Kumaranand vs Brij Mohan Lal

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 644 of 1964

Decision Date: 24 August, 1964

Coram: J.C. Shah, P.B. Gajendragadkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

The case was Kumaranand versus Brij Mohan Lal and was decided on the twenty‑fourth of August, 1964 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice J.C. Shah, and the bench was composed of Justice J.C. Shah, Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner in the proceedings was Kumaranand and the respondent was Brij Mohan Lal. The official citation for the decision is 1965 AIR 628 and 1965 SCR (1) 116, with a citator reference of D 1968 SC 300 (10). The matter arose under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (forty‑three of 1951), specifically under section 119‑A, which deals with the requirement of a security deposit for an election petition or appeal. The issue before the Court concerned whether the appeal should be dismissed because the appellant had not complied with the statutory requirement concerning the deposit.

According to the headnote, the respondent filed a petition challenging the election of the appellant to the State Legislative Assembly. The Election Tribunal, after hearing the petition, declared the election void under section 100(1)(b) of the Representation of the People Act. The appellant then appealed the Tribunal’s order to the High Court of Rajasthan. Instead of attaching a receipt from the Government Treasury showing that a deposit of five hundred rupees had been paid to the Election Commission, the appellant’s counsel tendered the same amount directly to the office of the Registrar of the High Court. The registrar accepted the payment and recorded it as a “security deposit” in the appellant’s name. At the hearing, the respondent argued that the appellant’s failure to produce a Government Treasury receipt meant that the appeal was not maintainable. The High Court agreed with the respondent, held that the appellant had not complied with the requirements of section 119‑A, and consequently dismissed the appeal as incompetent.

In the present appeal by special leave, the Supreme Court held that a failure to comply with the procedural requirements of section 119‑A does not automatically compel dismissal of an appeal, because the statute does not prescribe a specific penalty for such non‑compliance. The Court observed that it possessed jurisdiction, given the circumstances, either to allow rectification of the procedural defect or to refuse to proceed with the appeal that failed to meet the statutory conditions. The Court further concluded that the High Court erred by not taking into account the conduct of the registrar’s office in accepting the deposit of costs and by ignoring the defective presentation of the appeal, both of which contributed to the procedural irregularity. The Court referred to the precedent set in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, [1954] S.C.R. 892, in support of its reasoning. The judgment was rendered under the civil appellate jurisdiction, specifically Civil Appeal No. 644 of 1964, which was filed by special leave against the judgment and order dated twenty‑fifth of February, 1964, of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Election Appeal No. 93 of 1963. Counsel for the appellant was R. K. Garg, while counsel for the respondent was B. D. Sharma.

In this case the judgment was delivered by Justice Shah. The facts began with the general elections held in February 1962, when the appellant, Kumaranand, stood for election to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly from the Beawar constituency and was returned as the successful candidate. The opposing candidate, Brij Mohan Lal, subsequently filed an election petition asserting that Kumaranand had engaged in corrupt practices as defined in section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The alleged corrupt practice consisted of the publication of a poem that contained false statements about Brij Mohan Lal’s personal character and conduct, statements that were deemed highly prejudicial to Lal’s chances of election. The Election Tribunal examined the petition and, invoking section 100(1)(b) of the Act, declared Kumaranand’s election to be void. Dissatisfied with that decision, Kumaranand appealed to the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur. During the hearing of that appeal, the respondent Brij Mohan Lal contended, among other points, that Kumaranand had failed to attach to his memorandum of appeal a Government Treasury receipt evidencing a deposit of five hundred rupees made in favour of the Election Commission as security for the costs of the appeal. On the basis of that omission, Lal argued that the appeal could not be maintained. The High Court examined the provisions of section 119A of the Representation of the People Act and concluded that Kumaranand had indeed not complied with the statutory requirement to enclose the required receipt. Consequently, the Court held the appeal to be incompetent. The appellant sought condonation of any delay in filing the appeal under the proviso to section 116A(3) and also requested that the Court permit rectification of the defect by allowing the deposit receipt to be submitted. The High Court declined both requests and dismissed the appeal. The appellant then obtained special leave to approach this Court. For the record, the relevant statutory provision, section 119A, was introduced by section 64 of Act 27 of 1956 and later amended by Act 58 of 1958. That provision obliges every person who files an appeal under Chapter IVA to attach to the memorandum a Government Treasury receipt showing that a deposit of five hundred rupees has been made either in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India in favour of the Election Commission as security for the appeal costs. In place of the prescribed receipt, the appellant, through his counsel Vijay Chandra Mehta, tendered on 21 October 1963 an amount of rupees 

In this case the appellant tendered five hundred rupees in the office of the Registrar of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, Jaipur Bench, on 21 October 1963. The amount was accepted by the Registrar and was entered in the records as a “security deposit” in the name of the appellant. The tender form prepared by the Registrar recorded the original tender as 771 dated 21‑10‑63 and referred to Register‑Receipt‑Document No. 239 dated 31‑10‑63. The form contained specific instructions for the applicant to complete columns one to four accurately. Column 1 required the name of the party on whose behalf the money was tendered, which was entered as “Shri Kumaranand.” Column 2 required the name of the parties and the number of the suit, which was entered as “Kumaranand v. Brij Mohan Lal D. B. Election appeal/63.” Column 3 asked for the nature of payment, which was noted as “Security Deposits.” Column 4 required the amount tendered, which was shown as “Rs. 500 (Rs. Five hundred only).” The form also contained a line stating “Office report – May be deposited,” which was signed by Vijay Chandra Mehta, whose signature appeared partially illegible, dated 21‑10‑63, and endorsed by the cashier. The receipt was entered in the register under R.R.D. No. 239 on 31‑10‑63, with a credit entry referencing S.B. Ch. No. 157/54 dated 21‑10‑63, and was signed by the receiving officer, Mohammed Haji, on 31‑10‑63. A note indicated that the entry should be filed with the record, and the accountant, Prem Raj, signed the document on 31‑10‑63.

The Court observed that the language of the tender clearly indicated that the five hundred rupees had been deposited in the High Court as a “security deposit” for the proceeding titled “Election appeal Kumaranand v. Brij Mohan Lal.” The cashier’s endorsement on the form stated that the amount “may be deposited,” and the receipt was subsequently entered in the register and ordered by the accountant to be filed with the case record. However, the Court held that this method of deposit did not satisfy the requirements of section 119A of the Representation of the People Act. The tender form did not show that the deposit was made in a Government Treasury in favour of the Election Commission, nor did it indicate that the Election Commission had control over the amount or that the sum would be payable on a proper application made to the Commission. Section 121, insofar as it is relevant, provides that when a direction for payment of costs is made under Part VI, such costs must be paid out of the security deposit and any further security deposit made by the party, upon a written application to the Election Commission by the person to whose favour the costs have been awarded. Section 119A was enacted to secure the costs of the successful party by requiring the deposit to be placed in a Government Treasury in favour of the Election Commission so that the Commission could disburse the amount to the entitled person. The Court noted that the failure to comply with the specific procedural requirements of section 119A did not automatically lead to dismissal of the appeal, because the Act does not prescribe an express penalty for non‑compliance with that section.

In this case, the Court noted that the Act did not prescribe any explicit penalty for a failure to meet the requirements of section 119A. By contrast, section 90(3) obliges the Tribunal to dismiss an election petition that does not comply with sections 81 or 82, even if the Election Commission itself had not dismissed the petition under section 85. No similar sanction exists for non‑compliance with section 119A. The Court further observed that, when section 90 was first enacted, clause (4) dealt with failure to comply with the provisions of section 117. Section 117 required a petitioner to attach a Government Treasury receipt showing that a deposit of two thousand rupees had been made either in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India in favor of the Election Commission as security for the petition’s costs. Clause (4) therefore allowed the Tribunal to dismiss an election petition in such circumstances. This clause was later altered and renumbered as clause (3) by Act 27 of 1956, and the amendment expressly stated that the Tribunal shall dismiss a petition that does not satisfy, among other requirements, the provisions of section 117. However, the amendment made by Act 40 of 1961 removed the reference to section 117. The Legislature’s changes demonstrate a deliberate distinction: for certain statutory defaults the Election Tribunal is required to dismiss the petition, whereas a default in complying with section 119A does not attract any dismissal penalty.

The Court then referred to the decision in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh and Ors., where Chief Justice Mahajan observed that the general rule is that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed, and that an election contest is a purely statutory proceeding, not an action at law or a suit in equity, and therefore the Court possesses no common‑law power over it. He added that natural‑justice principles demand that the success of a candidate who has won an election should not be lightly disturbed, and any petition seeking such interference must strictly follow the law’s requirements. However, Mahajan clarified that these propositions do not apply when the special law itself authorises a tribunal to proceed with a petition according to a prescribed procedure and does not specify the consequence of non‑compliance with those procedural rules. In situations where election law does not prescribe a penalty for a procedural defect, the tribunal’s jurisdiction to try the case remains unaffected. Consequently, the Court posed the remaining question: whether, in instances of failure to comply with the requirements of section 119A, the High Court possessed jurisdiction to intervene.

In order to correct the error made in depositing the security for costs, the court recorded that an amount of five hundred rupees had indeed been intended by the appellant and had actually been deposited as security for the respondent’s costs, although the tender labelled the payment with the somewhat inappropriate heading “security deposit.” The counsel appearing for the appellant before the High Court failed to appreciate properly the scope of the amendment introduced by Act 56 of 1956, which had incorporated section 119A. He proceeded as though the matter were an ordinary civil appeal in which the law required the deposit of security for costs to be made directly in the court. By not acquainting himself with the statutory provisions governing the proper lodgement of the memorandum of appeal, the counsel acted negligently; if that negligence alone were the only factor influencing the disposal of the appeal, the order of the High Court would not have been subject to interference. Nevertheless, the High Court had not given due consideration to certain additional factors before dismissing the appeal. Because the legislature had prescribed no penalty for failure to comply with the requirements of section 119A, the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the appeal was not forfeited or jeopardised. The appellant, it was true, could not disregard the statutory requirement that a Government Treasury receipt for the required amount, in favour of the Election Commission as security for the costs of the appeal, be enclosed. Yet when there is a default in complying with that requirement, it is for the court, in each case, to decide whether to exercise its discretion to proceed after rectifying the mistake or to decline to proceed. In the present matter, as noted earlier, the counsel failed to familiarize himself with the provisions of section 119A, and it was also unfortunate that the office of the Registrar of the High Court shared the counsel’s ignorance. The tender form produced before the High Court plainly disclosed that the sum of five hundred rupees was intended to be deposited as security for the respondent’s costs in the election appeal Kumaranand v. Brij Mohan Lal. Instead of depositing that amount in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank, the amount was deposited in the High Court. The amount was accepted, the receipt was filed with the record, and this was treated as sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 119A. The Deputy Registrar of the High Court accepted the presentation, assigned a number to the appeal, and raised no objection to the procedure followed, which suggests that the Registrar’s office, like the counsel, was misinformed about the statutory requirements imposed by the Representation of the People Act regarding the deposit of security for costs of the appeal.

In this matter the Court observed that the amount deposited under the tender form was intended to serve as security for the costs of the appeal. The Court noted that, had the memorandum of appeal not been accepted by the Registrar’s office because it lacked the receipt required from a Government Treasury, the appellant could have corrected the defect before the appeal proceeded. Nevertheless, the memorandum was accepted, it was assigned a number as an appeal, and a notice of appeal was subsequently issued to the respondent. The objection to the regularity of the procedure was apparently raised before the Court only at the hearing of the appeal. The Court recognised that the counsel for the appellant had been negligent in this regard, a point that could not be denied. At the same time, the Court held that the conduct of the High Court Registrar’s office in accepting a presentation that did not satisfy the statutory requirements of section 119A had largely contributed to the procedural irregularity. The Court reiterated the well‑known principle that it is the duty of the Court to ensure that its own actions do not cause injury to any party. Although the statute did not compel the Court to dismiss an appeal for non‑compliance with section 119A, the Court possessed jurisdiction, considering the circumstances, either to allow the mistake to be rectified or to refuse to proceed with an appeal that failed to meet the statutory conditions. The Court concluded that the High Court had erred in failing to take into account the Registrar’s acceptance of the cost deposit and the defective presentation of the appeal, both of which contributed to the irregular procedure adopted by the appellant. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court should have directed the amount deposited on 21 October 1963 to be placed in the Government Treasury in the name of the Election Commission and that a Government Treasury receipt should have been obtained in favour of the Election Commission as security for the appeal costs. The Court therefore set aside the order of the High Court and directed that the High Court give the appellant an opportunity to rectify the error by securing the appropriate Government Treasury receipt and filing it in the record. After such receipt is filed, the High Court was instructed to proceed to hear the appeal on its merits. The Court further held that the failure to file the Government Treasury receipt did not affect the High Court’s jurisdiction nor render the appeal barred by any limitation rule. Consequently, the appeal was allowed. While the appellant had acted irregularly and somewhat negligently, the respondent was justified in bringing the defect to the attention of the High Court, and even at the hearing the appellant had attempted to justify his actions.

In this case the Court observed that the appellant had acted irregularly and had shown negligence in the conduct of the proceedings. The Court remarked that the respondent was entitled to draw the Court’s attention to the defect in the filing of the appeal and that the appellant’s attempt to justify his action at the hearing was not successful. Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the appellant’s irregular conduct and the respondent’s timely notice of the procedural defect, the Court found that it was appropriate to order the appellant to bear the costs incurred by the respondent in connection with this appeal. The Court further clarified that the costs that had been fixed by the High Court would be treated as the costs of the present appeal and therefore would be recoverable from the appellant. The Court also noted that the cost order of the High Court would be applicable to the present appeal, ensuring that the respondent would be reimbursed for the expenses incurred in defending the petition. Accordingly the Court ordered that the appellant should pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. Having made this determination the Court finally concluded that the appeal was to be allowed.