Punjab Rao vs D. P. Meshram and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 562 of 1964

Decision Date: 26 October 1964

Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal

In this case the petitioner was Punjab Rao and the respondents were D P Meshram and others. The matter was decided on 26 October 1964 by a five‑judge bench of the Supreme Court of India. The bench comprised Justice J R Mudholkar, Chief Justice P B Gajendragadkar, Justice K N Wanchoo, Justice M Hidayatullah and Justice Raghubar Dayal. The citation of the decision is 1965 AIR 1179 and 1965 SCR (1) 849, with a subsequent citation of R 1969 SC 101 (13). The order under review was the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, paragraph 3, which defined the term “Profess” and dealt with the meaning of “Hindu” in that context. The appellant challenged the election of the first respondent to the Legislative Assembly on the ground that the respondent had embraced Buddhism on 17 March 1957, thereby ceasing to belong to a Scheduled Caste as contemplated by the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, and consequently was not entitled to contest a seat that was reserved for Scheduled Caste candidates. The Election Tribunal had accepted the appellant’s allegation, held that the respondent had indeed embraced Buddhism and set aside the election. The High Court, however, found that no evidence established the conversion and restored the respondent’s election. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined two principal propositions. First, it held that the word “profess” in the Order means “to declare one’s belief in”. A declaration of belief must be made in a manner that is known to those who may be interested, so that a public statement that a person has ceased to belong to his former religion and has accepted another religion is sufficient to show that he professes the new religion. The Court stated that it is unnecessary to inquire further whether the conversion was effective in a religious sense. Second, the Court observed that although the Explanation to Article 25 expands the definition of “Hindu”, that expansion is limited to the purpose of sub‑clause (2) of clause (2) of that article and does not extend to other contexts. The reference to the Sikh religion in paragraph 3 of the Order indicates that the term “Hindu” therein is employed in its narrower, orthodox sense, which recognises caste and includes caste‑based injunctions. Consequently, the term does not encompass Buddhism. The Court over‑ruled the earlier decision of Karwade v Shambhakar, I L R 1959 Bombay 229, which had been relied upon by the High Court.

The civil appeal was numbered 562 of 1964 and was filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated 7 February 1963 and 8 February 1963 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, in appeal No 115 of 1962. Counsel for the appellant were senior advocates who appeared on behalf of Punjab Rao, while counsel for the first respondent, Dr D P Meshram, were appointed to represent his interests. The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Justice Mudholkar. The central question presented for determination on special leave was whether the first respondent, Dr D P Meshram, was legally entitled to be a candidate for election to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from constituency No 190 of Nagpur III, a constituency that was reserved for candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes. This issue required the Court to consider the applicability of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, to a person who had publicly embraced Buddhism, and whether such a conversion disqualified him from the reserved seat.

Respondent No. 1, Dr. D. P. Meshram, had been nominated as a candidate for election to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from constituency No. 190 of Nagpur III, a seat that was reserved for candidates belonging to scheduled castes. The appellant and respondents 1 to 4 were also duly nominated for the same constituency. The election was held on 27 February 1962, and respondent No. 1 received the highest number of votes and was therefore declared elected. The appellant subsequently filed an election petition before the Election Commission, alleging two main points: first, that respondent No. 1 had embraced Buddhism on 17 March 1957 and, as a result, no longer qualified as a member of a scheduled caste within the meaning of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, and consequently was ineligible to stand for the reserved seat; and second, that respondent No. 1 had committed several corrupt practices. The Tribunal found that the alleged corrupt practices were not proved. However, it concluded that respondent No. 1 had indeed embraced Buddhism, as asserted by the appellant, and therefore was not eligible to be a candidate for the reserved constituency. On that basis, the Tribunal set aside respondent No. 1’s election. The appellant also prayed that he be declared elected, but the Tribunal denied this request because he was not the sole remaining candidate, and it could not determine how the votes obtained by respondent No. 1 would have been distributed among the other candidates. Dissatisfied with the Tribunal’s decision, respondent No. 1 appealed to the High Court of Bombay, raising only the question of his alleged conversion to Buddhism. The High Court reversed the Tribunal’s finding, holding that the conversion had not been established by evidence, and therefore upheld respondent No. 1’s election. To support the claim of conversion, the appellant introduced the testimony of witnesses identified as P.W. 9 Ramrattan Janorkar, P.W. 2 Akant Mate, P.W. 5 Devaji Bhagat and P.W. 10 Wasudeo Dongre. Ramrattan Janorkar, who described himself as a Buddha, stated that he had presided over a meeting held at Lashkari Bagh, Nagpur, two or three days after the Holi festival of 1957, during which a mass conversion of scheduled‑caste persons to Buddhism took place. He named ten individuals who, according to him, were converted at that meeting, including respondent No. 1, and also listed P.W. 2 Akant Mate, P.W. 5 Devaji Bhagat and P.W. 10 Wasudeo Dongre among them. These three witnesses corroborated Ramrattan’s testimony. The Court was taken through the evidence of these witnesses and, though there may be

The Court observed that although the witnesses presented a few minor contradictions, the overall testimony of those witnesses remained consistent and possessed a convincing element of truth. The Tribunal, which had directly heard and observed the witnesses while they were giving evidence, had placed confidence in the veracity of their statements. In contrast, the High Court had chosen not to accept the witnesses’ evidence, basing its refusal largely on the consideration that the witnesses were members of a political party that opposed the respondent identified as No. 1 and his own political affiliation. The Court noted that this explanation centered on the partisan background of the witnesses rather than on any substantive deficiency in the evidence they gave.

The Court further noted that no dispute existed before it regarding the political affiliations of the witnesses and the respondent No. 1. All of them were members of the Republican Party of India originally founded by the late Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. After Dr. Ambedkar’s death, the party experienced an internal split that resulted in the formation of two distinct factions. One faction was led in the city of Haridas by a figure named Awade, while the other faction was headed by an individual named Khobargade. The Court recorded that respondent No. 1 was aligned with the Khobargade faction, whereas the appellant and the witnesses belonged to the faction led by Awade. While agreeing with the High Court that the existence of this intra‑party rivalry was a factual circumstance that should not be ignored, the Court expressed the view that the presence of such a rivalry did not, in itself, justify a wholesale rejection of the witnesses’ evidence. The Court concluded that there were sufficient grounds to admit the testimony, given its overall consistency and the Tribunal’s earlier endorsement of its reliability.

The Court then turned to the factual background concerning the mass conversion event that had taken place in Nagpur. It noted that respondent No. 1 himself had admitted that a large‑scale conversion of many individuals belonging to the Scheduled Castes to Buddhism had occurred on 14 October 1956 at a public meeting presided over by Dr. Ambedkar. The details of that meeting were set out in Exhibit 66, which recorded an account of the proceedings. According to that exhibit, approximately five lakh persons were present at the gathering. Dr. Ambedkar attended the meeting together with Reverend Mahesthavir Chandramani, a Buddhist monk. The monk led Dr. Ambedkar and his wife in reciting the three refuges (Thrisathi) and the five precepts in the Pali language. Following the recitation, Dr. Ambedkar and his wife placed garlands around a statue of Lord Buddha that had been installed in a temporary pavilion where the principal participants, including the monk and other dignitaries, were seated. Dr. Ambedkar then proclaimed twenty‑two vows that he had personally composed. After these vows were pronounced, a mass‑ordination was carried out in which those who wished to convert to Buddhism repeated the three refuges three times. The Court observed that the event attracted nationwide attention and received extensive coverage in the press, which was well represented at the venue.

Respondent No. 1 further acknowledged that he had been a member of Dr. Ambedkar’s party at the time of the conversion ceremony, although he could not attend the ceremony personally. He explained that his absence was due to his involvement in preparing arrangements for the water‑works project, which was intended to supply drinking water to the large crowds—estimated in the hundreds of thousands—who had travelled from surrounding villages to attend the ceremony. Moreover, the Court pointed out that the testimony of the witnesses asserted that at least several lakh individuals belonging to the Scheduled Castes had been converted to Buddhism at that meeting, and that the conversion activities continued beyond 14 October 1956 for a considerable period thereafter.

In examining the events that followed the conversion ceremonies held after 14 October 1956, the Court observed that many prominent individuals belonging to the Scheduled Castes embraced Buddhism. Given that respondent No 1 was a well‑known member of the Scheduled Castes in Nagpur and a follower of Dr Ambedkar, it was considered highly unlikely that he would have remained detached from the movement initiated by Dr Ambedkar. The Court explained that Dr Ambedkar’s principal aim was to obtain a respectable position in society for members of the Scheduled Castes. He attributed the numerous disabilities imposed on these groups to their traditional status within the Hindu religion, where they were assigned the lowest rank and consequently regarded as untouchables. Recognising that the caste system was virtually embedded as an essential feature of Hindu society, Dr Ambedkar concluded that the only viable solution for the lowest‑ranked groups was to sever completely their ties to such a society. He identified Buddhism as a path of peace that also offered spiritual solace and guaranteed social equality for all its adherents. In Maharashtra, Dr Ambedkar was the unquestioned leader of the Scheduled Castes; therefore, it was not unreasonable to infer that those who accepted his leadership, particularly those occupying prominent positions among the Scheduled Castes, would follow his guidance and renounce Hinduism in favour of Buddhism. Accepting this probability, the testimony of witnesses who affirmed that respondent No 1 had actually converted to Buddhism became more readily acceptable. To strengthen this testimony, the appellant sought corroboration from the conduct of respondent No 1 after the alleged conversion. The appellant relied on three pieces of evidence: first, a declaration signed by respondent No 1 together with several other individuals stating that they had embraced Buddhism and were no longer members of the Scheduled Castes; second, a wedding invitation on which a picture of Lord Buddha was printed, to which respondent No 1 had subscribed; and third, the transformation of a Shiva temple located near the appellant’s residence into a Buddha temple. The declaration, exhibited as Exhibit 42 and dated 5 July 1957, reads: “To whomsoever it may concern:‑ We, the following signatories, do hereby affirm that we embraced Buddha religion on 17‑3‑1957 and no longer since remain Harijans.” The document lists ten signatories, including P.W. 2 Akant Mate, P.W. 5 Devaji Bhagat and P.W. 10 Dongre, each of whom signed beside his name. The appellant contended that the reason for the preparation of this declaration was as follows:

In this case, the Court described a meeting of the Nagpur Corporation that occurred on 5 July 1957 for the purpose of selecting six additional members. During that meeting, a Corporator named Mr Udhoji raised a point of order stating that, because no member of the Scheduled Castes had been elected to the Corporation, a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes was not required to be selected under the Nagpur Municipal Corporation Act. Respondent No 1 had already been elected to the Corporation and was present at the meeting, but he did not dispute Mr Udhoji’s statement that no Scheduled‑Caste member had been elected. The point of order was apparently disallowed, and the six members were chosen, none of whom belonged to the Scheduled Castes. Immediately after that selection, a declaration—referred to earlier—was signed by ten persons, including Respondent No 1, all of whom had been elected as Municipal Corporation members in the same election. That declaration was later filed together with a writ petition before the High Court, seeking to set aside the July 5 selection on the ground that no Scheduled‑Caste person had been selected. Respondent No 1 admitted that he had signed the declaration; in his written statement he said that he signed it because of political pressure. However, his oral evidence presented a different explanation. He recounted that a person named Akant Mate arrived with a written document and claimed that the Scheduled Castes Federation had directed that members elected on its tickets should sign the document. Respondent No 1 said he did not know how Akant Mate obtained that directive or from whom. He noted that the document was in English, that he could not read the English typewritten material, and that Akant Mate told him to sign while promising to obtain the signatures of other Corporators and submit the document to the Corporation office. According to his testimony, Akant Mate also told him that the President of the meeting had ruled, based on information from the Commissioner, that both he and Mate were members of the Scheduled Castes and that if that were not the case they could obtain one additional member, which motivated him to sign. Respondent No 1 asserted that his consent had not been obtained for filing the declaration in the High Court and that he was not a party to the High Court proceedings related to the declaration. In substance, his statement suggested that he had been misled by Akant Mate. The Court observed that there was a clear inconsistency between Respondent No 1’s pleading and the evidence he produced. Accordingly, the Court found it appropriate to reject his explanation. Once his explanation was rejected, the Court held that the declaration should be considered as corroborative evidence of the fact that Respondent No 1 had ceased to be a Hindu.

In this case the Court observed that Respondent No 1 did not dispute that the wedding invitation placed on record by the appellant displayed his name as one of the hosts, and that the invitation related to the marriages of his daughters Lalita and Pushpa Lata to Sirish and Yashwant Rao respectively. The invitation bore the customary opening words “Subh Langna” indicating an auspicious wedding, and it was followed by a picture of Lord Buddha together with the inscription “May victory and prosperity by yours‑ Obeisances to Buddha”. The Court noted that in typical Hindu wedding invitations issued in an Indian language, a picture of the family deity, or Kuladaivata, is ordinarily printed and the blessings of that deity are invoked. Consequently, had Respondent No 1 regarded himself as a Hindu, the usual practice would have required him to follow that tradition. Although the Court recognized that some sophisticated individuals who continue to identify as Hindus may have abandoned the custom of printing the family deity’s picture and invoking its blessings, Respondent No 1 made no claim to belong to such a class. The Court further reasoned that if he had been among those who forgo the practice, there would have been no reason to print the picture of Lord Buddha and to solicit his blessings on the invitation. In this instance the picture of the Kuladaivata was replaced by that of Lord Buddha, an alteration the Court found to be more consistent with Respondent No 1 having become a Buddhist than with his remaining a Hindu. According to Respondent No 1, he did not become aware, until after the sakshyagandh (engagement), that either bridegroom was a Buddhist. He claimed that a week before the marriages, a representative of the bridegrooms’ side approached him and informed him that the ceremonies had to be conducted according to Buddhist ritual, and that a refusal would lead to the engagements being broken off. It was at that moment that he first thought the bridegrooms were Buddhists, yet he did not consider it appropriate to terminate the engagements. The Court observed that if he were still a Hindu belonging to the Scheduled Castes, it would be unlikely for him to reconcile himself to giving his daughters in marriage to non‑Hindus, especially when the bridegrooms’ side insisted on a Buddhist ceremony. Respondent No 1 attempted to justify his conduct by stating that he treated Lord Buddha as the “11th (sic) incarnation” and therefore had Buddha’s picture printed on the wedding invitation, but the Court found that explanation not readily credible. Regarding the third circumstance, the Court relied on the testimony of Budhaji Godbole, PW 11, and Kisan Shende, PW 14, together with the appellant’s evidence, which indicated that Respondent No 1 converted the Shiva temple in Gautamnagar into a Buddha temple on 6 June 1959, installed an image of Lord Buddha at a function he presided over, and that Dr Y. B. Ambedkar, President of the Buddhist Society, was present at that event. The Court also noted that Respondent No 1 had admitted most of these facts, as pointed out in the record.

In this case, the Court noted that the High Court had themselves identified the essential disagreement between the parties. According to the version presented by respondent No 1, a Shiva Temple had originally stood on a parcel of land located in Gaddigudam, Nagpur. He alleged that when a new road was being laid sometime around the year 1932, the Nazul authorities took over that parcel and, in return, allotted another piece of land on which a Shiva Temple could be reconstructed. However, respondent No 1 further claimed that no Shiva Temple was ever actually built on the substituted plot and that no Shiva Linga was ever installed there. The Court found this assertion to be manifestly false, because the respondent also admitted that the plot in question was administered by a Panch Committee of which he himself was a member. It was logically impossible for a Panch Committee to manage a piece of land that did not contain any temple structure.

The Court observed that respondent No 1 conceded that, while serving as Chairman of that Committee in either 1959 or 1960, the Committee made a decision to construct a temple on the site. The Court found it difficult to accept the suggestion that the local community would have waited almost twenty‑eight years after the road work before deciding to erect a new temple. Moreover, the respondent acknowledged that a temple dedicated to Lord Buddha was indeed erected on the plot, a fact that was also supported by the appellant’s witnesses. From these admissions, the Court inferred that the Committee’s resolution pertained to the construction of the Buddha temple rather than to the erection of a Shiva Temple that was purportedly already present.

The evidence offered by the appellant indicated that, during a ceremony held on 6 June 1959, the idol of Lord Buddha was installed directly above the Shiva Linga. The implication, as understood by the Court, was that the existing Shiva Linga had been covered with earth or bricks and that the Buddha image was then placed on top of that covering. When referring to the testimony of Shende, the High Court had observed that the witness did not state that he had personally observed the removal of the original Shiva image, the Linga, or the Pinda that were already in place. The High Court further noted that, according to the case of Meshram, the municipal corporation had already provided another plot to which the Shiva Mandir had previously been shifted, and that because this latter plot remained idle, it was offered for the installation of the Buddha idol.

The Court pointed out that this observation by the High Court was based on a misreading of respondent No 1’s evidence and disregarded the respondent’s written statement. Respondent No 1 never claimed that two separate plots had been allotted for a Shiva Temple, one of which lay vacant. Instead, his contention, as previously outlined, was that the plot offered in exchange for the original one had never been utilized for a Shiva Temple, and that there was no second plot that had been employed for that purpose. The Court further criticized the High Court for not giving proper weight to the testimony of Budhaji Godbole. Budhaji Godbole testified that a house situated one house away from respondent No 1’s residence stood on a plot of land on which a Shiva Temple once existed, and that this particular plot was recorded in the name of respondent No 1.

In the testimony concerning the temple, the witness stated that the shrine originally contained the lingam and the pind of Shiva. He further recounted that on 6‑6‑1959 the temple was converted into a Buddha Vihar. On that date, according to the witness, the lingam and the pind were buried underground and an idol of the Buddha was installed in their place. The witness identified Bhaiyasaheb Ambedkar as the person who performed the installation of the Buddha image, and he said that respondent No 1 was the principal individual responsible for converting the Shiva temple into a Buddha Vihar. The cross‑examination did not suggest that the witness lacked personal knowledge of these events; rather, his description of the burial of the Shiva lingam and the placement of the Buddha idol indicated that he observed these actions himself and also observed respondent No 1’s participation in them. The witness also disclosed that he himself had become a Buddhist.

Reference was also made to the evidence of another witness, Kisan Shende. The relevant portion of his deposition recorded that respondent No 1 acted as President of the ceremony and that Bhaiyasaheb Ambedkar installed the Buddha idol on an ota that covered the former lingam and pind representing the deity Shiva. This portion of Shende’s testimony had not been challenged during cross‑examination, and there was no reason presented to reject it, especially because some essential facts described by the witnesses had been admitted by respondent No 1 himself. Accepting this evidence, the logical conclusion was that respondent No 1 had ceased to be a Hindu. The court noted that, however great a Hindu’s admiration for the Buddha, a devout Hindu would find it abhorrent to desecrate a Shiva lingam or to transform a Shiva temple into a Buddhist temple. Consequently, the court regarded this evidence as the strongest corroboration of the eyewitness accounts regarding respondent No 1’s conversion to Buddhism.

Respondent No 1 argued that a register existed documenting persons who had converted to Buddhism and that his name did not appear in that register. The testimony of witness 5, Waman Godbole, mentioned such a register but also demonstrated that the register was not maintained regularly, nor were signatures of converts taken in accordance with the dates of conversion. The court observed that there was no legal requirement for every convert to sign the register, and that even a signature, if present, would constitute merely one piece of evidence of conversion. Accordingly, the absence of a signature could not be taken as definitive proof that a person had not converted to Buddhism. Finally, the court addressed the contention that only a Bhikkhu was authorized to convert non‑Buddhists, noting that abundant evidence on the record contradicted the notion that conversion required strict adherence to such a procedural restriction.

The Court noted that at the conversion ceremony held on 14 October 1956 Dr. Ambedkar addressed the new Buddhists. He told them that anyone who had become a Buddhist could admit others to the Buddhist faith. The Court further observed that no authority had been produced to show that a person could not become a Buddhist unless the conversion was performed by a Bhikku. It was pointed out that Buddhism, in its essence, represented a protest against orthodoxy and against priestly power. Consequently, it would be strange to require strict ritual compliance for a non‑Buddhist to become a Buddhist. Evidence showed that at every conversion three vows were repeated three times. The five precepts were also repeated by each person offering themselves for conversion. The Court stated that this exact procedure had been carried out by Dr Ambedkar, his wife and others at the mass meeting on 14 October 1956. It was not suggested that their actions were inadequate or that they could not be regarded as having embraced Buddhism from that date. Accordingly, the Court held that it was futile to claim that others who underwent the same procedure had not become Buddhists merely because no Bhikku officiated at the function. The Court then turned to clause (3) of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, which provides that a person shall be treated as belonging to a Scheduled Caste only if he professes either the Hindu or Sikh religion. The High Court, following its earlier decision in Karwade v. Shambhakar, had explained that the phrase “professes a religion” means “to enter publicly into a religious state”. The High Court further held that a mere personal declaration of having left one religion and embraced another was not sufficient for the purpose of that provision. The Court quoted the definition of “profess” given in Webster’s New World Dictionary: to avow publicly; to make an open declaration of; to declare one’s belief in. The Court added that the Shorter Oxford Dictionary gives a similar meaning. It was considered that the meaning “to declare one’s belief in” was the appropriate sense for construing the Order because it relates directly to religious belief and to a change in religious belief. From this it followed that a declaration of belief must be made in a manner that is known to those to whom it may be relevant. Accordingly, the Court concluded that when a person publicly declares that he has ceased to belong to his former religion and has accepted another religion, he is taken to be professing the new religion. In the presence of such an open declaration, the Court found it unnecessary to inquire further into whether the conversion was efficacious.

The Court observed that the term “profess” employed in the Presidential Order was intended to signify an open declaration or outward practice by an individual who identified as Hindu or Sikh. Consequently, when a person expressly stated that he had ceased to be a Hindu, the Court held that such a person could not claim any advantage or right under that Order. The Court then considered the argument that the word “Hindu” might be interpreted broadly enough to encompass Buddhists. In addressing that argument, the Court referred to Explanation 11 to clause (2) of Article 25 of the Constitution. The Court noted that clause (1) of Article 25 guarantees, among other freedoms, the right to practise and to propagate one’s religion. Sub‑clause (b) of clause (2) was quoted as providing that nothing in the article would affect existing law or prevent the State from making any law “providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.” The Court then read Explanation II, which clarified that in sub‑clause (b) the reference to “Hindus” should be understood to include persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religions, and that the reference to Hindu religious institutions should be construed accordingly. The Court emphasized that this expanded definition of “Hindu” applied only for the special purposes of sub‑clause (b) of clause (2) of Article 25 and not for other purposes. Turning to Paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, the Court quoted that provision, which stated that, notwithstanding paragraph 2, no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu or Sikh religion would be deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste. The Court reasoned that if the word “Hindu” in that paragraph were meant to have the same wide meaning as in Explanation 11, there would have been no need to mention the Sikh religion separately. The specific mention of Sikhs indicated that “Hindu” was to be understood in its narrow, orthodox sense, referring to the traditional Hindu religion that recognises caste and contains caste‑based injunctions. On this basis, the Court concluded that respondent No. 1 had ceased to be a Hindu at the time of his nomination, rendering him ineligible to contest a seat reserved for Scheduled Caste members. Accordingly, the Court affirmed that the Tribunal was correct in annulling his election. The appeal was allowed, the High Court judgment was set aside, and the Tribunal’s order was restored. All costs of the proceedings were ordered to be borne by respondent No. 1.