Kanumukkala Krishna Murthy vs State Of Andhra Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 134 of 1962

Decision Date: 23 March 1964

Coram: Raghubar Dayal, Subbarao, K. Gupta, K.C. Das

In this case, the Supreme Court of India heard an appeal titled Kanumukkala Krishna Murthy versus State of Andhra Pradesh, decided on 23 March 1964. The judgment was authored by Justice Raghubar Dayal, who sat with Justices Subbarao, K. Gupta and K.C. Das on the bench. The petitioner was Kanumukkala Krishna Murthy and the respondent was the State of Andhra Pradesh. The decision was reported as 1965 AIR 333 and 1964 SCR (7) 410. The matters arose under sections 415 and 419 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which concern cheating and false representations to a public service commission. The headnote recorded that the appellant had applied for a post advertised by the Madras Public Service Commission and had made several false statements in his application. He was convicted under section 419 for cheating the commission. The conviction had been affirmed by the Sessions Judge and a revision petition had been dismissed by the High Court. The Supreme Court held two main points: first, that cheating may be committed in either of the two modes described in section 415, and that deception of a person is a common element in both modes; second, that the appellant’s misrepresentations to the Service Commission continued until the Government itself was deceived by the false statements presented to the Commission, which functions as a statutory adviser on appointments, and that deceiving such an adviser amounts to deceiving the Government. The Court referred to numerous authorities, including State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, The Crown v. Gunput, Billinqhurst v. H.P. Blackburn, Legal Remembrancer v. Manmatha Bhusan Chatterjee, Legal Remembrancer v. Hridoy Narian, Emperor v. Fazal Din, Queen Empress v. Appasami, Ashwani Kumar Gupta v. Emperor and In re: Hampshire Land Company.

The appeal was filed as Criminal Appeal No. 134 of 1962 under criminal appellate jurisdiction, and it was entertained by special leave from the order dated 17 July 1962 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision Case No. 298 of 1961. Counsel for the appellant comprised A.S.R. Chari, G.D. Gupta, S. Balakrishnan, R.K. Garg, S.C. Agarwala, D.P. Singh and M.K. Ramamurthi. Counsel for the respondent comprised S.G. Patwardhan and B.R.G.K. Achar. The judgment was delivered on 23 March 1964 by Justice Raghubar Dayal. The factual background leading to the appeal was that the Madras Public Service Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Service Commission, issued a notification in the Fort St. George Gazette on 3 August 1948 inviting applications for appointment as Assistant Surgeons in the Madras Medical Service (Men’s Section). The notification specified that applicants should have rendered temporary service as Assistant Surgeons in that Service at any time between 3 September 1939 and

December 31 1947 marked the cut‑off date for persons who had rendered war service and who possessed the qualifications described in paragraph 3 of the notification. Paragraph 3 of the notification, inter alia, states: “Applicants must satisfy the Commission— (a) that they are registered practitioners within the meaning of the Madras Medical Registration Act, 1914; (b) that they possess the L.M.S. degree or the M.B., B.S., degree of a University in the Province or an equivalent qualification.” The appellant was, at that time, employed as a Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Madras Medical Service on a temporary basis and he submitted an application for a permanent appointment to the posts that had been announced by the Public Service Commission. In the course of that application he made four specific representations which the lower courts later found to be false: first, that his name was Kaza Krishnamurthy; second, that his place of birth was Bezwada in Krishna district; third, that his father was K. R. Rao of Bezwada; and fourth, that he possessed a second‑class M.B.B.S. degree from Andhra Medical College, Vizagapatam, Andhra University. Based on these misrepresentations the appellant was convicted under section 419 of the Indian Penal Code for cheating the Madras Public Service Commission by assuming the identity of Kaza Krishnamurthy and by falsely claiming the required qualifications for the advertised post, a deception that the court held was likely to cause damage to the Commission’s reputation. The appellant was also tried for offences under sections 420 and 465 of the Indian Penal Code for acts alleged to have occurred in June and October 1944. The trial court acquitted him of the charge under section 465 but convicted him of the charge under section 420. On appeal before the Sessions Judge he was acquitted of the section 420 offence, while the conviction under section 419 was upheld. The High Court dismissed a revision of that conviction, and the appellant obtained special leave to appeal that High Court order. In the appeal the appellant argued that no offence under section 419 was proved because his surgical competence was not contested; he had received satisfactory reports from his superiors, and consequently the Service Commission could not have suffered any reputational damage. The State countered that the appellant’s deception constituted cheating, contending that his false statements misled the Service Commission and that such deception was likely to damage its reputation. The State further argued that the appellant obtained “property” from the Commission in the form of an admission card that entitled him to sit for the competitive examination for the advertised posts, and that he also deceived the State Government by obtaining appointment and salary through his false representations.

The Court noted that the appellant had employed false representations, thereby dishonestly inducing the Service Commission to appoint him to service and to pay him salary throughout his period of service. Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code defines the offence of cheating and provides that a person who, by deceiving any other person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the deceived person to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the deceived person to do or omit to do anything which he would not have done or omitted if he were not deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to cheat. The provision further contains an explanation that a dishonest concealment of facts constitutes deception within the meaning of the section. According to the provision, cheating may be committed in either of two manners described in Section 415. In both manners, the element of “deceiving a person” is common. In the first manner, the deceived person may be fraudulently or dishonestly induced to deliver any property or to consent to the retention of any property by another person. In the second manner, the deceived person may be intentionally induced to do or to omit to do something which he would not have done or omitted if not deceived, and such act or omission must cause or be likely to cause damage or harm to the deceived person in body, mind, reputation or property. The courts below, as previously indicated, held that the appellant had cheated the Service Commission by falsely representing that he possessed the degree of M.B.B.S., and by intentionally inducing the Commission to recommend his appointment to the post of Civil Assistant Surgeon, Class I. The lower courts further held that such conduct was likely to damage the reputation of the Service Commission because the appellant did not actually hold the medical degree. While accepting, without deciding, that in certain circumstances a deception of the Service Commission and its recommendation could impair its reputation, the Court expressed the opinion that, on the facts of the present case, there was no likelihood that the Commission’s reputation would be harmed. The record contained no evidence that the Service Commission could ordinarily have detected the appellant’s false claim, nor was there any evidence that the appellant’s appointment resulted in the employment of an inefficient officer. On the contrary, the evidence showed that for about ten years between his appointment and the filing of the present proceedings, the appellant performed his duties efficiently and received favorable reports from his departmental superiors. The only deficiency identified was that the appellant did not possess the minimum academic qualifications prescribed for candidates for the posts. Consequently, the Court held that the appellant had not committed the offence of cheating as defined in the latter part of Section 415, even though he had deceived the Service Commission by presenting himself as a duly qualified candidate and thereby induced the Commission to select him for the post. It was argued for the State that the

The State argued that the Public Service Commission had conducted a competitive written examination and that, as a result, it must have issued an admission card to the appellant that entitled him to appear at that examination. The argument continued that, by deceitfully inducing the Commission to give him the admission card—a thing that the Court treated as “property”—the appellant had committed the offence of cheating defined in the first part of section 415 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court found no support for this contention. The record contains no evidence that any admission card was ever issued to the appellant for the purpose of sitting a competitive examination. In fact, the Court observed that no such written examination was conducted at all. The respondent’s claim appeared to arise from a misunderstanding of a letter sent by the Secretary of the Service Commission to the Surgeon‑General of the Government of Madras, in which the Secretary enclosed a list of the names and details of forty‑five candidates who had been successful in a competitive examination held by the Commission for the direct recruitment of Civil Assistant Surgeons, Class II (Men), in the Madras Medical Service. The Court clarified that the candidates on that list had been selected merely by interview and that there was no written test for which admission cards were required. This conclusion was reinforced by the judgment of the Magistrate, which stated, “The accused was interviewed by the Service Commission as seen from Exhibit P‑70, extract of Service Commission particulars.” The Sessions Judge made the same observation, recording that “The accused sent an application Ex. P‑72… showing that he passed M.B., B.S. degree examination, and on receiving it and interviewing him, the Public Service Commission selected him as Civil Assistant Surgeon, Class 1.” The High Court similarly held that “In 1948 he sent an application to the Madras public Service Commission for selection as class II Civil Assistant Surgeon and was selected as such following an interview by the said body.” In view of these findings, the Court could not accept the suggestion that a competitive written examination had been held or that an admission card had been issued to the appellant, and consequently it could not hold that the appellant had committed cheating by dishonestly inducing the Commission to deliver property to him.

The remaining issue for the Court was whether the appellant had deceived the Government of Madras and had dishonestly induced it to provide him with a salary. It was contended that the appointment to the medical post was the prerogative of the Government, not of the Service Commission, and that the Government would not have appointed the appellant to the Medical Service unless it believed he possessed the required qualifications, specifically a degree of M.B., B.S. According to the respondent, that belief was based on the appellant’s fraudulent representation that he held such a degree. The Court therefore had to consider whether the deception in the appellant’s application had caused the Government to deliver salary to him, thereby constituting a dishonest inducement. This question remained open for determination.

The appellant had alleged that the term “property” referred to in section 415 of the Indian Penal Code required that the person who was deceived deliver the property, and that, in this case, the deceived party was the Service Commission rather than the Government because the appellant’s misrepresentation was made in an application addressed to the Service Commission. The Court, however, adopted the argument presented by the respondent. It held that appointments to the Medical Services were made by the Government, while the Service Commission’s role was limited to selecting candidates and recommending their names for appointment. This conclusion was supported by a letter identified as Exhibit P‑47, which was sent by the Secretary of the Service Commission to the Surgeon‑General of the Government of Madras. The letter listed the names and particulars of candidates who had succeeded in the examination, arranged in order of merit, and noted that a particular rule had been relaxed because of a shortage of candidates, allowing appointments to be made if necessary pending the receipt of a physical‑fitness certificate and further communication from the commission. The Court further examined the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. Section 241 of that Act stipulated that appointments connected with provincial affairs were to be made by the Governor of the Province. Sub‑section (1) of section 266 imposed a duty on the Provincial Public Service Commission to conduct examinations for provincial service appointments. Clause (a) of sub‑section (3) required that the Provincial Public Service Commission be consulted on all matters relating to recruitment methods for civil services and civil posts, and clause (b) required consultation on the principles to be followed in making such appointments and on the suitability of candidates. The Public Service Commission itself was constituted under section 264, making it a statutory body that functioned independently of the Government. The independence of the Public Service Commission was underscored in the decision of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, which interpreted the corresponding provisions of article 320 of the Constitution. In that case, the Court observed that once relevant regulations are enacted they must be followed both in letter and in spirit, and that consultation with the Commission on disciplinary matters affecting a public servant ensures that an independent body, not directly involved in issuing adverse orders, can review the proposed action with an open mind and provide the Government with unbiased advice on issues critical to the morale of public services. It was on the basis of these statutory provisions and principles of independence that the Court assessed the arguments in the present case.

In this case, the Court explained that the Public Service Commission issued invitations for applications to fill various government posts, after which it selected candidates for those posts. The selection could be based on a written examination, an interview, or a combination of both. Once the candidates were selected, their names were placed in order of merit and transmitted to the Government. As a general rule, the Government was expected to make appointments from that merit list in the same sequence. Nevertheless, the Government retained the discretion to refrain from appointing any portion of the candidates who had secured a place in the merit order, even though that placement would normally have resulted in an appointment. The Court observed that any representation made in an application for appointment was essentially a representation to the appointing authority – the Government – and not solely to the Commission, which initially received and processed the application up to the selection stage. The applicant’s aim was to obtain an appointment, not merely to mislead the Commission to gain entry to an examination or interview. Consequently, the deception was intended to achieve the appointment, and there was no justification for considering the deception to have ended once the Commission had been misled and acted upon it. The Court held that a false representation made to the Commission persisted until the final authority responsible for making the appointment considered the application, and therefore the false representation was also deemed to have been made to that final authority. In the present matter, when the Commission’s recommendation was forwarded to the Government, it included the qualifications of the recommended candidates, specifically stating that the appellant had passed the M.B.,B.S. examination. The Government consequently believed that the appellant possessed the M.B.,B.S. degree, relying on the Commission’s verification of the application. That belief was, in fact, based on a false representation. The Court was of the opinion that the appellant’s misrepresentation to the Commission continued and remained effective up to the stage when the Government issued the appointment order, thereby deceiving the Government itself. The Court further noted that the Commission’s status as an independent statutory authority did not affect this analysis. Although the Commission was established under statutory provisions and functioned independently of the Government in selecting candidates and offering advice, its independence did not diminish the fact that the misrepresentation made to it ultimately deceived the appointing authority.

The Court observed that the Public Service Commission exercised its own independent judgment to evaluate the comparative merits of each candidate and to determine the suitability of the candidates for the posts for which they applied. Its function was described as advising the Government on the suitability of the candidates, making the Commission a statutory adviser to the Government in matters concerning appointments to the Services. Accordingly, the Court held that any deception of such an adviser amounted to deception of the Government itself, which is bound to consider the adviser’s recommendations and act in accordance with them. The Court further noted that there exist precedents in which servants or agents of an authority were deceived, yet the loss was suffered by the authority itself. In those cases, the person who deceived the servants or agents was held to have deceived the authority, even though the question of deception was not framed as being directed at the authority rather than at its servant. The Court applied this principle to the present situation, concluding that the candidates who deceived the Public Service Commission also deceived the Government by inducing it to believe that they fulfilled the conditions prescribed for the appointments. The Court then referred to several illustrative cases. In Crown v. Gunput(1) the accused presented a railway pass bearing an altered number to the ticket collector while traveling by train; the Court held that the accused had dishonestly induced the railway company to act in a manner it would not have otherwise taken, and that the deception of the ticket collector constituted deception of the railway company. In P. E. Billinghurst v. H. P. Blackburn(2) certain bills were submitted for payment and were examined by Government officials who were misled by representations made by subordinate officials through whom the bills had passed, resulting in payments being made; the individuals responsible for causing the deception were convicted of cheating the Government. In Legal Remembrancer v. Manmatha Bhusan Chatterjee and Legal Remembrancer v. Hridoy Narain(3) it was held that when evidence showed that responsible officers of the East Indian Railway Company and its Asansol Office were deceived and induced either to allocate wagons to a particular colliery or to issue wagon challans that would not otherwise have been issued, such deception was sufficient to establish that the railway company, by reason of the deception, was induced to act in a particular way, even though any damage to the company’s reputation was remote. Finally, in Emperor v. Fazal Din(4) the Court ruled that the deception practiced was likely to cause damage or harm to the person on whom it was practiced or to the railway authorities whose agent the deceiver was acting as.

The Court observed that the issue concerned the appointment process. It referred to the decision in Queen‑Empress v. Appasaimi (1), where the accused obtained a hall ticket from the University Superintendent by pretending to be someone else and then signed another person’s name on the examination papers. The Court held that this conduct demonstrated an intention to make the University authorities believe that the papers had been answered by the other individual. The reasoning was based on the principle that deceiving the Superintendent, who acted for the University, amounted to deceiving the University itself. In a comparable case, Ashwini Kumar Gupta v. Emperor (2), the accused again impersonated another individual at a University examination, thereby cheating the Registrar. The Court concluded that such conduct injured not only the Registrar’s reputation but also that of the University. The Court also cited In re: Hampshire Land Company (3), where a Society lent money to a company on the basis of authorisations from the company’s directors, who lacked the competence to borrow. The resolution granting borrowing power was invalid, yet the Society was entitled to assume that the company’s internal management requirements had been satisfied. Applying the same principle, the Court stated that the State Government could rightly assume that the Service Commission had verified that the candidates it selected for appointment possessed the necessary qualifications, and therefore the Commission’s scrutiny was performed on behalf of the Government. Consequently, the Government appointed the appellant to a position in its Medical Service after being deceived into believing that he was fully qualified. Following his appointment, the Government was obliged to pay the appellant the salaries that fell due. The Court held that, by deceiving the Government, the appellant had dishonestly induced the Government to deliver property to him, thereby committing the offence of cheating under section 415 of the Indian Penal Code, as he pretended to be Kaza Krishnamurthy, a person he was not. The actual offence was cheating by personation, punishable under section 419 of the Indian Penal Code. Accordingly, the Court found the appellant’s conviction for that offence to be correct. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to surrender his bail and to serve the remainder of his sentence. (1) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 151. (2) I.L.R. 1937 (1) Cal. 71. (3) 1896 (2) Ch. 743.