Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai Etc vs Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 791-798 of 1964

Decision Date: 3 December 1964

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, R.S. Bachawat

The matter concerned Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai and others versus Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and another, decided on 3 December 1964. The judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court of India with Justice A.K. Sarkar presiding, joined by Justices N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and R.S. Bachawat. The petitioner in the case was identified as Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai etc., while the respondent was Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and another individual. The official citation of the decision is recorded as 1965 AIR 1457 and 1965 SCR (2) 328, with subsequent citator references including RF 1966 SC 641, D 1969 SC 329, and R 1978 SC 1814. The legal issue arose under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act of 1948, as amended by Act 38 of 1957, specifically sections thirty‑two and seventy‑six A. The bench composition was repeatedly recorded as Sarkar, A.K., Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala, and Bachawat, R.S., confirming the three‑judge panel. No other parties were recorded as intervenors or amici in the proceedings. The date of judgment, formatted as 03/12/1964, corresponds to the third of December, 1964.

In May 1956 the respondent served a notice under section fourteen of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, on the appellants who were then occupying the land as tenants, alleging non‑payment of rent and terminating their tenancy. Subsequently, in December 1956 the respondent issued a second notice, this time invoking section thirty‑one of the same Act, and claimed termination of the tenancy because he intended to cultivate the land himself. The respondent then approached the Mamlatdar in March 1957, filing an application for recovery of possession of the land based on the notice served under section thirty‑one. In July 1957 the respondent lodged an additional application for possession, this time relying on the earlier notice issued under section fourteen. On 28 September 1957 section thirty‑two of the Act was amended by Act 38 of 1957, introducing a provision that, under certain conditions, a tenant would be deemed to have purchased the land from the landlord effective 1 April 1957. Following the amendment, the Mamlatdar adjudicated the respondent’s application based on section fourteen and granted relief in December 1957, ordering possession in favor of the respondent. In March 1958 the respondent withdrew his earlier application that had been filed under section thirty‑one, leaving only the December 1957 order operative. The appellants chose not to appeal the Mamlatdar’s December 1957 order, but instead sought a revision of that order by filing an application under section seventy‑six A with the Collector in August 1958. The Collector requested the case records, but before receiving them he rejected the appellants’ revision application; the appellants then filed a second revision request, which was again rejected in October 1958. Undeterred, the appellants submitted a further revision application in November 1958; the Collector finally received the necessary records in December 1958, issued notices to the parties, conducted a hearing, and on 17 February 1959 issued an order setting aside the Mamlatdar’s December 1957 order. The respondent challenged this collector’s order before the Revenue Tribunal but was unsuccessful, and subsequently invoked article 227 of the Constitution to approach the High Court for relief. The High Court concluded that the Collector possessed the authority to issue the February 1959 order, yet held that the amendment to section thirty‑two did not confer any rights upon the appellants because the eviction application filed in July 1957 remained pending when the amendment became effective; consequently the High Court ruled in favor of the respondent landlord. The appellants then appealed the High Court’s decision to the Supreme Court, seeking reversal of the judgment in their favor.

In this appeal the petitioners argued that the view expressed by the High Court concerning the applicability of section 32 of the Act was mistaken. The respondent, while agreeing with the High Court’s interpretation of section 32, asserted that the High Court’s construction of section 76A was incorrect and that the Collector did not possess the authority to revise his own orders of October 1958 through the order issued in February 1959.

The Court, speaking through Justice Ayyangar and Justice Bachawat, held that the provisions set out in sub‑sections (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause 32(1)(b) are not alternative conditions; they are not satisfied by meeting any single one of them. The Court observed that the word “or” placed between sub‑sections (ii) and (iii), when read together with the following negative words, must be interpreted as “nor”. Consequently, the statute provided that the petitioners, who were not permanent tenants but were actually cultivating the land themselves, could be regarded as purchasers of the land on 1 April 1957 only if, on that date, there was neither an application pending under section 31 nor an application pending under section 14. The Court explained that if an application of either kind was pending on that specific date, the tenants could not acquire the status of purchasers on that date; however, the provision permitted them to become purchasers on a later date if the pending application was subsequently rejected, as allowed by the proviso to the section. The Court noted that on 31 March 1957 the respondent’s application under section 31 was still pending, and therefore the petitioners could not be considered to have purchased the land on 1 April 1957 (see paragraph L343 F‑G, H; 344 A). The Court further observed that the respondent’s application under section 14 was not maintainable because it was filed after 31 March 1957. Under the amended section 32, all applications that were pending on 31 March 1957 are saved, and, by necessary implication, any application filed after that date is barred. The Court stressed that the mere fact that an application under section 31 remained pending and that the petitioners continued to occupy the land as tenants did not alter the legal position. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the High Court erred in setting aside the Collector’s order on the ground that the amended section 32 had no effect on eviction applications that were pending at the relevant time.

Nevertheless, the Court held that because the Mamlatdar had allowed the eviction application, the petitioners ceased to be tenants; consequently, even though the respondent later withdrew his section 31 application, such withdrawal constituted a legal rejection, and the petitioners could not invoke the proviso to section 32 to become purchasers on any postponed date (see paragraphs 344 B; 345 B, D‑E, H; 349 C). Regarding the Collector’s order of February 1959 issued under section 76A, the Court declared that this order did not alter the situation because it was illegal, ultra vires, and beyond the Collector’s jurisdiction. The Court explained that the Collector was competent to pass the earlier orders rejecting the revision applications in October 1958 based on the material then before him, without first calling for the record. However, once the Collector had called for the record, he was required to await its arrival before deciding, and the orders he issued prior to the receipt of the record could not be said to be without jurisdiction. The Court further held that the mere fact that the Collector had called for the record did not, by itself, justify a conclusion that he could subsequently examine the material and issue an order refusing to interfere with the Mamlatdar’s decision without giving notice to the parties.

The Court observed that once the Collector had called for the record, he could not thereafter examine the materials and issue an order refusing to interfere with the Mamlatdar’s order without giving notice to the parties. The Court held that orders passed by the Collector while exercising his revisional powers were quasi‑judicial and final. Even if the order directing the record was not itself quasi‑judicial, the Collector’s subsequent determination that there was no ground for interference rendered that order quasi‑judicial. Because the Act did not empower the Collector to review an order of his own making, the earlier orders dismissing the applications for revision were final and could not be rescinded later [346 B‑C; 347 F‑H; 348 D‑H].

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sarkar stated that the conditions specified in section 32(1)(b)(i), (ii) and (iii) were not alternatives; the fulfillment of any single condition did not entitle a tenant to be treated as a purchaser. A tenant had to satisfy all three conditions to become a purchaser. Consequently, when an application for ejectment filed before 31 March 1957 on the basis of a notice under section 31 was still pending at the time the Amending Act came into force, the tenant had not become a purchaser on the prescribed date. However, the dissent did not conclude that an ejectment application based on a notice under section 14 filed after 31 March 1957 remained maintainable after the amendment. On the coming into force of the Amending Act, the landlord’s ejectment application filed in July 1957 on the strength of a notice under section 14 became incompetent and ought to have been rejected. The order of ejectment issued by the Mamlatdar was therefore wholly illegal, and the Collector’s order dated 19 February 1959 setting aside that ejectment order was valid and proper. Under section 76A, the request for the record was a preliminary step to the substantive judicial act concerning the parties’ rights, which would follow after the record was examined. By requesting the record, the Collector indicated that the merits required consideration. Once the request was made, his sole authority was to await the record’s arrival and then decide the case on its basis. The statute did not envisage an order being issued before the Collector had received and examined the record. Since the record had not arrived when the Collector rejected the applications in October 1958, he had not made any order under section 76A at that time. Accordingly, the only order the Collector made under that provision was the one dated 19 February 1959 [333 C‑D, G; 334 C, E; 336 G‑H; 337 D; 339 B‑D; 340 B‑D]. The judgment concerned civil appeals numbered 791 to 798 of 1964.

By special leave, the Supreme Court entertained the judgment and orders dated 4 and 5 November 1963 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Applications numbered 428 to 430 and 432 to 436 of 1961. Counsel for the appellants, namely the tenants, appeared on behalf of all eight appeals, while counsel for the respondents, the landlord, represented the opposing side in each case. Justice Sarkar delivered a dissenting opinion, whereas the majority judgment of Justices Rajagopala Ayyangar and Bacha J. was delivered by Justice Bacha J., with Justice Sarkar noted separately. The appellants were tenants against whom ejectment orders had been passed at the instance of the landlord. They contended that, because of a particular amendment to section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, those orders were illegal and that the Collector had correctly set them aside under section 76A of the same Act. The principal questions in the appeals required interpretation of sections 76A and 32. All eight tenants filed separate appeals, creating eight distinct appeals before the Court, but the respondent in each appeal was the same landlord. The landlord had invoked sections 14, 31 and 29 of the Act against each tenant, leading to the present litigation. Section 14 authorized a landlord to terminate a tenancy for causes such as non‑payment of rent by issuing a notice of termination. Section 31, notwithstanding section 14, permitted a landlord, after giving notice, to terminate a tenancy if he genuinely required the land for personal cultivation. Section 29 required that a landlord could obtain possession of the tenant’s land only through an order of the Mamlatdar on an application prescribed in that provision. On 1 May 1956 the landlord served the tenants with a notice under section 14. Subsequently, on 25 December 1956, he served a fresh notice under section 31. Pursuant to the notice issued under section 31, the landlord filed ejectment applications before the Mamlatdar on 28 March 1957, and later, on 10 July 1957, he filed another set of ejectment applications based on the section 14 notice. The Mamlatdar, by a series of orders dated between 20 and 25 December 1957, granted the landlord’s ejectment applications that relied on the section 14 notice. On 1 March 1958 the landlord withdrew the ejectment applications that were based on the section 31 notice. The tenants did not appeal the Mamlatdar’s ejectment orders; instead, they approached the Collector under section 76A of the Act, seeking to have those orders set aside. The tenants filed three successive sets of applications under section 76A. The first set was lodged on 4 August 1958, and on 14 August 1958 the Collector, acting under section 76A, called for the record of the ejectment proceedings before the Mamlatdar. The required record did not arrive until 24 December 1958. However, during the interval, the tenants submitted a second set of applications under section 76A on 26 August 1958, and the Collector appears to have issued orders on 3 and 4 October 1958 rejecting both the first and second sets of applications. On about 6 October 1958 the tenants made a joint application under section 76A, which the Collector also rejected on 17 October 1958. On 7 November 1958 a local Congress Committee passed a resolution claiming that the tenants were being harassed and demanding that justice be done to them; a copy of this resolution was sent to the Collector. After finally receiving the record of the ejectment proceedings on 24 December 1958, the Collector gave notice to the parties, heard them, and on 17 February 1959 issued an order setting aside the Mamlatdar’s ejectment orders on the ground that, in view of the amendment to section 32, the earlier orders were invalid.

Section 76A required the Collector to obtain the record of the ejectment proceedings that had been conducted before the Mamlatdar. That record did not reach the Collector’s office until 24 December 1958. In the interval, the tenants filed a second set of applications under section 76A on 26 August 1958. Subsequently, on 3 and 4 October 1958, the Collector appears to have issued orders rejecting both of the tenants’ earlier applications that were made under section 76A. Around 6 October 1958 the tenants filed a joint application under the same provision, and the Collector rejected this joint application on 17 October 1958. On 7 November 1958 the local Congress Committee adopted a resolution declaring that the tenants were being subjected to harassment and urging that justice be done to them; a copy of this resolution was forwarded to the Collector. When the long‑awaited record finally arrived on 24 December 1958, the Collector gave notice to the parties, conducted a hearing, and on 17 February 1959 issued an order setting aside the Mamlatdar’s ejectment orders. The Collector based this reversal on the provisions of section 32 as amended by Act XXXVIII of 1957, holding that, in view of those amendments, the tenants could not be evicted.

Following the Collector’s order, the landlord approached the Revenue Tribunal in revision, seeking to have the Collector’s February 1959 order set aside. The Tribunal dismissed the landlord’s revision applications. Undeterred, the landlord then filed petitions before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, asking that both the Tribunal’s and the Collector’s orders be declared void. The High Court allowed the landlord’s petitions, thereby creating the present appeals filed by the tenants. Because the landlord had lodged separate applications against each of the eight tenants, eight distinct appeals now stand before this Court. In the High Court, the landlord argued that once the Collector had rejected the tenants’ applications by the orders of 3‑4 October 1958 or of 17 October 1958, the Collector no longer possessed authority under section 76A to reconsider the matter and issue the February 1959 order, and that the Tribunal was likewise incorrect in holding that the Collector had such power. On the merits, the landlord contended that section 32, as amended by Act XXXVIII of 1957 and which came into force on 28 September 1957, did not apply to the ejectment proceedings. The High Court concluded that the Collector did have the power to make the February 1959 order, but it held that the amended section 32 could not govern the ejectment proceedings because the amendment could not affect applications that were already pending when the amendment became operative. Consequently, the High Court set aside the orders of both the Tribunal and the Collector. In the present appeals, the landlord maintains that the High Court’s interpretation of section 76A is erroneous, while the tenants argue that the High Court’s view on the applicability of section 32 is mistaken. These two questions form the core of the disputes before this Court.

In these appeals two principal questions were presented to the Court. The first question concerned the proper construction of section 76A, while the second question related to the applicability of section 32. The Court first considered the interpretation of section 76A, which reads as follows: “Section 76A. Where no appeal has been filed within the period provided for it, the Collector may, suo motu or on a reference made in this behalf by the Divisional Officer or the State Government, at any time—(a) call for the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal, as the case may be, and (b) pass such order thereon as he deems fit; Provided that no such record shall be called for after the expiry of one year from the date of such order and no order of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal shall be modified, annulled or reversed unless opportunity has been given to the interested parties to appear and be heard.” The landlord contended that the power conferred by section 76A could be exercised only once and that the sole exercise of that power occurred in the order issued in October 1958, which he argued rendered the Collector’s order of 17 February 1959 wholly incompetent and a nullity. The Court held that it was not necessary to adjudicate the correctness of the landlord’s contention that the section’s power could be exercised only once and therefore proceeded on the assumption that the contention was correct for the purpose of analysis. The remaining issue was whether any order under section 76A had been made by the Collector prior to 17 February 1959. The Court observed that the order contemplated in clause (b) is to be made after the Collector has called for and examined the record, because the language “pass such order thereon” indicates that the order must be based on the record. Consequently, an order cannot be made before the record has been received and reviewed. Since the record had not been received at the time the Collector rejected the applications in early October 1958, the Court concluded that no order under section 76A was made on those dates. Accordingly, the only order that could be said to have been made under the provision was the order dated 17 February 1959. The landlord further argued that the Collector’s earlier refusals in October 1958 to call for the record amounted to a full exercise of the power under the section, precluding any later order. The High Court had held that such refusals were merely administrative acts and not orders made in a judicial capacity under section 76A, and therefore did not exhaust the Collector’s statutory power. While the Court did not declare that view entirely devoid of force, it noted that the section does not create a right for any party to compel the Collector, and that the Collector may act either suo motu or upon reference, first sending for the record and subsequently making a judicial order after perusing it.

In examining the provisions of the section, the Court observed that an order issued in a purely judicial capacity does not exhaust the Collector’s power under that provision. The Court could not say that the view denying any further authority was completely without merit, but it emphasized that the statute does not grant any party a specific right to compel the Collector to act. The Collector may act on his own initiative, or he may act only when directed by the Divisional Officer or by the State Government. The statutory purpose, as the Court explained, is first to require the Collector to procure the relevant record and thereafter to make a determination concerning the parties’ rights after he has examined that record. Consequently, the act of requesting the record is a preliminary step that must precede the substantive judicial act that follows the perusal of the record once it arrives. The Collector’s request for the record is intended solely to obtain the material on which his judicial decision must be based. The Court stressed that the Collector’s true power under the section is the judicial act itself; he cannot be said to have exhausted that power before he has actually reviewed the record. The proviso to the section supports this interpretation, stating that the judicial power may be exercised at any time provided that the Collector has sent for the record within the time limit prescribed. The Court then considered another possible aspect of the case. It imagined a hypothetical situation in which the Collector might refuse to send for the record, thereby claiming that his power under the section was exhausted because he had formed the opinion that the matter did not warrant a merits‑based inquiry. However, in the present dispute the Collector never refused to obtain the record. By his earliest order, dated 14 August 1958, he expressly called for the record. The Court observed that if the Collector could not revisit an order that refused to call for the record on the ground that his power was exhausted, then he likewise could not revisit an order that did call for the record. This reasoning undermines the notion that any of the orders dated 3, 4 or 17 October 1958 could constitute a final order under the section, because such an order would effectively require reviewing, and possibly setting aside, the earlier order that demanded the record.

The Court further analyzed the effect of the Collector’s orders of 3, 4 and 17 October 1958. By sending for the record, the Collector indicated that he considered the merits of the case worthy of examination. If that request for the record were not intended to lead to a substantive merits‑based decision, the act would be meaningless, and the Court could not conceive that the statute contemplated such a futile act by the Collector. Accordingly, the Court held that the orders of 3, 4 and 17 October 1958 must be understood as having decided that the merits of the case did not merit examination. Such a determination would amount to a review of the earlier order that called for the record, a power which, ex hypothesis, the Collector did not possess. Since the Collector had indeed sent for the record, his authority to decide on the merits remained intact, and any order issued before the record’s arrival was therefore incompetent and ineffective. The Court concluded that the Collector’s power was not exhausted until after he had received and examined the record, and that the subsequent order of 17 February 1959 was the proper and valid exercise of his statutory authority.

In this case, the Court observed that the Collector’s sole authority was to await the arrival of the required record and, once it was received, to decide the merits of the application based on that record. Consequently, the orders issued on 3 October, 4 October and 17 October 1958, which had been made before the record arrived, were held to be completely incompetent and ineffective. None of those earlier orders could limit or negate the Collector’s power to pass a proper order after the record was in hand. For that reason, the Court held that the order dated 17 February 1959 had been properly made and was a valid order.

The Court then turned to the question of how section 32 of the relevant Act should be interpreted as it stood in December 1957, the time when the Mamlatdar had made the ejectment orders, and whether that provision applied to ejectment proceedings that were already pending. The Court noted that section 32 had been amended on more than one occasion, but only two amendments were material for this enquiry. The first amendment was effected by Act XIII of 1956, which was passed on 16 March 1956 and came into force on 1 August 1956. As amended by that Act, section 32 for the first time provided that, in certain circumstances, a tenant would be deemed to have purchased, on 1 April 1957, the land he held from his landlord. The second amendment was made by Act XXXVIII of 1957, which became operative on 28 September 1957, and this was the amendment that was directly relevant to the matter before the Court. Section 12 of Act XXXVIII inserted clause (iii) into sub‑section (1) of section 32, and section 34 of the same Act gave retrospective effect to the amendment from 1 August 1956. The Court pointed out that 1 August 1956 was the date on which the amendment introduced by Act XIII of 1956 became operative, and that Act XXXVIII of 1957 was already in force at the time the Mamlatdar issued his ejectment orders.

Accordingly, the Court reproduced the text of section 32 as it stood after the amendment made by Act XXXVIII of 1957. The provision read: “On the first day of April 1957, every tenant shall, if (a) such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates land personally; (b) such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates the land leased personally; and (i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy under section 31; or (ii) notice has been given under section 31, but the landlord has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the land; or (iii) the landlord has not terminated this tenancy on any of the grounds specified in section 14, or has so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the lands: Provided that if an application made by the landlord under section 29 for obtaining possession of the land has been rejected…”

The provision states that when the Mamlatdar or the Collector, either on appeal or in revision before the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, rejects an application for possession under this Act, the tenant is to be treated as having purchased the land on the date on which the final order of rejection is issued. That date is thereafter called “the postponed date.” The High Court, as previously noted, held that although Section 32 was made retrospective, the retrospective effect did not extend to applications for ejectment that were already pending at the time the amendment came into force. The High Court expressed this view by stating that a retrospective provision cannot affect pending proceedings when the provision itself requires that an application or proceeding be started no later than a specified date, and such proceedings have already been filed before the amending Act became operative. The Court’s observation was difficult to interpret fully, and the counsel representing the landlord explained that the statement could only be taken to mean that the amendment did not disturb pending ejectment applications. Nonetheless, the landlord’s counsel was unable to support the High Court’s reasoning. The higher court’s analysis was therefore questioned, and it appeared that the High Court may have erred in its interpretation of the retrospective effect of the amendment.

The present analysis considered whether the legislature, by amending Section 32, intended to make the amendment applicable to pending proceedings. It is well‑settled that a legislature may enact a law with retrospective operation that impacts ongoing cases. The question before the Court was whether the amendment in this case was such a law. Section 32, as amended, provides that a tenant who personally cultivates land shall, as of the date of the amendment, be entitled to claim that he became the purchaser of the land held by him, with effect dating back to 1 April 1957, provided that no application for his ejectment based on a notice under Section 14 or Section 31 was filed on or before 31 March 1957. Any application filed after that cut‑off date and still pending when the amendment took effect could no longer affect the tenant’s right under the amended provision to be deemed a purchaser. Consequently, such an application would become futile because the tenant would already be deemed the owner and no longer a tenant subject to eviction. The amended provision therefore necessarily altered the status of pending ejectment proceedings. To read the amendment in the way the High Court did would require ignoring the clear language of the statute, an interpretation the Court found untenable. Accordingly, the Court could not agree with the High Court’s view. The next issue addressed was whether the amendment rendered the Mamlatdar’s order of ejectment illegal. For a tenant to rely on the amendment and claim purchaser status, he must satisfy the conditions laid down in the section, which are arranged in two distinct sets. The first set of conditions must be fulfilled before the second set is considered.

Clauses (a) and (b) of the first set of conditions are clearly intended to operate in an alternative manner, even though the word “or” does not appear between them. A tenant cannot satisfy both clauses simultaneously because a person cannot be a permanent tenant and at the same time a non‑permanent tenant. The record shows that the tenants in the present matter were personally cultivating the lands that they held on the date mentioned in the statutory provision. Consequently, at least one of the two alternative conditions in the first set has been satisfied. The dispute in this case therefore turned on the second set of conditions, which are found in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii). The Court observed that clause (iii) actually comprises two separate requirements: first, a failure to terminate the tenancy by notice under section 14; and second, if a termination notice has been served, a failure to file an ejectment application on the basis of that termination on or before 31 March 1957. Accordingly, the second set contains a total of four distinct conditions. Counsel for the tenants argued that the conditions in the second set are also alternative, so that satisfaction of any one condition would be sufficient to convert a tenant into a purchaser. If that argument were correct, the tenants in the present case would inevitably be deemed purchasers because the last condition was satisfied – the landlord had not applied to the Mamlatdar for ejectment before 31 March 1957 on the strength of a notice under section 14. The Court, however, was not persuaded that the conditions operate alternatively, and rejected the view that fulfillment of any single condition alone would give a tenant the right to claim purchaser status.

The Court illustrated the flaw in the counsel’s contention by a hypothetical scenario. Assume that clause (iii) is satisfied, yet at the same time the landlord, prior to 31 March 1957, served a notice under section 31 and also made an application for ejectment under section 29 on the basis of that notice, an application that remained pending when the amending Act came into force. That exact sequence of events occurred in the present case. If the counsel’s reasoning were accepted, the tenant would be deemed a purchaser as of the effective date of the amendment, 1 April 1957, despite the existence of the pending ejectment application. Such a construction would neutralise the effect of the proviso, which expressly deals with pending applications. The proviso requires that the pending application be of a type covered by clauses (ii) or (iii); in the absence of such an application, the tenant automatically becomes a purchaser. However, the proviso further states that when a qualifying application is pending at the moment the amendment becomes operative, the tenant does not become a purchaser until that application is rejected, and only from the date of rejection. According to the counsel’s position, the tenant would have become a purchaser at the moment the amendment was enacted, thereby contradicting the purpose and language of the proviso.

The Court observed that the proviso in the statute clearly anticipated that the application referred to in it might be rejected, because it expressly stated “if an application … has been rejected.” By allowing for the possibility that the application could fail, the proviso indicated that the tenant against whom the application was made could be evicted. Such eviction could not occur if the tenant had already become a purchaser, as Mr. Shroff argued, because a purchaser could not be lawfully removed under the provisions of the statute. Likewise, the proviso could not operate on the basis that the tenant would become a purchaser on the date of rejection, for the same reason that a purchaser could not be evicted. The plain effect of the section, therefore, was that a tenant who satisfied the statutory conditions was deemed to have become a purchaser at the moment the amending Act was passed, with effect retroactive to an earlier date. However, where an application for ejectment based on a notice under section 14 or section 31 had been filed on or before 31 March 1957 and remained pending when the amending Act came into force, the tenant would become a purchaser only if that application was rejected, and the date of purchaser status would be the date of rejection. Consequently, when a pending application existed, the tenant did not automatically become a purchaser upon the enactment of the amending Act, even though another condition of the section might have been satisfied. The Court therefore concluded that the conditions in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) could not operate as alternatives.

In the present case, the tenants relied principally on the second condition contained in clause (iii) to argue that the Mamlatdar’s order for ejectment was illegal. The applications on which that order was based had been filed after 31 March 1957; specifically, they were filed on 10 July 1957 and were still pending when the amending Act came into force. If those applications represented the only steps taken by the landlord to obtain ejectment of the tenants, then all three conditions in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) would have been fulfilled, and the tenants would have been deemed purchasers of the land as of 1 April 1957. This status would have existed on 28 September 1957, the date when Act XXXVIII of 1957 became operative. The Mamlatdar’s order of ejectment was issued after that Act had come into force, between 20 and 25 December 1957. Assuming, as the Court had previously hypothesised, that the tenants had become purchasers, they would no longer have been tenants at the time of those orders, and consequently there would have been no legal basis for evicting them. Under that assumption, the Mamlatdar should have dismissed the applications and his ejectment orders would have been illegal. However, the factual situation differed. The landlord had filed an application for ejectment before 31 March 1957 based on a notice under section 31, and that application remained pending when the amending Act became operative. This fact altered the legal analysis, leading the Court to a different conclusion regarding the tenants’ status and the validity of the Mamlatdar’s orders.

The Court observed that the condition in clause (ii) had not been satisfied and therefore the tenants had not become purchasers under the statutory provision. It was submitted that, because the tenants were not purchasers, the Mamlatdar could treat them as tenants and could issue an order of ejectment on the landlord’s application under the notice prescribed in section 14, even though such an application was made after 31 March 1957. The Court found this contention to be without merit. While it is correct that a tenant must satisfy all three conditions listed in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) in order to acquire purchaser status, the fact that an application for ejectment filed before 31 March 1957 on the basis of a notice under section 31 was still pending when the amending Act XXXVIII of 1957 came into force meant that the tenant had not become a purchaser on the date of the enactment. However, this circumstance did not imply that an application for ejectment filed after 31 March 1957 on the basis of a notice under section 14 remained maintainable after the amending Act became operative. In the Court’s view, such a later application became incompetent at the moment the amendment took effect. Allowing the later application to continue would create an anomalous situation. Suppose the earlier application filed before 31 March 1957 was rejected after the amendment came into force, which in law amounts to a dismissal; under the proviso the tenant would then become a purchaser on the date of that rejection. If, at the same time, the later application filed after 31 March 1957 remained competent and succeeded, the result would be contradictory because the tenant would already have become an owner, leaving no tenant to be evicted. Conversely, if the later application succeeded before the earlier one was heard, the earlier application would become moot, for the proviso contemplates a pending ejectment application against a person who is still a tenant; once the tenant becomes an owner, the proviso would no longer apply. In either scenario the proviso would be rendered ineffective, which would be an unnatural construction of the provision. The Court therefore concluded that the proviso was intended to operate only where an application filed before 31 March 1957 remained pending at the time the amendment took effect, allowing the tenant to become a purchaser only if that earlier application subsequently failed. The tenant’s right to become a purchaser could not depend on any later application filed after the amendment, nor could it be altered by an order made on such a later application.

In this case the Court explained that the tenant’s entitlement to become a purchaser when an earlier application for ejectment was pending depended solely on the outcome of that specific application. The tenant’s right could be altered only by a successful result of the pending application; it could not be modified by any later ejectment proceedings filed after 31 March 1957. Consequently, no application for ejectment brought under section 14 or section 31 after that date could affect the tenant’s rights under section 32. If such a later application had not been finally decided before the commencement of Act XXXVIII of 1957, it became dead and without effect. For this reason, the Court held that when Act XXXVIII of 1957 came into force, the landlord’s ejectment applications filed on 10 July 1957 on the basis of a notice under section 14 lost their competence and ought to have been rejected. Any order of ejectment issued on those applications after the amending Act would therefore have been wholly illegal. The Mamlatdar who had passed ejectment orders on those applications was therefore in error, and those orders were rightly set aside by the Collector and the Tribunal. Although it was somewhat unfortunate that the landlord withdrew the applications filed before 31 March 1957 under section 31—applications that might have succeeded on their merits—the withdrawal on 1 March 1958 must be treated as a rejection of those applications. The Court found no indication that the tenants had induced the landlord to withdraw, and concluded that any mistake the landlord made in believing the earlier ejectment orders were lawful was solely his responsibility. The fact that the landlord withdrew the applications, rather than having them rejected on their merits, did not improve his position under section 32. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the High Court had erred in overturning the Tribunal’s decision. In the Court’s view the Tribunal’s order, which upheld the Collector’s directive to set aside the Mamlatdar’s ejectment orders, was entirely correct and should be affirmed. Hence, the appeals were allowed and the Tribunal’s orders were restored.

On 1 May 1956 the landlord gave the tenant a notice under section 14 of the Act that terminated the tenancy. Later, on 25 December 1956, the landlord issued a second notice under section 31, also terminating the tenancy. The landlord then filed an application on 28 March 1957 under section 29 read with section 31 seeking recovery of possession of the lands. A further application was lodged on 10 July 1957, this time under section 29 read with section 14, requesting the same relief. The Mamlatdar issued an order on 25 December 1957 granting the landlord’s July 10 application under section 29 and section 14, directing that the tenancy be terminated and that possession of the lands be handed over to the landlord. Subsequently, on 1 March 1958 the landlord withdrew the earlier application filed on 28 March 1957 under section 29 read with section 31. The tenant then approached the Collector of Baroda for a revision of the Mamlatdar’s December 1957 order, filing an application on 9 August 1958 and a second one on 26 August 1958, both under section 76‑A. The Collector requested the Mamlatdar’s records around 14 August 1958, but the documents did not reach the Collector’s office until 24 December 1958. On approximately 3 October 1958 the Collector rejected the tenant’s revision applications. The tenant filed another revision request on 6 October 1958, which the Collector disposed of on 17 October 1958; although the Collector’s letter of that date merely referred to an earlier refusal, it effectively operated as a rejection of the 6 October application. Following a resolution passed by the local Congress Mandal Samiti on 7 November 1958 requesting the Collector to reconsider his earlier orders, a copy of which was sent to the Collector on 10 November 1958, the tenant again filed a revision petition on 14 November 1958 under section 76‑A. Acting under the same provision, the Collector on 17 February 1959 reversed the Mamlatdar’s order and directed that possession of the disputed lands be restored to the tenant.

After the Collector’s reversal, the landlord filed a revision application on 24 March 1959, which the tribunal dismissed on 23 February 1961. The landlord then invoked Article 227 of the Constitution in an application dated 15 June 1961; the High Court allowed this application on 5 November 1963. The tenant now seeks special leave before this Court, contending that the amendment to section 32(1) made by Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957, which was retrospective, should deem him to have purchased the land on 1 April 1957. Accordingly, the tenant argues that the landlord’s application under section 29 read with section 14 was not maintainable, and alternatively, that any application filed after 1 April 1957 should have been dismissed by the Mamlatdar. The tenant further asserts that the withdrawal and subsequent rejection of the landlord’s earlier application on 1 March 1958 should be treated as a purchase of the lands by the tenant, thereby justifying the Collector’s setting aside of the Mamlatdar’s order.

The appellant argued that, because the earlier application filed under section 29 read with section 14 had been withdrawn and consequently rejected, the Mahalkari should have dismissed the application on that ground. He further contended that, as a result of the withdrawal and rejection, the appellant must be regarded as having purchased the disputed lands on 1 March 1958. In support of this view, the appellant pointed to the order of the Collector, who on 17 February 1959 had set aside the Mahalkari’s earlier order and directed that possession of the lands be restored to the appellant. According to the appellant, the provision of section 32(1), as amended by the Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957, required that a tenant be deemed to have purchased his leased land on the “tiller’s day” of 1 April 1957, subject to certain conditions. The amended wording of section 32(1) was reproduced in full: “32(1). On the first day of April 1957 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the tiller’s day’) every tenant shall, subject to the other provisions of this section and the provisions of the next succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from his landlord, free of all encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant, if— (a) such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates land personally; (b) such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates the land leased personally; and (i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy under section 31; or (ii) notice has been given under section 31, but the landlord has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the land; or (iii) the landlord has not terminated this tenancy on any of the grounds specified in section 14, or has so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the lands: Provided that if an application made by the “landlord” under section 29 for obtaining possession of the land has been rejected by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal or in revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under the provisions of this Act, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which the final order of rejection is passed. The date on which the final order of rejection is passed is hereinafter referred to as ‘the postponed date’: Provided further that the tenant of a landlord who is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to sub‑section (3) of section 31 shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the 1st day of April 1958, if no separation of his share has been effected before the date mentioned in that proviso.”

The Court noted that the amendments to section 32 had been introduced progressively, and that the Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 had inserted clause (iii) and the preceding “or” into sub‑section (1)(b). It observed that the conditions specified in sub‑sections (1)(a) and (1)(b) were mutually exclusive, meaning that a tenant could satisfy either condition but not both simultaneously. Although the text did not contain the word “or” between sub‑sections (1)(a) and (1)(b), the Court interpreted the two subsections as setting out alternative pathways for a tenant to be deemed a purchaser. Consequently, a tenant would be regarded as having purchased the land if he satisfied either the condition in sub‑section (1)(a) concerning permanent tenants who cultivate personally, or the condition in sub‑section (1)(b) involving non‑permanent tenants who personally cultivate the leased land, subject to the additional sub‑clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) that relate to the landlord’s notice and application for possession. This interpretation underscored that the statutory language required fulfillment of one of the two primary categories, and that the presence or absence of “or” between them did not alter the alternative nature of the conditions.

In the present proceedings the appellant was described as a tenant who was not a permanent tenant and therefore did not meet the requirement set out in sub‑section (1)(a). Nevertheless, the appellant cultivated the leased land himself, which satisfied the initial element of the requirement in sub‑section (1)(b). The appellant argued that the three clauses referred to as sub‑sections (1)(b)(i), (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(b)(iii) should be read as offering alternative ways to qualify, and that because he fulfilled the condition stated in sub‑section (1)(b)(iii) he ought to be deemed to have purchased the land on 1 April 1957. He relied on the presence of the word “or” between sub‑section (1)(b)(ii) and sub‑section (1)(b)(iii) to support his reading. The Court, however, observed that the word “or” followed by negative terms should be interpreted as “nor”. Accordingly, the Court held that a tenant who is not a permanent tenant and who cultivates the land personally would become the purchaser on 1 April 1957 only if, on that date, neither an application under section 29 read with section 31 nor an application under section 29 read with section 14 was pending.

The Court further explained that if either of those applications was pending on 1 April 1957, the tenant’s right to purchase would be postponed to the “postponed date”, which is the date when the pending application is finally rejected. If the pending application were ultimately allowed, the tenant would not acquire ownership. The term “an application” in the proviso was interpreted to include both an application under section 31 and an application under section 29 read with section 14. On the factual matrix of this case, an application filed by respondent No. 1 under section 29 read with section 31 was indeed pending on 1 April 1957; consequently, the appellant could not be deemed to have purchased the land on that date. By contrast, an application under section 29 read with section 14 was not maintainable because it had been filed after 1 April 1957. In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted the reasoning of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramchandra Anant v. Janardan, agreeing with the observations of Chief Justice Chainani that, although the statute did not expressly prohibit an application under section 14 after 1 April 1947, the legislature’s intention in enacting section 32 was to effect the transfer of ownership on 1 April 1957 except where a pre‑April 1 application for possession existed.

In interpreting section 32 the Court observed that the provision was intended to transfer ownership of the lands to the tenants on 1 April 1957, except where a landlord had filed an application for possession before that date. Where such an earlier application existed, the tenant’s right to purchase was to be postponed until the landlord’s application was finally rejected. The Court held that the Legislature did not intend that a tenant’s statutory right could be destroyed or impaired by any application filed after 1 April 1957. Accordingly, if an application for possession filed under section 29 read with section 14 after 1 April 1957 were decided in favour of the landlord before the earlier application made prior to that date was disposed of, the tenant’s later entitlement to become the owner would be unfairly affected. The Court concluded that this outcome was not contemplated by the Legislature. The legislative scheme, as expressed in the wording of section 32, made clear that only an application filed before 1 April 1957 could affect the tenant’s right to become purchaser on that date, indicating that the Legislature did not envisage any application made after 1 April 1957 having such effect. (1) [1962] 64 B.L.R. 635.

Applying that construction, the Court found that the application filed under section 29 read with section 14 on 10 July 1957 became untenable as of 22 September 1957, the date when the amending Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 came into force. Although on 10 July 1957 another application under section 29 read with section 31 was still pending and the appellant remained a tenant who had not yet become a purchaser, section 32 expressly barred all applications filed after 1 April 1957, irrespective of whether the respondent was still a tenant. Respondent No. 1 argued that the 1957 amendment could not retrospectively amend section 32 to affect pending applications, an argument that the High Court had accepted. The Court, however, rejected that contention. Section 34 of Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 stipulated that the amendment to section 32 “shall be deemed to have been made and shall have come into force on the date on which the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1955 came into force.” Since the 1955 amendment became effective on 1 August 1956, the amended section 32 was deemed to have been operative from that date. While the amendment saved applications that were pending on 1 April 1957, it necessarily barred every application filed on or after that date, regardless of whether the application was still pending on 22 September 1957. No exception was made for applications filed between 1 April and 22 September 1957 that remained pending on the latter date.

In this case, the Court observed that applications filed between 1 April and 22 September 1957 and still pending on 22 September 1957 were barred by the statutory provision. Accordingly, the application that had been filed on 10 July 1957, although still pending on 22 September 1957, was not maintainable and should have been dismissed by the Mahalkari. Nevertheless, the Mahalkari, by an order dated 25 December 1957, allowed that application. The Court noted that, despite being erroneous, the Mahalkari’s order was an order of a competent tribunal that terminated the tenancy and directed that possession of the lands be delivered to the landlord. From the date of that order, the appellant ceased to be a tenant within the meaning of section 32 read with section 2(18); he was no longer a person lawfully cultivating the lands, nor a person holding the lands on lease, and he was neither a protected tenant nor a permanent tenant. Subsequently, on 1 March 1958, after the period for filing an appeal against the Mahalkari’s order had expired, respondent No 1 withdrew the pending eviction application that had been filed on 28 March 1957. By withdrawing, that application was finally disposed of and rejected. Consequently, on 1 March 1958 the appellant was not a tenant and therefore could not claim the benefit of section 32 or become a purchaser of the lands. However, on 17 February 1959 the Collector attempted to reverse and set aside the Mahalkari’s order. The Court explained that, if that reversal were effective, the eviction order would be deemed never to have existed, the appellant would never have ceased to be a tenant, and he would have become a purchaser on the postponed date of 1 March 1958. The principal issue, therefore, was whether the Collector possessed the authority to revise the Mahalkari’s order under section 76‑A. Section 76‑A provides that where no appeal has been filed within the prescribed period, the Collector may, on his own motion or on a reference by the Divisional Officer or the State Government, at any time (a) call for the record of any enquiry or the proceedings of any Mamlatdar or Tribunal for the purpose of examining the regularity of such proceedings, and (b) pass such order as he deems fit, provided that no record may be called for after one year from the date of the order and no order of the Mamlatdar or Tribunal may be modified, annulled, or reversed unless the interested parties have been given an opportunity to appear and be heard. The Court noted that the Mahalkari’s order under section 29 had been issued on 25 December 1957 and was appealable under section 74. Under section 79, an appeal could be filed within sixty days of that order, but no appeal was filed within the prescribed period. Accordingly, the Collector could, at any time thereafter, exercise his revisional powers under section 76‑A.

In this case, the Collector possessed revision authority under section 76‑A that could be exercised either on his own initiative or upon a reference made by the Divisional Officer or the State Government. When exercising this power, the Collector was authorized to summon the record of the Mahalkari’s proceedings and to issue any order he deemed appropriate. However, two restrictions governed this revisional power. First, the Collector could not request the record after more than one year had elapsed from the date of the Mahalkari’s order. Second, the Collector could not modify, annul, or reverse that order unless the parties with an interest in the matter were given a chance to appear and be heard. In the present matter no reference had been made by any authority. Nonetheless, the Collector retained the ability to act on his own motion, although he normally exercised such powers only when an irregularity or illegality was brought to his attention by the aggrieved party. Section 76‑A, unlike section 76, does not provide for a formal application for revision by the aggrieved party; therefore the appellant drew the Collector’s attention to his grievances and requested that the Collector invoke his revisional powers under section 76‑A. After examining the revision applications submitted by the appellant, the Collector chose to act suo motu and, on 14 August 1958, within the one‑year period, called for the record of the Mahalkari’s order. This request was made before the statutory time limit expired, thereby complying with the first limitation on the Collector’s revisional authority.

Before the requested record could be produced, the Collector issued three separate orders dated 3 October, 4 October, and 17 October 1958, each rejecting the appellant’s applications for revision. In these orders the Collector concluded that there was no basis for interfering with the Mahalkari’s order. He observed that the appellant had failed to pay rent for three consecutive years, that the tenancy had been properly terminated by the required notice, and that the Mahalkari’s findings on these matters had not been challenged in a regular appeal. Consequently, the Collector upheld and confirmed the Mahalkari’s order. The Collector did not address the question of whether the eviction application was non‑maintainable under the amended section 32, because that issue had not been raised before either the Mahalkari or the Collector. All of these orders were issued in the exercise of the Collector’s suo motu power of revision, and they, together with the earlier order calling for the record, could be issued only under the revisional authority granted by section 76‑A. Since the Collector chose not to modify, annul, or reverse the Mahalkari’s order, he was not required to serve notice to respondent No 2. The Collector’s orders, made pursuant to his revisional powers, possessed a quasi‑judicial character and were final. The governing Act does not give the Collector a power to review an order that he himself made under section 76‑A, and in the absence of any such review power he could not later reconsider his previous decisions or find grounds to annul or reverse the Mahalkari’s order.

In this case, the Court observed that the order issued by the Collector on 17 February 1959, which reopened the proceedings, was illegal, ultra vires and beyond his jurisdiction. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court should have set aside that Collector’s order on the basis of its lack of jurisdiction. The High Court, however, had taken the view that the Collector could exercise the revisional authority granted by section 76‑A only after examining the record of the Mahalkar’s impugned order. The Court disagreed with that view and reached the opposite conclusion. It stated that, while exercising the powers conferred by section 76‑A, the Collector was not obliged to call for the record; the Collector could either summon the record or decide without doing so. Even without a formal call for the record, the Collector could, after reviewing the order itself together with any representation made by the aggrieved party, any reference made by the Divisional Officer or the State Government, and any other documents submitted, determine that there was no ground for interfering with the challenged order and therefore confirm it. The appellant argued that the term “thereon” in section 76‑A supported the High Court’s interpretation, but the Court found that argument unpersuasive. It interpreted subsection (b) of section 76‑A to mean that the Collector was empowered to pass any order he deemed appropriate concerning the legality, propriety or regularity of an order made by any Mamlatdar or tribunal, and that he could base such orders on the materials before him without formally calling for the record. Nevertheless, the Court noted that if the Collector did call for the record, he should wait for its receipt before issuing any order. Orders issued before the record arrived were not, however, beyond jurisdiction. By analogy, the Court explained that when a court issues a notice to a respondent to show cause, the court is not prevented from dismissing the petition on the hearing day, even though the notice was issued earlier; the issuance of a notice does not compel the court to wait for a response before disposing of the matter, although the court must consider the record and hear the supporting party before granting relief. Finally, the Court emphasized that, notwithstanding any error in the Collector’s orders dismissing the revision, those orders were final, could not be reviewed, and could not be reopened by the Collector. The High Court had also observed that only the Collector’s final determination was a quasi‑judicial act, whereas the decision to call for, or not to call for, the record did not constitute a quasi‑judicial act.

In this matter the Court observed that the collector’s action of merely calling for the record did not constitute a quasi‑judicial act, but the collector went further by actually deciding that there was no basis for interfering with the order issued by the Mahalkari. Consequently, the collector issued an order on 17 February 1957 that reversed the Mahalkari’s decision. The Court held that this later order was issued without jurisdiction and therefore was subject to being set aside by the High Court. As a result of the collector’s improper reversal, the original order of the Mahalkari remained the only final and operative decree. Because that order stood, the appellant lost his status as a tenant and was consequently unable to become the purchaser of the lands on 1 March 1958; the application he had filed on 28 March 1957 was therefore rejected. The High Court had set aside the collector’s order on the ground that the amended Section 32 of the relevant statute could not affect an eviction application that had been filed on 10 July 1957 and was still pending when the amending Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 came into force, and it held that the Mahalkari’s allowance of the application was correct. The Court noted that it had already pointed out the error in the High Court’s reasoning for quashing the collector’s order on that particular ground. However, the Court further stated that the High Court should have annulled the collector’s order because, having previously concluded that there was no ground for interfering with the Mahalkari’s order, the collector could not later revise that same order. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the collector’s order was liable to be quashed, although on reasons different from those relied upon by the High Court. On this basis, the Court affirmed the High Court’s decision to set aside the collector’s order and to restore the Mahalkari’s original order. Consequently, all the appeals were dismissed with costs, and a single hearing fee was ordered to be paid.