Raja Birakishore vs The State Of Orissa

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 135 of 1962

Decision Date: 5 March 1964

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, S.M. Sikri

In the matter titled Raja Birakishore versus The State of Orissa, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the fifth day of March, 1964. The opinion was authored by Justice K.N. Wanchoo, who sat with Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar and Justices J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, and S.M. Sikri. The case is reported in the 1964 AIR 1501 and the 1964 SCR (7) 32, with later citations appearing in 1971 SC 891 and 1983 SC 1. The petitioner, identified as Raja Birakishore, challenged the constitutionality of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act of 1954, specifically sections 8, 11, 18, 21, 21A, and 30, as well as the broader implications of the Act for the fundamental rights protected under Articles 13, 19, 26(d), 27, and 28 of the Constitution of India. The central issue involved alleged interference with the religious affairs of the temple, which the petitioners argued fell within the scope of Article 31(2). The case arose from a writ petition originally filed in the High Court of Orissa by the father of the appellant, seeking to invalidate the Act. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that, except for section 28(2)(f), the Act was valid and consistent with the Constitution, and therefore struck down only the contested provision while upholding the remainder of the legislation. After securing a certificate of fitness for appeal, the appellant approached the Supreme Court, contending that the Act discriminated against the Jagannath Temple by granting it special treatment not afforded to other temples in the State of Orissa. The appellant further asserted that the Act removed the exclusive management rights of the temple, which had historically been vested in him or his ancestors, and that section 15(1) interfered with the temple’s religious functions. Additional attacks were directed at the validity of sections 11, 19, 21, 21A, and 30 of the Act.

The Supreme Court, after considering the submissions, dismissed the appeal and held that there was no breach of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court observed that the Jagannath Temple occupies a unique and nationally significant position in Orissa, a status unmatched by any other temple in the State, and it draws large numbers of pilgrims from across India. Consequently, the Court reasoned that the temple could legitimately be the object of special consideration by the State Government. It further explained that a law may be constitutional even if it pertains to a single individual, provided that special circumstances justifying such treatment exist, thereby allowing that individual to be treated as a class of his own. The Court also concluded that there was no violation of Article 19(1)(f) or Article 31(2). It noted that the Act merely removed the appellant’s exclusive right to manage the temple’s property and substituted a management committee, with the appellant appointed as Chairman of that body. The Court held that this reorganization did not amount to an acquisition of an extinguished office nor did it constitute a vesting of rights in the petitioner, and therefore did not infringe the constitutional protections claimed.

In this case the appellant held two positions, namely Superintendent and Adya Sevak, of the Shri Jagannath Temple. After the statutory changes the role of Superintendent was abolished and the appellant was appointed Chairman of the Committee created under section 6 of the Act. The appellant’s position as Adya Sevak remained protected by section 8, which ensures that the rights and privileges associated with the Gajapati Maharaja’s service are preserved even if the appellant ceases to be Chairman because of minority or any other reason. Section 15(1) of the Act was held not to interfere with the religious affairs of the Temple. The Court explained that the Sevapuja service has two components: a secular component involving the provision of materials and a religious component involving the performance of rites. Section 15(1) deals only with the secular component, imposing a duty on the Committee to manage the material aspects, while leaving the religious component entirely untouched. The Court further held that sections 11, 19 and 21 of the Act were valid and could not be challenged, and that sections 5 and 6, which constitute the Committee in place of the Raja, were likewise valid. Sections 21A and 30 were also found to be constitutionally sound. The Court observed that Articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution were irrelevant to the matters addressed by the Act, and that the appellant could not argue that the Act was invalid on the ground of Article 26(d) because such a contention had not been properly raised before the High Court. The judgment cited the earlier case of Tilkayat, Shri Govindlal ji v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. (1963) S.C. 1638, as authority. The appeal, filed as Civil Appeal No. 135 of 1962, arose from a judgment and order dated 30 April 1958 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 321 of 1955. Counsel for the appellant appeared, and counsel for the respondent, including the Additional Solicitor‑General, also represented their respective parties. The appeal, heard on 5 March 1964, sought to determine the constitutionality of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1954 (No. 11 of 1955). The challenge originated from a writ petition filed by the appellant’s father, who claimed that the Temple was his private property as Raja of Puri and that the Act, by depriving the appellant of that property, violated Article 19 of the Constitution. Alternatively, the petition asserted that the appellant possessed the exclusive right of superintendence and management of the Temple, a right that could not be taken away without compensation, thereby invoking Article 31. The petition further argued that the right of superintendence constituted property within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f), and that its deprivation was unreasonable and not saved under Article 19(5). Additional grounds raised included discrimination under Article 14 because the Temple was singled out for special legislation despite the existence of the general Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act No. 11 of 1952, and reliance on Articles 26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution, although the petition did not specify how those articles affected the Act.

The petitioner claimed that he possessed the exclusive right of superintendence and management of the Temple and that this right could not be removed without payment of compensation. Accordingly, he argued that the Act, by taking away that right without providing any compensation, violated Article 31 of the Constitution. He further contended that the right of superintendence constituted property within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Because the Act deprived him of that property, he maintained that the provision was unreasonable and was not saved by Article 19(5). The petitioner also asserted that the Act was discriminatory because it singled out the Temple for special legislation despite the existence of a general law, namely the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act No. 11 of 1952. He relied on Article 14 of the Constitution to argue that such discrimination made the Act unconstitutional. Additionally, he invoked Articles 26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution in an attempt to invalidate the Act, although he did not specify in the petition how those articles were violated. Finally, he submitted that the use of Temple funds for purposes unrelated to the deity’s interest, as authorized by the Act, was illegal and ultra vires.

The State opposed the petition and contended that the Temple was not the private property of the petitioner but a public place of worship. The State argued that it possessed the inherent right to ensure that a public temple is administered properly and in accordance with public interest. Historically, before the British conquest of Orissa in 1803, the Temple had been administered directly by Muslim rulers, although they employed Hindu personnel for its daily operations. After the conquest, the British Government assumed direct management of the Temple, but Regulation IV of 1809 transferred the superintendence to the Raja of Khurda, now known as the Raja of Puri, as hereditary superintendent because of his family’s historic connection with the Temple. Nevertheless, whenever mismanagement occurred during the subsequent one and a half centuries, the Government intervened and frequently administered the secular affairs of the Temple through an appointed officer. In such instances, the then Raja executed a power of attorney that completely divested him of all management powers in favor of the Government officer. Citing persistent reports of mismanagement, the State legislature enacted the Puri Shri Jagannath Temple (Administration) Act, No. XIV of 1952, to appoint a Special Officer tasked with preparing a comprehensive record of the rights and duties of sevaks, pujaris and other persons connected with the Temple’s seva, puja or administration. The Special Officer was duly appointed and submitted his report on 15 March, detailing the administrative deficiencies that prompted the enactment of the 1955 Act.

The report that was submitted on 15 March 1954 disclosed serious mismanagement in the affairs of the Shri Jagannath Temple, and as a consequence the legislature enacted the Puri Shri Jagannath Temple (Administration) Act in 1955. The State argued that the Act was fully valid and did not violate any constitutional provision. When the case was argued before the High Court, the appellant, the Raja of Puri, withdrew his earlier claim that the Temple was his private property, and it was thereby accepted that the Temple was a public institution whose properties belonged to the deity and not to the Raja personally. Because of this acknowledgement, the challenge to the constitutionality of the Act was mainly based on the contention that it removed the perquisites which had been recorded as belonging to the Raja in the rights register prepared under the 1952 Act. It is relevant to note that the Raja of Puri had a two‑fold relationship with the Temple. Firstly, he served as the adya sevak, that is, the chief servant of the Temple, a position that conferred certain rights and privileges upon him. Secondly, he acted as the sole superintendent of the Temple and was responsible for the secular administration of its affairs. The principal argument presented by the appellant before the High Court was that the Act not only stripped him of the secular management of the Temple but also interfered with his rights as adya sevak, rendering the Act unconstitutional. The High Court rejected every submission made on behalf of the appellant and held that the Act was valid and constitutional, except for the provision contained in section 28(2)(f). Accordingly, the court struck down that particular provision while upholding the remainder of the legislation. After that decision, the appellant applied for a certificate of fitness, which was granted, and the matter consequently reached this Court on appeal. Before examining the constitutional challenge, the Court wishes to outline briefly the scheme of the Act and its provisions relating to the management of the Temple. Section 1 deals with the commencement of the Act. Section 2 contains certain repeals. Section 3 incorporates the Orissa Act XIV of 1952 as part of the present Act and delegates to the committee created under section 6 all powers previously vested in the State Government under the 1952 Act, effective from a date to be notified by the State Government. Section 4 provides definitions. Section 5 vests administration and governance of the Temple and its endowments in a body corporate called the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee, which shall have perpetual succession, a common seal, and the capacity to sue and be sued. Section 6 provides for the constitution of the Committee with the Raja of Puri as its chairman and stipulates that only persons professing the Hindu religion may be members.

Section 6 of the Act stipulates that, besides the ex officio members, the remaining members of the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee are to be nominated by the State Government. One nominee must be chosen from among those who are entitled to sit on the mukti‑mandap, three nominees must be selected from the sevaks of the Temple as recorded in the Record‑of‑Rights, and seven nominees must be drawn from persons who do not belong to either of those two classes. The Collector of the district of Puri is designated as an ex officio member and is appointed to act as the vice‑chairman of the Committee. Section 7 deals with the appointment of a chairman for the period when the Raja of Puri is a minor or when the Raja is suffering from any of the disabilities enumerated in section 10(1) clauses (a) to (e) and (g). Section 8 clarifies that nothing contained in section 7 shall be construed as affecting the Raja of Puri’s rights and privileges with respect to the Gajapati Maharaj Seva merely because the Raja has ceased to perform the duties of the chairman at that time. Section 9 prescribes the terms of office of the Committee members, while section 10 empowers the State Government to remove any member of the Committee, other than the ex officio members, on any of the grounds specified in clauses (a) through (g) of that section. No member may be removed without first being given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against such removal. Section 11 provides for the dissolution and supersession of the Committee in certain circumstances, such as incompetence to perform the duties imposed by the Act or default in performing those duties; the Committee must be afforded an opportunity to show cause before any such action is taken, and a provision is made for the continuation of management during any period of supersession or dissolution. Section 12 deals with casual vacancies, section 13 with the holding of Committee meetings, and section 14 with allowances payable from the Temple fund. Under section 14, no member of the Committee, other than the administrator, is to receive a salary or any other remuneration from the Temple fund, except for travelling and daily allowances as may be prescribed. Section 15 enumerates the duties of the Committee and is reproduced in full because it constitutes the principal point of attack: “15. Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, it shall be the duty of the Committee— (1) to arrange for the proper performance of sevapujah and of the daily and periodical Nitis of the Temple in accordance with the Record‑of‑Rights; (2) to provide facilities for the proper performance of worship by the pilgrims; (3) to ensure the safe custody of the funds, valuable securities and jewelleries and for the preservation and management of the properties vested in the Temple; (4) to ensure maintenance of order and discipline and proper hygienic conditions in the Temple and of proper standard.”

In this case, the Court referred to the duties enumerated in Section 15 of the Act governing the Temple Committee. The provision requires the Committee, subject to the Act and its rules, to arrange for proper performance of sevapujah and the daily and periodic Nitis of the Temple in accordance with the Record‑of‑Rights; to provide facilities that enable pilgrims to perform worship; to ensure safe custody of the Temple’s funds, valuable securities and jewelry and to preserve and manage the properties vested in the Temple; to maintain order, discipline, hygienic conditions and cleanliness and purity in the offerings made therein; to ensure that the funds of specific and religious endowments are spent in accordance with the wishes of the donors, as far as those wishes are known; to make provision for the payment of suitable emoluments to the salaried staff; and to carry out all other acts that are incidental or conducive to the efficient management of the Temple’s affairs, its endowments and the convenience of the pilgrims. Section 16 was noted to prohibit alienation of Temple properties except under certain conditions laid down in the statute. Section 17 was observed to forbid the Committee from borrowing money from any person unless it first obtained prior sanction of the State Government. Section 18 requires the Committee to submit an annual administration report to the Government. Section 18‑A empowers the Committee, with prior approval of the State Government, to delegate its functions to the Collector of the district or, as the case may be, to an officer who happens to be a member of the Committee in place of such Collector. Section 9 confers on the State Government the power to appoint an administrator for the Temple. Section 20 prescribes the qualifications and conditions of service of the administrator, and Section 21 delineates the powers and duties of the administrator, a provision that was the specific subject of attack and therefore reproduced in full. Section 21 states that the Administrator shall be Secretary of the Committee and its chief executive officer and, subject to the control of the Committee, shall have the authority to carry out the Committee’s decisions in accordance with the Act. Notwithstanding anything in sub‑section (1) or in Section 5, the Administrator shall be responsible for custody of all records and properties of the Temple, shall arrange for proper collection of offerings made in the Temple and shall have the power to appoint all officers and employees of the Temple; to lease out, for a period not exceeding one year at a time, the lands and buildings of the Temple which are ordinarily leased out; to call for tenders for works or supplies and to accept such tenders when the amount or value does not exceed two thousand rupees; to order emergency repairs; to specify, by general or special orders, such conditions and safeguards as he deems fit, subject to which any sevak, office‑holder or servant shall have the right to be in possession of jewels or other valuable belongings of the Temple; to decide disputes relating to the collection, distribution or apportionment of offerings, fees and other receipts in cash or kind received from members of the public; to decide disputes concerning the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of sevaks, office‑holders and servants with respect to sevapuja and Nitis, whether ordinary or special; and to require various sevaks and other persons to perform their legitimate duties.

In accordance with the Record‑of‑Rights, the administrator was authorised to ensure that every required service or ritual was performed at the appropriate time. Where a sevak, his substitute, or any person appointed to perform such duties was absent or failed to carry out the duties, the administrator could direct that another individual perform the niti or seva so that the obligations set out in the Record‑of‑Rights were satisfied. Further, the administrator, subject to any conditions that the committee might impose by a general or special order, could provide facilities for the public on payment of fees for special darshan, special services, rituals, or ceremonies, provided that such offerings did not conflict with the established customs and usage of the Temple. The administrator also possessed the authority to determine, if any portion of the fees was to be retained, what share, if any, should be distributed to the sevaks, office‑holders, or servants of the Temple, thereby regulating the financial aspects of these special arrangements.

Section 21‑A stipulated that every sevak, office‑holder, and servant attached to the Temple, whether receiving hereditary or non‑hereditary emoluments or perquisites, was to remain under the control of the administrator. The administrator, acting within the limits of the Act and the regulations framed by the committee, could after giving the person a reasonable opportunity to be heard, withhold the receipt of such emoluments or perquisites, impose a fine, suspend, or dismiss the individual for reasons including breach of trust, incapacity, disobedience of lawful orders, neglect or willful absence from duty, disorderly conduct, behaviour detrimental to the discipline or dignity of the Temple, or any other sufficient cause. Section 22 granted the administrator extraordinary powers to take immediate action in emergencies, with a requirement to report the action taken and the reasons for it promptly to the committee. Section 23 dealt with the establishment schedule, while Section 24 provided a mechanism for an appeal to the committee against any order of the administrator issued under Section 21(2)(f) or (g) or under Section 21‑A. Sections 25 through 27 required the preparation of an annual budget and the conduct of an audit of the Temple’s finances. Section 28 created a Temple fund and detailed the manner in which the fund could be utilised. Section 29 prohibited any suit against the State Government, the committee, or the administrator for acts done or purported to be done under the provisions of the Act. Finally, Section 30 conferred upon the State Government the power of general superintendence over the Temple and its endowments, authorising it to issue orders for proper maintenance or administration of the Temple or its endowments or in the public interest. The State Government could also examine the records of the administrator or the committee concerning any proceedings, to verify the regularity, legality, or propriety of decisions or orders, and if necessary, could modify, annul, reverse, or remit such decisions and orders, including staying their execution pending further review.

State Government also has authority to stay the execution of any decision or order while it is under consideration. Section 30‑A creates an offence that is punishable by a fine which may extend to Rs. 500 when a person who has duties to perform in respect of the nitis of the Temple or sevapuja of the deity raises a claim or dispute and then fails or refuses to perform those duties. The offender must know, or have reason to believe, that the non‑performance would cause delay in the performance of the niti or sevapuja, or would create inconvenience or harassment to the public or any section thereof entitled to worship in the Temple, and must willfully disobey or fail to comply with the administrator’s order directing him to perform his duties, without prejudice to the result of a proper adjudication of such claim or dispute. Section 31 gives the committee power to frame regulations concerning the conditions of service of office‑bearers and employees of the Temple, the procedure for transfer of sevapuja, chuli or panti, the observance of nitis and other usages in the Temple where the record of rights is silent, and any other matters for which regulations are required for the purposes of the Act. Section 32 authorises the State Government to make rules. Section 33 provides that the committee shall be entitled to take and possess all movable and immovable property belonging to the Temple, including the Ratna Bhandar, funds, jewellery, records, documents and other assets, and it also prescribes the procedure to be followed in case of resistance in obtaining such possession. Section 34 requires that all public officers who have custody of any record, register, report or other document relating to the Temple or any of its movable or immovable property must furnish copies or extracts of the same as may be required by the administrator. Section 35 declares that no act or proceeding of the committee or of any person acting as a member of the committee shall be deemed invalid merely because of a defect in the establishment or constitution of the committee, or because any member was disqualified, irregularly appointed, or the act was taken during a vacancy in the committee; similar protection is given to an act or proceeding of the administrator. Section 36 empowers the State Government to remove difficulties, provided that any order issued for that purpose is not inconsistent with the Act or the rules made thereunder. This review shows that, broadly, the Act provides for the management of the secular affairs of the Temple while leaving religious affairs to be performed according to the record of rights prepared under the 1952 Act or, where such a record does not exist, according to customary practice.

The Court observed that the statute concerned itself only with the secular administration of the Temple and expressly refrained from interfering in the religious rites, which were required to be performed in accordance with a record of rights prepared under the 1952 Act, and, in the absence of such a record, according to the customary usage prevailing in the Temple. In this context, the Court proceeded to examine the challenge raised against the constitutional validity of the Act. The first ground of attack was founded on Article 14 of the Constitution. It was submitted that, because a special statute had been enacted specifically for this Temple and the general legislation, namely the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act No 11 of 1952, no longer applied to it, the Temple had been subjected to discriminatory treatment by being singled out for a special regime unlike other temples in the State of Orissa. The Court acknowledged that the special Act differed in many respects from the 1952 Act, notably by replacing the Raja of Puri with a committee for the purpose of managing the Temple, and that, on its face, such differentiation could appear to be discrimination unless it could be shown that the Temple constituted a class of its own requiring special treatment. The State Government, through an affidavit, asserted that the Temple was a unique institution in Orissa, belonging to a class by itself, and that no other temple in the State could be compared with it. The State’s submissions emphasized that the Temple had been regarded as a special object throughout centuries because of its singular importance, and that no other temple in the whole of India occupied the same position. Moreover, the State contended that no other temple in Orissa possessed comparable vast assets or attracted the enormous number of pilgrims that the Temple received from across the country. It was further averred that the claim that other temples in Orissa were equal to this Temple on the basis of assets, all‑India character, or the complex nature of the nitis and sevapuja affecting the lives, religious sensitivities and sentiments of millions throughout India, was absolutely incorrect. After considering these declarations, the Court found no doubt that the Temple held a unique position in Orissa, was a temple of national importance, and stood in a class by itself; consequently, given the large influx of pilgrims from all over India, it warranted special consideration by the State Government. In response to the State’s averments, the appellant, in his rejoinder, simply stated that he did not admit the statements made by the State. The appellant did not deny the special significance of the Temple as described by the State, but merely refused to accept the factual assertions put forward.

In the present proceedings the Court considered the argument that the temple in question occupies a singular position within the State of Orissa and therefore warrants a special scheme of management. The Court noted that the State had asserted that the temple stands in a class by itself and consequently required special treatment. Reference was made to the decision of the Court in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji v. State of Rajasthan (1), where the Court, dealing with a temple at Nathdwara that was governed by a special Act of the State of Rajasthan, observed that a law may be constitutional even though it concerns a single individual, provided that special circumstances applicable to that individual and not to others permit treating that individual as a class of his own. The Court further observed that the challenge to the Act under Article 14 of the Constitution was rejected because the Nathdwara temple possessed a unique status among Hindu shrines in Rajasthan and could not be compared with any other temple. Applying the same reasoning, the Court held that the present temple likewise holds a unique position among Hindu temples in Orissa, and no other temple in that State can be regarded as comparable. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Act could not be struck down on the ground of violation of Article 14, since the special status of the temple justified the distinct legislative scheme.

The Court then turned to the second challenge, which questioned the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that it removed the sole management of the temple, previously vested in the appellant or his ancestors. The Court explained that the purpose of the legislation was set out in its preamble. The preamble declares that the ancient Temple of Lord Jagannath of Puri has, from its inception, been an institution of unique and national importance, revered by millions of Hindu devotees from distant regions as the embodiment of their tradition and culture. It further states that both before and after the British conquest, the superintendence, control, and administration of the temple’s affairs were directly overseen by successive rulers, governments, their officers, and the public exchequer. The preamble continues that, by Regulation IV of 1809 and subsequent statutes and regulations arising from agreements with the Raja of Khurda—later styled the Raja of Puri—the Raja was hereditarily entrusted with the management of the temple and its properties as superintendent, subject to the authority and supervision of the ruling power. The preamble also notes that, in view of grave and serious irregularities, the Government had been compelled to intervene on several occasions, as cited in [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561. Finally, the preamble records that administration under the superintendent had further deteriorated, creating a situation that made it expedient to reorganise the scheme of management of the temple’s affairs and its properties. The Court therefore found that the removal of the appellant’s exclusive control and the appointment of a management committee, as authorised by Section 6 of the Act, were justified by the historical and administrative considerations set out in the preamble.

The Court observed that the purpose of the legislation was to bring the Temple’s properties under a more efficient system of administration and governance, superseding every earlier law, regulation and arrangement, while still respecting the ancient customs, usages, and the distinctive traditional rites and rituals recorded in the rights register prepared under the 1952 Act. Consequently, the appellant was removed from his exclusive superintendence of the Temple and, pursuant to section 6 of the Act, a committee was constituted to manage the Temple. The Court noted that the statements in the pre‑amble of the Act were not seriously contested, a fact made clear by the reports of G. Grome dated 10 June 1905, the report of the Special Officer appointed under the 1952 Act dated 15 March 1954, and the various correspondences exchanged over time between Government officers and the appellant’s predecessors. In the circumstances, the Court held that the transfer of secular management of the Temple from the appellant’s sole control to a committee—of which the appellant continued to serve as chairman—could not be said to violate the provisions of the Act by infringing Article 31(2) or Article 19(f) of the Constitution. The Court further drew a direct parallel between the present legislation and the law governing the temple at Nathdwara in Rajasthan, which had been examined earlier in the matter of Tilkayat Govindlalji. It was observed that, if anything, the appellant’s position was weaker than that of Govindlalji because the appellant’s authority to act as superintendent originated from Regulation IV of 1809, granted after the British conquest of Orissa. The Court pointed out that, irrespective of any earlier connection the appellant might have had with the Temple before 1809, the historical record showed that Muslim rulers had removed the earlier custodians and administered the Temple directly through Hindu officers they appointed. The right of management was subsequently bestowed upon the appellant’s ancestor after the British conquest by virtue of the 1809 Regulation and other subsequent statutes. Accordingly, the effect of the Act was merely to substitute the appellant’s exclusive right of management with a committee, while the appellant retained the chairmanship of that committee. The Court found that there was no basis for applying Article 31(2) in the present case. Firstly, the right of superintendence did not constitute property, as it did not confer any beneficial enjoyment of property. Secondly, the right had not been acquired by the State, a condition required for Article 31(2) to arise. Referring again to the reasoning in Tilkayat Govindlalji’s case, the Court explained that the sole right of the appellant to manage the Temple property had been extinguished, and in its place a new body was created for the administration of the Temple’s assets. In other words, the office of a single functionary was terminated and a new functionary, embodied in the committee, was established to carry out the same administrative purpose.

In this case, the Court observed that the procedure by which the former office was abolished and its functions transferred to a committee could not be described as an acquisition of the extinguished office nor as a vesting of the former office‑holder’s rights in the new holder, referring to the precedent set in Tilkayat Govindlalji’s case (1). The Court reiterated that the appellant and his ancestors possessed two separate sets of rights in relation to the Temple. Firstly, they served as adya sevaks, a position that conferred specific rights, privileges and perquisites. The Court noted that those rights, which would be explained later, had not been affected by the Act. Secondly, the appellant held the exclusive right to manage the Temple, a right that did not involve any beneficial enjoyment of property. The Act removed that exclusive managerial right and placed the management of the Temple in a committee, while the appellant continued to serve as the chairman of that committee. Because the two categories of rights were clearly distinct, the Court concluded that Article 31(2) of the Constitution was inapplicable to the appellant’s supervisory right. Consequently, the challenge to the constitutionality of the Act on the basis that the removal of the sole supervisory right violated Article 19(1)(f) or Article 31(2) could not succeed.

The discussion then turned to the appellant’s rights as an adya sevak. It was submitted that the Act had also taken away those adya‑sevak rights and that, if so, the relevant provisions would be unreasonable and could not be saved under Article 19(5). The Court examined the language of the Act and found no provision that stripped the appellant of his adya‑sevak rights. On the contrary, the Act contained indications that those rights, apart from the supervisory function, remained intact. The Court clarified that it was not saying that any secular management rights that the appellant might have exercised in his capacity as adya sevak would continue; historically the appellant occupied a dual role as both superintendent and adya sevak, which had sometimes caused confusion between the two sets of rights. However, apart from the managerial authority that the Act expressly removed, the Court saw no statutory basis for depriving the appellant of his adya‑sevak privileges, which include his duties as chief servant of Lord Jagannath in the performance of sevapuja, nitis and related religious functions. Those privileges are rooted in his religious status and obligations as sevak, as reflected in the citation (1) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 561. The Court indicated that further reference would be made to support this conclusion.

Section 8 of the Act provided that nothing in section 7 could be regarded as affecting the Raja’s rights and privileges in respect of Gajapati Maharaja Seva merely because the Raja had temporarily stopped performing the duties of chairman. The Court observed that this clause made it clear that even if the appellant could not act as chairman of the committee owing to his minority or to disqualifications specified in section 7 read with section 10(1), his rights and privileges concerning Gajapati Maharaja Seva – that is, the daily sevapuja of Lord Jagannath – remained intact. Those rights, the Court noted, were the rights he possessed as adya sevak. Consequently, the Court held that section 8, by its plain implication, preserved the appellant’s rights as adya sevak in connection with the sevapuja of Lord Jagannath. The Court then turned to section 14 of the Act, which authorised the State Government, by order, to direct from time to time the payment of allowances from the Temple fund to the chairman, in such amounts and manner that the Government considered reasonable and proper. It was submitted that, in view of section 14, the appellant’s rights and privileges as adya sevak had been lost. The Court disagreed with that submission. It reiterated that the positions of superintendent and adya sevak were distinct, and that the appellant and his predecessors had held both positions in the Temple. While the appellant’s role as superintendent had been abolished and replaced by his appointment as chairman of the committee created under section 6, the reference in section 14 to allowances pertained solely to his duties as chairman, which substituted the former superintendent role. This reference, the Court explained, did not touch upon his role as adya sevak, which remained protected by section 8 because the rights and privileges relating to Gajapati Maharaja Seva were safeguarded even if he ceased to be chairman due to minority or any other reason. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the provisions of section 14 dealt only with allowances payable to the chairman and did not affect the appellant’s rights, privileges, or perquisites as adya sevak. Even if he were no longer entitled to allowances under section 14 because section 7 caused his removal as chairman, his adya sevak rights would continue to be protected by section 8. The Court found no provision in the Act that expressly removed his rights, privileges, or perquisites as adya sevak, and noted that other provisions appeared to confirm that the rights and privileges of sevaks remained unaffected.

In this case, the Court observed that, absent any specific provision, it was difficult to conclude that the Act would alter the privileges of the appellant in his capacity as adya sevak. The Court pointed to section 21(2)(g), which authorises the administrator to adjudicate disputes concerning the rights, privileges, duties and obligations of sevaks, office‑holders and servants with respect to sevapuja and nitis, whether such matters are ordinary or special. This provision, the Court noted, clearly indicates that the rights and privileges of sevaks remain intact and that any controversy about them must be decided by the administrator. The Court further referred to section 21(2)(f), which gives the administrator power to resolve disputes relating to the collection, distribution or apportionment of offerings, fees and other receipts, whether in cash or kind, received from members of the public. This clause, according to the Court, acknowledges a right in persons who are sevaks—or similarly situated—to a share of such offerings, fees and receipts, and again places the authority to settle any disagreement in the hands of the administrator. Reading these two clauses together, the Court held that there could be no doubt that the Act does not affect the rights, privileges and perquisites of sevaks. Consequently, in the absence of an express provision, it could not be argued that the Act impairs the rights, privileges and perquisites of an adya sevak. The Court reiterated that those rights, privileges and perquisites of an adya sevak are also protected under section 8 of the Act. Turning to section 21(3), the Court quoted its language, which allows the administrator, subject to any conditions that the committee may prescribe by general or special order, to impose and provide facilities on the payment of fees for special darshan or any special service, ritual or ceremony, provided such arrangements are not inconsistent with the custom and usage of the Temple. The administrator is also empowered to determine the portion, if any, of such fees that shall be paid to the sevakas, office‑holders or servants of the Temple. This provision, the Court explained, further confirms that the rights, privileges and perquisites of sevaks are not to be altered by the Act but are to be governed by the established record of rights or, as appropriate, by the committee’s order. Accordingly, the contention that the Act is ultra vires because it removes the appellant’s rights, privileges and perquisites as an adya sevak—some of which may constitute property—must fail in view of the explicit protection in section 8 and the supportive language in the other provisions already discussed. The Court noted that clause (1) of section 15 of the Act has been specifically challenged on the ground that it interferes with the religious affairs of the Temple, whereas the remaining provisions of that section deal evidently with secular matters and have not been contested. Clause (1) provides that it shall be the duty of the committee to arrange for the proper performance of the Temple’s sevapuja and the daily and periodical nitis in accordance with the record of rights.

The Court explained that clause (1) of section 15 required the committee to arrange for the proper performance of sevapuja and the daily and periodic nitis of the Temple in accordance with the record of rights. The Court observed that this requirement did not intrude into the religious affairs of the Temple. It noted that the clause merely imposed a duty on the committee to ensure that sevapuja was carried out properly, subject to the record of rights. The Court described sevapuja as having two components. The first component involved the provision of material items and other supplies needed for the performance of sevapuja; the Court classified this component as a secular function. The second component involved the actual performance of sevapuja and other rites by sevaks or other persons entitled to do so, according to the dictates of religion. The Court held that clause (1) of section 15 dealt only with the secular component and did not regulate the religious component. Consequently, the clause required the committee to provide the necessary materials when the record of rights indicated that such materials were required, and it barred the committee from refusing those materials. The Court therefore concluded that the clause imposed a duty on the committee to look after the secular aspect of sevapuja while leaving the religious aspect untouched.

Furthermore, the Court stated that the clause also required the committee to see that the individuals who performed the religious part of the duties carried out their responsibilities properly. The Court characterised this supervisory role as a secular function, because it concerned ensuring that sevaks and other servants performed their duties, not the content of the religious rites themselves. Accordingly, the Court rejected the contention that the provision interfered with the religious affairs of the Temple. The Court then turned to other provisions of the Act that had been challenged. Apart from sections 5 and 6, which removed the appellant’s sole management of the Temple, the first provision questioned was section 11, which dealt with the dissolution and supersession of the committee. The Court remarked that it could not understand how section 11 could be attacked after it had already accepted the validity of sections 5 and 6, which established the committee in place of the Raja and transferred management to the committee. The Court observed that sections 5 and 6 were the principal provisions effecting that transfer of control.

The Court next considered section 19, which authorized the appointment of an administrator to manage the day‑to‑day administration of the secular affairs of the Temple. The Court expressed that, once sections 5 and 6 were held valid, it was impossible to attack section 19, because the committee required an officer to carry out its administrative functions. Thus, the Court found no ground for the challenge to section 19.

The Court observed that the provision dealing with the day‑to‑day administration of the temple was followed by section 21, which set out the powers and duties of the administrator appointed under section 19. The Court stated that it could not perceive any basis for challenging section 21 once the validity of the appointment made under section 19 was accepted, because section 21 merely defines the scope of the administrator’s authority. All the powers and duties described in that section related exclusively to the secular affairs of the temple and did not touch upon its religious functions. The next provision examined was section 21‑A, which the Court described as clearly concerned with the secular management of the temple. It noted that the disciplinary powers granted to the administrator by section 21‑A were required for the effective administration of the temple’s secular matters. The Court then turned to section 30, which confers overall supervisory authority on the State Government. It expressed the view that, once the appointment of the committee was held to be valid, the supervisory power granted to the State Government by section 30 could not be attacked. Finally, the Court mentioned section 30A, which creates a criminal offence and subjects sevaks and similar persons to a fine upon conviction. The Court deemed it unnecessary to assess the validity of that section at this stage, suggesting that the question could be addressed only if a prosecution under that provision were ever instituted.

Turning to the constitutional challenges raised in the petition, the Court considered the arguments involving Articles 26, 27 and 28. It held that Articles 27 and 28 were unrelated to the matters regulated by the Act. The principal reliance of the petition was on Article 26(d), which provides that, subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof has the right to administer its property in accordance with law. The Court noted that the petition merely asserted that the Act was inconsistent with Article 26, yet it failed to identify the specific denomination that was said to be concerned with the temple or whose right to administer the temple had allegedly been taken away. Moreover, the petition was filed on the basis that the appellant owned the temple as private property, and no claim was made on behalf of any religious denomination. In light of these facts, the Court concluded that the appellant could not argue that the Act was invalid because it infringed Article 26(d). The Court also recounted the argument presented before the High Court, which asserted that the worshippers of Lord Jagannath formed a distinct religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 and that they possessed a right to manage the temple and its endowments in accordance with law, with management to be exercised solely through the Raja of Puri. The Court noted that this argument had not been articulated in the original writ petition.

In the present appeal the petitioner contended that the superintendent of the Temple at Puri, together with the innumerable sevaks who were attached to the Temple, had previously possessed the right to manage the religious institution, a right that was taken away by the enactment in question and was instead vested in persons nominated by the State Government. The petitioner argued that this removal of management authority from the worshippers of Lord Jagannath, who he described as a distinct religious denomination, amounted to a contravention of the fundamental right guaranteed by clause (d) of Article 26 of the Constitution. The State, for its part, responded by maintaining that the Temple does not belong to any particular sect, cult or creed within Hinduism but that it is a public shrine intended for the worship of all Hindus irrespective of sectarian affiliation. Accordingly the State submitted that, because the Temple is not the exclusive property of any single religious domination, the Constitution‑guaranteed right under clause (d) of Article 26 is not engaged and therefore no breach can be said to have occurred. The Court observed that the foundation of this line of argument was never placed before the High Court in the writ petition that gave rise to the present proceedings; the writ petition itself contained no specific claim that the Temple was a sectarian institution whose management rights were protected by Article 26. In view of that omission the Court considered it unnecessary for the High Court to address the constitutional question in a writ petition of this character. Nevertheless, the High Court examined the matter and rejected the petitioner’s contention on the ground that the Temple was meant for all Hindus, and even if all Hindus were treated as a single denomination for the purpose of Article 26, the management of the Temple continued to be in Hindu hands because the committee appointed by the State consisted entirely of Hindus, although the committee was a nominated one. The Supreme Court, noting the defective state of the pleadings, held that it could not entertain the argument based on Article 26(d) before it, since no such contention had been properly raised before the High Court. Consequently the Court dismissed the appeal on the sole basis that the petition failed to raise a valid claim under Article 26(d), ordered that the appeal be dismissed with costs, and recorded that the appeal was dismissed.