Ram Sharan vs The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ajmer Range

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Writ Petition No. 175 of 1963

Decision Date: 16 March 1964

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, S.M. Sikri

In this case the Supreme Court heard a petition filed by Ram Sharan against the Deputy Inspector General of Police of the Ajmer Range and other respondents. The judgment was delivered on 16 March 1964. The matter was authored by Justice K. N. Wanchoo and decided by a bench composed of Justices K. N. Wanchoo, P. B. Gajendragadkar, J. C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and S. M. Sikri. The petition was recorded as Writ Petition No. 175 of 1963 and cited as 1964 AIR 1559 and 1964 SCR (7) 228. The relevant statute discussed was the Police Act of 1861, specifically section 2, and the constitutional provisions invoked were Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, which guarantee equality before the law and equality of opportunity in public employment. The factual backdrop involved the system used by the State of Rajasthan for promoting head‑constables to the rank of Sub‑Inspector of Police. The petitioner, having been promoted from head‑constable to Sub‑Inspector, was later reverted to his former rank when a permanent Sub‑Inspector returned to the same range. The petitioner argued that he was the most senior approved head‑constable in his range, yet many younger approved head‑constables in other ranges continued to serve as Sub‑Inspectors. He contended that if the entire State were treated as a single unit for the purposes of promotion and reversion, his reversal would not have occurred. He further submitted that the practice of promoting head‑constables on a rangewise basis, while allowing unrestricted inter‑range transfers, created unequal opportunities and violated Articles 14 and 16. Additionally, the petitioner claimed that this arrangement produced serious disparities in seniority and arbitrary changes in the status of officers across different ranges, thereby undermining the principle of equal treatment in public service.

The Court held that the promotion system adopted by Rajasthan could not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it denied equality before the law or equal opportunity in public employment. The Court explained that the system was designed to promote efficiency within the police force and to serve administrative convenience, and that the Constitution does not require promotion to be based on the entire State when a rational administrative scheme exists. The Court further observed that even if the Inspector‑General of Police were to misuse his power of transfer—since only he may move Sub‑Inspectors between ranges—such misuse would not invalidate the entire promotion scheme. Rather, only the abusive transfers could be struck down, leaving the promotion structure intact. The judgment therefore concluded that the rangewise promotion arrangement, despite potential for abuse, remained valid, and that any claim of wholesale denial of equality must be based on demonstrable, systematic abuse rather than on the existence of the scheme itself.

In this portion of the judgment, the Court explained that a system which might be misused cannot be invalidated merely because it can be abused; only the specific abuse, if it occurs on a large scale, may be struck down, not the entire scheme. The Court further observed that, in light of the Government Order issued in March 1955 directing that officers drawing less than Rs. 229 or Rs. 250 per month should not ordinarily be transferred outside their home district, it could not be accepted that the Inspector‑General of Police routinely made free and frequent transfers in violation of that order. The Court noted that the material placed on record by the petitioner did not demonstrate that, together with the promotion system, there existed a practice of routinely transferring Sub‑Inspectors from one range to another as a matter of routine in Rajasthan. The judgment then set out the original jurisdiction of the writ petition, identified as Writ Petition No. 175 of 1963, filed under article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights. The petitioner, a former head‑constable of the erstwhile State of Ajmer, had been included in the approved list for promotion to Sub‑Inspector in 1955 and was appointed as an officiating Sub‑Inspector on 14 July 1956. When the former State of Ajmer merged into the State of Rajasthan on 1 November 1956 under the States Reorganisation Act, the petitioner was absorbed into the Rajasthan police service and a fresh order appointing him as officiating Sub‑Inspector in Rajasthan was issued on the same date. The petitioner described the police administration in Rajasthan as being centrally controlled by the Inspector‑General of Police, who was assisted by six Deputy Inspectors‑General, each responsible for administration of one of six ranges into which the State was divided for convenience. Although the State is divided into six ranges, the petitioner asserted that Sub‑Inspectors in all ranges belong to a single cadre, are governed by identical rules regarding pay, leave, pension, promotion, and disciplinary matters, and may be transferred from any range to another. It was further contended that the Inspector‑General habitually issued transfer orders moving three or four Sub‑Inspectors daily from one range to another, so that Sub‑Inspectors and head‑constables across ranges were similarly situated. Finally, the petitioner argued that despite the police force being a single entity under section 2 of the Police Act, 1861, a practice had developed in Rajasthan of treating officers in each range as separate units for the purposes of promotion and reversion, resulting in vacancies being filled only by the most senior head‑constables within the same range, even when more senior head‑constables in other ranges were also eligible.

In this case, the petitioner explained that the Inspector General of Police routinely issued transfer orders moving three or four Sub‑Inspectors from one range to another each day, and that the same pattern applied to head‑constables serving in the various ranges. Because of these frequent transfers, the petitioner argued that Sub‑Inspectors and head‑constables in all six ranges were placed in essentially the same circumstances with respect to duties, conditions of service and seniority. The petitioner further submitted that, although the Police Act, No 5 of 1861, section 2 provides that the police force constitutes a single entity for the whole State, a customary practice had developed in Rajasthan whereby officers serving in a particular range at a given time were treated as a separate and distinct unit for purposes of promotion and reversion. Under this practice, when a vacancy arose in the Sub‑Inspector cadre in a specific range, only the senior head‑constables belonging to that same range were considered for promotion, even if head‑constables in other ranges possessed greater seniority and had already been approved for promotion. Consequently, promotions were made solely on the basis of the cadre of head‑constables within the range where the vacancy existed. The petitioner described a similar procedure for reversion: when a permanent Sub‑Inspector returned to a range, the officer who was the junior‑most approved head‑constable in that range would be reverted, regardless of the existence of more junior approved head‑constables in other ranges who continued to hold the acting Sub‑Inspector position. As an illustration, the petitioner recounted that in April 1957 he was reverted because a permanent Sub‑Inspector rejoined the Ajmer range, and the petitioner was the junior‑most approved head‑constable in that range, while numerous approved head‑constables in other ranges were junior to him but remained in acting Sub‑Inspector posts. The petitioner maintained that, had the entire State been regarded as a single unit for promotions and reversions, his reversion would not have occurred. He asserted that the practice of promoting head‑constables to act as Sub‑Inspectors on a range‑by‑range basis denied him equal opportunity before the law and contravened Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The petitioner further contended that limiting promotions and reversions to officers present in a particular range at the time of a vacancy, while simultaneously permitting unrestricted inter‑range transfers as a routine matter, inevitably generated serious disparities in promotion and reversion outcomes and caused erratic changes in seniority among officers. According to the petitioner, the freedom to transfer officers across ranges produced results that violated the constitutional guarantees of equal protection and equal opportunity for public servants, thereby infringing Articles 14 and 16. The petition was opposed on behalf of the State, which defended the range‑based system of promotion by invoking the administrative organisation of the police force and the need for efficient police administration.

The Court recorded that the police force of the State was placed under an Inspector General of Police, but for purposes of administrative efficiency the State divided its territory into four ranges, each headed by a Deputy Inspector General of Police. In addition to these four ranges, the State maintained two separate administrative units, each also under a Deputy Inspector General of Police, although they were not designated as ranges. The two units were the Criminal Intelligence Department and Intelligence Branch, and the Railway and Crime Branch. Under each range there were several district police organisations that were supervised by Superintendents of Police. Recruitment to the police force began at the district level with appointments to the rank of constable. After completing training, the constables were posted within their respective districts so that they would become familiar with local conditions, topography, fairs, festivals and customs, which the Court noted was intended to promote administrative efficiency.

The Court then explained the promotion process as it existed in the State. From the pool of constables, district‑wise lists of candidates for promotion to head‑constable were prepared by the Superintendent of Police, who possessed the authority to promote a constable to head‑constable within his own district. Once a constable became a head‑constable, further promotion to the rank of Sub‑Inspector was made by the Deputy Inspector General of Police. For this purpose, the Deputy Inspector General considered all head‑constables in the range, which comprised a number of districts under his administrative control, as a single group. He prepared an approved list of head‑constables based on a combination of seniority and merit. Whenever a vacancy for Sub‑Inspector arose in the range, the Deputy Inspector General selected a candidate from this approved list according to seniority; if a reversion was required, the junior‑most head‑constable who was temporarily serving as a Sub‑Inspector was reverted to the rank of head‑constable. The Inspector General of Police retained a list of confirmed Sub‑Inspectors because only he held the power to promote Sub‑Inspectors to the rank of Inspector. Accordingly, the State described this three‑tier system as having been in place for a long time: promotion from constable to head‑constable was confined to the district, promotion from head‑constable to Sub‑Inspector was confined to the range—or, where applicable, to one of the two special units—and promotion from Sub‑Inspector to Inspector was undertaken on a State‑wide basis by the Inspector General. The State argued that the system had evolved to ensure administrative efficiency and that, under the circumstances, it did not create any inequality before the law or deny equal opportunity in the employment of police personnel.

In this case, the State argued that the existing promotion system was essential not only for good administration but also for efficiency, given that the State employed approximately twenty thousand constables, three thousand head‑constables and one thousand Sub‑Inspectors of Police. The State further explained that it would be extremely difficult for the Inspector General of Police to personally order each promotion from constable to head‑constable and subsequently from head‑constable to Sub‑Inspector, because of the large number of personnel involved. Consequently, the State maintained that officers who are directly responsible for promotions, such as the Superintendent of Police who promotes a constable to head‑constable within his district, and the Deputy Inspector General of Police who promotes a head‑constable to Sub‑Inspector within his range, possess the necessary local knowledge of the staff. For this reason, the rules provided that promotions should be made either by the Superintendent of Police or by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, as appropriate to the level of promotion. The State did not dispute that, on occasion, administrative reasons or service exigencies might require transfers from one district to another or from one range to another, but it asserted that such transfers were rare. The State strongly rejected the petitioner’s assertion that three or four Sub‑Inspectors on average were transferred daily from one range to another. It emphasized that the Government’s policy was that transfers of subordinate staff, even between districts, should be uncommon. To support this position, the State referred to a Government Order issued to all Heads of Department in March 1955, which observed that officers were frequently being transferred outside their home districts or divisions, causing considerable hardship to low‑paid employees. Accordingly, the Order directed that any officer drawing less than rupees two hundred and fifty per month should not ordinarily be transferred outside his home district, and that any unavoidable transfer should, as far as possible, be confined to the same division. It was noted that a revenue division generally corresponded in extent to a police range, although the two did not have to be identical. The State therefore contended that transfers of subordinate staff were not made freely as alleged by the petitioner, and that the range‑wise promotion of head‑constables did not normally cause hardship because promotion from head‑constable to Sub‑Inspector was confined within the same range. Accordingly, the State submitted that the system did not create inequality before the law nor deny equal opportunity in employment within the State’s police service. It was also acknowledged that, under section two of the Police Act, the entire police establishment of a State Government is, for purposes of the Act, deemed to be a single police force, and that pay and other conditions of service for subordinate ranks are determined by the State Government.

In this case, the Court observed that the remuneration and all other service conditions for members of the subordinate ranks of any police force are within the exclusive competence of the State Government. Nevertheless, the statutory scheme envisages that police administration be organised under the overall authority of the Inspector General of Police, with the creation of police ranges headed by Deputy Inspectors General of Police and districts administered by District Superintendents of Police. This organisational structure is considered essential for the efficient operation of the police force, which explains why practically every State maintains a hierarchy in which, although a single Inspector General commands the entire force, the force is further divided into ranges under Deputy Inspectors General and into districts under Superintendents of Police. The Court further noted that local knowledge generally contributes positively to administrative efficiency in policing, and this reality underlies the practice of recruiting constables on a district‑wise basis. Likewise, promotion from constable to head‑constable is also carried out on a district‑wise basis by the Superintendent of Police, who is presumed to be familiar with the performance of the personnel under his command.

The judgment continued by explaining that the same principle operates in the second tier of the promotion system. Head‑constables belonging to a range that comprises several districts are collectively regarded as a single pool for promotion to the rank of Sub‑Inspector, a promotion authority vested in the Deputy Inspector General of Police. By extending the promotion area from a single district to an entire range, the system modestly widens the jurisdiction while still preserving the benefit of local knowledge when selections are made on a rangewise basis. The Court observed that it is only at the third tier—when Sub‑Inspectors are considered for promotion to Inspector—that the emphasis on local knowledge diminishes, because the duties of Inspectors and higher officers are predominantly supervisory rather than operational. In contrast, constables, head‑constables and Sub‑Inspectors interact directly with the public, making local familiarity an important factor in the efficiency of these ranks. Consequently, the Court held that the three‑tier promotion structure—progressing from constable to head‑constable, from head‑constable to Sub‑Inspector, and from Sub‑Inspector to Inspector—has been devised to promote administrative efficiency. The Court could not accept the argument that, because the police force is deemed a single entity for the whole State, promotions must be conducted on a statewide basis. Moreover, concentrating all promotion decisions in the hands of the Inspector General, as the petitioner suggested, would create administrative difficulties. The Court concluded that the State’s contention that the three‑tier system serves the efficient functioning of the police ranks carries substantial merit and that the system should not be invalidated on the ground of alleged inequality.

It was acknowledged that, on occasion, a junior head‑constable in one range could be promoted while a senior head‑constable in another range remained without promotion because promotions were conducted separately in each range. The argument presented was that such occasional mismatches must be weighed against the considerations of efficiency that had led to the establishment of the three‑tier promotion system previously described. Accordingly, the system should not be invalidated merely because at times a junior head‑constable might receive promotion as an officiating Sub‑Inspector while a senior head‑constable in a different range had to wait for a later opportunity. After balancing the various considerations, it was concluded that the promotion scheme operating in the State of Rajasthan had been fashioned to promote the efficiency of the police force as well as to provide administrative convenience, and that the scheme, in itself, could not be said to contravene the principle of equality before the law or the principle of equality in public‑service employment, even though isolated instances might arise where a junior head‑constable in one range advanced ahead of a senior head‑constable in another range. Consequently, the court was not prepared to declare the scheme unconstitutional on the basis of these occasional hardships.

The petitioner further argued that the scheme was vulnerable to abuse, contending that the Inspector General of Police could transfer Sub‑Inspectors from one range to another in order to deprive head‑constables of a particular range of their rightful promotions and to favour head‑constables of another range who might be junior with respect to length of service. It was not disputed that transfers between districts or between ranges might be required in the public interest or for reasons specific to an individual officer, and it was not contended that such transfers were unlawful under the provisions of the Police Act. What was asserted was that, through such transfers, it was possible to create circumstances that denied a head‑constable of a given range equality before the law or equal opportunity in public‑service employment. The court accepted that if there were a systematic and wholesale abuse of the transfer power vested solely in the Inspector General of Police, a serious denial of equality before the law and of equal employment opportunity could occur. Nevertheless, the court held that the existence of a potential for abuse did not justify striking down the entire promotion system.

In this case, the Court noted that the system presupposed that an Inspector General of Police might exercise his transfer power in a way that creates obvious denial of equality before law. The Court further observed that the same system could also lead to denial of equal opportunity for employment in the service of the State. However, the Court held that a system cannot be declared invalid merely on the ground that it might be abused. If such abuse occurs on a large scale, the Court explained, the appropriate remedy is to strike down the abusive act, not the entire scheme. Turning to the petitioner's allegation, the Court stated that it was claimed inter‑range transfers of Sub‑Inspectors were being carried out freely and frequently as routine practice, resulting in serious inequalities in promotions and reversions. The petitioner further asserted that the Inspector General of Police was making an average of three to four transfers of Sub‑Inspectors each day. The State, on the other hand, categorically denied these allegations. The Court also noted that the State Government’s policy provided that subordinate staff drawing less than rupees two hundred fifty per month should generally not be transferred outside their home district. The policy further required that if a transfer is essential, it should, as far as possible, be limited to the division. Since constables, head‑constables and Sub‑Inspectors typically earn less than rupees two hundred fifty per month, the Government’s policy aimed to keep such officers within their district and, as far as practicable, within their division. Consequently, the Government Order of March 1955 directed that transfers of Sub‑Inspectors should rarely occur outside the range. The Court therefore could not accept that there existed a policy of free and frequent transfers of Sub‑Inspectors as a routine practice, which would cause serious inequalities in promotion and reversion. In light of the March 1955 Government Order, the Court found no evidence that the Inspector General of Police routinely violated the order by making frequent transfers. The Court also held that the material placed on record by the petitioner was insufficient to conclude that, alongside the promotion system, there was a practice of routine, free and frequent inter‑range transfers of Sub‑Inspectors throughout Rajasthan. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed for failure to establish its claim. No order as to costs was made. Before concluding, the Court issued a warning that the promotion system for head‑constables to Sub‑Inspectors within a range could be reasonably supported, provided inter‑range transfers remain rare and are not carried out liberally or for ulterior motives. The Court emphasized that this consideration should always be kept in mind by the authorities in Rajasthan to avoid any further challenges to the system.

In this case the Court observed that the question before it related to the system of promotion of head‑constables to Sub‑Inspectors within a police range, a system that could be justified only if the accompanying practice of inter‑range transfers of Sub‑Inspectors remained an exceptional measure and was not employed liberally or for improper motives. The Court stressed that the authorities in Rajasthan must always bear this principle in mind so that the promotion system is not abused and does not give rise to further legal challenges. After a careful examination of the material placed on record, the Court found that the petitioner had not produced any evidence showing that the promotion system was being misused or that Sub‑Inspectors were being transferred from one range to another as a matter of routine. The Court also noted that the petitioner’s submissions did not establish any violation of statutory provisions or any infringement of the petitioner’s rights. Consequently, having determined that the petition failed to disclose any actionable impropriety, the Court concluded that there was no basis for granting relief. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed and no order as to costs was made.