Lalji Haridas vs State Of Maharashtra And Another

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1962

Decision Date: 7 February 1964

Coram: P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, A. K. Sarkar, K. C. Das Gupta

Lalji Haridas filed a petition against the State of Maharashtra and another respondent, and the judgment was delivered on 7 February 1964 by the Supreme Court of India. The bench that heard the matter consisted of Chief Justice Bhuvneshwari P. Sinha, and Justices A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo, K. C. Das Gupta, and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The case was reported as 1964 AIR 1154 and 1964 SCR (6) 700, with later citations including R 1969 SC 724, RF 1971 SC 44, and D 1988 SC 2267. The substantive issue involved provisions of the Income‑Tax‑Act 1922, the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and the Indian Penal Code 1860.

The petitioner, Lalji Haridas, instituted a criminal complaint against the second respondent alleging that the latter had committed an offence under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code by giving false evidence in proceedings conducted by an Income‑tax Officer under section 37 of the Income‑tax Act. The second respondent raised a preliminary objection, contending that the learned magistrate could not take cognizance of the complaint because the proceedings in which the alleged false statement was made were proceedings before a court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The respondent further argued that, since no written complaint had been filed by the Income‑tax Officer, section 195(1)(b) barred the competence of the petitioner’s complaint.

The learned magistrate rejected the preliminary objection, and the second respondent then filed a criminal revision application before the Bombay High Court, impleading the State of Maharashtra as the first respondent. The High Court allowed the revision, holding that the condition precedent of section 195(1)(b) had not been satisfied because a complaint in writing had not been filed by the Income‑tax Officer.

The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court on a certificate issued under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The central question before the Court was whether proceedings before an Income‑tax Officer under section 37 of the Income‑tax Act could be characterized as proceedings in any court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In the majority judgment delivered by Chief Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, together with Justices K. N. Wanchoo and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, the Court held that while the Income‑tax Officer exercised powers granted by sections 37(1), (2) and (3), the proceedings conducted by him qualified as judicial proceedings for the purposes of sections 193, 196 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Consequently, the false statement alleged to have been made by the second respondent was made in a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court further observed that it was unnecessary to resolve the broader question of whether the Income‑tax Officer himself constituted a court for the purposes of section 37(4) of the Income‑tax Act.

A dissenting opinion was expressed by Justices A. K. Sarkar and K. C. Das Gupta. They argued that the nature of the functions performed by the Income‑tax Officer under the Income‑tax Act placed him within the executive branch of the State. They maintained that even though the officer might be vested with powers resembling those of a court under the Code of Civil Procedure for certain executive functions, such powers did not transform him into a limb of the judicial system.

The Court held that the proceedings before the Income‑tax Officer were judicial proceedings for the purposes of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court further held that those judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any court for the purpose of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the High Court was correct in allowing the revision application because the required condition precedent under section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been fulfilled. The Court observed that the condition precedent prescribed by section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been complied with because the Income‑tax Officer had not filed any complaint. The Court distinguished the authority cited in Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in the 1963 Second Series of the Supreme Court Reporter at page 850. It also distinguished Puran Chand Maneklal, in re, reported in the 1938 Bombay Law Reports at page 642. In a dissenting opinion, Justices Sarkar and Das Gupta expressed a contrary view, arguing that the Income‑tax Officer should not be treated as a court. They argued that, by virtue of the nature of the functions assigned under the various provisions of the Income‑tax Act, the Income‑tax Officer formed a part of the executive organ of the State. They further contended that the Officer possessed certain powers that were otherwise vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of performing some executive functions. They argued that those powers did not transform the Officer into a limb of the judicial organ because the Officer remained an executive functionary. They maintained that even though the Officer performed quasi‑judicial functions, such character did not make him a court within the meaning of the law. They asserted that section 37(4) of the Income‑tax Act was not intended to deem a proceeding before the specified authority to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. They further argued that reading the provision as also deeming that authority itself to be a court within the meaning of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would attribute to the legislature a purpose. They said that such an interpretation went beyond the intention of the legislature because the statute did not expressly confer court status on the officer.

They referred to the authority of Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 Second Series at page 850, and to Puran Chand Maneklal, in re, I.L.R. 38 Bombay at page 642. They also cited State v. Nemchatid Pesvir, reported in the 1957 Bombay Law Reporter at page 1056, and Indochina Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. The Additional Collector of Customs, reported in the 1964 Sixth Series of the Supreme Court Reporter at page 394. The judgment concerned Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1962, which was an appeal from the order dated 30 January 1962 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 1142 of 1960. The appellant was represented by the Additional Solicitor‑General and three counsel, while respondent No. 1 was represented by two counsel, and respondent No. 2 was represented by three counsel. The judgment was delivered on 7 February 1964 by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar, with Justices Wanchoo and Rajagopala Ayyangar concurring. Justices Sarkar and Das Gupta authored a dissenting opinion, expressing disagreement with the majority view.

The judgment was delivered by Das Gupta J. The Court identified a concise question of law that required resolution in the present appeal. The question was whether a proceeding conducted before an Income‑tax Officer, pursuant to section 37 of the Indian Income‑tax Act, 1922 (No XI of 1922) – hereinafter referred to as the Act – could be characterised as a proceeding “in any Court” within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The factual backdrop that gave rise to this issue was as follows. The appellant, Lalji Haridas, and the respondent identified as No 2, Mulii Maniial Kamdar, were both businessmen engaged in the oil trade, the former operating in Jamnagar and the latter in Bombay. They had been acquainted for several years through their routine commercial dealings. During the income‑tax assessment proceedings relating to the appellant for the assessment years 1949‑50 and 1950‑51, respondent No 2 appeared before the Income‑tax Officer, Ward A, in Jamnagar on 4 December 1958 and gave evidence on oath. In that testimony he denied having a son named Nihal Chand and denied conducting any business under the name of M/s Nihal Chand & Co. at Jamnagar. The appellant alleged that the statements made by respondent No 2 were false, that he knew they were false, and that he made them with the intention of misleading the Income‑tax Officer and averting the liability of income‑tax upon himself. As a consequence of those alleged false statements, the appellant’s tax assessment was considerably increased. On 24 November 1959, the appellant instituted a criminal complaint against respondent No 2 under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code (No 452/S of 1959) before the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanades, Bombay. At the hearing of that complaint, respondent No 2 raised a preliminary objection, contending that the learned Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance because the alleged false statement on oath had been made in a proceeding that, in his view, constituted a “Court” within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. He further argued that, since no written complaint had been filed before the Income‑tax Officer’s proceeding, section 195(1)(b) imposed a bar on the competence of the appellant’s complaint. The Presidency Magistrate rejected this preliminary objection, holding that the Income‑tax Officer was not a “Court” within the meaning of section 195(1)(b) and therefore proceeded with the complaint. Dissatisfied with that finding, respondent No 2 filed a Criminal Revision Application (No 1142 of 1960) in the Bombay High Court, with the State of Maharashtra joined as respondent No 1. The Division Bench of the High Court overturned the Magistrate’s decision, concluding that the Income‑tax Officer did constitute a “Court” under section 195(1)(b) and consequently upheld the preliminary objection raised by respondent No 2. Accordingly, the High Court ordered that the criminal complaint filed by the appellant be dismissed.

The lower court had dismissed the appellant’s complaint. After that dismissal, the appellant applied to the Bombay High Court for a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The High Court granted the certificate, and with that certificate the appellant filed the present appeal before this Court. Consequently, the precise issue that this appeal asks this Court to resolve is whether the proceedings conducted before an Income‑Tax Officer qualify as proceedings in any Court for the purposes of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although the question is phrased in a concise way, its answer is not straightforward. Both sides presented arguments supporting opposite interpretations, and each set of arguments was reasonably persuasive. Because of this balance, choosing one construction over the other required careful consideration of the competing viewpoints.

The appellant contended that during the proceedings before the Income‑Tax Officer, respondent No 2 allegedly gave a false statement on oath. Those proceedings were conducted under section 37 of the Income‑Tax Act. Section 37(1) of that Act states that, for the purposes of the Act, an Income‑Tax Officer possesses the same powers as a Court exercising authority under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit on matters specified in clauses (a) to (d). Section 37(2) adds that the Officer may exercise additional powers, provided that such powers are authorized by the Commissioner and are subject to any rules made for that purpose; when exercising those additional powers, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 relating to searches are applicable. Section 37(3) governs the impounding and retention of books of account or other documents. The next provision, section 37(4), is directly relevant here. It declares that any proceeding before any authority mentioned in this section shall be deemed a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, while the Income‑Tax Officer is exercising powers under sections 37(1), (2) and (3), the proceedings he conducts are to be treated as judicial proceedings for the three sections of the Penal Code referred to in subsection (4). This leads to the conclusion that the alleged false statement made by respondent No 2 occurred during a judicial proceeding as defined by section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and therefore the answer to that point must be affirmative. The plain effect of section 37(4) is precisely to bring such proceedings within the scope of section 193.

Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, which is the provision directly engaged in this appeal, prescribes punishment for the intentional giving of false evidence. The section is divided into two parts. The first part deals, among other matters, with false evidence that is intentionally given at any stage of a judicial proceeding, and it provides that a person convicted of such an offence shall be punished with

Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code prescribes punishment for the intentional giving of false evidence, and it is divided into two distinct parts. The first part deals with false evidence given at any stage of a judicial proceeding and authorises imprisonment of either description for a term that may extend to seven years, together with a possible fine. The second part concerns false evidence given in any other circumstance and limits the maximum imprisonment to three years, also allowing a fine. Consequently, the law imposes a harsher penalty when false evidence is supplied during a judicial proceeding than when it is supplied in non‑judicial contexts.

Three explanations accompany section 193. Explanation I declares that a trial before a Court‑martial qualifies as a judicial proceeding. Explanation II provides that an investigation mandated by law as a preliminary step to a proceeding before a Court of Justice constitutes a stage of a judicial proceeding, even if that investigation does not physically occur before a Court of Justice; for example, committal proceedings fall within this category. Explanation III states that an investigation ordered by a Court of Justice and carried out under the authority of that Court also represents a stage of a judicial proceeding, regardless of whether the investigation takes place before the Court; this includes inquiries conducted by officers appointed by Courts of Justice, such as on‑site surveys of land boundaries.

These explanations expand the meaning of “judicial proceeding” in section 193 to embrace certain proceedings that a strict reading might otherwise exclude. For the present appeal, the crucial observation is that section 37(4) of the relevant Act classifies a proceeding before an Income‑Tax Officer, conducted under that provision, as a judicial proceeding for the purposes of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, if a person is found to have deliberately provided false evidence before an Income‑Tax Officer, that individual becomes subject to the higher penalty prescribed in the first part of section 193.

The discussion then moves to section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is widely recognised as creating an exception to the general rule that any person may lodge a complaint concerning an offence triable under the Code. Section 4(h) of the Code defines a “complaint” as an allegation, either oral or written, presented to a Magistrate with the intention that the Magistrate act under the Code, asserting that some person, known or unknown, has committed an offence, and it expressly excludes a police officer’s report. This definition confirms that any individual may file a complaint about the commission of an offence. Section 190 further requires that the Magistrate who receives such a complaint must take cognizance of it.

The Court explained that, as a general principle, any individual is entitled to lodge a complaint, but Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure creates a specific exception to this rule. Section 195(1) 134‑159 S.C.-45 (b), which is the provision under consideration, stipulates that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the sections listed therein when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in connection with, any proceeding in any Court, unless the complaint is made in writing by that Court or by another Court to which the former Court is subordinate. The sections mentioned in this provision include sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. The practical effect of this provision is that if an alleged offence falls under section 193 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and it is asserted that the offence arose out of a proceeding in any Court, then cognizance of the complaint will be taken only if the Court in which the proceeding occurred, or a Court subordinate to it, files a written complaint. Consequently, a private individual cannot make a complaint regarding the alleged commission of any of the offences specified in subsection (b) of Section 195(1); this limitation is the plain and ordinary meaning of the provision.

Section 195(2), which was introduced in 1923 when the earlier Section 195 was substantially amended, further clarifies that in clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) the term “Court” embraces Civil, Revenue and Criminal Courts, but expressly excludes a Registrar or Sub‑Registrar appointed under the Indian Registration Act, 1877. The Court noted that it is unnecessary to analyse the full impact of this definition because the present decision will not be based on the proposition that the Income‑tax Officer qualifies as a Revenue Court within the meaning of this sub‑section. The Court did, however, observe that the sub‑section provides an inclusive, though not exhaustive, definition of “Court”, thereby bringing within its scope Civil, Criminal and Revenue Courts while deliberately leaving out Registrars and Sub‑Registrars under the Registration Act.

Turning to the specific matter raised in the present appeal, the Court identified the principal question as whether a proceeding before an Income‑tax Officer, which under the operation of section 37(4) of the Income‑Tax Act must be treated as a judicial proceeding under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, can also be characterised as a proceeding in any Court for the purposes of Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code distinguishes between offences committed in any judicial proceeding and offences committed in non‑judicial proceedings. By contrast, Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not refer to “judicial proceedings” per se, but rather mentions “proceedings in any Court”. The Court therefore observed that the dispute between the parties is confined to this narrow issue: whether a proceeding that qualifies as a judicial proceeding under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code must necessarily be regarded as a proceeding in any Court under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In this appeal the dispute centred on whether a proceeding before an Income‑tax Officer, by virtue of section 37(4) of the Income‑tax Act, should be treated as a “proceeding in any Court” under section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The submissions advanced by the parties were essentially balanced on this point. The Court observed that it was unnecessary to examine how the Income‑tax Officer would have acted under sections 37(1), (2) and (3) of the Act, or what the character of the proceedings before him would have been if subsection (4) had not been introduced. The Court referred to the decision in Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where it had held that a Sales‑tax Officer exercising powers under the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948, was not a Court within the meaning of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and consequently there was no requirement for him to lodge a complaint for the prosecution of a person alleged to have committed an offence under section 471 of the Indian Penal Code. That ruling suggested that, absent section 37(4), the Income‑tax Officer exercising powers under sections 37(1) to (3) would likewise not qualify as a Court under section 195, and therefore the provisions of section 195 would not be attracted. The counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 did not dispute this inference. However, he maintained that the insertion of subsection (4) in 1956 altered the legal position and was intended to bring section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure within the ambit of the proceedings before the Income‑tax Officer. In contrast, the Additional Solicitor‑General argued forcefully that the legislature’s purpose in adding subsection (4) was solely to render the proceedings before the Income‑tax Officer judicial proceedings within the meaning of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and not to subject them to section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The argument was that, had the legislature intended to encompass the Income‑tax Officer’s proceedings within the mischief of section 195, it would have done so in explicit terms. The omission of any reference to the relevant provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure in section 37(4) was therefore viewed as deliberate. Consequently, although the proceeding before the Income‑tax Officer may be characterised as a judicial proceeding under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, it could not be described as a proceeding before a Court, because the Income‑tax Officer does not constitute a Court. To support this position, the Additional Solicitor‑General cited several statutes where the legislature expressly extended the provisions of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to particular proceedings. For example, section 23 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, grants the Commissioner all the powers of a civil court and, by an amendment in 1929, deems the Commissioner to be a civil court for all purposes of section 195 and Chapter 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The argument advanced was that where the legislature intended to apply section 195 to the Commissioner’s proceedings under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it chose to make a specific and express provision to that effect. Similar explicit provisions are found in section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and in section 11(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which confer upon the authorities named therein powers equivalent to those of a civil court. The Court noted that these examples demonstrated the legislature’s practice of making an explicit provision whenever it wished to extend the scope of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court observed that the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, expressly provided that the Commissioner possessed the powers of a civil court for the purposes indicated in the statute, and that an amendment made in 1929 further declared the Commissioner to be deemed a civil court for all purposes of section 195 and Chapter 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court explained that the argument put forward was that whenever the legislature intended to extend the provisions of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to proceedings before the Commissioner under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it felt compelled to insert a specific and express provision to that effect. A comparable provision, the Court noted, existed in section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (No. 4 of 1936). In the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947), the situation was similar to that in the Workmen’s Compensation Act; section 11(4) conferred on the authorities specified therein powers that were vested in a civil court with respect to the matters mentioned. The Court further recorded that in 1950 a subsection (8) was added to section II, providing that every Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal would be deemed a civil court for the purposes of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This scheme, the Court said, demonstrated, as argued by the Additional Solicitor‑General, that when the legislature wished to deem any tribunal or authority a court, it employed explicit and appropriate language. Section 45 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (No. 31 of 1950) similarly granted the Custodian powers of a civil court and expressly added that proceedings before the Custodian would be deemed judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, and that the Custodian would be deemed a court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court pointed out that the same provision was reproduced in section 17 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 (Act 64 of 1951) and in section 26 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (No. 44 of 1954). On the other hand, the Court noted that section 51 of the Minister‑General’s Act, 1913 (No. 3 of 1913) provided that anyone who, during any examination authorized by that Act, knowingly made a false statement on oath would be deemed to have intentionally given false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding. The argument concerning this provision, the Court said, was that the legislature intended to equate the proceedings under that Act with judicial proceedings under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and did not intend to make section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable, because the provision did not declare the authority under the Act to be a court, nor did it, in terms, extend the provisions of section 195 to the proceedings before such an authority. The Court observed that a similar comment had been made regarding the provisions of section 171A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (No. 8 of 1878). Thus, the Court concluded that the argument, while attractive, could not be dismissed as lacking substance.

In this case the Court noted that the expression “judicial proceeding” is not defined in the Indian Penal Code, but a definition is provided by section 4(m) of the Criminal Procedure Code. That provision states that “judicial proceeding” includes any proceeding in which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. The Court further observed that the term “Court” is likewise undefined by either the Criminal Procedure Code or the Indian Penal Code. However, section 20 of the Indian Penal Code defines “Court of Justice” as a judge empowered by law to act judicially alone, or a body of judges empowered by law to act judicially as a body when such judge or body is acting in a judicial capacity. In addition, section 3 of the Evidence Act defines “Court” to include all judges and magistrates and all persons, except arbitrators, who are legally authorised to take evidence. The Court acknowledged that, on a preliminary view, there is some force in the contention that it would be unreasonable to assume that every judicial proceeding is automatically a proceeding before a Court. Consequently, the appellant was permitted to argue that, although a proceeding before an Income‑tax Officer may qualify as a judicial proceeding under section 193, I.P.C., that does not necessarily mean that the proceeding is a proceeding in a Court as required by section 195(i)(b), Cr. P.C. The Court found it noteworthy that section 193, I.P.C., speaks of a judicial proceeding, whereas section 195, Cr. P.C., refers to a proceeding in any Court and does not qualify the term with “judicial”. Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Desai, contended that when sections 193, I.P.C., and 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C., are read together, it is not unreasonable to hold that proceedings described as judicial under the former should be treated as proceedings in any Court under the latter. The Court explained that the legislative purpose of prescribing a higher sentence for offences committed at any stage of a judicial proceeding appears to be the view that such offences are more serious in character, and therefore the legislature distinguished them from similar offences occurring at other stages of different proceedings. According to the argument, while providing for a harsher penalty for this more serious class of offences, the legislature intended to incorporate a safeguard concerning complaints about those offences, and that safeguard is found in section 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C. In other words, an offence that the first paragraph of section 193, I.P.C., treats as more serious because it occurs during a judicial proceeding should be regarded, for the purposes of section 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C., as an offence committed in any proceeding in any Court. On the basis of this line of reasoning, the Court indicated that it is necessary to examine whether an Income‑tax Officer can be regarded as a Court, since the substance of the contention is that, as soon as section 37(4) of the Act was enacted, the proceedings before the Income‑tax Officer became judicial proceedings for the purpose of section 193, I.P.C., and therefore, if the Officer is not a Court, the protection offered by section 195(1)(b), Cr. P.C., would not apply.

Section 37(4) of the Act was enacted, thereby making the proceedings before an Income‑tax Officer judicial proceedings for the purpose of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and because these proceedings fall within the first paragraph of that section, they attract the protection of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the Court’s view, the argument supporting this construction possesses considerable strength, and overall the Court is inclined to adopt the interpretation advanced by Mr. Desai rather than the position presented by the learned Additional Solicitor‑General. The Additional Solicitor‑General correctly relied on the relevant provisions of several statutes to support his construction, and where certain provisions in those statutes appear to extend the application of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the proceedings involved, his argument does obtain some support. However, the Court hesitates to conclude that the omission of any reference to section 195(1)(b) in section 37(4) of the Act necessarily indicates that the legislature intended merely to prescribe a higher sentence for an offence under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code when committed before an Income‑tax Officer. It is clear that if the Additional Solicitor‑General’s argument were accepted, any person could lodge a complaint such as the present one, and if the alleged offence were proved, the accused would be liable to the higher penalty prescribed in the first paragraph of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, without the safeguard that section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides. The Court therefore doubts that the legislature would have intended to make an offence committed during a proceeding before an Income‑tax Officer more serious without providing a corresponding safeguard for complaints that might be filed in that regard. The answer to that question, in the Court’s opinion, must be negative.

Consequently, after careful consideration, the Court has concluded that the view taken by the Bombay High Court should be upheld, although for reasons different from those originally expressed by that Court. Section 37(4) of the Act makes the proceedings before the Income‑tax Officer judicial proceedings under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and these judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any Court for the purpose of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court believes that this interpretation faithfully carries out the legislative intention behind section 37(4). Another factor influencing this conclusion is the observation that section 37(4) also brings the proceedings before the Income‑tax Officer within the meaning of section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 228 deals with the offence of intentionally causing insult or interruption to a public servant who is sitting in a judicial proceeding. Clearly, the offence described in section 228 is an offence committed against a public servant engaged in a judicial proceeding, and this connection further supports the view that the protections of section 195(1)(b) should apply to complaints arising from such proceedings before an Income‑tax Officer.

Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code defines the offence of intentionally insulting or causing interruption to a public servant who is sitting in a judicial proceeding. This provision is listed among the sections referred to in subsection (b) of clause (1) of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires that any complaint relating to an offence alleged under section 228 must be filed by the court concerned. Consequently, if an individual insults a public servant who is engaged in a judicial proceeding, or creates an interruption while the servant is presiding at any stage of that proceeding, the complaint must originate from the public servant himself, as mandated by section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Before the enactment of section 37(4) of the Income‑Tax Act, an insult directed at an Income‑Tax Officer or any interruption of his proceedings would not have qualified as an offence under section 228 of the Penal Code. However, section 37(4) now characterises a proceeding before an Income‑Tax Officer as a proceeding under section 228, thereby rendering any interruption of his proceedings or insult directed at him punishable under that provision. The question arises whether the legislature intended that, unlike the usual requirement that a complaint in such cases must be lodged by the public servant himself, an insult or interruption occurring in the context of proceedings before an Income‑Tax Officer could be cognisable on the complaint of a private party. The Court observed that accepting the construction suggested by the Additional Solicitor‑General would create a glaring inconsistency, and therefore found the alternative argument advanced by counsel Desai and upheld by the Bombay High Court—an argument that avoids this anomaly—to be more reasonable and more in line with the legislature’s true intention.

Accordingly, the Court declined to accept the appellant’s contention that the Bombay High Court erred in dismissing his complaint on the ground that the condition precedent under section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been satisfied because no complaint had been filed by the Income‑Tax Officer. The Court noted that, in the decision reported as In re: Punam Chand Maneklal (1), the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court had held that an Income‑Tax Collector constituted a Revenue Court within the meaning of clauses (b) and (c) of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Justice Scott, speaking for the Full Bench, observed that it could not be argued that the Income‑Tax Collector was a civil or criminal court; therefore, he confined his analysis to the narrow issue of whether the Collector was a Revenue Court. Examining the functions of the Income‑Tax Collector under Act 11 of 1886, the Full Bench concluded that the Collector was indeed a Revenue Court. The Court further recorded that the Full Bench rejected the contention that the Collector could be treated as a Registrar or Sub‑Registrar under the Registration Act, thereby affirming the position that the Income‑Tax Officer was not a court within the meaning of the provisions relied upon by the appellant.

In reviewing the matter, the Court observed that the Bombay High Court had largely based its decision on the earlier Full Bench judgment in In re: Punam Chand Maneklal, using that authority to overturn the finding of the Presidency Magistrate and to order that the complaint filed by the appellant be dismissed. The Court noted that it was unnecessary to revisit whether the Full Bench’s view in that earlier case was correct, because the provisions of the Income‑tax Act had been substantially altered by the 1922 amendment, which introduced new considerations. Consequently, the Court held that it could no longer be said that an Income‑tax Officer qualified as a Revenue Court, and furthermore, the appellant’s counsel had not raised any argument that the Officer was a Revenue Court. For these reasons, the appeal was deemed to fail and was dismissed.

DAS GUPTA, J. examined the central issue of whether an Income‑tax Officer appointed under the Indian Income‑tax Act, 1922, could be regarded as a court within the meaning of clause (b) of sub‑section (1) of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant had lodged a complaint on 24 November 1949 before the Presidency Magistrate in Bombay, alleging that the respondent, Mulji Manilal Kamdar, had deliberately given false answers while being examined on commission by the Income‑tax Officer of the Jamnagar Circle. The appellant sought the issuance of a process against the respondent so that the false statements could be dealt with according to law. The accused objected, contending that, because no complaint had been filed by the Income‑tax Officer—who purportedly made the false statement—the Magistrate was barred from taking cognizance. That objection rested on the argument that the Income‑tax Officer was a court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b). The Presidency Magistrate rejected this objection.

Subsequently, the appellant appealed the Magistrate’s order to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The High Court, considering itself bound by the Full Bench decision in In re: Punam Chand Maneklal and by the later judgment in State v. Nemchand Peshvir, held that an Income‑tax Officer conducting proceedings under section 23 of the Income‑tax Act, 1922, was a Revenue Court for the purposes of clause (b) of sub‑section (1) of section 195. The appellant challenged this view before the present Court, relying on a certificate issued by the High Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The Court noted that section 195(1)(b) belongs to a group of provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure that create specific exceptions to the general rule that criminal proceedings may be instituted by any person. Together with sections 196, 196A, 197, 197A, 198, 198A and 199, section 195 delineates particular classes of offences and the circumstances in which a court may take cognizance only upon a written complaint from a designated authority.

Section 198A and Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, together with Section 195, create specific exceptions to the general rule that any person may institute criminal proceedings. Section 195, in its first sub‑section, enumerates offences for which no court may take cognizance except upon receipt of a written complaint from designated persons. The provision divides the offences into three classes, labelled (a), (b) and (c). Sub‑section (a) covers offences punishable under sections 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code and requires that a court may only take cognizance of such offences on a written complaint filed by the public servant concerned or by a public servant who is subordinate to him. Sub‑section (b) deals with offences punishable under sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, and provides that when any of these offences is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, cognizance may be taken only on a written complaint from that court or from another court to which the first court is subordinate. Sub‑section (c) concerns offences punishable under sections 463, 471, 475 and 476 and states that when such an offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any court in respect of any document produced or given in evidence, cognizance may be taken only on a written complaint from that court or from a court subordinate to it. The second sub‑section of Section 195 clarifies that, for the purposes of clauses (b) and (c) of the first sub‑section, the term “court” includes civil, revenue or criminal courts, but expressly excludes a registrar or sub‑registrar under the Indian Registration Act, 1877. In the present appeal, the Court examined clause (b) of Section 195(1). The appellant’s complaint before the magistrate alleged that an offence under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code had been committed during the oath‑bound examination conducted by Income‑tax Officer Ward A of the Jamnagar Circle, Jamnagar. That examination was part of assessment proceedings against the complainant for the fiscal years 1949‑50 and 1950‑51. The essential question, therefore, was whether the Income‑tax Officer should be regarded as a “court” within the meaning of Section 195(1)(b). If the Income‑tax Officer is a court, the magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the alleged offence except on a written complaint filed by the Income‑tax Officer. The determination of the officer’s status required reference to Section 5 of the Income‑tax Act, 1922, which classifies six categories of Income‑tax authorities for purposes of the Act. The principal function of an Income‑tax Officer is the assessment of income that is chargeable to tax under section 3 of the Act and the calculation of the tax payable on that income. The officer also performs other functions that are subsidiary or ancillary to the principal assessment function. Section 5(7) of the Act makes clear that Income‑tax Officers are subordinate to the Director of Inspection, the Commissioner of Income‑tax and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax, who exercise authority over the jurisdictions in which the officers operate.

The judgment explained that the Income‑tax Officer, together with the Commissioner of Income‑tax and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax who exercise jurisdiction within their respective territories, must obey the orders, instructions and directions issued by the Central Board of Revenue as mandated by section 5(8) of the Income‑tax Act, 1922. Chapter III of that Act enumerates the various heads of income—profits and gains—that are liable to tax and delineates the duties that the Income‑tax Officer must perform in order to assess the taxable income. For example, the Act provides that deductions under section 7(2)(iia) for conveyances owned by or used by the assessee for employment purposes shall be an amount that the Income‑tax Officer may estimate. Similarly, the allowances permissible under section 10(2)(i) shall be an amount that the Income‑tax Officer may determine, and the allowances under section 10(2)(ix) relating to loans made in the ordinary course of business shall be a sum that the Income‑tax Officer may estimate to be irrecoverable. Moreover, the allowances mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 10(4)(a) cannot be granted if, in the opinion of the Income‑tax Officer, such an allowance is excessive or unreasonable. The proviso to section 10(5) obliges the Income‑tax Officer to satisfy himself, in the cases covered by that provision, whether the principal purpose of the transfer of assets was to reduce income‑tax liability, and provides that, if that is the case, the actual cost of the assets shall be an amount that the Income‑tax Officer may determine. Additional sections that require the Income‑tax Officer either to be satisfied or to form an opinion for assessment purposes include sections 12(a), 13 and 17.

Chapter IV of the Act sets out the procedural requirements for making an assessment and imposes, among other duties, the obligation to call for returns of income under section 22, to assess income and determine the amount payable by the assessee under section 23, to exercise the power to assess companies for a super‑tax under section 23A, and to make a provisional assessment before a regular assessment under section 23B. To fulfil these functions effectively, the Income‑tax Officer must be empowered to examine documents and examine persons. Such powers are conferred upon the Income‑tax Officer, as well as certain other Income‑tax authorities, by section 37 of the Act. The first subsection of that section provides that the Income‑tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal shall, for the purposes of the Act, possess the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit with respect to the following matters: (a) discovery and inspection; (b) enforcing the attendance of any person, including any officer of a banking company, and examining that person on oath; (c) compelling the production of books of account and other documents; and (d) issuing summons.

In this part of the judgment, the Court described the powers granted by the second, third and fourth subsections of the provision. The second subsection authorises an Income‑tax Officer who has been specially authorised by the Commissioner to enter any building, to conduct a search and to seize books of account and other documents. The third subsection provides that the Income‑tax Officer may, after complying with a prescribed procedure, impound or retain those books and documents. The fourth subsection does not create any new power; nevertheless the respondent has relied heavily upon it, and the Court indicated that it will be examined in detail later in the judgment. From the brief description of the functions of an Income‑tax Officer, the Court observed that the officer forms a part of the executive organ of the State. Although the officer is endowed, for the purpose of performing certain executive functions, with powers that are comparable to those of a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, this does not transform the officer into a limb of the judicial organ. The Court noted that jurisprudence has described the officer as a quasi‑judicial authority, but that characterisation alone is insufficient to deem the officer a court. To be a court, the officer must be shown to belong to the judicial organ of the State, and apart from the question of section 37(4), the Court found no basis to regard an Income‑tax Officer as a court. The Court further stated that it was unnecessary to refer to the many decisions of the High Courts, this Court or the Privy Council on the definition of a court, because most of those authorities had already been considered in a recent decision of this Court in Jagannath Prosad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where the question was whether a Sales Tax Officer was a court within the meaning of section 195(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In that case the Court held that a Sales Tax Officer is not a court. The reasons articulated by Kapur J. in that judgment are likewise applicable to the present question concerning the Income‑tax Officer; consequently, if those reasons are accepted, the Income‑tax Officer must also be held not to be a court unless a different conclusion is justified by the provisions of section 37(4) of the Act. The Court also referred to the observations of the Constitution Bench in Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand, where the issue was whether a Conciliation Officer appointed under clause 29 of the Government Order framed under sections 3 and 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act constituted a “Tribunal” within the meaning of article 136 of the Constitution. The Bench held that such an officer was not a tribunal. The Court cited this as an illustration of other authorities whose primary function is administrative even though they may be required to act judicially.

In this case, the Court quoted Justice Shah, speaking for the Court, who observed that a statutory duty to act judicially does not automatically give an authority the judicial power of the State. He explained that many administrative or executive bodies are required by their constitution to decide questions affecting citizens’ rights in a judicial manner. He listed Boards of Revenue, Customs Authorities, Motor Vehicles Authorities, Income‑tax Officers and Sales‑Tax Officers as typical examples of such administrative bodies. Although these bodies have a duty to act judicially, either because their statutes expressly command it, because of regulations made under those statutes, or because of implications of the statutes or the powers granted to them, the Court held that they are not delegates of the State’s judicial power. Their primary role remains administrative rather than judicial. The Court cited two authorities, identified as (1) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 242 and (2) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850, to support this view.

The Court noted that the specific issue of whether an Income‑tax Officer constitutes a court or a tribunal was not directly decided in Jaswant Sugar Mills case (1). Nevertheless, the Court explained that in reaching its conclusion that a Conciliation Officer under clause 29 of the Government Order was not a Tribunal, it was also of the opinion that an Income‑tax Officer is not a Tribunal. The Court further reasoned that an entity that is not even a Tribunal cannot be regarded as a court.

Counsel for the respondent did not dispute the observation that, considering the functions of an Income‑tax Officer, it is difficult to classify the Officer as a court, especially after the decision in Jagannath Prasad’s case referenced earlier. The respondent’s principal argument was that, although the Income‑tax Officer was not originally a court within the meaning of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the deeming provision contained in section 37(4) of the Act had transformed the Officer into a court. Section 37(4) states: “Any proceeding before any authority referred to in this section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

The authorities listed in that provision are the Income‑tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal. Consequently, subsection 4 of section 37 makes proceedings before an Income‑tax Officer “deemed to be judicial proceedings” as defined in sections 193 and 228 and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court observed that the provision makes no reference to section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. When Parliament introduced this deeming provision in 1956, it did not consider it necessary to extend the deeming to cover section 195. The Court suggested that, had Parliament intended to deem the authorities as courts for the purposes of section 195, it would have included explicit language to that effect, which it did not.

In order to make the authorities listed in the section be treated as a court under section 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it would have been logical for Parliament to insert language such as “and shall be deemed to be a court within the meaning of section 195(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,” or “shall be deemed to be a court for the purpose of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,” or comparable wording. The fact that no such expression was included is striking, particularly because earlier statutes before 1956 show that Parliament did employ explicit language when it intended a specific authority to function as a court for the purposes of section 195. For example, the Payment of Wages Act of 1936, in section 18, first declared that every authority appointed under subsection (1) of section 15 would possess all the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure for certain purposes, and then added the sentence “every such authority shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.” Similarly, section 23 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which gave the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was amended in 1929 to read “and the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of section 195 and of Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.” It is also noteworthy that several other statutes contain a two‑step formulation: after declaring that a proceeding constitutes a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, the legislation proceeds to state that, for certain purposes, the authority is also deemed to be a court. The Evacuee Property Act of 1950, after observing that an enquiry by the custodian is a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, further provided that “the Custodian shall be deemed to be a court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.” A comparable provision appears in section 17 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951, where, after noting that any proceeding before the competent officer or the appellate officer is a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, the statute adds that “the competent Officer or the appellate officer shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.” The Displaced Persons’ (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 employs almost identical wording in section 26, reinforcing the pattern that Parliament habitually used explicit deeming language when it intended an authority to function as a court for the purposes of section 195.

Section 1 of the Act confers on each officer appointed under the Act the same powers with respect to certain specified matters as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, for the purpose of conducting any enquiry or hearing any appeal that may arise under the Act. The provision then declares that any proceeding before any such officer shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code, and that every such officer shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. In a similar fashion, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides in subsection (3) of section 11 that every enquiry or investigation carried out by a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. The same section further contains subsection (8), inserted in 1950, which adds that every Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1892. In clear contrast with these statutes are those that, after stating that certain proceedings shall be judicial proceedings, stop short of declaring that the authority conducting the proceedings shall be deemed to be a court. One such example is the Sea Customs Act, where section 171A(4) provides that every enquiry made under that section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and makes no further declaration about the status of the enquiring authority. A somewhat similar provision, although expressed in different language, appears in section 51 of the Administrator‑General’s Act, 1913, which states: “Whoever, during any examination authorised by this Act, makes upon oath a statement which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, shall be deemed to have intentionally given false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding.”

The solicitor‑general, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, strongly argued that if the legislature had ever intended that the income‑tax officer or other authorities mentioned in section 37 be deemed to be a court for the purpose of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it would have expressed that intention in clear and unambiguous language. Counsel further observed that when, in 1956, the old section 37 was completely rewritten, Parliament at that time possessed a well‑established pattern of legislative drafting, as demonstrated by the numerous statutes previously cited. This established pattern showed a consistent practice of expressly stating when an authority was to be deemed a court for the purposes of section 195 or any other provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, counsel submitted that there could be no conceivable reason for Parliament to omit such language if the intention had indeed been to deem the authority a court, and that the absence of an express declaration should be interpreted as an indication that the legislature did not intend to create that legal status.

In this matter, the Court observed that the legislative pattern previously discussed possessed considerable persuasive force. The Court noted that counsel representing the accused‑respondent, Mr. Desai, contended that the specific language employed in the statute – namely, the phrase “that proceeding before the authority shall be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code” – was by itself sufficient to demonstrate an intention that the authority should also be deemed a court for the purposes of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The counsel further argued that, according to the definition of a judicial proceeding in s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, such a proceeding could occur only before a court. The Court found no support for this proposition in either legal principle or established authority. On the contrary, the Court held that proceedings before tribunals that are quasi‑judicial in nature and not courts may rightly be classified as judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court pointed out that although the expression “judicial proceeding” appears in many sections of the Indian Penal Code, the Code itself does not provide a definition of the term, even though it defines “court of justice” and “a judge.” By contrast, the Code of Criminal Procedure defines “judicial proceeding” in s. 4(m) as “any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath.” This definition has been part of the Code of Criminal Procedure since its inception in 1898. The Court emphasized that the absence of a definition of “judicial proceeding” in the Indian Penal Code for more than a century suggests that the term should be given the same meaning as that supplied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, it would be reasonable to understand the phrase in the Indian Penal Code to include any proceeding in which evidence may be taken on oath. Such an interpretation would bring within the scope of “judicial proceeding” many quasi‑judicial authorities that are not courts, for example a Customs Officer or a Sales Tax Officer. The Court stated that it is unnecessary for the present purpose to formulate an exact definition of “judicial proceeding” as used in s. 193 or any other provision of the Indian Penal Code. Nevertheless, even without a precise definition, the phrase is sufficiently broad to encompass not only proceedings before courts but also proceedings before certain tribunals. Finally, the Court remarked that if a proceeding before any authority other than a court could not be regarded as a judicial proceeding under s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, Parliament would not have found it necessary to enact provisions such as those in the Evacuee Property Act, 1950, which treat such proceedings as judicial.

The Property Act, 1950, the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1950, and the Displaced Persons' (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, each added a clause. The clause first declared that proceedings before certain authorities were to be considered judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. After that declaration, the clause further provided that the authority would be deemed a civil court for particular purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court found it especially noteworthy to examine the provisions of sections 11(3) and 11(8) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which had been previously mentioned. When section 11(3) was originally enacted, it declared that every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court or Tribunal was deemed a judicial proceeding under sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Parliament later added subsection (8) to the same section, stipulating that every Tribunal would be deemed a civil court for the purposes of sections 480 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. The amendment enacted by Act 36 of 1956 revised the wording of section 11(3). It now provided that every enquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal was deemed a judicial proceeding under sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. The same Act also amended section 8, replacing the term “Tribunal” with the words “Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal”. Despite the inclusion of Boards within the definition of judicial proceedings, Parliament deliberately omitted any provision that would deem a Board to be a civil court. This omission applied to the purposes of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court interpreted this legislative pattern as indicating that Parliament did not intend that deeming a proceeding a judicial proceeding automatically made the authority a court. Consequently, the Court held that claiming section 37(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act intended to deem the specified authorities as civil courts under section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was improper. The Court reasoned that such a claim would attribute to Parliament an intention that it never expressed. Counsel for the accused‑respondent then drew attention to the use of the term “judicial proceeding” in sections 476 and 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The counsel argued that these sections treated the term as equivalent to a proceeding in a court.

In this case the Court observed that the expression “proceeding” had sometimes been used as a synonym for a proceeding that takes place in a court, and it accepted that such an understanding could be correct. The Court noted that Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes the procedure to be followed in cases mentioned in paragraph (b) and paragraph (c) of Section 195(1), where the offences appear to have been committed in, or in connection with, a proceeding that is held in a court. Because the statute itself refers to that proceeding later in the same provision as a “judicial proceeding,” the Court considered that reference to be appropriate. Similarly, Section 479A sets out the procedure for certain offences involving the giving of false evidence in civil, revenue or criminal courts, and it expressly describes the process before those courts as a “judicial proceeding.” The Court found it difficult to accept the argument that the use of the words “judicial proceeding” in these two sections demonstrated that the term could be limited only to proceedings that occur before a court. While it is indisputable that every proceeding that occurs before a court qualifies as a “judicial proceeding,” the Court emphasized that the converse – that every judicial proceeding must be a court proceeding – does not follow. Counsel for the accused, Mr Desai, presented a bleak scenario in which an authority whose proceeding is deemed a judicial proceeding under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code is not simultaneously regarded as a court under Section 195. He correctly pointed out that, under such circumstances, if a person insults or obstructs a public servant while the servant is sitting in that judicial proceeding, the offence under Section 228 would allow individuals other than the public servant himself to commence a criminal prosecution. Mr Desai described this possibility as highly undesirable. The Court expressed no agreement with the view that this outcome is undesirable and, even if it were, the Court held that such a consideration should not compel an expansion of the meaning of “judicial proceeding” beyond what the language conveys. The Court further referred to Section 171A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1874, which declares that every enquiry before a Custom Officer “shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code.” Despite this statutory formulation, the Constitution Bench of this Court, in the recent decision of Indo‑China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. The Additional Collector of Customs, concluded that a Customs Officer is not even a tribunal. Chief Justice Gajendragadkar, speaking for the Court, observed that there is no longer any doubt that a Customs Officer does not constitute a court or a tribunal. Consequently, the Court found it difficult to comprehend how the presence of the words “shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code” in Section 171A(4) could fail to have the effect of rendering a Customs Officer a

The Court noted that, even though section 37(4) of the Indian Income‑tax Act contains wording similar to that found in other statutes, such wording does not automatically render an Income‑tax Officer a court or a tribunal. It further held that the specific expression used in section 37(4) of the Income‑tax Act offers no basis for altering the well‑settled legal position which, when the functions of an Income‑tax Officer are examined, shows that he is not a court within the meaning of section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the Court declared that it would allow the appeal, set aside the order that had been passed by the High Court, and direct that the Presidency Magistrate of Bombay should now dispose of the case in accordance with law. In the final order, the Court recorded that, consistent with the view expressed by the majority of the judges, the appeal was deemed to have failed and was consequently dismissed. The direction to the Presidency Magistrate required the magistrate to apply the appropriate legal provisions and to pass any orders necessary to resolve the matter fully. All parties were instructed to comply with the subsequent orders and to proceed without further delay. The judgment was reported in [1964] 6 S.C.R. 594.