K. V. Narayanaswami Iyer vs K. V. Ramakrishna Iyer and Ors

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 589 of 1960

Decision Date: 26 March, 1964

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal

In this matter, the Supreme Court considered an appeal filed on 26 March 1964 by K. V. Narayanaswami Iyer against K. V. Ramakrishna Iyer and other respondents. The bench comprised Justice K. C. Das Gupta together with Justice Raghubar Dayal. The case was reported in 1965 AIR 289 and also appears in the 1964 Supreme Court Reports at page 490. The dispute concerned property that had been acquired in the name of a member of a Hindu joint family. The central issue was whether such property, acquired when the joint family possessed a sufficient nucleus, was to be presumed to have been bought from joint‑family funds, a presumption that could be rebutted by evidence showing otherwise. The court also examined whether the Karta of the family could be required to render an account of past transactions in the absence of any fraud or misrepresentation.

The factual backdrop involved three brothers who continued as members of a joint family, the eldest being the first respondent, K. V. Ramakrishna Iyer, who acted as the Karta. After the family was formed, several properties were purchased for the joint family’s benefit. In addition, other properties were bought in the name of the first respondent’s son, his wife, and his grandson. The two younger brothers acquired some properties on their own, using their personal earnings. Relations between the brothers later deteriorated, and the second brother, who was the appellant, instituted a suit for partition. In that suit he claimed not only the original joint‑family assets and the properties acquired by the Karta for the family, but also the properties bought in the names of the Karta’s wife, son and grandson, asserting that they formed part of the joint‑family estate. He also demanded that the Karta render an account of the family’s past dealings. The third brother was impleaded as a second defendant. The first respondent contended that the properties held in the names of his wife, son and grandson had been purchased solely from his own savings and therefore did not belong to the joint family nor were subject to partition. The trial judge disagreed, holding that those properties were indeed joint‑family property and subject to division. The first respondent appealed this finding, and the High Court allowed the appeal in respect of a substantial portion of the scheduled properties. Consequently, the appellant brought the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The Court held that where a property is acquired in the name of a joint‑family member and, at the time of acquisition, the family possessed a sufficient nucleus, a statutory presumption arises that the purchase was made from family funds, making the property part of the joint‑family estate unless the contrary is proven. On the facts, the evidence demonstrated that the joint family had the requisite nucleus at the relevant dates, and the Court relied on earlier decisions such as Amritlal Sen & Ors. v. Surath Lal Sen and Appalaswami v. Suryanarayanamurthy. The Court further observed that in the absence of any proof of fraud or misrepresentation, the Karta cannot be compelled to account for past transactions; however, this does not bind the parties to accept the Karta’s statement uncritically, and an appropriate enquiry by the court may be necessary to determine the true composition of the property at the time of partition.

It was held that the parties could not be compelled to reject the declaration of the Karta regarding the composition of the joint family property. Accordingly, the court was required to order an investigation in the usual manner employed to determine the actual extent of the property at the time of partition. The method of applying this principle was said to depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case. In the present matter, the evidence on record demonstrated prima facie that the Karta could not reasonably have been expected to possess, at the date of the suit, any of the accumulations that the evidence showed had been acquired by the family. Consequently, there was no justification for requiring the Karta to render account of his earlier dealings with the joint‑family property and its income. This position was illustrated by reference to Parameshwar Dube v. Govind Dube, I.L.R., 53 Cal. 459.

The appeal was filed under civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 589 of 1960, by special leave from the judgment and decree dated 28 April 1953 of the Madras High Court in A.S. No. 695 of 1949. Counsel for the appellant comprised K.N. Rajagopal Sastri, K. Jayram and R. Ganapthy Iyer. Counsel for respondents numbered 1, 3, 4 and 6 to 8 were A.V. Viswanatha Sastri and T.V.R. Tatachari. Counsel for respondent 2, K.R. Chaudhuri, were B. Kalyana Sundaram, M. Rajagopalan, K. Rajendr Choudhry and M.R. Krishna Pillai. The judgment was delivered on 26 March 1964 by Justice D.A.S. Gupta. The principal parties in the dispute were three brothers—Ram Krikishna, Narayanaswamy and Mahadeva—who were respectively eighty‑three, seventy‑nine and sixty‑nine years old at the time of the hearing. Following the death of their father in 1908, the brothers continued as members of a joint family, with the eldest brother, Ram Krikishna, becoming the Karta under the law. At the time of the patriarch’s death the family owned approximately ten acres of land, but also owed certain debts which the newly appointed Karta was obliged to settle as his first duty. Ram Krikishna had previously been appointed the Karnam of Narasingampettai in 1902 and, even during his father’s lifetime, began acquiring additional lands. Between 1911 and 1931, about twenty‑five acres were acquired for the joint family. In 1927 he was transferred to the larger village of Vepatthur and remained there until his retirement in 1930, when his son Venkatarama succeeded him as Karnam of Vepatthur. From 1931 to 1946 further properties in Vepatthur and other villages were purchased in the names of Ram Krikishna’s son Venkatarama, his wife Mangalathammal, and his grandson Mahalingam, as well as in the name of Mangalathammal’s brother Raja Ayyar. Loans were also extended in the names of Ram Krikishna’s wife, Mangalathammal, his son Venkatarama and his grandson Mahalingam. The second brother, Narayanaswamy, entered the legal profession as a Vakil’s clerk in Kumbakonam in 1910, while the youngest brother, Mahadeva, was only thirteen years old at the time of their father’s death and later pursued a medical education, eventually serving as a Sub‑Assistant Surgeon at the time the present suit was instituted.

In this matter, the younger brother who had entered the medical college and become a qualified doctor was employed as a Sub‑Assistant Surgeon at the time the present suit was filed by his elder brother, Narayanaswami. Both brothers earned respectable incomes and, according to their own admissions, each had purchased property for personal use from the earnings of their respective professions. Relations between the eldest brother, Ramakrishna, and the second brother, Narayanaswami, began to deteriorate during the 1930s. The youngest brother, Mahadeva, whose duties required him to be stationed at various locations, demanded a partition of the joint‑family estate, an initiative with which Narayanaswami also aligned. Nevertheless, the parties refrained from resorting to litigation while their mother was still alive. She passed away in early 1945 at the age of ninety.

On 12 December 1946, Narayanaswami issued a formal legal notice to Ramakrishna through counsel. In that notice he asserted that, in addition to the twenty‑five acres acquired between 1911 and 1931, the properties that had been obtained in the names of Ramakrishna’s wife, his son, and his brother‑in‑law were also bought with the income of the joint family and therefore formed part of the joint‑family estate. He further alleged that approximately Rs 25,000 in cash and benami investments were held by Ramakrishna on behalf of the family. Narayanaswami demanded a partition of all such immovable and movable assets, including cattle, and requested that Ramakrishna account for the income derived from the family properties for the preceding three years. In addition, he claimed a one‑third share of the total estate.

Ramakrishna responded on 1 December 1946, contending that the joint‑family property consisted solely of ten acres bequeathed by their father and the subsequent acquisition of roughly twenty‑five acres, and he denied that any of the other properties in question belonged to the family. Shortly thereafter, on 1 February 1947, Narayanaswami instituted suit for partition and accounting before the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam. The pleadings named Ramakrishna as the first defendant, Mahadeva as the second defendant, Ramakrishna’s son Venkatarama as the third defendant, Venkatarama’s wife Mangalathammal as the fourth defendant, and Venkatarama’s brother‑in‑law Raja Ayyar as the fifth defendant. Mahalingam, the grandson, was impleaded as the sixth defendant, and two minor sons of Venkatarama were listed as the seventh and eighth defendants.

The plaintiff’s case was concise. He alleged that Ramakrishna, acting as the Karta of the joint family, had managed the family assets and had used family funds to acquire additional properties from 1911 to 1946. Accordingly, he claimed that the acres and fifty‑eight cents of land in the village of Kumarakshi, which were listed in Schedule A, together with other parcels described in Schedules B, B1, B2, C, C1, C2 and D, and for which the sale deeds were executed in the names of Ramakrishna’s wife, son, grandson or brother‑in‑law, were to be treated as joint‑family property.

In the plaintiff’s petition he asserted that the lands and other assets listed in the various schedules constituted joint family property. He further alleged that between the years 1931 and 1946 the Karta of the family, Ramakrishna, had employed family funds to acquire property in the names of his wife, his son and his grandson, and that those acquisitions also formed part of the joint family estate. The movable assets that the plaintiff claimed belonged to the joint family were enumerated in Schedule A2, while a house located in Thiagarajapuram, which the plaintiff also claimed as joint family property, was listed in AI Schedule. The relief sought by the plaintiff consisted of an order directing that his one‑third share of the aforementioned properties be allotted to him, the division being to be made by metes and bounds so as to produce three equal portions. In addition, the plaintiff asked that the first defendant be directed to render an account of the management of the family properties for a period of three years and that the plaintiff be paid his share of any amounts that might be found due.

The second defendant, Mahadeva, generally supported the plaintiff’s case. However, in his written statement he contended that for the years 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943 the income from the joint family properties had been collected by the plaintiff, Narayanaswami, and not by the first defendant. Accordingly, Mahadeva maintained that for those four years the plaintiff alone was liable to give an accounting, whereas for the remaining years the first defendant was the party responsible for accounting. In a schedule annexed to his written statement Mahadeva identified several additional items of property that he claimed belonged to the joint family, although he noted that one of the sale deeds was in the name of the sixth defendant, Mahalingam, and another sale deed was in the name of the fifth defendant, Raja Ayyar.

The remaining defendants opposed the suit. The first defendant, Ramakrishna, argued that although he became the Karta of the joint Hindu family upon his father’s death, the actual administration of the family’s assets had been carried out by the mother until 1940. From 1940 until the mother’s death in 1945, the plaintiff Narayanaswami had exercised the management functions. The first defendant asserted that he only assumed management of the properties after the mother’s death. He further contended that of all the properties described in the plaint, only the 34.58 acres specified in Schedule A were truly joint family property, together with certain movable assets listed in Schedule A2. He also claimed that a house in Kumbakonam town, which the plaintiff had acquired in his own name, as well as some lands situated in Manalur village in Kumbakonam and a sum of Rs 8,000 obtained by the plaintiff from the sale of certain lands, were also part of the joint family property.

The fourth defendant, Mangalathammal, who was the wife of the first defendant, pleaded that the properties and investments recorded in her name had been acquired by her personally, using money that her husband Ramakrishna had given her from his own earnings. She therefore maintained that such assets were not part of the joint family estate and consequently were not subject to partition. The third defendant, Venkatarama, asserted that all purchases of land and monetary investments that appeared in his name had been made with his own earnings since he had become a Qarnam, and thus did not belong to the joint family property.

In this case, the court considered the contention of the third defendant that the properties registered in the name of his son Mahalingam were acquired with his own earnings. Likewise, the fifth defendant asserted that every asset recorded in his name had been purchased with his personal funds and therefore did not belong to the joint family of the plaintiff and his brothers. The learned Subordinate Judge, after reviewing the evidence, held that the plaintiff’s allegation that the eldest brother, Ramakrishna, had acted as Karta and managed the family property from the death of their father in 1908 up to the filing of the suit was proved. The judge further concluded that around the year 1931 Ramakrishna possessed an accumulated family income of approximately Rs 14,000, while his personal cash was said to be minimal. Based on these findings the judge found it straightforward to determine that the immovable properties listed in Schedules A, A1, B, B1, C, C1, C2 and D, together with Item 5 in Schedule B2, were all assets of the joint family. The judge observed, however, that the house described in Schedule A1, located in Thiagarajapuram, had been transferred to the sister Rukmaniammal and consequently ceased to be a joint‑family property, rendering it exempt from division. All remaining properties were held to be liable for partition among the three brothers, namely the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2. The court additionally held that the mortgages and promissory notes taken in the names of defendants 3 to 5 represented liabilities of the joint family, except for a few instruments in the name of the third defendant, Venkatarama, which were judged to be his personal property. Accordingly, a preliminary decree was issued in line with these findings. The decree directed that an account be prepared with reference to the income generated by the properties enumerated in Schedules A, A1, B, B1, C, C1, D and Item 5 in Schedule B2, as well as the house in Kumbakonam mentioned in the schedule annexed to the first defendant’s written statement. The accounting was to cover the three years preceding the suit and the period from the date of the suit until the final decree was passed. Regarding the properties listed in Schedule A, the court ordered that the accounting would terminate on the date when the parties took possession of their respective shares pursuant to the interim decree. The first defendant appealed this decision to the Madras High Court. The plaintiff also filed an appeal contesting the Subordinate Judge’s view that the Kumbakonam house formed part of the joint family property. The High Court allowed the plaintiff’s appeal, holding that the Kumbakonam house was a separate self‑acquired asset of the plaintiff. No further appeal was lodged against the High Court’s decision, and the matter of whether that house belonged to the plaintiff was therefore left unexamined by this court.

In the appeal filed by the first defendant, the High Court disagreed with the trial court’s view that the first defendant, Ramakrishna, had accumulated only Rs 14,000 from the income of the joint family lands by the year 1930. The High Court held that the first defendant had saved sufficient amounts from his separate earnings, making it quite possible for him to have financed all subsequent acquisitions and investments that were placed in the names of his son, his wife and his grandson after 1930. Accordingly, the High Court found the trial court’s opinion that the first defendant possessed a sum of Rs 14,000 in 1930 to be “surprising and untenable”. Although the High Court did not disturb the trial court’s determination that the land described in Schedule D, which was acquired in the name of the third defendant, constituted joint family property – a finding that remained unchallenged because no appeal was filed against it – the Court nevertheless treated the fourteen acres in question as acquisitions for the family. The High Court expressed its view in the following terms: “When we consider that the joint family nucleus has been more than quadrupled, it is difficult to see what grievance the younger coparceners really have, particularly the second defendant, who after keeping for himself his earnings as a Doctor in Government Service finds himself entitled to a share in a greatly increased ancestral patrimony.” The Court then concluded that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that any of the acquisitions or investments made in the names of the third, fourth and sixth defendants were financed from joint family funds. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal of the first defendant, holding that only the assets listed in Schedules A and D were liable to be partitioned as joint family property. In addition, the Court ordered that the first defendant account for the income generated from 12 December 1946, the date on which the plaintiff had sent a notice demanding partition.

The plaintiff challenged this decision by filing the present appeal, and two principal arguments were advanced before the Court by counsel for the plaintiff. The first argument concerned the properties that had been purchased in the names of the first defendant’s wife, his son and his grandson. Counsel submitted that the High Court had not drawn a clear conclusion that, at the dates of those acquisitions, the joint family did not possess a sufficient nucleus to acquire the properties. He emphasized that the acquisition made in the name of the first defendant’s wife was undeniably funded by monies advanced by the first defendant himself, and if, at the time of that acquisition, the joint family had enough nucleus to acquire the property, the legal presumption would be that the purchase was made with joint family funds, even though the first defendant might have had personal resources available for the same purpose. Counsel correctly argued that, under such circumstances, the property should be treated as joint family property unless the first defendant could rebut the presumption that the acquired property was bought with family funds. The argument further asserted that similar reasoning should apply to the acquisitions made in the names of the third and sixth defendants, contending that those purchases were also funded by the first defendant and should therefore be presumed to be joint family acquisitions if it could be shown that the joint family possessed a sufficient nucleus at the respective dates of acquisition and the first defendant failed to positively demonstrate that the funds used did not belong to the joint family.

Counsel contended that the acquisitions recorded in the name of the third defendant and the sixth defendant should likewise be treated as having been financed by the first defendant. Accordingly, those properties were to be presumed acquired from joint family funds, provided it could be shown that, at the time of each acquisition, the joint family possessed a sufficient nucleus to enable such purchases, and the first defendant failed to establish positively that the monies used did not belong to the joint family. The Court noted that the legal position on this point was well settled: when, at the date of acquiring a particular asset, the joint family had a sufficient nucleus, any property bought in the name of a member of that family was presumed to have been obtained from family funds and thus to form part of the joint family estate, unless the presumption was successfully rebutted. This principle was illustrated by the authorities cited, namely Amritlal Sen and ors. v. Surath Lal Sen and others and Appalaswami v. Suryanarayanamurthy and others.

In the matter before the Court, there was no dispute that the purchases made in the name of the first defendant’s wife were financed by advances from the first defendant himself. Regarding the purchases in the name of the third defendant, his minor son, and the sixth defendant, the Court found the evidence, including the third defendant’s earnings and other surrounding circumstances, to be sufficient to conclude that the first defendant also provided the money for those transactions. Consequently, the crucial question turned on whether, at the respective dates of these acquisitions, the joint family possessed a sufficient nucleus to support such purchases. After a careful examination of the record, the Court concluded that the joint family did not have a sufficient nucleus at the times when the properties in the names of the first defendant’s wife, son, and grandson were acquired. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered, among other factors, that family funds had been expended in buying a fourteen‑acre parcel of land registered in the name of the fifth defendant. The period during which acquisitions genuinely made for the joint family took place had effectively ceased by around 1931. At that point, the first defendant, relying on his own testimony, claimed to have held approximately Rs. 15,000, which he asserted derived entirely from his personal earnings. The Subordinate Judge had held that just over Rs. 14,000 of that amount represented savings from family funds. The Court agreed with the High Court that this inference was not substantiated by the evidence before the tribunal. Moreover, the High Court correctly observed that properties valued at roughly Rs. 20,000 had been purchased from the family’s income during that period.

The Court observed that, besides acquiring land, the family had to meet various other expenses during the relevant period, including the educational costs of the third brother, Mahadeva. The documents introduced in the proceedings demonstrated that on more than one occasion the first defendant was compelled to borrow money by issuing promissory notes in order to pay the consideration specified in those documents. It is noteworthy that the plaintiff was not prepared to affirm that the family income was sufficient to finance these acquisitions. During cross‑examination the plaintiff was asked, “From 1911 out of the family income Rs. 20,000‑worth of lands had been purchased? Can there have been more income from the family lands?” He responded, “From the family income, the joint income of myself and Defendant 1 certainly exceeded Rs. 20,000/‑. The income of myself and Defendant 1 which went in the purchase of lands may have come to Rs. 10,000/‑.” In other words, the plaintiff himself seemed to concede that only Rs. 10,000 of the family income was available for land purchase during that period. Consequently, his assertion that he also contributed to the purchases conflicted with his written statement and other parts of his testimony and could not be accepted.

The learned Subordinate Judge appeared to be convinced that Ramakrishna’s personal earnings were very small and that whatever little he earned was required for the expenses of his own branch of the family. On that basis the Judge concluded that Ramakrishna could not have saved from those earnings, leading to the finding that almost the whole of the Rs. 15,000 which the first defendant admitted possessing around 1931 derived from the family funds. The Court, however, held that the record did not justify the Trial Court’s view that Ramakrishna could not have accumulated Rs. 15,000 from his own income. The “mamools” that he received as Karnam of Narasingampettai and later of the larger village Vepatthur consisted of a substantial quantity of paddy and must have generated a considerable income. In addition, he derived revenue from banana plantations at Narasingampettai; one lease deed showed a receipt of Rs. 450 for a single season, and it would not be unreasonable to infer that, over good and bad years, this activity yielded several thousand rupees. The Court was also persuaded, on the basis of his own testimony and the entries in the account book of Appaswamy Iyer (Ex. B IO 1), that he received a reward of Rs. 2,500 for successfully maintaining litigation on behalf of Appalaswamy, and that he earned a respectable sum as fees for drafting documents. A witness, Narayanaswami Reddiar, testified that the defendant paid Rs. 1,000 as fees for documents prepared for him. Even if that figure were somewhat exaggerated, the witness’s evidence clearly indicated that Ramakrishna, who was a man of some education, conducted a flourishing side business as a document writer and saved two or three thousand rupees from this activity throughout his tenure as Karnam.

It was therefore more than probable that Ramakrishna had other sources of income that he chose not to disclose in evidence. Considering all the circumstances, the Court was convinced that the claim that he possessed Rs. 15,000 in his hands around 1931, accumulated from his own earnings, was substantially true. Counsel for the plaintiff, however, correctly pointed out that a finding that very little of the family income remained in 1931 would not, by itself, demonstrate the absence of a sufficient nucleus for acquiring the various properties in the defendants’ names.

The Court noted that a witness testified that the defendant had received a payment of one thousand rupees as fees for preparing documents. Even if that figure were somewhat exaggerated, the testimony clearly indicated that Ramakrishna, who was a man of some education, earned a substantial side income by writing documents. It was evident from the evidence that he had saved two or three thousand rupees during the whole period in which he served as Karnam. The Court further observed that it was highly probable that he possessed other sources of income which he chose not to disclose while giving evidence. Considering all the circumstances, the Court became convinced that the assertion that he had fifteen thousand rupees in his hands around the year 1931, accumulated from his own earnings, was substantially true. Counsel for the respondent, Mr Rajagopala Sastri, correctly pointed out that a finding that very little of the family income remained in 1931 would not, by itself, be sufficient to demonstrate that there was no viable nucleus for the acquisition of the various properties later transferred to the wife, the son and the grandson of the defendant after 1931. For a proper decision on that issue, the Court held that it was necessary to examine roughly the income and expenditure derived from the family properties during the relevant period. The Court therefore first considered the period from 1931 to 1939, since the evidence showed that during those years Defendant No 1 actually managed the joint‑family lands. Both parties agreed that the paddy yield was eight hundred fifty‑six kalams in 1931, one thousand kalams in 1932 and one thousand one hundred eighteen kalams in 1933. For the next five years, the respondent’s counsel stated that the yields were one thousand fifty‑eight, one thousand fifty‑eight, nine hundred fifty‑eight, nine hundred fifty‑eight and nine hundred fifty‑eight kalams respectively, whereas the appellant’s counsel put the figures at one thousand one hundred sixty kalams for each of those years. The Court observed that the discrepancy arose because the appellant claimed that, in addition to the thirty‑five acres already possessed, an extra six acres of mortgaged land were also in the family’s possession during those years, a claim that the respondent denied. Since Mr Rajagopala Sastri was unable to produce any record supporting the appellant’s allegation, the Court found it reasonable to accept the respondent’s estimate of the paddy yields as substantially correct. For the year 1939, the Court took the yield to be approximately one thousand one hundred fifty‑three kalams, noting that in that year the D‑Schedule lands later found to belong to the joint family had also been acquired. After reviewing the evidence, the Court accepted the price of each kalam of paddy as two rupees fifty paise for each of the years 1931 and 1932, and as one rupee nineteen paise, one rupee twenty‑five paise, one rupee thirty‑seven paise, one rupee forty paise, one rupee fifty paise, one rupee fifty‑six paise and one rupee sixty‑two paise respectively for the years 1933 through 1939, as contended by the respondent.

In this matter the Court observed that the prices per kalam of paddy for the years 1933 through 1939, as put forward by the respondent, were accepted as correct. Consequently, the Court calculated that the aggregate revenue derived from paddy cultivation over the nine‑year period from 1931 to 1939 amounted to approximately Rs. 14,976. To this figure the Court added the earnings obtained from dry crops such as black gram and green gram that had been cultivated on portions of the land. The Court accepted the testimony of the defendant that dry crops were not cultivated every year nor on all of the holdings. The account book labelled Exhibit A 98 showed that the sale proceeds from black gram and green gram for the year 1935 were Rs. 72. By treating this amount as a representative average for each year, the Court estimated that the total receipts from dry‑crop production over the nine‑year span were roughly Rs. 648. Adding the paddy and dry‑crop incomes together, the Court determined that the overall income generated from the joint family’s agricultural lands during 1931‑1939 was about Rs. 15,624. Furthermore, the Court incorporated the sum of Rs. 1,100 received on repayment of the mortgage loan, as evidenced by Exhibit 187, bringing the total earnings of the joint family for the nine years to approximately Rs. 16,724.

The Court then turned to the question of expenditures incurred in the same period. The respondent’s claim that the family expended Rs. 5,172 during those years was not contested by the appellant, and the Court found no reason to reject it. The Court also accepted the respondent’s assertion that the Rs. 1,100 advanced on the mortgage bond (Exhibit 187) was repaid from family funds. In addition, the Court identified further outlays consisting of Rs. 6,500 spent on the purchase of the Schedule D lands, Rs. 4,030 paid as kists, and Rs. 2,000 allocated to cultivation expenses, which included the remuneration of the Kariasthan. Summing these amounts, the Court concluded that the total expenditure incurred by the joint family between 1931 and 1939 exceeded Rs. 18,000.

Having established that there was no longer any dispute that the Schedule D lands had been acquired using the joint family’s resources, the Court reasoned that the family did not possess sufficient surplus to finance the other acquisitions made during the same period. Those other acquisitions included the properties listed in Schedule B and Schedule B1, purchased under Document Exhibit 125, the properties enumerated in Schedule C1, purchased under Document Exhibit B 124, the properties set out in Schedule C, purchased under Exhibit 129, and the properties referred to in the schedule annexed to the second defendant’s written statement, purchased under Exhibits B 134 and B 135. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the High Court’s conclusion that these properties did not form part of the joint family estate and therefore were not subject to partition in the present suit.

The Court further noted that the properties recorded in Schedule C2 were bought on 24 April 1941 by Exhibit 136 in the name of the fourth defendant, while the properties listed as Item 1 of Schedule B2 were purchased on 19 August 1942 by Exhibit 126 in the name of the sixth defendant.

The Court observed that the sixth defendant had purchased certain lands, and although the first defendant maintained that he had no participation in those acquisitions, the evidence led the Court to conclude that the money used for those purchases was also advanced by the first defendant. To determine whether those lands or the property described in Item 5 of Schedule B2—a house in Vepatthur whose mortgage was taken in the first defendant’s name by Exhibit B 1929 on 10 May 1942—constituted joint family property, it was necessary to examine what, if any, joint‑family funds were in the possession of the first defendant during the relevant years.

The first defendant contended, as already noted, that from 1940 until the mother’s death in 1945 the plaintiff, and not he, managed the joint‑family properties, and therefore he received no share of the family earnings during that period. The plaintiff vigorously denied this allegation. The Court, however, found several circumstances that persuaded it that the first defendant’s version was credible. The most significant circumstance was the written statement of the youngest brother, Mahadeva, who clearly aligned himself with the plaintiff in the family dispute. Mahadeva asserted in his statement that the plaintiff had been collecting the income from the joint‑family properties during the years 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1943. He further stated that the plaintiff had promised to maintain proper accounts of the collection and expenditure of the family income for the period of his management and that the plaintiff was liable to render an account for that period.

At trial Mahadeva attempted to qualify his assertion by claiming that it was based on information supplied to him by the first defendant. Nevertheless, in the very next sentence he reiterated that his conclusion was that the plaintiff alone had been managing the family lands for those years. The Court also noted an entry made by Mahadeva in red ink at the bottom of Exhibit B 190, dated 13 March 1941, which Mahadeva had received from Ramakrishna. The entry read: “1939‑Kuruvai (paddy)‑sold by Nana 1939‑Semba Mudal (harvest)‑by Nana, sold in 1940.”

While some letters indicated that Ramakrishna continued to issue certain instructions to the Kariasthan after 1941, the Court considered those letters together with Exhibits B 177 and B 72, which contained detailed instructions regarding cultivation that were issued by the plaintiff to the Kariasthan. In light of these facts, the Court concluded that from about 1940 until the mother’s death early in 1945 the plaintiff had effectively displaced the first defendant from the management of the family lands, taken control of all the family lands in Kumarakshi, and appropriated all the income generated from them.

In the present case the only income that appears to have reached the first defendant from the joint‑family properties during the relevant period was derived from the lands listed in D Schedule. The production from those lands can be roughly placed at three hundred kalams each year. The price recorded for a kalam in the year 1941, according to Exhibit 100, was two rupees and six annas. After deducting the customary kist payment and the expenses incurred in cultivating the land, the net yield can be estimated at about five hundred rupees per year. This figure is admittedly a very approximate calculation, but because the record contains no more precise data, the Court considered it reasonable to accept this estimate as a basis for determining the amount of capital that the first defendant actually possessed from the D Schedule property. Applying this estimate, the Court arrived at a total of roughly one thousand five hundred rupees that the first defendant could have had in his possession during the years 1940 to 1942.

The Court also noted that during the earlier period from 1931 to 1939 the first defendant’s management of the family lands had already produced a shortfall that exceeded the amount estimated for 1940‑1942. Consequently, it was reasonable to conclude that the first defendant did not have any substantial capital from the joint‑family assets that could have been used to finance his acquisitions in 1941 and 1942. Accordingly, the finding of the High Court that those properties did not belong to the joint family and therefore were not subject to partition was left undisturbed.

The Court further examined the properties mentioned in Schedule B‑2 of the plaint, which were purchased in 1945 and 1946 as shown by Exhibits B‑127 and B‑128. Those purchases were made in the name of the third defendant, Venkatarama, who at that time had served as the karan of Vepatthur for more than fifteen years. It was therefore plausible that Venkatarama had been able to set aside part of his own earnings over that long period and use those personal savings to pay for the land acquisitions. For this reason, the Court could not support the contention that the purchases were funded by money advanced by the first defendant. Moreover, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that, at the time of those acquisitions, the first defendant possessed sufficient income from the joint‑family properties to afford the purchase of all the lands in question.

The record already established that the first defendant resumed management of the joint‑family properties only after his mother’s death in 1945. Regarding the income and expenditures of the estate during that later period, the Court found virtually no evidence of substance. Considering all of these circumstances, the Court affirmed the High Court’s conclusion that the properties acquired in 1945‑1946 did not form part of the joint‑family estate.

This analysis leads to the second argument raised by counsel for the plaintiff, Mr. Rajagopala Sastri. While acknowledging the established legal principle that, absent any proof of fraud or misappropriation, the Karta is not required to render an account of past transactions, counsel emphasized that the Karta nevertheless bears the responsibility of establishing what assets are actually available for partition.

The counsel supporting the argument referred the Court to the judgment in Parmeshwar Dube v. Gobind Dube (1). That decision established that, when there is no allegation of fraud or other improper conduct, a Karta of a joint family is required to give an account only with respect to the existing divisible state of the family property at the relevant time. However, the ruling also clarified that this limitation does not compel the parties to accept the Karta’s own description of what the property comprises; instead, the Court must conduct an inquiry in the usual manner to ascertain the true composition of the property as of the date of partition. The correctness of this principle was not contested by any party. The application of the principle, the Court observed, must be tailored to the particular facts and circumstances of each case. In the present matter, the evidence already placed before the Court demonstrated prima facie that the Karta could not reasonably have possessed, at the date of the suit, any accumulation of wealth beyond the immovable assets that had been shown by evidence to have been acquired for the benefit of the family. Consequently, there was no justification for requiring the Karta to account for any past dealings with the joint family property or its income. In view of these facts, the Court found that the order of the High Court—holding that the first defendant, as managing member, bore no liability to render any account before 12 December 1946, the date on which the partition notice was issued—required no alteration. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs, and the judgment of the High Court was upheld. (1) I.L.R. 53 CaL 459.