Official Receiver, Kanpur And Another vs Abdul Shakur And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 257 of 1962

Decision Date: 11 September 1964

Coram: J.C. Shah, P.B. Gajendragadkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this matter the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 11 September 1964. The petition was brought by the Official Receiver of Kanpur together with another respondent against Abdul Shakur and several other respondents. The judgment was authored by Justice J C Shah, with Justices P B Gajendragadkar and N Rajagopala Ayyangar sitting on the bench. The case is reported in 1965 AIR 920 and 1965 SCR (1) 254, and it is cited in later reports as 1969 SC 1334 (8A). The statutes that formed the basis of the dispute were sections 33, 75(1) and 80 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) and section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881). The principal issue recorded in the headnote concerned whether the Official Receiver was required to rely on a statutory presumption in favour of creditors and whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction under section 75(1) of the Insolvency Act to interfere with a district‑court decision. The factual backdrop involved a second appellant who had issued promissory notes to the respondents. The respondents subsequently obtained a decree adjudicating the second appellant as an insolvent. Acting under the authority of sections 33 and 80 of the Provincial Insolvency Act and following the directions of the Insolvency Judge, the Official Receiver examined the claims presented by the respondents and rejected them. The respondents appealed that decision, and the Insolvency Judge ordered that the respondents’ names be entered in the schedule of creditors. The Insolvency Judge’s order was challenged before the District Court, which allowed the appeal and set aside the Insolvency Judge’s direction. The matter proceeded to a second appeal before the High Court. The High Court held that the inference drawn by the District Court from its factual findings was a matter of law, and consequently the High Court possessed jurisdiction under section 75(1) of the Insolvency Act to interfere with the District Court’s order. Relying on the presumption in favour of creditors created by section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the High Court overturned the District Court’s judgment. Both the Official Receiver and the insolvent then appealed to this Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the appeal should be allowed. It observed that every finding made by the District Court was a finding of fact, and the question of whether the statutory presumption under section 118 had been rebutted by the remaining evidence was likewise a question of fact. Because these issues were factual, the High Court did not have jurisdiction to set aside the District Court’s judgment. The Court referenced the decision in Wali Mohammad v. Mohammad Bakhsh (1930) L R 57 I A 86 as approved authority. The Court further explained that section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act creates a special evidential rule that applies only between the parties to the instrument or those claiming under it in a proceeding relating to that instrument. The provision does not alter the operation of section 114 of the Evidence Act, and in cases that do not fall within section 118 the Court may, but is not obliged to, presume that a promissory note was founded on good consideration. Accordingly, in a proceeding concerning the proof of debts, the question is not confined to the relationship between the insolvent and the proving creditor; the rights of all other creditors of the insolvent must also be considered. Therefore the Court affirmed its jurisdiction to investigate whether a genuine debt exists, even if, for

In this matter, the Court observed that even if, for some reason, the debtor himself were prevented by estoppel from denying the existence of a debt, that estoppel could not be imposed upon the Insolvency Court. Consequently, there was no statutory presumption of consideration that favored the creditors when promissory notes were presented in proceedings under section 33 of the Provincial Insolvency Act for the preparation of the schedule of creditors. Accordingly, the Receiver, who exercised the powers conferred by section 80 of that Act, was not obligated to admit the debts in the schedule merely because the insolvent or the creditors had failed to overturn the presumption. The Court then turned to the case law that had been examined. The judgment concerned a civil appeal numbered 257 of 1962, which appealed the decree dated 19 February 1957 of the Allahabad High Court in S. A. F. No. 4 of 1952. Counsel for the appellants and counsel for respondent No. 2 were engaged. The decision was delivered by Justice Shah. In the original proceedings, respondents numbered one to three filed a petition before the Insolvency Judge in Kanpur, seeking an order that the second appellant, Kotwaleshwar Prasad, be adjudicated insolvent. The petition alleged that Kotwaleshwar had, in the course of his business, borrowed fifteen thousand rupees on 28 September 1935 from respondents one and three, executing a promissory note promising repayment, and had also borrowed three thousand five hundred rupees on 9 January 1936 and four thousand rupees on 7 April 1936 from respondent two, each time executing similar notes. It was further alleged that Kotwaleshwar failed to repay the sums, and, intending to defeat or delay his creditors, concealed himself so as to deprive them of any means of communication, thereby committing an act of insolvency. The Insolvency Judge, by order dated 8 October 1937, adjudicated Kotwaleshwar insolvent and appointed the first appellant, the Official Receiver of Kanpur, as receiver of his estate under the powers granted by section 80 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. Exercising the authority under section 33 read with section 80, the Receiver proceeded to frame a schedule of debts. The claims presented by respondents one to three were contested by Kotwaleshwar and by a creditor named Abdul Sayed; however, the Official Receiver included the respondents’ claims in the schedule, reasoning that Kotwaleshwar had admitted those claims on 8 October 1937 before the Insolvency Court. An appeal under section 68 to the Insolvency Judge resulted in the matter being remanded to the Official Receiver with directions to conduct a fresh enquiry into the debts owed to the respondents. In the subsequent enquiry, the Official Receiver rejected the claims of respondents one to three, holding that it had not been proved that Kotwaleshwar had received any consideration for the three promissory notes. In the Receiver’s view, the documentary evidence produced by Kotwaleshwar and the respondents demonstrated that the notes were executed under the influence of respondents one to three and their servant Amir Hassan, and that the books of account presented in support of consideration were unreliable.

The Court noted that the promissory notes had been executed by Kotwaleshwar while under the influence of respondents I to 3 and their servant Amir Hassan, and that the evidence, including the books of account of respondents I to 3, offered to demonstrate that consideration had been advanced under the notes was unreliable. In the appeal against the Official Receiver’s order, the Insolvency Judge of Kanpur directed that the names of respondents I to 3 be entered in the schedule of creditors. The Insolvency Judge held that the statutory presumption of consideration created by section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act supported the remaining evidence which was intended to prove the authenticity of the signatures and the endorsements on the promissory notes signed by Kotwaleshwar, as well as the authenticity of the receipts he had executed. He further held that the “Kachi Rokar” of the respondents was adequately corroborated by the testimony of the creditors, their witness Abdul Rashid, and other evidence, and concluded that Kotwaleshwar had failed to discharge the heavy burden placed upon him to demonstrate a lack of consideration. An appeal against the Insolvency Judge’s order was lodged in the District Court at Kanpur. While that appeal was pending, respondents I and III were declared evacuees under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, and the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property, into whose possession their property had passed, was impleaded as a respondent. The District Court found the testimony of the respondents’ witnesses, presented in support of the claim that consideration had been paid, to be unreliable, and it held that the admission made by Kotwaleshwar before the Insolvency Judge on 8 October 1937 had been obtained through undue influence. The court also found the books of account relied upon by the respondents and the accompanying oral evidence to be unreliable. The District Judge observed that, although the presumption under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act concerning the promissory notes did arise, the circumstances of the case weakened that presumption and shifted the burden of proof onto respondents I to 3. They were required to prove positively that the sums represented by the three promissory notes had actually been paid to the insolvent, a burden they failed to meet. Against the District Court’s order, a second appeal—number 4 of 1952—was filed under section 75(I) proviso 2 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, before the High Court of Allahabad. The Division Bench hearing that appeal referred two questions to a Full Bench: first, whether the presumption enumerated in clause (a) of section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, may be invoked in insolvency proceedings when an alleged debt against the insolvent is challenged by the Official Receiver, a creditor, or the insolvent themselves; and second, if such a presumption may be invoked, whether circumstances that cast doubt on the passage of consideration under the negotiable instrument—despite a denial by the maker—are sufficient to deprive the creditor of the benefit of the presumption and require the creditor to prove that consideration actually passed.

In this appeal the Court addressed whether a creditor could be deprived of the benefit of the statutory presumption contained in clause (a) of section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and consequently be required to prove by evidence that actual consideration had passed. A Full Bench of the High Court, by a majority, answered affirmatively to the first question and therefore referred the second appeal to a Division Bench of the same High Court. The Division Bench noted that the lower District Court had recorded certain findings and, based on those findings, had inferred as a matter of law that the statutory presumption under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was rebutted. The Division Bench then examined the correctness of that preliminary inference. It observed that the inference was open to challenge for two reasons. First, the material facts described by the lower court as “circumstances” suffered from legal defects previously identified. Second, the lower court’s conclusion that the statutory presumption was rebutted was a finding of law rather than a finding of fact. The lower court had thus concluded that the burden of proving consideration had shifted onto the creditors. The Division Bench explained that a finding which depends on a rule of law for its recording or for ascertaining its truth is a question of law, whereas any other finding is a question of fact. Because the shift of the onus required application of pleading, proof, procedural and evidentiary rules, it constituted a finding of law. Consequently, the inference that the statutory presumption was rebutted required legal scrutiny rather than factual re‑evaluation.

The High Court subsequently held that, in the present case, the insolvent had not only failed to displace or weaken the statutory presumption in favour of the creditors under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, but that the consideration was fully established by the evidence produced by the creditors and by the insolvent’s own admission, even assuming that no initial presumption existed. With the grant of special leave, the Official Receiver and Kotwaleshwar preferred this appeal. The District Court, on the basis of the evidence, found that the insolvent’s father had died in 1933 leaving substantial property; at the time of his father’s death the insolvent was a young man of about twenty years, described as inexperienced and susceptible to the temptations of early life. The District Court further found that the insolvent had “got mixed up” with Amir Hassan and others, who “initiated him into the mysteries of wine and women.” Although the promissory notes were not executed “under the influence of drink,” the court held there were grounds to conclude that the insolvent was under the influence of Amir Hassan when he signed them, and that this influence was a significant factor in assessing the validity of the notes.

The Court recorded that the three promissory notes were signed by the insolvent in rapid succession, at a time when he already owed other creditors an amount of Rs 6,000. It was noted that the respondents had never conducted any business with the insolvent prior to the execution of those notes. Although the creditors were aware that the insolvent’s inherited share in his father’s estate amounted to only between Rs 28,000 and Rs 30,000 and that he held the estate jointly with his brother, they did not obtain any security from him, nor did they investigate whether the inherited property was already encumbered. Respondent 3, Abdul Wahid, testified that roughly twenty‑one months after the note dated 28 September 1935 he learned that the insolvent was issuing “bogus and fictitious promissory notes” in favour of his friends with the intention of defrauding genuine creditors. Consequently, Wahid found it implausible that the insolvent would have permitted further advances under the two subsequent notes totalling Rs 7,500. Moreover, the Court observed that the insolvent appeared “fairly well off for his ordinary needs” and that there was no evident motive for him to borrow such substantial sums. The respondents themselves lacked sufficient funds or resources to advance either the amounts covered by the three recent notes or those under the earlier notes dated 4 September 1935 and 15 September 1935. Additionally, the insolvent’s thumb impression had been taken in addition to his signatures on the promissory notes, and his signatures also appeared on the Rokar Bahi. The oral evidence presented by the respondents to prove consideration was deemed unconvincing. The insolvent’s admission of 8 October 1937, upon which the adjudication order was based, was described as having been made under suspicious circumstances, labelled an erroneous admission, and consequently not binding on the insolvent. Finally, the Court described the creditors’ Bahi Khatas as being of a suspicious character, and these observations were expressly recorded as findings of fact.

The District Court inferred from these findings that the statutory presumption under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act had been weakened, thereby relieving the insolvent of the evidential burden. The Court further held that it was not within the jurisdiction of the High Court, exercising powers under section 75(1) proviso 1 or proviso 2 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, to set aside the District Court’s judgment, because the question of whether a statutory presumption is rebutted by the surrounding evidence is a question of fact, as established in Wali Mohammad v. Mohammad Bakhsh. While this reasoning would ordinarily have sufficed to dispose of the appeal, the Court identified a separate issue: whether the Official Receiver is obligated to apply the statutory presumption of section 118 when a negotiable instrument is relied upon by a creditor in the insolvency proceeding for proof of debt to be entered in the creditors’ schedule. This issue had been fully argued before the Court, and the High Court had previously overruled an earlier decision in Ram Lal Tandon v. Kashi Charan. Given the importance of this question, the Court deemed it necessary to express its opinion on the matter.

In this case the parties fully argued the question of how proof of debts should be presented for inclusion in the schedule of creditors. The Court noted that the High Court had set aside an earlier decision of that same Court in Ram Lal Tandon v. Kashi Charan (2). Because the issue was regarded as significant, the Court considered it appropriate to state its own view. The Court then examined Section 33 of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The first subsection of that provision reads: “When an order of adjudication has been made under this Act, all persons alleging themselves to be creditors of the insolvent in respect of debts provable under this Act shall tender proof of their respective debts by producing evidence of the amount and particulars thereof, and the Court shall, by order, determine the persons who have proved themselves to be creditors of the insolvent in respect of such debts, and the amount of such debts, respectively, and shall frame a schedule of such persons and debts.” From this language, the Court derived that the statute imposes a duty on the court to fashion a schedule that lists every creditor whose claim is provable under the Act together with the amount of each debt. To fulfil that duty, the court must conduct an enquiry into each debt claimed by the insolvent estate, determining which debts are indeed provable. The Court stressed that a proceeding under Section 33 is not a direct contest between the insolvent debtor and the creditor who seeks proof. The case law cited—L.R. 57 I.A. 86, 92 and A.I.R. 1928 All. 380—supports the proposition that the true proceeding is between the creditors, represented by the official receiver, and the insolvent estate. Consequently, when a creditor relies on a negotiable instrument or any other evidence to assert a claim for inclusion of his debt, the court, or the receiver acting on the court’s authority, must be satisfied that the debt actually exists, that the amount claimed is correct, that the particulars are clear, and that the debt qualifies as provable in the insolvency context.

The Court observed that Section 33 does not prescribe a specific quantum of proof that must be produced to establish a debt. It is permissible, for example, for a court to accept a registered letter addressed to the court together with an affidavit verifying the debt, as authorized under Section 49 of the Act. However, the Court clarified that such procedural allowances do not define the substantive standard of proof required. In each individual case, it is the responsibility of the court or the official receiver—subject to the review mechanisms foreseen in the Act—to decide whether the creditor’s claim has been sufficiently proved. That decision must necessarily hinge on the particular circumstances and the evidence adduced to substantiate the debt. Applying this principle to the matter before it, the Court noted that the majority of the High Court had held that, in a proceeding under Section 33, the mere production of a promissory note by the promisee creates a presumption that the note was issued for consideration, as provided by Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The High Court further held that this presumption continues until it is rebutted by the promisor or by other creditors. The Court indicated that this view was reached after examining the nature of the proceeding in which such presumptions are to be raised concerning negotiable instruments.

The Court observed that the receiver could not alone decide that the amount for which the promissory note was executed must be entered in the schedule. In reaching that conclusion, the High Court mainly relied on the fact that the judgment did not refer to the specific nature of the proceeding in which the statutory presumptions concerning negotiable instruments were required to be raised. The Court first noted that the presumption created by section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a presumption of consideration and that it does not invariably establish the amount of debt owed by the insolvent at the date of insolvency. Accordingly, the Insolvency Court must determine, as a matter of fact, whether a debt is actually due by the insolvent, whether the debt is provable in the insolvency proceeding, and what the quantum of that debt is at the material date. In carrying out this three‑fold enquiry, the Court held that even a judgment rendered against the debtor is not automatically binding on the Insolvency Court. The Court cited the decision in Ex Parte Lennox, where it was held that a judgment which the judgment debtor cannot set aside may still be examined by the bankruptcy court to decide whether the debt on which the judgment was based was a good debt, and that the court may refuse to make a receiving order if it is not satisfied that the debt is genuine.

The Court further explained that the principle in Lennox was extended in In Re Fraser Ex Parte Central Bank of London. In that case the court held that, upon hearing a creditor’s petition for a receiving order against a judgment debtor, the bankruptcy court has the power, at the debtor’s own request, to look beyond the judgment and investigate the validity of the debt, even where the debtor had previously applied to set aside the judgment and that application had been refused and upheld by the Court of Appeal. Lord Esher, M.R., observed that the decision in Lennox is based on the highest ground—that making a receiving order interferes with the rights of other creditors, and that the court should not exercise this extraordinary power unless it is convinced that a good debt is due to the petitioning creditor. He noted that while a judgment is prima facie evidence of a debt, the bankruptcy court remains entitled to inquire whether a genuine debt actually exists. Consequently, the Court affirmed that a debt entered in the schedule must be a real debt, and that reliance on a judgment alone does not automatically establish the existence of a real debt, especially where the judgment may have been obtained by consent, default, or other reasons.

In default, a judgment may have been obtained by consent or by other means. When a proceeding concerns the proof of debts, the issue is not confined to the relationship between the insolvent debtor and the creditor who is proving the debt; the rights of all other creditors of the insolvent must also be taken into account. Even if the debtor is, for some reason, prevented (estopped) from denying the existence of the debt, that estoppel does not bind the Insolvency Court. Accordingly, the Court possesses jurisdiction in every case to examine whether a genuine debt exists, and it alone decides whether the production of a judgment, a negotiable instrument, or any other piece of evidence is sufficient to consider the debt proved. The decision cannot be based on any estoppel that might apply to the insolvent or on any presumption. The Court may, in a particular case, rely solely on a judgment, a negotiable instrument, or another document and admit the debt to the schedule, not because an estoppel 1. [1892] 2 Q. B.D. 633. L2Sup./64-4 exists against the Receiver or other creditors, nor because a presumption of law favours the evidence, but because, after considering the circumstances, the Court finds that no further inquiry beyond the proof of the judgment or instrument and evidence that the debt remains unsatisfied since that date is necessary. Nevertheless, the Court retains the power to demand proof of the debt independent of the judgment or any negotiable instrument. This power arises because the Insolvency Court, seeking to distribute the insolvent’s estate fairly among all creditors, is authorised to look beyond the external forms of transactions and ascertain the true nature of the debts that are claimed, and any estoppel that the insolvent may have raised against other parties does not affect the Receiver. Whether the Court should exercise this power in relation to a judgment debt depends on the Court’s discretion, which must be exercised according to sound judicial principles. It is correct that, as a general rule, the Court does not scrutinise a judgment against the debtor merely on the debtor’s unsubstantiated claim that the debt merged in the judgment was nonexistent or defective. An enquiry must be justified by prima facie circumstances, such as evidence that the judgment was obtained by fraud, collusion, or a miscarriage of justice. A simple irregularity or procedural error is insufficient to warrant setting aside the judgment. When a debt is secured by a promissory note and the creditor seeks to prove it, the Insolvency Court must investigate both the reality of the debt and the amount of consideration involved. The specific form that this enquiry takes will vary according to the facts of each case. In some instances, the Court may accept an affidavit that details the particulars of the debt, confirms the execution of the promissory note by the insolvent, and asserts that the debt remains unsatisfied, as adequate proof.

In the matter before the Court, it was explained that a statement setting out the particulars of the debt, together with an affirmation that the promissory note had been executed by the insolvent and an assertion that the debt had not been satisfied, could be regarded as sufficient proof in some circumstances. The Court noted, however, that in other situations it might be necessary to conduct a more extensive inquiry, depending on the facts and conditions that characterized the case. Regardless of the depth of inquiry, the Court emphasized that whenever a debt is to be proved under section 33 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the entire burden of proof rests upon the creditor. That burden, the Court held, may be discharged by the creditor’s sworn affidavit, provided the affidavit is considered in the context of the presumption authorised by section 114 of the Evidence Act, which allows the Court to presume that a bill of exchange that has been accepted or endorsed was made for good consideration. The Court further observed that, if section 33 of the Provincial Insolvency Act is correctly interpreted – a view supported by both principle and authority – then the presumption contained in section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, which declares that every negotiable instrument is made or drawn for consideration, cannot be used against the Receiver of the insolvent’s estate. The Court pointed out that section 118, unlike sections 119 to 122 that appear in Chapter XIII, does not refer to a suit proceeding in which the various presumptions must be raised. Although the provision is expressed in general terms, there is no basis to assume that it was intended to apply to proceedings that are not civil disputes between the parties to the negotiable instrument or their privies. The Negotiable Instruments Act, the Court said, was enacted to codify the law merchant concerning dealings with negotiable instruments, and the special evidential rules set out in section 118 are designed to operate in favour of or against the parties to the instrument or those claiming under them, not against persons who have no claim under the instrument. The Court then referred to the decision in Anumolus Narayana Rao v. Chattaraju Venkatappayya, where Justice Varadachariar observed that a suit on a promissory note filed against an undivided son of a Hindu promisor, governed by Mitakshara law after the promisor’s death, cannot be treated as a suit against the promisor’s heirs or representatives because the action seeks to enforce the Hindu law concept of pious obligation of the sons regarding property they obtained by survivorship. The Court explained that such pious obligation can arise only on the assumption that a debt owed by the father exists, and consequently the initial burden of proving the debt must lie with the creditor. The creditor may rely on the general evidential presumption under section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, but not on the specific presumption provided by section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The learned Judge further remarked that, although section 118 is not limited in the same way as sections 119 to 122, it is reasonable to conclude that the special evidence rules in that section were intended to apply solely between the parties to the instrument or those claiming under them.

It was observed that although section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act dealt with a suit on the instrument, it was reasonable to hold that the special evidential rules set out in that provision were intended to apply only between the parties to the instrument or those claiming under them. In cases that did not involve the parties to the instrument, the presumption could arise only under the terms of section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. The expression “may presume” in that section, as noted in I.L.R. [1937] Mad. 299, left the discretion to the Court to decide whether to apply the presumption according to the circumstances of the case. Section 114 authorised the Court to presume the existence of any fact it considered likely to have happened, taking into account the usual course of natural events, human conduct and the patterns of public and private business as they related to the facts of the particular case. The third illustration to section 114 allowed the Court to presume that a bill of exchange that had been accepted or endorsed was accepted for good consideration. However, the provision also required the Court to consider other material facts in deciding whether the presumption should be applied. Consequently, the Court could examine, for example, the fact that the drawer of a bill of exchange was a businessman while the acceptor was a young and ignorant person wholly under the drawer’s influence. Such a circumstance could justify the Court in raising the presumption, although other facts might lead the Court to decline to do so.

Mr. Pathak, appearing for the respondents, argued that because the Indian Evidence Act was enacted in 1872 and the Negotiable Instruments Act in 1881, any conflict or overlap between the two statutes should result in section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act supplanting section 114 of the Evidence Act. The Court was unable to accept that submission. It affirmed that section 114 was a general provision that permitted, but did not obligate, the Court to presume that a bill of exchange or a promissory note was founded on good consideration. In contrast, section 118 created a special evidential rule that operated solely between the parties to the instrument or persons claiming under them in any suit or proceeding relating to the bill of exchange, and it did not displace the general rule in section 114 in matters falling outside the ambit of section 118. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court erred in concluding that a statutory presumption of consideration arose in favour of the respondents in the proceedings under section 33 for the settlement of the schedule of creditors, and that the Receiver, exercising powers under section 80, was bound to admit the debts in the schedule merely because the insolvent or other creditors failed to rebut that presumption. The appeal was thus allowed, the order of the High Court set aside, and the order of the District Court restored, with costs awarded in this Court.

The Court examined the material placed before it and concluded that the appeal ought to be allowed. In reaching this conclusion, the Court determined that the judgment delivered by the High Court was erroneous and therefore required reversal. Accordingly, the Court set aside the order of the High Court, nullifying its effect. In its place, the Court restored the earlier order that had been issued by the District Court, thereby reinstating the position that existed before the High Court’s intervention. The Court further directed that the costs of the proceedings be awarded by this Court, ordering that the party who had unsuccessfully appealed to the High Court should bear those expenses. By taking these steps, the Court formally allowed the appeal, overturned the High Court’s decision, reinstated the District Court’s order, and ordered costs against the unsuccessful appellant.