Potti Lakshmi Perumallu vs Potti Krishnavenamma

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 519 of 1961

Decision Date: 13 August, 1964

Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, K. Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala

In this case, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 13 August 1964. The judgment was authored by Justice J. R. Mudholkar, who sat together with Justices N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and K. Subbarao. The petitioner was Potti Lakshmi Perumallu and the respondent was Potti Krishnavenamma. The dispute arose under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 (Act 18 of 1937) and centered on several questions: whether a will executed by a husband who was a member of a Hindu joint family amounted to a separation of the joint family, whether the will could be construed as a family arrangement, how the widow’s interest should be determined, and whether that interest should be measured as of the date on which partition was sought or as of the date of the husband’s death. The respondent, who was the widow of S, the brother of the petitioner, instituted a suit claiming a half share in the entire property by invoking the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act. After the death of S, his only son by his first wife had also died at the age of eleven years. The respondent admitted that S had purported to execute a will before his death but contended that the will was inoperative because S was a member of a Hindu joint family at the time of his death. The courts below found that the suit properties were the joint‑family properties of S and the petitioner, that the will executed by S was inoperative and not binding on the respondent, and that the respondent was therefore entitled to a half share in the suit properties. The petitioner appealed to this Court by special leave. In the appeal the petitioner advanced three principal contentions. First, that the will executed by S itself resulted in a severance of the status of the two brothers who constituted the joint family and that, in any event, a separation had occurred between them at the death of S. Second, that the will should be construed as a family arrangement made by the karta of the family and that it had been assented to by the respondent and by the father and foster‑father of the respondent on her behalf. Third, assuming that the first two contentions were incorrect, the petitioner argued that the respondent would be entitled only to a one‑quarter share in the property, not a half share, and that the appropriate date for ascertaining her interest would be the date of S’s death. The Court held that the High Court rightly rejected all of these contentions. The Court observed that nowhere in the will had S expressed a desire to put an end to the coparcenary. Indeed, the very assertion in the will—although later found to be untrue—that the property was not joint‑family property would preclude any inference that S intended to separate or to end a coparcenary which, according to that assertion, did not exist. The Court referred to the decision in A. Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 933, in support of this reasoning. The Court further noted that a family arrangement made for the benefit of the family in general can be enforced by a court of law.

The Court observed that, prior to granting relief based on a family arrangement, the parties must demonstrate that a specific occasion for entering into such an arrangement existed and that the arrangement was actually carried out, as indicated by the citations [31A‑B]. It then explained the prevailing theory under Hindu law that a widow is considered the surviving half of her deceased husband, meaning that, as long as the widow lives, the husband is deemed to continue existing in her person. Under the traditional Hindu law texts, this surviving half did not possess any right to demand a partition of the family property to which the husband belonged. However, the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act of 1937 conferred that right upon the widow. The Court clarified that when the Act provides that the widow shall have the same right as her husband had, it plainly means that she is entitled to receive the same share that the husband would have obtained had he been alive on the date the widow seeks partition. The interest that devolves upon the widow therefore need not arise solely by survivorship or by inheritance; it may arise in a third manner—by operation of statute—and when the interest is taken under a statute, its character is defined by the provisions of that statute, as reflected in the references [34B‑D; 37B]. The judgment discussed several authorities: Jadaobai v. Puranmal, I.L.R. [1944] Nag. 832, and Natarajan Chettiar v. Perumal Ammal, A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 246, which were expressly disapproved; whereas Siveshwar Prasad v. Lala Har Narain, I.L.R. (1944) 23 Pat. 760, and Rajendrabati v. Mungalal, I.L.R. (1952) 31 Pat. 477, were distinguished. The matter at hand was Civil Appeal No. 519 of 1961, filed by special leave against the judgment and decree dated 11 December 1958 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suit No. 1142/1953. Counsel for the appellant were S. T. Desai and T. V. R. Tatachari, while counsel for the respondent were G. Venkatarama Sastri and R. Gopalakrishnan. The judgment was delivered by Justice Mudholkar. This appeal sought confirmation of the High Court’s decree that ordered the partition and separate possession of certain movable and immovable properties, a decree originally passed by the second Additional Subordinate Judge at Vijayawada. To aid in understanding the factual backdrop, the Court referred to a genealogical table outlining the relationships among the parties. According to that table, Potti Subba Rao, who died in 1919, was survived by three sons: Sitaramaiah, Lakshmi Perumallu, and Krishnamurti. Sitaramaiah had married twice; his first wife was Sitaraimaiah and his second wife was Lakshmi Krishnamruti. The plaintiff, Perumallu, died in 1930. The defendant died on 10 August 1938. A child named Pulla Rao died in 1939. These familial details provided the necessary context for the Court’s further analysis of the partition suit.

In this matter the plaintiff remained living in the same house as the defendant until the beginning of July 1950, when she abruptly departed and instituted the present suit on 6 July 1950. She asserted that her late husband Sitaramaiah, together with his two brothers – the defendant and Krishnamurti – had acquired extensive movable and immovable assets at Vijayawada, the description of which was set out in the schedule to the plaint. She claimed that, by virtue of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, she was entitled to a fifty‑percent share in the entire property listed in the schedule. The plaintiff acknowledged that her husband had purportedly executed a will before his death, but she contended that the will could not operate because Sitaramaiah was a member of a Hindu joint family at the time of his demise.

The defendant disputed the plaintiff’s claim on several grounds. First, he argued that no ancestral property existed and that the properties alleged by the plaintiff had been acquired by the brothers through their own individual efforts, constituting self‑acquisition. Second, he maintained that the will executed by Sitaramaiah was valid, binding upon the plaintiff, and that the portion of the property allotted to the plaintiff under the will was already in her possession. He further asserted that the assets allotted to Pulla Rao had devolved upon him following Pulla Rao’s death. Finally, the defendant submitted that even assuming the property formed part of the joint family estate of Sitaramaiah and himself, the plaintiff could only claim a one‑quarter share and not the half share she sought.

The lower courts found that the suit properties were indeed joint family properties of Sitaramaiah and the defendant, held that the will executed by Sitaramaiah was inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff, and concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to a fifty‑percent share in the suit properties. Accordingly, the trial court directed that a commissioner be appointed to ascertain the property liable to be partitioned and to divide it into two equal portions by metes and bounds so that the plaintiff could be awarded separate possession of her half share.

Mr S. T. Desai, appearing for the defendant‑appellant, did not challenge the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the family‑acquired properties were joint family properties. He advanced three specific contentions before this Court. First, he argued that the will dated 3 August 1938 had effectually severed the status of the two brothers as members of a joint family and that a separation had consequently arisen between them upon Sitaramaiah’s death. Second, he submitted that the will ought to be construed as a family arrangement made by the family’s karta and assented to by the defendant as well as by the plaintiff’s father and foster‑father on her behalf. Third, assuming that neither of the first two arguments was correct, he contended that the plaintiff’s entitlement would be limited to a one‑quarter share in the property, not the half share claimed, and that this interest should be ascertained as of the date of Sitaramaiah’s death.

The respondent argued that the plaintiff’s entitlement would be only a one‑fourth share in the disputed property rather than the half share that had been claimed. He further contended that the quantum of that one‑fourth share must be measured as of the date of Sitaramaiah’s death. The same contentions were advanced before the High Court, and the High Court rejected them. In the present opinion the Court agrees with the High Court’s view and finds that the plaintiff is not limited to a one‑fourth interest.

The counsel for the respondent, Mr Desai, relied heavily on a recent decision of this Court in A. Raghavamma & anr. v. A. Chenchamma & anr. (1). In that precedent the Court held that a member of a joint Hindu family may effect a separation in status by making a clear and unequivocal declaration of his intention to sever himself from the family and to enjoy his share in severalty, even if such intention is expressed in a will. The Court further explained that the knowledge of that intention must be communicated to the persons who are affected, and that, once communicated, the effect of the intention is deemed to relate back to the date on which it was formed and expressed. While the respondent seeks to apply this rule to the present will, a careful reading of the will annexed as Exhibit B‑1 does not unmistakably demonstrate that Sitaramaiah intended to separate himself from the joint family. At the very beginning of the will Sitaramaiah states: “I have executed this will regarding the arrangements to take effect after my life‑time with regard to the enjoyment of the joint immovable and movable properties which are possessed by me and under my management by my brother and others.” In the second paragraph he asserts that he possessed no ancestral property and that the business carried on by him and his brother was a venture they had established together. In the third paragraph he directs that the plaintiff shall maintain his son Pulla Rao and that his brother shall look after the interests of Pulla Rao.

Mr Desai points to the fourth, fifth and eighth paragraphs of the will as evidence of a severance. Those paragraphs read as follows: “4. If for any reason the said Krishnaveni does not agree to be like that my younger brother Lakshmi Perumallu shall deliver possession of the upstairs house constructed newly on the house site purchased from Nadakurthi (1) [1964]2 S.C.R. 933. p./64 3 Kristamma and others and the tiled room situate in the big street and purchased from Gunda Subbarayudu out of the immovable property possessed by me in Bezwada town on condition of including them in the half share of the property that shall pass to my –, on after my life‑time. 5. The said Krishnaveni shall be at liberty to take possession of the two properties mentioned in paragraph 4 above, to pay all kinds of taxes payable thereon and to enjoy freely throughout her life‑time only the income got every year from the said two properties without powers of gift, mortgage, exchange and sale by following the age‑old custom and by maintaining the family respect and custom and the said two properties shall pass to my son Pulla Rao alias Venkatasatyanarayana.” The Court observes that while paragraph 4 indicates that, under certain circumstances, particular properties may be included in the half share that will pass to the son after the testator’s death, and paragraph 5 allows Krishnaveni to possess and enjoy those two properties during her lifetime, the language of paragraph 6 (as reproduced in the subsequent portion of the judgment) reverts to describing the remaining property as “joint property.” Consequently, the will does not contain an unequivocal declaration of an intention to sever Sitaramaiah’s status from the joint family, and the reliance on the earlier decision cannot be sustained in this case.

In the will, paragraph eight directed that the younger brother, Lakshmi Perumallu, should retain the remaining entire property as joint property until the son, Pulla Rao alias Venkatasatyanarayana, reached majority. The brother was instructed to manage the property, to bring up the boy properly, to celebrate his marriage and other auspicious functions, and after the son attained majority to divide the half‑share of the property and deliver possession of the same to him. The Court found it difficult to infer from the recitals that Sitaramaiah had expressed a clear intention to separate his status from the joint family. Although paragraph four mentioned that, under certain circumstances, particular property would be included in the half‑share that would pass to his son after his death, and paragraph five allowed the plaintiff liberty to take possession of the two properties listed in paragraph four, enjoy them during her lifetime, and have them pass to Pulla Rao on her death, the later paragraphs emphasized joint ownership. Paragraph six referred to the remaining property as “joint property,” and paragraph seven repeated that description. Moreover, the statements in paragraph eight expressly required the defendant to keep the remaining property joint until the son attained majority, to manage it, and then to divide it between the brother and the son after the son’s majority. Nowhere in the will did Sitaramaiah state a desire to terminate the coparcenary. The Court noted that the claim, which had been concurrently found to be untrue, that the property was not joint family property would actually prevent any inference that Sitaramaiah intended to end the coparcenary, especially since the assertion itself denied the existence of such a joint family. Consequently, the Court could not accept the first contention advanced by Mr Desai.

The Court further observed that a family arrangement intended for the benefit of the family can be enforced by a court, but only when it is shown that there was an occasion for making such an arrangement and that the arrangement was acted upon. In this case, there was a complete absence of evidence demonstrating either an occasion for the arrangement or that the provisions of the will had been put into effect. The letter marked Ex B12, relied upon before the High Court on behalf of the defendant, had been determined by that court to be inauthentic. The defendant also claimed that the provisions of the will had been implemented, yet no satisfactory evidence was presented to prove that the plaintiff was enjoying the properties assigned to her under the will. Accordingly, the Court could not accept the second contention raised by Mr Desai. The Court then turned to the issue of the quantum of interest, noting that the decisions of various High Courts were in conflict on this point.

In this case, the Court explained that the amount of interest to which a Hindu widow is entitled under section 3(2) of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, may be determined in one of two ways. One approach holds that the interest is measured as of the date on which the widow files a petition for partition under sub‑section (3) of section 3. The alternative approach contends that the interest is fixed as of the date of the husband’s death and does not fluctuate thereafter because of births or deaths among other family members. The first approach has been endorsed in the twelfth edition of Mulla’s Principles of Hindu Law, pages 109‑110, where it is stated that a widow’s share is not a fixed, determinate portion but is the “same interest as he himself had.” Consequently, until a partition occurs, the widow cannot specify a precise fraction of her share because that share may increase or decrease with the birth or death of other coparceners. Her share includes any accretion to the joint family property up to the time of partition. Prior to the enactment of the Act, a widow was entitled to a share in the partition among her sons in her capacity as mother, except in Madras. Subsequent case law has held that after the Act the widow cannot claim a double share—once as a widow and once as a mother—when partitioning among the sons. Moreover, stridhan acquired by a woman from her husband or father‑in‑law was traditionally considered when allotting her share on partition, but the share conferred by section 3(2) is not reduced by any contrary rule of Hindu law, and a Nagpur decision affirmed that such stridhan is not deducted from her share on partition. To support this view, the Court referred to the following authorities: Nagappa v. Mukambe; Mahadu v. Gajarabai; Shivappa v. Yellewa; Gangadhar v. Subhashsini; Tukaram v. Gangi; Ramchandra v. Ramgopal; Hanuman v. Tulsabai; Gurudayal v. Sarju; Kamal Kishore v. Harihar; Sabujpari v. Satrughan Isser; Movva Subba Rao v. Movva Krishna Prasaadam; Parapa v. Nagamma; Manicka v. Arunachala; Harekrishna v. Jujesthi; Keluni v. Jagabandhu; The Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Co. Ltd. v. K. Kotayya; Laxman v. Gangabai; Bhondu v. Ramdayal; and Ratan Kumari v. Sunder Lal. The High Court also cited the Full Bench decision in Chinniah Chettiar v. Sivagami Achi, a judgment that was convened to resolve an apparent conflict between Chinniali Chettiar’s case and Subba Naicker v. Nallammal. The Full Bench concluded that there was no real conflict and that the right conferred by the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act represented a new right that modified the pre‑existing position.

The judgment observed that the right conferred by the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act introduced a new entitlement that modified the pre‑existing right. The Full Bench further held that section 3(2) of the Act did not sever the interest of a deceased coparcener. It stated that the widow of the deceased was not elevated to the status of a coparcener, although she continued to remain a member of the joint Hindu family in the same manner as before the enactment. The Bench explained that the joint family would continue to exist as it had previously, subject only to the rights of the other members, and that the death of the husband did not alter that continuity. The judgment cited a series of authorities, including I.L.R. [1951] Bom. 442; I.L.R. [1953] Bom. 958; A.I.R. 1957 Nag. 28; A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 63; I.L.R. [1951] Pat. 357; I.L.R. [1954] Mad. 257; I.L.R. [1961] Mad. 1016; I.L.R. [1957] Cutt. 630; I.L.R. [1955] M.B. 282; A.I.R. 1959 Cal. 787; (1949) 2 M.L.J. 536; I.L.R. [1954] Bom. 885; A.I.R. 1955 Orissa 135; I.L.R. [1956] Nag. 362; A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 43; A.I.R. 1958 Pat. 405; I.L.R. [1954] Mad. 183 (Full Bench); I.L.R. [1955] Cutt. 70; A.I.R. 1955 Andh. 135; A.I.R. 1960 M.P. 51; and I.L.R. [1945] Mad. 402, to support its reasoning. It further noted that when the widow died, the right of survivorship was suspended until that date. According to the Full Bench, the widow could, under the Act, claim a share not only in the property owned and possessed by the family at the time of her husband’s death but also in any accretions arising thereafter, regardless of the nature of those accretions. The Court referred to various decisions previously mentioned, which held that the interest granted to the widow by the statute was a new kind of interest, commonly described as the Hindu widow’s estate. This interest replaced her pre‑existing right under Hindu law to claim maintenance. The decisions also recognised that, although the widow did not become a coparcener by virtue of the statutory interest, she was entitled to claim partition of the joint family property and thus occupied the same position that her deceased husband would have occupied in exercising that right. Accordingly, the Court explained that her interest was fluctuating, increasing or decreasing in response to deaths or additions among family members, or to accretions or diminutions of the property. In the Court’s opinion, these decisions correctly laid down the law. The Court warned that to accept the opposite view, as argued by counsel for the petitioner and as reflected in the two decisions on which that counsel relied—Jadaobai v. Puranmal and Siveshwar Prasad v. Lala Har Narain—would mean that whenever a coparcener in a Hindu joint family died leaving a widow, a disruption would occur in the family.

The Court observed that without a finding that a disruption has taken place in the joint family, the widow’s share cannot be crystallised. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Desai, argued that the statute uses the phrase ‘his widow shall, subject to the provisions of sub‑s. (3) have in the property the same interest as he himself had’. He said that this language can only refer to the interest the deceased coparcener possessed at the moment of his death. Mr. Desai further contended that the words ‘shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman’s estate’ indicate that the nature of the widow’s interest must correspond to the interest recognised by Hindu law. He maintained that the legislature did not intend to create a new kind of interest nor to make the widow a coparcener. He admitted that the widow does not become a coparcener, but asserted that her interest in the family property should be the same as that of her deceased husband. He added that the extent of her interest is limited to what is applicable to a Hindu widow. He noted that the scope of a Hindu widow’s interest has subsequently been enlarged by section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Court observed, however, that a coparcener possesses no defined share in the joint family property; his right is limited to the right to claim a partition. The quantum of a coparcener’s interest, as explained in the authorities (1) I.L.R., [1944] Nag. 832 and (2) I.L.R. (1944) 23 Pat. 760, is determinable. It is determined with reference to the date on which the member unequivocally declares his intention to separate, thereby ending the coparcenary.

The Court rejected any suggestion that the death of a coparcener does not amount to an unequivocal declaration of separation from the family. According to the theory underlying Hindu law, the widow of a deceased Hindu is regarded as his surviving half. Therefore, as long as she lives, the husband is deemed to continue to exist in her person. That surviving half, under classical Hindu law texts, possessed no right to claim a partition of the joint family property to which the husband belonged. The Act of 1937, however, conferred upon the widow the right to claim such a partition. When the statute provides that the widow shall have the same right as her husband, it means she is entitled to be allotted the same share that her husband would have obtained. This entitlement applies as if the husband were alive on the date the widow seeks partition. The Court then considered Jadaobai v. Puranmal(1), a decision on which Mr. Desai relied, to examine the alternative view expressed therein. In that case, it was contended that the widow does not acquire any property by succession. Therefore, she is not required to produce a succession certificate for the execution of a decree obtained by her husband. Support for that contention was sought by relying on the decision in Natarajan Chettiar v. Perumal Ammal(2). In that decision, Hon’ble Justice Horwill observed: “The widow does not obtain the right given under this”.

The Court examined section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 and noted that the widow was neither a coparcener before her husband’s death nor after it. Consequently, the Court held that the fact that the widow does not acquire her right by survivorship does not compel the conclusion that she must acquire it by inheritance. The effect of clause (2) and clause (3) of section 3, the Court explained, may be understood as a continuation of the husband’s legal personality in his wife, thereby giving her the same rights that the husband possessed, subject to a limitation that she may alienate property only under specified circumstances. Because the widow’s right does not arise through inheritance, the Court affirmed that no succession certificate is required. The learned judges of the Nagpur High Court had previously observed that a person may acquire another’s property either by survivorship or by succession, and that, according to the Madras decision, if the widow of a deceased coparcener does not acquire the property by survivorship, succession is the only remaining mode of acquisition. The Nagpur judges quoted the authorities I.L.R. [1944] Nag. 832 and A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 246 in support of this view.

In further analysis, the Court reproduced the observations of the Nagpur judges that Horwill J., in the cited Madras case, opined that the mere absence of survivorship does not automatically mean the widow obtains the right by inheritance. The judges questioned how the widow could claim the right in the face of the clear language of the Act if she does not rely on inheritance. They argued that the statements regarding the effect of section 3, clauses (2) and (3) – namely that they represent a survival of the husband’s persona in the wife and grant her the same rights with limited alienation powers – were not sufficiently clear about the intended legal position. The Court further observed that the reasoning that survivorship is excluded and that succession or inheritance is the only alternative for the widow to obtain her husband’s rights under the Act is not entirely correct. The Court emphasized that the legislature is competent to vest a person with a statutory right to acquire another’s property upon the latter’s death under certain conditions, which is precisely what subsection (2) of section 3 effectually does. Referring to the decision in Gurdayal v. Sarju, the Court noted that the defendants had relied on Jadaobai v. Puranmal, wherein a division bench had held that the husband’s interest devolves upon the widow by inheritance rather than by survivorship.

The Court observed that the disputed interest vested in Sarjubai through the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act could have arisen either by inheritance or by another mode, but the precise mode of its vesting was irrelevant for the present adjudication. The essential enquiry, according to the Court, was the nature of the interest itself. The Act expressly stipulates that the interest passing to a widow is “the same interest as the husband had” and that she enjoys “the same right of claiming a partition as a male owner.” Consequently, whether the interest arrived to Sarjubai by inheritance, by succession, or by operation of a statutory provision—cited as A.T.R. [1952] Nag. 43 and I.L.R. [1944] Nag. 832—made no material difference. The Court emphasized that the right conferred on the widow is identical to that of a male proprietor, and for the limited purposes of the statute she merely steps into her husband’s shoes and may be treated as a continuation of his legal personality.

In the subsequent authority, Siveshwar Prasad v. Lala Har Narain, a Division Bench held that a widow’s interest under the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937 is acquired not as a survivor but as an heir of her husband. The Bench therefore regarded the interest as an asset of the husband held by the widow, subject to attachment by the husband’s creditors even where the interest constituted an undivided share in joint‑family property. The Court found that this decision did not aid the appellant, noting that although the husband’s interest does not pass by survivorship, it does not necessarily crystallise at the moment of his death, nor does it follow that the widow succeeds to a fixed interest at that instant. Nevertheless, the learned Judges’ view that the husband’s interest remains vulnerable to claims by his creditors, despite its devolution to the widow, aligned with the notion that the widow assumes the husband’s interest as his surviving half.

A further reference was made to Rajendrabati v. Mungalal, wherein the question mirrored that of Jadaobai’s case. The High Court, relying on an earlier decision, held that Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, was attracted because the suit sought recovery of the widow’s share of monies due to the joint family of which her deceased husband had been a member. During argument, counsel also cited a Madras High Court decision stating that under Section 3 of the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act a widow of a deceased coparcener in a joint Hindu family acquires a right not as an heir but by operation of statute, thereby standing in the shoes of her deceased husband and continuing as a member of the joint family.

The Court rejected the contention that the widow’s interest in the joint family property arose solely by survivorship. The learned judges stated that, with due respect, they could not accept that proposition, particularly in light of the clear principles established in two earlier Bench decisions of this Court that had been cited. While acknowledging that the widow could be considered a member of the joint family, the Court observed that this Court had previously held that the interest which vests in her after the death of the last male holder must be regarded as an interest that descends to her as an heir. The Court cited the authorities I.L.R. (1944) 23 Pat. 760; I.L.R. (1952) 31 Pat. 477; and I.L.R. [1944] Nag. 832 to support this view. The judges further explained that once it is held that the widow acquires her interest as an heir, Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 becomes applicable, and consequently no decree could be granted in her favour unless she produced a succession certificate. The Court then clarified that the widow’s interest need not be limited to survivorship or inheritance; it could also arise by operation of statute. Where the interest was acquired under a statutory provision, the Court noted that no additional difficulty would arise. On this basis, the Court concluded that the High Court had correctly allotted a half share of the family property to the respondent in the partition. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decree of the lower court, dismissed the appeal, ordered costs against the appellant, and entered the appeal as dismissed.