilful. A survey of these authorities demonstrates that the guiding principle is that the meaning of “wilful” or “wilfully” must be determined by a close examination of the legislative scheme and the specific context in which the words occur. Turning to the Indian Post Office Act, the judgment observed that section 53 criminalises the wilful detention or delay of a postal article by a post‑office officer, and that this provision is one among twenty‑one sections creating offences under the Act, the other sections being listed as sections 49, 31 Ch. D. 174, 1933(2) K.B. 669, 78 Law E. 389, A.I.R. 1929 All. 826, 1951 2 S.T.C. 27, and I.L.R. 1949 Madras 121, covering the range L/P(D)ISCI‑20 to 56 and 58.

Chapter X of the Indian Post Office Act contains twenty‑one offences. The provisions listed in sections 49, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66 and 67 prescribe punishment solely by way of a fine. The provisions listed in sections 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 68 and 69 prescribe punishment by way of both fine and imprisonment. Among these, the offence under section 53 alone may attract imprisonment for a term that may extend to seven years. The offences under sections 53, 54, 55, 56, 60 and 68 may each be punished with imprisonment for a term that may extend to two years. The offences under sections 61 and 62 may each be punished with imprisonment for a term that may extend to one year, while the offences under sections 51 and 69 may each be punished with imprisonment for a term that may extend to six months only. An offence under section 50 is punishable by imprisonment for a term that may extend to one month or by a fine of up to Rs 50. This gradation of punishments shows that the legislature considered the offence of wilful detention of a postal article, found in section 52, to be more serious than many other offences contained in the same chapter.

For example, the delay in the conveyance or delivery of a mail bag or any other postal article by a person employed to carry it is punished only by a fine of Rs 501 under section 49. Withdrawal from office without permission or without giving one month’s written notice by a person employed to carry or deliver a mail bag or postal article is punishable only by imprisonment for a term that may extend to one month or by a fine of Rs 501. Making a false entry in the register with the intention of creating the belief that an article has been delivered is punishable only by imprisonment for a term that may extend to six months or by a fine of Rs 100. In contrast, wilful detention of a postal article is punishable by imprisonment for a term that may extend to two years. It would be unreasonable to think that the legislature would impose such a heavy penalty for detention that was not deliberate and purposeful, while prescribing lighter penalties for the offences mentioned in sections 49, 50 and 51. The comparatively severe punishment of two years’ imprisonment for wilful detention, together with the lighter punishments for the other offences, leads to the conclusion that the legislature used the word “wilful” to refer only to detention that was deliberate and pursued for some purpose.

It is also noteworthy that the preceding provision, section 52, punishes theft of a postal article or dishonest misappropriation of the same, and additionally punishes the seizure, destruction or discarding of any postal article when done “for any purpose whatsoever.” Consequently, it is reasonable to infer that when the legislature employed the term “wilfully” in section 53, it similarly intended that the detention would be punishable only when it was carried out with a specific purpose.

In this case the Court explained that detention of a postal article would be punishable only when it was carried out for some purpose. Applying that principle to the facts before it, the Court observed that the prosecution had alleged a specific purpose, namely the intention to steal the contents of the envelope, and that this alleged purpose was said to be the motive for detaining the postal article. However, the Court found that the existence of such a purpose had not been proven. No evidence was presented indicating any other purpose that the appellant might have had in detaining the article. Consequently, the Court concluded that the detention could not be said to have been deliberate or purposeful; instead it must have resulted from inadvertence, carelessness or negligence. Because the detention was not intentional, the appellant could not be said to have detained or delayed the article wilfully. On that basis the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court, and ordered that the appellant be acquitted of the charge.

Justice Raghuvar Dayal then identified the principal issue for determination as the meaning of the expression “wilfully detains or delays” in section 53 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 (Act VI of 1898). The Justice expressed disagreement with the view that the phrase required detention to be both deliberate and for some purpose. Instead, the Justice held that detention or delay would be characterised as “wilful” when it was intentional and deliberate on the part of the post‑office officer, as opposed to a delay caused by negligence or inadvertence. The Court noted that other statutes have interpreted the word “wilful” or “wilfully” in a similar fashion. The Justice referred to several authorities for support. In Taylor v. Vergette (1861) 30 L.J. Ex. 400, “wilful delay” was interpreted to mean “intentional delay”. The Court observed that “wilfully” signifies that an act is performed deliberately and intentionally, not by accident or inadvertence, and that the mind of the person committing the act is aligned with it. In Tamboli v. Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company, L.R. 55 I.A. 67 = I.L.R. 52 Bom. 169, the Privy Council examined the term “wilful neglect” in assessing the liability of the railway administration and endorsed the view expressed by Lord Russell in Reg. v. Senior, [1889] 1 Q.B. 283, 290. The Court also cited Wheeler v. New Merton Board Mills, Ltd., where it was observed that a “wilful act” is plain English for an intentional act, and while “wilful” and “intentional” are synonymous, “wilful” is more commonly used in modern speech to describe misconduct rather than good conduct, though it does not necessarily imply moral turpitude. Finally, the Court mentioned Hudson v. Official Liquidator, where “wilful default” was construed, reinforcing the principle that “wilful” denotes intentionality and deliberation rather than mere accident or error.

In the passage quoted on page nine hundred and thirty, the Court explained that the adjective “wilful” appearing in the expression “wilful acts or defaults” is intended merely as a descriptive term rather than as a precise definition. The purpose of the description, according to the Court, is to convey that a default arises because the person responsible either exercised his own volition or failed to act out of a passive indifference, even though the person knew or ought to have known that his conduct was likely to cause loss or injury. The Court further observed that the word does not automatically carry a connotation of moral corruption. It stressed that any element of accident, inadvertence, or an honest mistake in judgment must be ruled out. Consequently, the default must be the product of a deliberate intention or of a reckless omission. The Court therefore described “wilful default” as indicating misconduct in the conduct of business or in the performance of duty, manifested by a deliberate failure to act or by a reckless disregard of whether such act or omission constituted a breach of duty. This interpretation was subsequently adopted by the Madras High Court in the matter of T.N.K. Govindarajulu Chetty, In re. The Court noted that the use of the terms “wilful” and “wilfully” in the various provisions of the Act does not create any divergent meaning of those words. For example, Section 6 of the Act, among other things, states that no officer of the Post Office shall be held liable for any loss, mis‑delivery, delay or damage unless the loss was caused by the officer’s fraud or by his wilful act or default. The same principle is reflected in Section 48(c), which provides that no suit or other legal proceeding may be brought against the Government or any post office officer concerning the payment of a money order that is refused or delayed because of accidental neglect, omission, mistake, or any cause other than the officer’s fraud or wilful act or default. This provision thereby draws a clear distinction between an officer’s wilful act or default and an act that results merely from accidental neglect, omission or mistake. Furthermore, Sections 49 through 70 of the Act enumerate various offences. Sections 49, 50 and 51 specifically address offences committed by persons employed to carry or deliver any mail bag or postal article during the transmission of post. These sections therefore create offences applicable to carriers of postal articles. Such offences may be committed both by officers of the postal department and by individuals who are not officers. Where an act described in these sections also falls within the scope of other provisions that apply exclusively to postal officers, the offence will naturally be dealt with under those exclusive provisions. Accordingly, the individuals who fall within the ambit of Sections 49 to 51 or other sections that prescribe lighter punishments are those who are not officers of the postal department but who are involved in any aspect of the transmission of the post.

In this case the Court explained that clause (c) of section 49 criminalises the act of loitering or causing any delay in the conveyance or delivery of a mail bag or any postal article, thereby stressing that postal items must be transported promptly. The provisions that follow, namely sections 52 to 66, deal specifically with offences committed by officers of a post office. Section 52 prescribes punishment for a range of serious conduct including theft, dishonest misappropriation, and, for any purpose whatsoever, the secret disposal, destruction or outright throwing away of a postal article while it is in transmission, or of anything contained in that article. The statute makes this offence punishable by imprisonment for up to seven years together with a fine, and the Court noted that this is the most severe offence contemplated in the chapter. The judgment further observed that the act of secreting, destroying or throwing away a postal article for any purpose is itself an offence, because an act done with a purpose must necessarily be a deliberate act, and a deliberate act must be carried out with some purpose. The legislature, when it intended the purpose behind an act to be an essential element of the offence, expressly stated this requirement. The Court pointed out that if the words “wilful” or “wilfully” had been used in the Act as a synonym for a deliberately purposeful act, the phrase “wilfully” could have been employed in place of “for any purpose whatsoever”. However, the legislature chose not to do so, even though it employed the word “wilful” in the very next provision, namely section 53. Section 53 reads as follows:.lm15 “Whoever, being an officer of the Post Office, contrary to his duty, opens, or causes or suffers to be opened, any postal article in course of transmission by post, or wilfully detains or delays or causes or suffers to be detained or delayed any such postal article, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine or with both: Provided that nothing in this section shall extend to the opening, detaining or delaying of any postal article under the authority of this Act or in obedience to the order in writing of the Central Government or the direction of a competent Court.” Sections 54, 55 and 56 each make certain acts that are done fraudulently, knowingly or with intent punishable by imprisonment for up to two years or by a fine. In particular, section 55 criminalises the fraudulent alteration, secret disposal or destruction of a document that a post‑office officer is entrusted to keep, prescribing imprisonment for up to two years together with a fine. The Court remarked that such conduct is considered less heinous than the offence of secreting, destroying or throwing away any postal article in transmission for any purpose whatsoever.

The Court then turned to section 66(1), which addresses the liability of the master of a ship. It stated that where, in certain circumstances, the master knowingly possesses in his baggage, or otherwise has custody of, any postal article that falls within the exclusive privilege conferred on the Central Government by section 4, he is punishable with a fine that may extend to fifty rupees for each such postal article. The judgment emphasised that this provision makes a knowingly committed act an offence, even though the conduct does not involve the more serious theft or destruction contemplated in section 52. The provision therefore creates a monetary penalty rather than imprisonment, reflecting the legislature’s intention to penalise the mere knowledge of possessing postal articles without proper authority. By highlighting the distinction between offences that require a purposeful or wilful act and those that are punished merely on the basis of knowledge, the Court clarified the scope of liability for postal officers and other persons who handle postal articles under the statutory scheme.

The Court explained that sub‑section (2) of section 66 made the detention of any postal article punishable when the detention occurred after an officer of the post office had issued a demand for its delivery. According to this provision, the mere fact of detaining the article after a demand was made attracted a penalty, irrespective of the officer’s intention or purpose in making the detention. Section 67 was described as creating a similar offence by criminalising the detention of mails or any postal article while they were in the course of transmission by post, except in the various situations that the section itself enumerated. In other words, the simple act of detaining the article, without regard to the circumstances of the detention, was deemed an offence unless one of the statutory exceptions applied. Section 68 was then quoted in full: “Whoever, fraudulently retains, or wilfully secretes or makes away with, or keeps or detains, or when required by an officer of the post office, neglects or refuses to deliver up, any postal article in course of transmission by post which ought to have been delivered to any other person, or a mail bag containing a postal, article, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be punishable with fine.” The Court noted that the expression ‘wilfully’ in the phrase ‘wilfully secretes any postal article in the course of transmission by post’ made that conduct an offence under this section. By comparing the language of section 52 with that of section 68, the Court observed that the legislature employed the terms ‘wilfully’ and ‘for any purpose whatsoever’ in distinct senses. The term ‘wilfully’ was held to be separate from the term ‘maliciously’, and it was used in addition to the phrase ‘with intent to injure any person’. Thus the particular purpose or intent formed an additional ingredient of the offence together with the element of wilful conduct.

The Court further examined sections 6 and 48(c), which provided that an officer of a post office was liable for loss, misdelivery, delay, or damage to any postal article in the course of transmission, or for the delay in the payment of a money order, only when such loss or delay resulted from the officer’s wilful act or default. Consequently, a person who suffered loss, misdelivery, or damage could not maintain a claim against a postal officer if the adverse event arose from circumstances that could not be described as the officer’s wilful act or default. The Court emphasized that it was irrelevant to the addressee or recipient of an article in transit whether the officer’s wilful act or default was motivated by a particular purpose or whether the officer succeeded in achieving that purpose. The Court held that a claimant would succeed in his claim only if the postal officer deliberately failed to act in the manner required by the Act or the rules made thereunder, or if the officer deliberately acted in breach of the duties entrusted to him. In either situation, the officer’s conduct was characterised as wilful because it involved an intentional violation of his statutory duty.

The Court explained that for an offence under section 53 of the Act to arise, the postal officer must detain a postal article in a way that is expressly prohibited and must do so with a deliberate intention, not merely by accident or inadvertence. Section 53 requires that the officer “wilfully detains” the article and that such detention be contrary to the duty imposed on the officer by the Act or subordinate rules. Under section 21(2)(c) the Central Government is empowered to make rules governing the detention and disposal of articles while they are in transmission by post under specified circumstances. Additional provisions, namely sections 22(1), 23, 26, 27B and 37(2), enumerate the situations in which a postal article may be lawfully detained or delayed; the Court noted that it was unnecessary to recite those circumstances in detail. The phrase “contrary to his duty” applies both to the improper opening of a postal article and to its improper detention. The first essential element of the offence under section 53 is therefore that the officer acts contrary to his duty. The Court observed, however, that an act contrary to duty may also occur through accident or negligence, where the officer is unaware of the breach or does not consciously intend it. The legislature, recognizing this possibility, deliberately chose not to criminalise accidental or negligent conduct. Consequently, only a detention that is performed wilfully—meaning the officer consciously applied his mind to the act and carried it out deliberately with the intention of doing so—shall attract punishment. By contrast, the mere detention of mails or postal articles by a person who is not a postal officer is punishable only by a fine under section 67 of the Act. This distinction underscores the severity of the punishment prescribed by section 53, because it targets a postal officer who, by virtue of his position, has the opportunity to detain articles and who willfully acts against his duty.

The Court further examined the proviso to section 53, which states that the main provisions do not extend to the opening, detention or delay of any postal article when such acts are performed under the authority of the Act, pursuant to a written order of the Central Government, or in compliance with a direction of a competent Court. The Court held that acts carried out under those authorised circumstances are unquestionably deliberate but lack any criminal purpose, and therefore fall outside the scope of the offence. The Court also addressed the expression “for any purpose whatsoever” in section 52, noting that it is not a guide to interpreting “wilfully” in section 53. The wording in section 52 was intended to contrast with the mens rea required for theft or dishonest misappropriation; it signals that an act of concealing, destroying or discarding a postal article will be punishable when done with any purpose, whatever that purpose may be. Accordingly, the Court construed “wilfully” in section 53 to mean “intentionally and deliberately,” excluding accidental or negligent conduct. Applying this interpretation, the Court concluded that the appellant’s conduct satisfied the requirement of wilful detention and therefore affirmed the conviction under section 53.

The Court was further of the opinion that even if the expression “wilfully detains” in section 53 of the Act were to be interpreted as requiring a detention that is both deliberate and undertaken for some purpose, the appellant was not entitled to an acquittal on the basis of the findings reached by the lower courts. In the ordinary course of his business, the appellant would have forwarded the registered letter by mail on 18 October 1955 when the letter was received at the usual hour; the appellant’s contention that the letter was received after the mail had already been dispatched was not accepted. Consequently, the Court found that the appellant deliberately detained the registered letter. The intention and deliberation were directed specifically toward retaining the registered letter and refraining from forwarding it with the mail on that day. The Court noted that every intentional and deliberate act must be performed with some purpose or object. In some instances the object may be satisfied merely by the act itself, meaning the purpose is simply the performance of that act; in other instances the act may be performed in addition to a further objective. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appellant’s purpose in intentionally detaining the registered letter must have been to remove whatever he suspected the letter to contain. Had he possessed no such object, there would have been no reason for him to deviate from his duty and retain the letter instead of sending it with the next mail as required by his ordinary responsibilities. Thus, his act of retaining the letter amounted to wilful detention. The fact that it was proved that someone had opened the letter, tampered with its contents, and removed a half‑currency note did not, in the Court’s view, negate that the appellant’s detention was purposeful. A person may act with a certain purpose and nevertheless fail to achieve that purpose; even if the purpose is achieved, it may be impossible for another person to establish that the act was performed for that purpose and that the purpose was fulfilled. On this basis, the Court would dismiss the appeal. In accordance with the majority opinion, the appeal was allowed, the order of conviction and sentence was set aside, and the appellant was ordered to be acquitted of the charge against him.