Karan Singh vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 1963

Decision Date: 4 November 1964

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, R.S. Bachawat

In the matter of Karan Singh versus the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 4 November 1964, with the opinion written by Justice A.K. Sarkar and a bench that also included Justices N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and R.S. Bachawat; the case is reported in 1965 AIR 1037 and 1965 SCR (2) 1, and it is cited in later authority 1991 SC 318 (17). The factual backdrop involved an incident in which a person identified as R fired at two individuals, resulting in the death of one victim while the other survived. The appellant, Karan Singh, was also present at the scene carrying a firearm and was accompanied by six additional persons who were variously armed. After the shooting, R fled the scene, and the appellant together with the six companions were prosecuted for offences under sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, read in conjunction with sections 148 and 149. The Sessions Judge, after hearing the prosecution evidence, convicted only the appellant, extending the benefit of doubt to the remaining accused. The appellant subsequently challenged the conviction before the High Court. Before the High Court could hear the appeal, R was apprehended, tried for the same charges, and was acquitted. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal but modified the conviction, substituting the original charge of sections 302 and 307 read with sections 148 and 149 with a conviction under sections 302 and 307 read with section 34, which deals with common intention. The appellant then appealed to this Court, contending that because R had been acquitted in a separate proceeding that was not appealed, the High Court could not lawfully hold the appellant guilty of murder and attempted murder on the basis of a common intention shared with R. The Court held that an acquittal of an individual in one case does not preclude another court from reaching a conviction in a different case, provided that the evidence presented in the latter case independently supports such a finding. Each case must be decided on the evidence adduced before it, irrespective of any differing conclusions that may have been reached elsewhere on the same factual occurrence. The Court relied on earlier decisions, including Marachalil Pakku v. State of Madras (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 648), Bombadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa, and Sunder Singh v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1211), to affirm this principle.

The Court noted several earlier authorities, including the decisions in State of Punjab v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 415; Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya L.R. [1950] A.C. 458; and Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, which were distinguished for the purpose of this appeal. The matter before the Court was Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 1963, filed by special leave against the order dated 27 August 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior Bench, in Criminal Appeal No. 18 of 1961. Counsel for the appellant was Ms B. C. Misra, while counsel for the respondent comprised senior advocates Al. S. K. Sastri and N. Shroff. The judgment was delivered by Justice Sarkar. The facts presented showed that the appellant, identified as Ramhans, together with six other individuals, were alleged to have murdered a person named Gabde and to have attempted to murder another individual, Ramchandra. The record indicated that Gabde and Ramchandra belonged to one faction, whereas Ramhans and the other accused were members of a rival faction that had harboured a long‑standing hostility. According to the prosecution, on the night of 18 November 1959, at approximately midnight, while Gabde, Ramchandra and several others were asleep on a terrace (referred to as a “Tiwaria”), the accused entered the premises. Ramhans allegedly discharged his firearm, killing Gabde, and then fired two additional shots at Ramchandra with the intention of killing him, but only succeeded in wounding him. During this incident the appellant was described as standing on the terrace, armed with a gun, and the remaining accused were also present, each bearing weapons, all having entered with a common intention to commit the offences.

Subsequent to the incident, Ramhans fled the scene. Consequently, the appellant and the six co‑accused were charged under sections 302 and 307 in conjunction with sections 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Gabde and the attempted murder of Ramchandra. The learned Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty of both offences while acquitting the six others on the ground of reasonable doubt. The appellant appealed this conviction to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. While the appeal was pending, Ramhans was apprehended, tried on the identical charges, and ultimately acquitted. Before the High Court, the appellant argued that the acquittal of Ramhans precluded the use of section 149 to impose constructive liability upon him. The High Court dismissed this contention, relying on precedents set by this Court in Marachalil Pakku v. State of Madras, Bombadhar Pradhan v. State of Orissa, and Sunder Singh v. State of Punjab. The High Court quoted the observation from those judgments: “Relying on Ramchandra’s direct testimony as supported by Dwarka, Matadin and Maharajsingh, I would hold that Gabde’s murder was committed by Ramhans by firing a gun at him and that Ramhans also fired two shots from his gun at Ramchandra.”

In the facts as found by the trial judge, Ramhans had fired a gun with the purpose of killing the deceased. At the same time Karan Singh was present, standing beside Ramhans and also holding a gun. Accordingly, the Court held that the murder of Gabde and the attempted murder of Ramchandra were committed by Ramhans but were done in furtherance of a common intention that he shared with the appellant Karan Singh. The prosecution case throughout had asserted that both Ramhans and Karan Singh entered the Tiwaria armed with firearms and that Karan Singh remained throughout the incident on the side of Ramhans, also armed. On the basis of those facts, the Court found that section 34 of the Indian Penal Code applied to Karan Singh. In this view the High Court sentenced the appellant under sections 302 and 307, each read with section 34, rather than under the earlier provision of sections 148 and 149 that had been applied by the learned Sessions Judge. The appellant then appealed to this Court. The sole issue raised on appeal was whether, given that Ramhans had been acquitted by the Sessions Judge in a proceeding that had not been appealed, the High Court could still convict the appellant for murder under section 302 read with section 34 on the basis that the evidence showed Ramhans, acting with a common intention, had shot the deceased and attempted to murder Ramchandra. The High Court, in support of its reasoning, relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab (1). That decision, in turn, approved the Judicial Committee’s judgment in Sambasivam v. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malay (2), which observed that “the effect of a verdict of acquittal… is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication.” The High Court correctly pointed out that this observation did not apply here because the acquittal of Ramhans occurred in a proceeding in which the appellant was not a party. Accordingly, each case must be decided on the evidence placed before it; the evidence that led to Ramhans’s acquittal was irrelevant to the merits of the appellant’s case. The Court further noted that the appellant’s counsel, Mr Misra, did not rely on Pritam Singh’s case before this Court but instead argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra (1) demonstrated that the High Court’s approach was erroneous.

The Court observed that the lower tribunal erred by disregarding the fact that Ramhans had been acquitted, and it stated that it could not accept the argument presented. The central issue that required consideration was whether, when four persons had been charged with the commission of murder read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the trial Court had acquitted three of those persons, it was legally permissible to convict the remaining accused of the same offence, namely murder read with section 34. The High Court had held that such a conviction could be sustained. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court primarily on the ground that allowing the conviction would lead to inconsistent or conflicting findings. The Court quoted the High Court’s finding, noting that while the High Court had acquitted accused 1, 3 and 4 under section 302 read with section 34, it had nevertheless convicted accused 2 under the same provision for having committed the offence jointly with the persons who had been acquitted, describing this situation as “legally impossible.” The earlier case discussed various circumstances in which, after acquitting certain individuals, a court might still find that another person’s conviction was justified under section 34 because the evidence indicated the presence of other unknown persons associated with the convicted individual, even though those unknown persons were not named in the charge. The Court clarified that this specific aspect was not relevant to the present matter and that the case of Krishna Govind Patil (1) was likewise not applicable. Accordingly, the Court expressed the view that the judgment in Krishna Govind Patil’s case offered no assistance to the appellant.

Conversely, the Court held that the earlier authorities relied upon by the High Court clearly supported the proposition that, despite the acquittal of a person in one proceeding, another court could, provided the evidence warranted it, proceed on the basis that the acquitted individual was in fact guilty of the offence for which he had been tried in the earlier case and could also find that the person tried in the present case was guilty of an offence under section 34 by virtue of having committed the offence together with the acquitted person. The Court affirmed that there was no legal principle preventing such a course of action. The Court further observed that the principle articulated in Sambasivam’s case (2) did not apply here because the two proceedings under consideration involved different accused persons, although the alleged offences were of the same nature. The Court reiterated that each case must be decided solely on the evidence presented in that specific case, independent of any differing view of the same act that might arise from evidence in another case. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellant’s challenge failed, and it dismissed the appeal.