Misrilal Parasmal vs H.P. Sadasiviah And Anr.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 20 March, 1964

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah, J.R. Mudholkar

In this case the respondents were the owners of a building located on Mamulpet Road in Bangalore. The building was identified by three numbers, namely 135, 136 and 120. The respondents possessed the entire portions designated as numbers 135 and 136. The portion numbered 120 was acknowledged to be in a dilapidated state, and the appellant firm occupied only a single room in that portion, using it as a cloth shop. The respondents filed an application before the First Munsiff of Bangalore invoking Section 8(2)(ix) and (xii) of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951. Their application sought to evict the appellant on two grounds: first, that the house was needed by the landlords in good faith for reconstruction, which could not be carried out unless the premises were vacated; and second, that the appellant possessed alternative premises where he could locate his shop. The Munsiff allowed the application and ordered the appellant to surrender possession within two months. The appellant appealed the order to the District Court, but the appeal was dismissed. Consequently, the appellant filed a revision application before the High Court under Section 17 of the same Act.

The appellant’s revision primarily argued that the portions numbered 135 and 136 did not actually require reconstruction and that the true purpose of the eviction request was to rebuild the structure in a manner that would prevent the appellant from obtaining comparable accommodation in the new building. The appellant contended that, according to Section 8(2)(ix) of the Act, the landlord must demonstrate a genuine necessity to reconstruct the house, and that a mere desire to replace the existing building with a new one does not satisfy this requirement. In support of this argument the appellant relied on the Punjab High Court decision in Labbu Ram v. Ram Prakash. The High Court, however, adopted the reasoning of an earlier decision of the same court reported in Ram Chancier v. Kidar Nath, which had accepted the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Bhulan Singh v. Ganendra Kumar Roy. The appellant repeated the same argument before this Court. The Court observed that the issue raised by the appellant could not be raised in a revision petition under Section 12 of the Act before the High Court, and therefore it could not be considered by this Court.

In the present case the Court held that the issue raised before the High Court could not be re‑examined before this Court because it was not a matter that the High Court was empowered to consider under the statutory scheme. The provision concerned reads: “(1) Except in respect of orders under Section 23, the High Court may, at any time, call for and examine the records relating to any decision given or proceeding taken by the District Judge or any order passed or proceeding taken by the court or the Controller under this Act, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such decision, order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.” However, the provision further provides that the powers conferred by this sub‑section shall not be exercisable in any case in which an appeal lies under Section 15, unless the Controller, the court or the District Judge appears to have (i) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him or it; or (ii) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (iii) acted in the exercise of his or its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The Court acknowledged that Sub‑section (1) of Section 17 confers broad powers on the High Court to entertain revision applications, but noted that the proviso added by Act 22 of 1954 limits those powers whenever an appeal under Section 15 is pending. The Court found that the proviso was applicable to the present facts. Accordingly, the Court explained that under the proviso the High Court’s powers when dealing with a revision of a District Court order are the same as those given by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, the High Court may interfere with a subordinate court’s order only when the order involves an error of jurisdiction. The Court therefore concluded that the High Court has no authority to set aside a District Court judgment merely because it was affected by an error of law or because a factual question, however important, was decided incorrectly by the District Court. The Court referred to the earlier decision of this Court in Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, which interpreted a comparable provision in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, in the same manner. The Court also cited the decision in Wora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai, C.A. No. 470 of 1963, dated 22‑10‑1963, where the issue was whether the High Court could set aside a District Court order under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, on the ground that the District Court had misinterpreted Section 12(3)(b) of that Act. Shah J, delivering the judgment, observed that “The High”

In this case, the Court explained that the High Court, while exercising its powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, did not possess authority to set aside a district court order merely because it believed that the lower‑court judgment was vulnerable to a factual or legal error. The Court clarified that a revision by the High Court is permissible only when, in a matter decided by a subordinate court where no appeal lies, the subordinate court either exercised a jurisdiction not granted to it by law, failed to exercise a jurisdiction that was vested in it, or acted illegally or with material irregularity while exercising its jurisdiction. To support this principle, the Court referred to the observations of the Privy Council in Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar, 44 Indian Appeals 261 (AIR 1912 Punjab Chief Court 71), which held that Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals exclusively with jurisdiction, the irregular exercise or non‑exercise of jurisdiction, or the illegal assumption of jurisdiction.

The Court also examined the provisions of Section 17 of the relevant Act in light of the earlier decision in A. Batchamain Sahib and Co. v. A. N. Channiah, Civil Appeal Nos. 452 and 487 of 1962 (dated 19 October 1962). In that precedent, the High Court had reversed a district judge’s order on the ground that the phrase “said business” in Section 8(3)(a)(ii) of the Act had been misinterpreted. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s reversal, noting that the statutory provision under which the two revisions were presented to the High Court consisted of two parts. The first part authorises the High Court to obtain the record of any case to determine the legality and propriety of the order passed by the lower courts. However, a proviso follows, stating that if an appeal has been filed, the High Court’s powers are the same as those contained in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The language of the proviso mirrors that of Section 115. The Court reiterated that the High Court’s revisional power under the Code of Civil Procedure, as affirmed by this Court and the Privy Council, does not permit it to overturn a decision of a subordinate court simply because the High Court is of the opinion that the subordinate court reached an erroneous conclusion on a question of law or fact, provided the lower court had jurisdiction to decide the matter. This principle was further reaffirmed in Hari Shanker v. Girdhari Lal, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 698.

Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Ganapathy Iyer, argued that the respondents, in their application under Section 8(3)(a)(ii) of the Act, had expressly stated that the accommodation in the house after reconstruction might not be suitable for the appellant. He asserted that this admission demonstrated the respondents’ intention to reconstruct the house solely to keep the appellant out, thereby indicating mala fides. According to his submission, establishing the respondents’ bona fides was essential for them to benefit from the statutory provision, and therefore the question of jurisdiction was implicated, allowing the High Court to examine that issue.

The respondents attempted to reconstruct the house with the sole purpose of keeping the appellant out of the premises, and the Court found that this intention was sufficient to demonstrate their malafide motive. Because the respondents were required to establish their bona fide intention in order to rely on the statutory provision, the question of jurisdiction, according to counsel, became material, and consequently the High Court was entitled to examine that jurisdictional question. Sub‑section (1) of Section 8 provides that, notwithstanding any agreement or any law to the contrary, a tenant may not be evicted—whether in execution of a decree or otherwise—except in accordance with the provisions of this section or those of Section 7‑C. Sub‑section (2) further provides that a landlord who wishes to evict a tenant in possession must apply to the court for a direction in that regard. The section empowers the Court to grant such permission only if it is satisfied that one of the several circumstances listed in that sub‑section exists. One of those circumstances is set out in Clause (ix) of the section, which reads: “That the house is reasonably and bona‑fide required by the landlord for carrying out repairs or reconstruction which cannot be carried out without the house being vacated.” Accordingly, the Court acquires jurisdiction to order eviction of the tenant once it is satisfied that the landlord’s requirement for possession is genuine and bona‑fide. The condition that confers jurisdiction on the Court is its satisfaction regarding the landlord’s bona‑fide requirement; if the Court is not satisfied of such a requirement, it lacks jurisdiction to make an order on the basis of that clause. Conversely, if the Court declares that it is satisfied, a mistake in assessing the landlord’s bona‑fide intention does not amount to an error of jurisdiction, and such a mistake does not constitute an illegal assumption of jurisdiction. For these reasons, the argument advanced by counsel Ganapathy Iyer was rejected, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.