Kultar Singh vs Mukhtiar Singh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 298 of 1964

Decision Date: 17 April 1964

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

Kultar Singh versus Mukhtiar Singh was decided on 17 April 1964 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was written by Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar and the bench comprised Justices P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, K. C. Das Gupta and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The case is cited as 1965 AIR 141, 1964 SCR (7) 790 and has been referenced in several subsequent reports, including RF 1965 SC 669, R 1970 SC 522, APL 1970 SC 1231, R 1971 SC 1262, RF 1975 SC 290, RF 1975 SC 1612, RF 1975 SC 1788, R 1980 SC 354, R 1985 SC 236 and others. The operative provision was Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), which deals with election petitions alleging publication and distribution of material that appeals to voters on the ground of religion, thereby constituting a corrupt practice.

The respondent challenged the petitioner’s election before the Election Tribunal on the ground that the petition was void because the petitioner had appealed to voters on religious grounds, which the respondent claimed amounted to a corrupt practice. The respondent asserted that the petitioner had conducted seven election meetings and, at each meeting, the petitioner and his supporters urged the electorate to vote for him as the proper representative of the Sikh Panth, claiming that only he could protect the Sikh religion and the Sikh language. Further, the respondent alleged that at five of those seven meetings the petitioner distributed printed posters (exhibits p. 1 to p. 10) that contained a direct appeal to voters to cast their votes on the basis of the petitioner’s religion.

The petitioner denied both sets of allegations. He contested the respondent’s claim that any religious appeal was made at the meetings. Regarding the posters, the petitioner conceded that he was connected with only one of them, Exhibit p. 9, and contended that this particular poster was innocent and its publication and distribution did not fall within the ambit of Section 123(3) of the Act. The Election Tribunal examined these questions and ruled in favor of the respondent on both issues.

On appeal, the High Court reversed the Tribunal’s finding on the first issue. Concerning the posters, the High Court held that all ten posters had indeed been distributed by the petitioner. However, it concluded that, except for Exhibit p. 10, none of the remaining posters violated Section 123(3). The High Court agreed with the Tribunal on Exhibit p. 10, determining that this poster contained an appeal to voters to support the petitioner on religious grounds; consequently, its publication and distribution at election meetings constituted a corrupt practice under Section 123(3) of the Act.

Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that both the Election Tribunal and the High Court had misconstrued the impugned pamphlet. He contended that the conclusions reached by the lower authorities were based on an incorrect interpretation of the material, and that a proper, fair and reasonable construction of the poster would not support a finding of corrupt practice.

In this appeal, the appellant argued that both the Election Tribunal and the Punjab High Court had reached their conclusions by misinterpreting the challenged pamphlet. The Court explained that when a court examines whether a specific appeal made by a candidate falls within the scope of section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, it must not read into the language of the appeal any meaning that cannot be derived from a fair and reasonable construction of the words used. Accordingly, the view adopted by the High Court and the Tribunal was found to conflict with such a construction of the impugned poster. The Court observed that the High Court had failed to analyse the several instances in the poster where the term “Panth” appeared, and it had made no effort to correlate the various sentences containing that word or to determine whether the meaning the High Court assigned to “Panth” was appropriate in each context. The reference made in the poster to the Punjabi Suba was significant because it offered a clue to the intended meaning of “Panth” in that document. The Court concluded that, in this poster, “Panth” did not denote the Sikh religion; consequently, it could not be said that the appellant, by distributing the poster, was urging voters to support him on religious grounds. Moreover, the High Court had disregarded the oral evidence that had been tendered. While the Court agreed that oral evidence generally does not aid in construing the wording of a pamphlet, it held that because the word “Panth” was used six times, its proper interpretation was that it referred to the Akali Dal political party, and in that interpretative context the testimony concerning the popular name by which the Akali Dal was known could be relevant. The Court cited the authorities Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. Hukam Singh (1953) VI, E.L.R. 316 and Baba Gurdit Singh v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon (Indian Election Cases by Doabia, Vol. 1, p. 92) to support this approach. The Court further noted that political controversies discussed at election meetings may incidentally bring language or religion into consideration, but when determining whether a corrupt practice under section 123(3) has occurred, the impugned speech must be examined carefully and always in the context of the relevant political dispute. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court was in error when it concluded that the poster identified as Ext. P. 10 fell within the ambit of section 123(3) of the Act. The Court referred to the earlier decision in Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Partap Singh Daulte, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 183, for support of this finding.

The matter before the Court was a civil appeal, numbered 298 of 1964, filed under the civil appellate jurisdiction. The appeal originated from the judgment and order dated 31 May 1963 issued by the Punjab High Court in First Appeal No. 5‑E of 1962. Counsel for the appellant were Mr M.C. Setalvad and Mr B.P. Maheshwari. Counsel for the respondent were Mr Bawa Shiv Charan Singh, Mr Hardev Singh and Mr Y. Kumar.

The judgment was delivered on 17 April 1964 by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar. The single legal question before the Court, arising on a special leave appeal, was whether the appellant, Kultar Singh, had committed a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (No 43 of 1951), by publishing and distributing a poster identified as Exhibit p. 10 in furtherance of his election. The matter had earlier been examined by the Election Tribunal, which had considered the election petition filed by the respondent, Mukhtiar Singh, challenging the validity of the appellant’s election, and by the Punjab High Court, which had heard the appellant’s appeal against the Tribunal’s decision. Both the Tribunal and the High Court had answered the question against the appellant, and consequently, the appellant’s election had been declared void. The appellant’s counsel argued that the Tribunal’s and the High Court’s conclusions were based on a misreading of the contested pamphlet. Kultar Singh had been elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Dharamkot constituency, defeating his nearest rival, the respondent, by a margin of approximately eight thousand votes. He had contested the election on an Akali Dal ticket, while the respondent had been formally endorsed by the Congress Party. After the declaration of the appellant’s election, the respondent filed an election petition asserting that the election should be set aside because the appellant, for the purpose of securing votes, had appealed to the voters on the basis of his religion, thereby committing a corrupt practice. The petition also claimed that the appellant had appealed to his language and community, but the Court noted that this aspect of the petition was no longer relevant to the present appeal because it had not succeeded. According to the respondent’s allegation, the appellant had addressed seven election meetings held at various locations on different dates, during which he and his supporters allegedly urged voters to elect him as the appropriate representative of the Sikh Panth, contrasting the respondent’s representation of a Hindu‑oriented party, and asserting that the appellant would safeguard the Sikh religion and language. The petition further alleged that at five of those seven meetings the printed posters, exhibits p. 1 through p. 10, had been distributed by the appellant and that those posters contained appeals to voters on the ground of his religion. The appellant denied both sets of allegations. He admitted that election meetings had been held on his behalf and that he and his supporters had addressed them, but he contested the respondent’s claim that any religious appeal was made at those meetings. Regarding the posters, the appellant asserted that he had no involvement with them except for Exhibit p. 9, which he described as an innocent document whose publication and distribution did not attract the provisions of section 123(3) of the Act.

The Court observed that the pleadings raised two principal issues for determination. The first issue concerned whether the speeches alleged to have been delivered by the appellant and his supporters at the election meetings contained any appeal to the electorate to vote for the appellant on the basis of his religion. The second issue related to whether the ten posters identified as Exts. p. I to p. 10 had been published or distributed by the appellant at those election meetings, and, if so, whether any of those posters contained an appeal to the voters on the ground of the appellant’s religion. The Tribunal had answered both questions in favour of the respondent. However, the High Court set aside the Tribunal’s finding on the first issue, holding that the evidence presented by the respondent did not establish that an appeal on religious grounds had been made to the voters at the meetings. Regarding the posters, the High Court concluded that all ten posters had indeed been distributed by the appellant, but it expressed the view that, except for Ext. p. 10, none of the other nine posters violated the provisions of section 123(3). The High Court considered arguments concerning particularly Ext. p. 9 and Ext. p. 10. It rejected the respondent’s contention that Ext. p. 9 amounted to a religious appeal, finding that the poster did not clearly contain such an appeal. Conversely, the Court agreed with the Tribunal that Ext. p. 10 did contain an appeal to the voters to support the appellant on the basis of his religion; consequently, by publishing and distributing that poster at his election meetings, the appellant had committed a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Act. On this narrow ground, the High Court affirmed the Tribunal’s decision. The Court noted that this outcome raised the need to examine the construction of the impugned Ext. p. 10. Before doing so, the Court set out the relevant statutory provision: section 123 lists various acts that constitute corrupt practices, and subsection (3) expressly provides that any appeal by a candidate, his agent, or any other person with the candidate’s consent to vote for or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of that person’s religion constitutes a corrupt practice. Accordingly, the Court declared that if it were shown that the poster in question had been published and distributed by the appellant at his election meetings and that it urged voters to cast their votes on the basis of his religion, such conduct would satisfy the elements of a corrupt practice under section 123(3).

In this case, the Court noted that an appeal to voters to vote for a candidate on the ground of his religion would amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act, and that, if such a corrupt practice were established, the election of the appellant would be declared void under section 100(1)(d)(ii). The Court further observed that section 123(3) could be triggered even when the rival candidate belonged to the same religion as the appellant, because the statute prohibited any appeal that invoked religion as a basis for seeking votes, regardless of the opponent’s religious affiliation. For example, the Court explained, a Sikh candidate who urged the electorate to vote for him because he was a Sikh and simultaneously disparaged his opponent as a non‑conformist or heretic, despite the opponent also being Sikh in name, would be committing a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123(3). Consequently, the Court rejected the argument that the provision did not apply merely because both the appellant and the respondent were Sikhs. In fairness, the Court added that the counsel for the appellant, Mr Setalvad, had not raised this particular contention before the Court. The Court praised section 123(3) as a sound and salutary provision designed to safeguard the secular character of democracy in India, emphasizing that a healthy democratic process required elections to Parliament and other legislative bodies to be free from the pernicious influence of appeals to religion, race, caste, community, or language. The Court warned that permitting such considerations to sway electoral campaigns would erode the secular atmosphere essential to democratic life, and therefore section 123(3) wisely provides a check on this undesirable development by declaring any appeal to these factors in furtherance of a candidate’s candidature to be a corrupt practice that would void the election of that candidate. When assessing whether the distribution of the impugned poster by the appellant constituted a corrupt practice under section 123(3), the Court noted an important factual context: the appellant had been adopted as the candidate of the Akali Dal Party, a political party recognized by the Election Commission despite the fact that all its members were Sikhs. The Court observed that many political parties in the country are organized around distinct political or economic ideologies, yet their membership is often confined to, or predominantly consists of, persons belonging to particular communities or religions. Since the law does not prohibit the formation of such parties and indeed recognizes them for purposes of elections and parliamentary functioning, the Court said it is necessary to remember that appeals made by candidates of these parties for votes may, if successful, lead to their election and, in an indirect manner, may be influenced by considerations of religion, race, caste, community, or language. The Court further remarked that this potential infirmity could perhaps not be avoided as long as parties with predominant community composition are allowed to continue functioning and are recognized under the law.

Because political parties were permitted to operate and were recognised even when their membership was largely drawn from particular communities or religions, the Court emphasized that, in assessing whether a specific appeal made by a candidate fell within the scope of section 123(3), courts should limit themselves to interpreting the words of the appeal in a fair and reasonable manner, without attributing meanings beyond what the language supports. The Court then turned to the issue of interpreting the disputed poster. It noted that the principles governing the construction of such documents were well established. The document had to be read in its entirety, and its purpose and effect were to be determined in an objective, fair and reasonable way. In doing so, the Court recognised that election meetings are usually charged with partisan emotions, and that candidates often employ hyperbole, exaggerated language, metaphors, and flamboyant expressions as part of the political contest. Consequently, when the effect of speeches or pamphlets produced at election gatherings was examined in the detached setting of a courtroom, some allowance had to be given for the heightened tone of the material. Nonetheless, the Court also held that it would be unreasonable to disregard the impact such speech or pamphlet might have on the mind of an ordinary voter who attended the meeting, read the pamphlet, or heard the speech. Applying these established principles, the Court proceeded to examine the impugned pamphlet. The translation of page ten of the exhibit, prepared by the High Court, was accepted as accurate because neither party challenged its correctness. The translation read as follows: “Dear resident Sikhs, we, who are living in Singapore, Malaya, and South East Asia, respectfully place before you that at this critical juncture it is your duty to uphold the honour of the Panth. This is not the time to criticize the weaknesses of the leaders of the Panth; the need is that in the coming General Elections you should defeat the opponents of the Panth in the same way as you did in the last Gurdwara Elections. Every Sikh vote should go to the representatives of the Akali Dal, and we hope that this prayer of ours from afar will be accepted by you and that you will once again preserve the honour of the Panth. Victory of the Panth will maintain the honour of the Panth. By maintaining such honour we will achieve our final goal, that is Punjabi Suba.” The poster concluded with the words: “We remain anxious to keep the honour and prestige of the Panth ever high. Yours, non‑resident brothers.” The respondent’s contention before the Tribunal and the High Court was then set out.

The Court observed that the appeal in the pamphlet plainly and unambiguously urged voters to cast their ballots for the appellant so that the honour and prestige of the Panth would be preserved, and it was further argued that, in the circumstances, the term “Panth” referred to the Sikh religion. Because the pamphlet expressly solicits votes for the appellant and bases its argument on the premise that electing the appellant would protect the honour and prestige of the Sikh faith, the Court held that such an appeal constituted a corrupt practice, the ground being the appellant’s religion. The lower tribunals and the High Court had accepted this submission.

The Court then turned to the meaning of the word “Panth.” It noted that “Panth” is a Sanskrit‑derived term whose literal meaning is “path” or “way.” By itself the term has come to denote the Sikh religion, since Sikhs have traditionally used it to identify their faith and to describe themselves as followers of that Panth. In that sense, “Panth” can signify the Sikh religion, and “the followers of the Panth” are those who adhere to the teachings of the Sikh Gurus, i.e., the Sikh community. The adjective “Panthic” means “of the Panth” or “belonging to the Panth,” and on that basis, prima facie the “glory or prestige of the Panth” could be understood as the glory or prestige of the Sikh religion.

However, the Court emphasized that the issue before it was not to decide the abstract meaning of “Panth” in the Punjab, but to determine its meaning in the specific pamphlet alleged to contain a corrupt practice. The Court observed that the word “Panth” appears six times in the pamphlet. In the first two instances the text refers to the honour of the Panth and advises that it is not the time to criticize the leaders of the Panth; in those contexts the term could plausibly be read as referring to the Sikh religion. Yet, when the pamphlet continues, the Court found that the meaning shifts. The pamphlet addresses the electors, stating that they should “defeat the opponents of the Panth the same way as you did in the last Gurdwara Elections.” The Court noted that the Gurdwara Elections were contested among different Sikh parties, and the Akali Dal emerged victorious. Consequently, the Court concluded that in this sentence “Panth” cannot be understood as the Sikh religion. Rather, the phrase “the opponents of the Panth” plainly denotes the opponents of the Akali Dal party, and the pamphlet urges the electors to repeat the earlier success of the Akali Dal by ensuring its triumph in the present election. The Court further observed that the subsequent sentence reinforces this interpretation by treating the Panth and the Akali Dal party as synonymous, a point that will be examined in the continuing analysis.

The Court noted that in the relevant portion of the poster the expression “Panth” was employed as if it were identical with the Akali Dal Party. The poster contained the statement “every Sikh vote should go to the representatives of the Akali Dal”, and the Court observed that this statement could be harmonised with the preceding sentence only on the assumption that the drafter of the poster regarded the Akali Dal Party and the Panth as one and the same. The poster further declared that the prayer articulated in the poster, if accepted, would “once again preserve the honour of the Panth”. The Court explained that the phrase “once again” alluded to the triumph achieved by the Akali Dal Party in the previous Gurdwara Elections, and therefore, in that context the term “Panth” must be understood to mean the Akali Dal Party. Likewise, when the pamphlet later referred to the “victory of the Panth” and the “honour of the Panth”, the Court held that these references were to be taken as references to the victory and honour of the Akali Dal Party. The Court identified the final sentence of the poster as especially important. It stated that by maintaining such honour – that is, the honour of the Panth, which the Court understood to be the Akali Dal – the ultimate objective, namely the creation of the Punjabi Suba, would be achieved. The Court observed that it was not contested that, during the elections, the Akali Dal Party campaigned for the establishment of the Punjabi Suba, and that the essential appeal of the poster was that, if voters returned the Akali Dal candidate, the honour and prestige of the Akali Dal would be preserved and the goal of the Punjabi Suba would be realised. The poster concluded by expressing that those who issued it were eager to keep the honour and prestige of the Panth continually high.

The Court then turned to the earlier judgments of the Punjab High Court and the Tribunal. After a careful review, the Court concluded that those authorities had arrived at a view that was inconsistent with a fair and reasonable interpretation of the poster. The Court observed that the High Court had not examined the various places in the poster where the word “Panth” appeared, and that it had failed to correlate those sentences or to inquire whether the meaning ascribed by the High Court to the word “Panth” was justified in every instance. The Court reiterated the elementary rule of construction that a single word cannot be given two different meanings in the same document unless the context forces such a construction. The Court further explained that the poster had been issued in support of the appellant’s candidature in an election, and that its plain object placed before the electorate was that the Punjabi Suba could be achieved if the appellant were elected. Consequently, the Court inferred that the appellant belonged to the Akali Dal Party and that the Akali Dal Party was a strong supporter of the Punjabi Suba. The Court clarified that it was not required to adjudicate on the propriety, reasonableness, or desirability of the Punjabi Suba claim, as that constituted a political issue. The Court affirmed that political parties are fully competent to hold sincere, divergent, and conflicting views on such political matters.

In this political matter, the Court observed that the reference to the Punjabi Suba in the challenged poster was significant because it provided a clue to the meaning that the poster intended to give to the term “Panth.” Accordingly, the Court concluded that the word “Panth” in the poster was not used to denote the Sikh religion, and therefore it could not be held that the appellant appealed to voters on the basis of his religion by circulating the poster. The Court then turned to the oral evidence presented in the proceedings. One witness, identified as Kartar Singh, testified that for the past thirty years the Akali Party has also been known as the Panthic Party. He explained that he had actively assisted the appellant in his election campaign and that, in the election in question, a broad anti‑Congress front had been formed, comprising the Jan Sangh, the Swatantra Party, the Akali Party and other groups. Another witness, Ajmer Singh, acknowledged that the Shiromani Akali Dal was a political party representing Sikhs. He further stated that, except for the 1957 election in which an arrangement with the Congress existed, the Akali Dal had contested every election. In 1957 the Akali candidates had run on the Congress ticket, and in 1958 the Akali Dal launched an agitation for a Punjabi Suba because it believed that the Regional Formula had not been properly implemented by the Government. This testimony demonstrated that the Akali Dal Party is also known as the Panthic Party and that a principal issue in its contest with the Congress during the election under review was the demand for a separate Punjabi province. The Court noted that the High Court had not taken this oral evidence into account when interpreting the poster. While acknowledging that oral evidence may not be decisive for construing the language of a pamphlet, the Court emphasized that the term “Panth,” which appeared six times in the poster, could be correctly understood only as referring to the Akali Dal Party. In that context, the witnesses’ statements about the popular name of the party were relevant. The Court also referred to earlier decisions of Election Tribunals on similar questions. In the case of Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. Hukam Singh and others, the Tribunal examined the meaning of “Panth” and “Panthic” candidate and observed that although “Panthic candidate” would literally mean a candidate of the Sikh community, after the Akali Dal Party became popularly known as the Panthic Party, the expression came to signify a candidate of the Akali Dal Party. The judgment indicated that the Akali Dal Party had, in fact, designated itself as the Panthic Party.

In this matter, the Court observed that the Akali Dal Party was commonly identified as a Panthic Party even during the period when separate Sikh electorates existed, a fact that carries its own significance. The earlier decisions cited, namely the report in (1) (1953) VI E.L.R., 316 at 326, demonstrated that when the electorate was divided on the basis of religion, all candidates contesting the election were themselves Sikhs. Nevertheless, the Akali Dal Party distinguished its own slate of candidates by describing the party as a Panthic Party and the individual candidates as Panthic candidates, as found in Baba Gurdit v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon (1). The Court noted that these rulings collectively indicate that the Akali Dal Party is widely recognized as the Panthic Party and that its representatives are referred to as Panthic candidates. The Court further explained that this established understanding could assist in interpreting the true meaning of the term “Panth” that appears on the poster contested in the present proceedings. However, the Court also pointed out that the earlier decisions had not been placed before the High Court for its consideration. Before concluding the appeal, the Court referred to a more recent judgment of this Court in Jagdev Singh Sidhanti v. Pratap Singh Daulta and Ors. (2), which provides guidance on the application of the provisions of section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act.

In the cited Jagdev Singh Sidhanti case, the election of the successful candidate was challenged on the ground that the candidate had allegedly committed a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Act by urging voters to support him on the basis of his language. The High Court had originally upheld that contention. Upon review, this Court reversed the High Court’s conclusion, emphasizing that the reference to language must be examined within the larger political controversy that formed the core of the dispute between the parties. The controversy, as identified by the Court, centered on the Hariana Lok Samiti’s opposition to the imposition of Punjabi in the Hariana region, a matter unmistakably political in nature. The Court held that when a candidate advances a political argument that incidentally invokes language, the context of the speech must not be ignored, and that circumstance precludes a finding of corrupt practice under section 123(3). The Court further clarified that political issues discussed at election meetings may incidentally touch upon language or religion, but each alleged corrupt practice must be assessed by carefully examining the impugned speech in light of the relevant political controversy. Accordingly, the Court was convinced that the High Court erred in holding that the impugned poster, identified as Exhibit P‑10, attracted the provisions of section 123(3). Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court’s order was set aside, and the election petition filed by the respondent was dismissed with costs awarded throughout. (1) Indian Election Cases by Doabia Vol. 1, p. 92. (2) A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 183.