Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan vs Municipal Board Of Sitapur And Anr.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 3 December 1964

Coram: K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this case the appellant, Raja Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan, sought special leave to appeal the judgment and decree issued by the High Court of Allahabad. The appeal arose because the plaintiff’s suit had been dismissed by the Civil Court of Sitapur, a dismissal that the High Court subsequently confirmed. The matter before the Supreme Court concerned a very limited factual dispute. The appellant claimed ownership of an area measuring sixteen Bighas, which is roughly three acres, situated in plot number 160 bearing Municipal number 1444 in the locality of Chhauni Qadim within the Sitapur Cantonment. The appellant identified himself as the Taluqdar of the Mahmudabad estate located in the district of Sitapur. The central issue was the nature of his title to this property, which was acknowledged as nazul land, and whether his lease‑hold interest had been forfeited by reason of his own conduct, a point that the Court intended to examine. The record showed that the exact date on which the appellant’s ancestors had originally obtained the lease of the land, as well as the specific terms of that lease, were not clearly established, and the High Court had not addressed this question. Evidence did indicate that a previous tenant had constructed a bungalow on the land, but that bungalow was destroyed by an accidental fire a few years before the present proceedings began, leaving the site vacant and devoid of any structures when the case was initiated. Around September 1947 the appellant is reported to have subdivided the plot and to have granted leases to various persons, enabling them to erect buildings on the subdivided parcels. The Municipal Board of Sitapur objected to this subdivision and leasing, contesting the appellant’s authority to deal with the land, and it passed a resolution seeking the State Government’s intervention to terminate the appellant’s lease. In response, the State Government issued a notification in December 1948 invoking Section 9 of the Rehabilitation of Refugees Act (Act 26 of 1948) to acquire 2.68 acres of the disputed plot for the purpose of constructing housing for refugees arriving from Pakistan. When the Land Acquisition Officer assessed the compensation, the Government argued that the land was nazul land and that the appellant was merely a non‑occupancy tenant, entitling him only to a compensation equivalent to one year’s rent. In response to this position, the appellant filed an application on 25 March 1949 asserting that he and his ancestors had been owners of the land and had exercised permanent, heritable and transferable rights over it openly, with the knowledge and consent of the Government. Accordingly, he claimed a compensation sum of Rs 52,900 for the acquisition of the land. The application also disclosed that the Municipal Board of Sitapur had challenged his right to transfer or lease the parcels in September 1947, prompting the appellant to commence a suit in the Civil Court for a declaration of his title. He prayed that, pending the decision of the Civil Court, the determination of the compensation payable to him be deferred, and alternatively, that if his claim for compensation were not accepted, the matter be referred to a Court for adjudication. The Compensation Officer, however, rejected the appellant’s claim to the title.

In the application filed by the plaintiff, he asserted that he had been exercising what he described as “permanent, heritable and transferable lights” over the land in an open manner, with the knowledge of, and with the consent of, the Government. On the basis of this asserted interest, he claimed that he was entitled to receive a compensation sum of Rs 52,900 for the acquisition of the land. He further explained in the same application that his title to the property was being contested by the Municipal Board of Sitapur, which maintained that he possessed no right to transfer or lease the parcels of land that he had allegedly dealt with in September 1947. Consequently, he stated that he was instituting a suit in the Civil Court seeking a declaration of his title with respect to the land in question. He prayed that, pending the decision of the Civil Court, the determination of the compensation owed to him should be deferred. Alternatively, he requested that, if his claim for compensation were not accepted, the matter should be referred to the Court for adjudication.

The Compensation Officer, however, rejected the plaintiff’s claim to the title that he asserted, holding that he was merely a non‑occupancy tenant. The Officer decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to any compensation beyond the amount equivalent to one year’s rent and accordingly assessed the compensation payable at Rs 15. This assessment order was issued on 26 March 1949. After the notice period prescribed under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code had expired, the plaintiff filed a suit on 11 July 1949, which gave rise to the present appeal. In that suit, he impleaded the Municipal Board of Sitapur, which had challenged his right to parcel out the lands and to lease them to refugees, and the State of the United Provinces, which had disputed his compensation claim, as defendants.

In the plaint, after reciting the earlier history of the property, the plaintiff contended that he and his ancestors had owned the bungalow and other constructions on the premises and had possessed the land with permanent, heritable and transferable rights. He further asserted that both he and his predecessors had been openly exercising those heritable and transferable rights over the disputed land, with the knowledge of the Government and the Municipal Board, and that, in the view of the court, they had acquired such rights by adverse possession. The plaint also narrated that the Municipal Board had been collecting a consolidated rent of Rs 388 8/‑ per year from the plaintiff and his ancestors for all of their bungalows, including the plot that was in dispute. Accordingly, the plaintiff prayed for a declaration that he possessed a permanent, heritable and transferable right as an owner, and, in any event, as a permanent lessee for building purposes, and that he retained the right to lease the land to others. The judgment does not consider the written statement filed by the Municipal Board; instead, it refers to a statement submitted by the Government of Uttar Pradesh on 10 April 1950, which must be taken into account. In paragraph 5 of that statement, the Government admitted that a bungalow existed on plot 1444, but that for the preceding thirty years no bungalow, out‑houses, or any other constructions had stood on the disputed land, which remained vacant up to 18 March 1949.

The Court noted that, according to the Government’s written statement, no bungalow, out‑houses, or any other construction had existed on the disputed land up to 18 March 1949, and that the plot had remained vacant until that date. In response to the plaintiff’s allegation in paragraph 11 of the plaint that he had decided to parcel out the land and lease it to various persons, the Government asserted that the plaintiff possessed no right to parcel the land and had falsely represented himself as the owner when he sold portions of the land at public auction. The Government characterized this alleged act of parceling and sub‑leasing as a repudiation of the landlord’s title. The plaintiff’s complaint that the Municipal Board had asked the Government to terminate his lease and to assume possession of the land was addressed in paragraph 13, where the Government explained that the Municipal Board had passed a resolution terminating the plaintiff’s tenancy and had requested the Government to take over the land because the plaintiff’s actions were said to constitute a denial of the landlord’s ownership, to be detrimental to the public interest, and to violate the purpose for which the land holder was permitted to use the property. Accordingly, the Government terminated the tenancy and assumed control of the land. The Government’s written statement reiterated the allegation of repudiation in paragraph 14 and expanded upon it in paragraphs 25, 26 and 27. Paragraph 25 declared that the plaintiff’s claim to a permanent heritable and transferable right as owner was wrong, baseless and without foundation. Paragraph 26 stated that, under the Cantonment tenure governing the area, only the Government could hold title to the land and that the Government could resume the land at any time. Paragraph 27 recounted that, despite having no ownership claim, the plaintiff had repudiated the landlord’s title, represented himself as the owner, parceled the land into various plots and, for profit, sold portions at auction to the public while claiming ownership. The Government therefore argued that the Municipal Board was compelled to terminate the plaintiff’s lease, that the Government acquired the land for the purpose of constructing houses for refugees, and that the plaintiff’s conduct had resulted in the forfeiture of his tenancy rights. The Court observed that additional defences were raised by the Government, but deemed it unnecessary to refer to them in detail. Finally, the Court recorded that, on 22 April 1950, approximately two weeks after filing the written statement, the Government issued a notice to the plaintiff stating that the Government was the absolute owner of the plot, that the plaintiff had repeatedly set up a title in his own name in acquisition proceedings and on other occasions, and that, because of those acts, the Government was forfeiting any tenancy rights, if any, that the plaintiff might have possessed in the land.

In the notice dated 22 April 1950 the Government declared that it owned the plot in question and that the plaintiff had repeatedly represented himself as the owner and proprietor in acquisition proceedings and on other occasions, thereby creating a title in his own name. The Government therefore asserted that, because of those acts, it was forfeiting any tenancy rights the plaintiff might have possessed in the land. On 15 May 1950 the plaintiff filed an application to amend his plaint, expressly acknowledging the Government’s ownership and seeking to claim only the rights of a permanent lessee; the trial court dismissed that application. The appeal before this Court raised the issue of whether the plaintiff’s denial of the Government’s title had caused forfeiture of his lease‑hold interests, thereby justifying termination of the lease. Although the pleadings raised twelve issues, the judgment focused on a few, namely whether the property had become part of Taluqa Mahmudabad in 1919 and whether the plaintiff possessed a permanent, heritable and transferable right in it; whether the Municipal Board had been collecting rent on behalf of the Uttar Pradesh Government from the plaintiff and his predecessors; whether the plaintiff and his predecessors were merely licensees of the land and whether the plaintiff’s attempts to sell and parcel the land terminated that licensor status; whether the defendants had terminated the plaintiff’s tenancy and taken possession after forfeiture; and whether the plaintiff’s own actions—denial of the landlord’s title, use of the land inconsistent with tenancy purpose, and destruction of a house thirty years earlier—had terminated any right he might have held. During the trial, counsel for the plaintiff argued that he possessed a permanent, transferable, and heritable right as a lessee of unknown origin. The trial judge, however, interpreted the plaint as offering only two alternatives: either the plaintiff claimed full ownership, which he had not proved, or he held a status of licensee or non‑occupancy tenant as entered in the revenue register. On that basis the judge decided in favour of the defendants on issue number seven, concluding that the plaintiff was a licensee of the bungalow site and a tenant at will of the remaining land. The judge held that the plaintiff’s written statement filed on 25 March 1949, in which he repudiated the landlord’s title, and the consistent oral evidence at trial demonstrated an attitude of denial. Consequently, the judge found that the plaintiff had incurred forfeiture, that the Government was entitled to revoke the licence, and that the amendment application filed in May 1950 could not remove the effect of that forfeiture. The trial judge therefore dismissed the suit, finding the tenancy properly terminated. The plaintiff subsequently appealed to the High Court, raising two grounds: that the trial judge erred in rejecting his claim of permanent lessee status with heritable and transferable rights, and that the evidence and legal principles did not support a finding of forfeiture.

The trial Judge observed that the plaintiff’s oral evidence at trial reiterated the same statements that had been made in writing, and on that basis he concluded that the plaintiff had suffered forfeiture of his licence; consequently, the Judge held that the Government was entitled to withdraw the licence and to terminate the plaintiff’s rights. The Judge also examined an application filed in May 1950 seeking to amend the plaint, but he determined that such an amendment could not relieve the plaintiff of the consequences of the forfeiture that had already occurred. On the finding that forfeiture had taken place and that the tenancy was therefore lawfully ended, the trial Judge ordered the dismissal of the suit. The plaintiff appealed this judgment and decree to the High Court. In the appellate proceedings only two points were raised on behalf of the plaintiff. The first point contended that the trial Judge was incorrect in rejecting the claim that the plaintiff was a permanent lessee possessing heritable and transferable rights over the land that was the subject of the suit. To support this contention, the appellant argued that the way the property had been managed, the fact that the grant was lost in antiquity, and other surrounding circumstances clearly demonstrated that the plaintiff enjoyed a permanent lease with heritable and transferable rights. The State, which was the sole contesting respondent before the High Court because the Municipal Board, the first defendant, had elected to remain absent, objected by stating that the plaintiff had approached the Court asserting ownership and had sought a declaration to that effect. The High Court judges, however, interpreted the plaint to indicate that the plaintiff sought a declaration alternatively, and they observed that, based on the evidence presented, the plaintiff appeared prima facie to be a permanent lessee with a right to sub‑let the plots. This issue formed the core of the dispute between the plaintiff and the Municipal Board, especially when the Board sought governmental assistance to terminate the lease. The judges also noted an application dated 15 May 1950 in which the plaintiff sought to amend his prayer, specifically requesting relief that he "was the owner with a permanent heritable and transferable right to property of which the Government had a paramount proprietary title." The judges expressed that they could not accept the trial Judge’s conclusion regarding whether the plaintiff was indeed a permanent lessee entitled to sub‑lease the property. Accordingly, they stated that they were inclined to remit the case for a thorough determination of the factual question of whether the plaintiff was a permanent lessee, an ordinary lessee, or merely a licensee, a view that arose from the plaintiff’s repeated unsuccessful attempts to compel the production of certain documents from the defendants.

The Court observed that the defendants, and in particular defendant number one, had been improperly obstructed from producing certain documents. The Court was led through three separate applications identified as 100 Ga, 101 Ga and 103 Ga, the last of which had been filed on the twenty‑second day of July, 1950. After reviewing the manner in which these applications were handled, the Court expressed satisfaction with the procedure that had been followed. It was noted that the plaintiff had failed to include the documents sought in any list of documents either filed with the plaint or submitted immediately after the issues were framed within the time allotted to him. Despite this omission, the Court found no doubt as to the authenticity of the documents because they were being summoned directly from the possession of defendant number one. The Court further concluded that there was essentially no question of proof, since the documents originated from the defendant’s possession and would have been produced in court without delay. In the circumstances, the Court was of the opinion that the learned Civil Judge should have permitted the summons of these papers upon the payment of costs, should have admitted them as evidence, and that any costs deemed just and proper could be imposed on the plaintiff for each document produced.

The effect of this observation was that, on the principal issue raised by the plaintiff, the learned judges did not render a definitive finding of their own but declined to accept the trial judge’s conclusion that the plaintiff was not a permanent lessee but merely a licensee or a tenant at will. It was noted that the trial judge had recorded a finding that the plaintiff had denied the landlord’s title, thereby incurring forfeiture and losing any further interest in the suit property for the purpose of obtaining a declaration of title. The plaintiff also urged the High Court that the trial judge erred in holding that the plaintiff had denied the landlord’s title on the basis of certain statements, taking into account both the circumstances of their making and their tenor. Counsel for the State indicated readiness to argue that the plaintiff was a permanent lessee possessing heritable and transferable rights, and contended that even if that were so, the tenancy had been forfeited and determined, rendering a remand unnecessary. The learned judges then examined the contents of Exhibit A‑18, the application lodged with the Compensation Officer in the land‑acquisition proceedings, and held that it contained an unequivocal claim by the plaintiff of an absolute proprietary right in the land and an unambiguous denial of the landlord’s title. Rejecting the plaintiff’s submission concerning the construction and legal effect of Exhibit A‑18, the judges dismissed the appeal, holding that the statements in that application clearly demonstrated the plaintiff’s denial of the landlord’s title.

The suit that was filed sought a judicial declaration that the plaintiff possessed title to the whole of plot number 160, which consists of sixteen bighas. In contrast, the land‑acquisition proceedings and the document identified as Exhibit A‑18, which was filed in those proceedings, dealt only with a much smaller portion of that plot, namely an area of two point six eight acres. The fact that the suit concerned the entire plot while the acquisition documents concerned only a fragment was either overlooked by the lower court or deemed to be irrelevant to the decision. The appeal before this Court therefore challenges the correctness of the judgment rendered by the High Court. Before the specific points of contention are set out, it is necessary to state that the arguments presented in this appeal rest on the premise that the appellant was a permanent lessee whose lease carried heritable and transferable rights. This premise is highlighted because the learned judges of the High Court did not make a definitive factual finding on whether the appellant indeed possessed such rights; instead, they expressed the view that, should a determination on that issue be required, the case would have to be sent back to the trial court after the relevant documents, referred to in the earlier extracted passage, were produced. The present Court concurs fully with that observation of the High Court judges. Section 111(g) of the relevant statute codifies the principle that a lease of immovable property is forfeited when the lessee renounces his status as a lessee by either establishing a title in the name of a third person or by asserting title in his own name. Although the Transfer of Property Act does not, according to its own terms, apply to the territory that is the subject of the present dispute, the Supreme Court has previously held that the principles embodied in Section 111(g) are equally applicable to tenancies falling outside the Act, on the ground that they are consistent with the requirements of justice, equity and good conscience, as stated in Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmini Pattamahadevi, 46 Ind App 109 (AIR 1919 PC 1). It is also well settled that permanent tenancies are covered by this rule and may be forfeited when the tenant disclaims the tenancy or denies the landlord’s title. Moreover, it is beyond dispute that such a disclaimer or repudiation must be clear, unequivocal and must be made with the landlord’s knowledge. Accordingly, the question before this Court is whether the learned High Court judges were correct in holding that, by the statement filed on behalf of the appellant before the Land Acquisition Officer and marked as Exhibit A‑18, the appellant had effectively renounced his character as a lessee and claimed title in his own name. To answer that question, two inquiries must be made: first, whether Exhibit A‑18 contains an assertion by the appellant of ownership that repudiates the Government’s title; and second, whether the language of that assertion is clear and unequivocal. Finally, it is noted that the land identified as plot number 1444, which is held by the appellant, was characterized as nazul land, although that characterization is not…

In the matter before the Court, it was not contested that the land in dispute was liable to the payment of a nominal annual rent of Rs 45 14 /‑ and that this amount had remained unchanged for as long as the record showed. No document was produced to prove the existence of a lease, and consequently the terms on which any such lease might have been granted could not be ascertained; the origin of the lease therefore remained shrouded in obscurity. Nevertheless, evidence demonstrated that a bungalow had been erected on a portion of the disputed property. That portion had originally been owned by a Mr Paton and later by a Captain Marett, from whom the appellant’s predecessor acquired it in the year 1870. By a deed dated 8 August 1918, an ancestor of the appellant, who then held the title of Taluqdar of Mahmudabad, annexed several properties, including the land now the subject of the suit, to his Taluqdari estate and declared them subject to the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, which governed the main Taluqdari holdings. The deed was executed under the provisions of Section 32A of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, an amendment introduced by Uttar Pradesh Act 3 of 1910. Section 32A provides, in substance, that any Taluqdar may, by a registered instrument bearing a non‑judicial stamp of Rs 15, signed by him and attested by two or more witnesses, declare an immovable property situated in the United Provinces, in which he possesses a separate permanent, heritable and transferable right, as part of his estate for the purposes of the Act, and that such declaration shall take effect from the date of its registration. The deed was presented for registration and was duly registered on 12 August 1918. The Court clarified that it was not required to determine the legal effect of this declaration nor to decide whether, by virtue of that declaration, the lease of the property had acquired the character of permanency with hereditary and transferable rights in the hands of the then Taluqdar or his successors. The purpose of reciting this earlier history was merely to establish, without dispute, the background against which the claim made in Exhibit A‑18 would be evaluated, particularly to ascertain whether that claim amounted to a repudiation of the landlord’s title.

Exhibit A‑18 contains three paragraphs—numbers 2, 5 and 8—that were relied upon by the learned judges in assessing the issue. The exhibit is an application addressed to the Compensation Officer concerning the compensation payable to the appellant for the land acquired under Act 26 of 1948 for the rehabilitation of refugees. The application set forth two prayers. The first prayer requested that the determination of compensation be deferred until the appellant could file a suit seeking a declaration of the nature of his interest in the land. The alternative prayer sought a direct award of Rs 52,900 as compensation for the acquired plot. Paragraph 2 of the application set out the appellant’s principal contention, and this paragraph forms the basis for the Court’s subsequent analysis of whether the appellant’s statements in the application constitute a denial of the landlord’s title.

In this case the applicant described the land that had been taken by the government as “the land acquired is part of Jali Kothi or Bungalow Marett Saheb, belonging to me, in the Civil Lines, Sitapur.” After he reproduced in paragraph 4 the declaration made by his ancestor under Section 32A, which had been mentioned earlier, he continued in paragraph 5 to assert that “I and my ancestors have been owners of the land and have been exercising permanent heritable and transferable rights in this land, openly and to the knowledge and consent of the Government.” Before reaching paragraph 8, the record contained two intervening paragraphs. In paragraph 6 the applicant explained that he had allotted portions of the land to various tenants for the purpose of construction. In paragraph 7 he claimed that “under a misconception of my rights some wrong entries have been made perhaps by the Patwari without any official order,” referring to his being recorded as a non‑occupancy tenant. He further stated that, on the same basis, the Municipal Board of Sitapur had contested his right to transfer or lease the land in September 1947, had asked the Government to give possession of the plot to the Municipal Board, and had ultimately persuaded the Government to acquire the land for the rehabilitation of refugees, even though other vacant lands were available for that purpose. Paragraph 8 then declared that “because of the conduct of the Municipal Board, Sitapur I have been forced to file a suit in the civil court for declaration of my title in respect of this land.” In paragraph 9 he prayed that the determination of compensation might be postponed until the civil court decided the title, pointing out that the Government had already taken possession and that houses for refugees had been built on the site, and that any delay in fixing the compensation would not prejudice anyone. He further claimed a sum of Rs 52,900 if the officer was not prepared to defer the consideration of his claim. The learned Judges later focused on paragraphs 2, 5 and 8 and held that the words “belonging to me” in paragraph 2 amounted to a clear denial of the Government’s title and a repudiation of the landlord’s interest. The Court did not accept that interpretation as the sole or proper meaning. While the word “belonging” could indicate absolute ownership, it was not limited to that meaning; it could also describe a lesser interest. Webster defined “belong to” as meaning, among other things, “to be owned by, be the possession of.” Accordingly, the precise sense intended had to be derived by reading the entire document and considering the context in which the term appeared. The Court also referred to the decision in Prag Narain v. Kadir Bakhsh, ILR 35 All 145, which held that the phrase “house with the lands which belong to me” used by a tenant did not constitute an unequivocal denial of the landlord’s title, because the denial was not clear enough to give rise to forfeiture.

In a previous case the lessee had mortgaged premises that included the land he occupied under a lease and on which he had erected buildings. The mortgage deed described the mortgaged property as “house with the lands which belong to me.” The landlord argued that this language denied his title. The Court, however, held that the words were not clear‑cut and that, because the denial was not unequivocal, they could not justify a forfeiture of the lease. In the present matter a bungalow had been constructed on the site. Counsel for the respondent admitted that if the bungalow existed and the property had been described as “my bungalow” or “bungalow belonging to me,” such a description would not constitute a disclaimer, or at least the denial would not be unequivocal. Nevertheless, counsel argued that when the same terms are applied solely to the site on which the super‑structure stands, rather than to the building and land together, the meaning might differ. The Court noted that the factual background of the tenancy is therefore crucial in determining what the tenant intended to assert. The tenancy’s origin was uncertain, the lessee had erected super‑structures, and the appellant together with his ancestors had enjoyed the land for more than seventy‑five years. The property had passed through several transfers and had been inherited. A document had publicly asserted that, although the land was Government property for which only a nominal rent was payable, the tenants possessed “a permanent heritable and transferable right.” Despite such enjoyment and public statements, when the municipality intervened to prevent sub‑leasing of the land for construction of houses, it denied those claims. The Court reasoned that, given this context, it must be decided whether the tenant’s statement that the land “belonged to him” merely reflected the substantial nature of his interest or whether it repudiated the Government’s reversionary rights and its authority to demand a fixed rent. After considering the circumstances, the Court concluded that the language used did not amount to a disclaimer or a renunciation of the tenancy.

Turning to the discussion of paragraph five, the Court observed that the analysis applied to the phrase “belonging to me” in paragraph two is equally applicable to the use of the word “owner” in the present paragraph. The reference to the appellant and his ancestors exercising permanent, heritable and transferable rights over the land clearly alludes to the deed dated 8 August 1918, executed under Section 32A of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, in which the same terminology appears. Although, when isolated from its surrounding context, those words might be interpreted as an assertion of absolute ownership, the Court held that, in the factual setting of a long‑standing enjoyment by the appellant and his predecessors, they could not be regarded as an unequivocal claim of absolute ownership sufficient to trigger forfeiture of a permanent tenancy. The Court emphasized that the enjoyment was described as being with the consent of the Government. If the assertion had been intended as an outright claim of ownership in derogation of the Government’s landlord rights, mentioning Government consent would be inappropriate, because consent is relevant only when the Government retains an interest in the property. Consequently, the Court understood the passage to mean that the permanent, transferable and heritable right, which the municipality sought to deny, was exercised with Government consent. This additional consideration reinforced the conclusion that, at most, the assertion was not unequivocal.

In the present case the Court examined the language used by the appellant when he referred to his interest in the land as an “owner” and as an assertion of absolute ownership. The Court concluded that, given the surrounding circumstances and the long‑standing enjoyment of the property by the appellant and his ancestors, those words could not be interpreted as a clear and unequivocal claim of absolute ownership that would automatically cause the loss of a permanent tenancy. The Court observed that the appellant’s enjoyment of the property was described as being with the consent of the Government. If the appellant were asserting ownership in a manner that denied the Government’s landlord rights, mentioning governmental consent would be inappropriate, because consent is relevant only when the Government retains an interest in the land. Accordingly, the Court understood the passage to indicate that the permanent, heritable, and transferable right – the very right that the municipality was refusing to acknowledge – had been exercised with the Government’s permission. This interpretation reinforced the view that the appellant’s claim, at most, was not an unequivocal denial of the tenancy and therefore could not be said to trigger forfeiture of the tenancy.

The Court then turned to paragraph 8, which referred to the appellant’s suit for a declaration “of my title in respect of this land.” The Court found that this allegation was even less likely to be interpreted as a repudiation of the landlord’s title. If the earlier conclusions about paragraphs 2 and 5 were correct, the title the appellant sought to have declared was the title he already possessed in the suit property – namely, the title of a permanent lessee possessing heritable and transferable rights. Such a lessee’s title is a recognized form of title, comparable to full ownership, and a request for a declaration of that title does not amount to setting up an independent ownership claim that would diminish the landlord’s interest. Counsel for the respondent cited English cases, including Vivian v. Moat (1881) 16 Ch D 730 and Warner v. Sampson, arguing that a tenant’s denial of a landlord’s right to increase rent amounted to a disclaimer and forfeiture. The Court held that the rule from the 1881 decision was inapplicable in India. Moreover, as noted by Sir Dinshaw Mulla, the tenant’s assertion in that case involved a claim to customary rent, which implied a denial of the landlord‑tenant relationship. The Court also referenced Lord Phillimore’s statement in 46 Ind App 109 (AIR 1919 PC 1) that, under English law, a tenant forfeits his holding only when he denies his landlord’s title in clear and unmistakable terms. This principle, however, does not govern Indian law in the present circumstances.

The Court explained that a denial of the landlord’s title must be expressed in clear and unmistakable language, whether it appears in a formal record or in certain statements made orally. Indian courts had often applied this qualification, holding that when a tenant acknowledged that he held the premises as a tenant of the person who claimed to be his landlord, but contested the tenancy’s terms and attempted to set out more favourable conditions for himself, such a tenant did not, even though he failed to establish a more favourable tenancy, deny the landlord’s title in a manner that would trigger forfeiture. This principle was illustrated in cases such as Vithu v. Dhondi, ILR 15 Bom 407; Venkaji Krishna Nadkarni v. Lakshman Devji Kandar, ILR 20 Bom 354 (FB); Unhamma Devi v. Vaikunta Hegde, ILR 17 Mad 218; and Chinna Narayudu v. Harischendana Deo, ILR 27 Mad 23.

The Judicial Committee had not needed to decide the issue on this precise ground, yet its inclination was evident. On page 120 of the Indian Appeals, it was observed that a tenant who disputes his character as a tenant does not thereby forfeit a lease for a term certain, as demonstrated in Doed Graves v. Wells, (1889) 10 A & E 427. The Court further noted that the doctrine articulated in (1881) 16 Ch. D. 730 did not apply to Indian tenures such as the present case, citing decisions like Kali Kishen Tagore v. Golam Ali, ILR 13 Cal 3; Kali Krishna Tagore v. Golam Ali, ILR 18 Cal 248; and ILR 15 Bom 407.

In addition to the cases mentioned by Lord Phillimore, a series of High Court judgments affirmed that a tenant who claimed rights exceeding those to which he was entitled did not incur forfeiture. Relevant authorities included ILR 32 Bom 78 and Amar Krishna v. Nazir Hasan, ILR 14 Luck 723 (AIR 1989 Oudh 257), among others. In Amar Krishna Narain Singh’s case, ILR 14 Luck 728 (AIR 1989 Oudh 257), the Court held that a tenant who alleged a permanent tenancy right, while his actual tenancy was not of that nature, did not, by that assertion, repudiate the landlord’s title so as to cause forfeiture.

The Court observed that a Divisional Court had held that even an inadvertent denial in a pleading of the landlord’s right would lead to forfeiture. However, the Court rejected this position for Indian law, reasoning that, for the same reasons that (1881) 16 Ch. D. 730 was deemed inapplicable, forfeiture would arise only when there is a disclaimer or renunciation expressed in clear and unequivocal terms, whether in pleadings or other documents.

Regarding the documents presented, the Court noted that Exhibit A‑18 was the sole document containing a statement by the appellant that the High Court had treated as a disclaimer resulting in forfeiture. Counsel for the respondent, however, drew the Court’s attention to statements in several additional documents, which he submitted in an attempt to demonstrate either a disclaimer or an intention that could clarify the appellant’s assertions made in Exhibit A‑18.

The respondent’s counsel argued that additional documents might either constitute a disclaimer or help explain the appellant’s intention expressed in Exhibit A‑18. The first document cited was Exhibit A‑19, dated 2 October 1949. It was necessary to recall that in Exhibit A‑18 the appellant had claimed a compensation of Rs 52,900 as the correct amount due to him. By contrast, the Compensation Officer, by his order dated 26 March 1949, awarded the appellant only Rs 15,000. Unsatisfied with this award, the appellant sought a higher amount by invoking Section 11(3) of Act XXVI of 1949 before the District Judge. The application filed for that purpose was Exhibit A‑19, in which the appellant again set out the two alternative prayers that he had previously presented to the Compensation Officer. The learned District Judge, by his order dated 23 December 1949, stayed the proceedings before him pending the final disposal of the present suit. The allegations contained in Exhibit A‑19 were essentially identical to those set out in Exhibit A‑18, which had been filed before the Compensation Officer on 25 March 1949. In paragraph 2 of Exhibit A‑19 the appellant described the land acquired as a portion of the Jali Kothi or Bangla Marett Saheb “belonging to the claimant” and located in the heart of the city. Paragraph 6, which corresponds to paragraph 5 of Exhibit A‑18, stated: “The claimant and his ancestors have been owners of the land and have been exercising permanent heritable and transferable rights in this (as in other lands mentioned in paragraph 4 above) openly and to the knowledge and consent of the Government for more than sixty years.” In paragraph 18 the appellant explained that he was compelled to file declaratory suit No. 24 of 1949 against the Government of Uttar Pradesh and the Municipal Board, Sitapur, asserting that “the rights of the claimant in the whole land acquired, requisitioned and left out are those of an owner or of a permanent lessee.” The counsel observed that this wording was, if anything, less clear and unequivocal than the statements contained in Exhibit A‑18. The counsel further directed the Court’s attention to the plaint itself. The plaint again asserted that the plaintiff and his ancestors had possessed the bungalow and its compound for the preceding 79 years; that they had owned the bungalow and other structures and held the premises with permanent heritable and transferable rights; and that the plaintiff’s predecessors had exercised those rights openly, with the knowledge of the Government and the Municipal Board, thereby acquiring such rights by adverse possession. In paragraph 20 of the plaint the plaintiff prayed that the Court declare that he possessed a permanent heritable and transferable right both as an owner and, alternatively, as a permanent lessee for building purposes, and that he had the right to lease out the property.

The Court observed that the plaintiff’s pleading did not strengthen the respondent’s position nor did it extend beyond the statements already set out in Exhibit A‑18, which had been examined in detail. The Court explained that even if the appellant were treated as a permanent tenant who occupied the plot for a nominal, fixed rent and who possessed a transferable and heritable interest, none of the allegations contained in Exhibits A‑18, A‑19, or in the plaint went beyond that description. Moreover, those allegations did not seek to deprive the landlord of the reversionary interest or to refuse the fixed rent due on the property. Counsel for the respondent also pointed to the oral testimony of the appellant’s manager, who reported that the plaintiffs believed themselves to be owners. The Court found that this testimony did not assist the respondent’s case and therefore could not be taken as a basis for altering the respondent’s standing.

The Court noted a single undeniable fact: rent had been paid continuously until March 1947, and the appellant never contested his liability to pay that rent. This fact had been emphasized before the learned judges of the High Court as evidence that the appellant’s claim did not amount to an assertion of full ownership. The High Court, however, rejected that argument on the ground that there was no proof that rent had been paid up to 1949. Counsel for the respondent made the same submission before this Court. Two additional points were highlighted. First, as already stated, the appellant never disputed his obligation to pay rent. Second, on 24 September 1947, the Municipal Board, objecting to the sub‑leases made by the appellant, applied to the Government for termination of the lease, and the Government appeared to concur with the municipality’s position. A notice of acquisition of the suit plots was published on 3 December 1948, and possession was taken shortly thereafter, as recorded in Exhibit A‑18. In these circumstances, the Court found no basis to infer any prejudice against the appellant from his failure to tender rent after possession was taken. Consequently, the Court held that the learned judges had erred in concluding that the appellant’s tenancy—assumed to be permanent—had been forfeited on the basis of the claim made in Exhibit A‑18 and the other documents cited to justify forfeiture under Exhibit A‑15. The appeal was therefore allowed, the matter remanded to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law, and the appellant was awarded costs of this proceeding and of the proceedings in the High Court, subject to any further directions of the High Court regarding future costs.