K. Narasimhah vs H. C. Singri Gowda

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 223 of 1964

Decision Date: 1 April 1964

Coram: K.C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India heard an appeal titled K. Narasimhah versus H. C. Singri Gowda, decided on 1 April 1964. The judgment was delivered by a bench consisting of Justice K. C. Das Gupta and Justice Raghubar Dayal. The petitioner was K. Narasimhah, who was the elected President of a municipality, and the respondent was H. C. Singri Gowda. The case is reported in the 1966 All India Reporter at page 330 and in the 1964 Supreme Court Reports (7) at page 618. The dispute arose under the provisions of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951, specifically sections 23(9), 24(1)(a), 24(3) and 27(3), which deal with the procedure for calling a special general meeting of municipal councillors, the requirement of a three‑day clear notice, the manner in which the President must preside, and the requisition for moving a resolution of no confidence. The factual background was that, during a special general meeting of the council, a resolution expressing no confidence in the petitioner as President was moved and subsequently passed. The petitioner challenged the legality of the meeting and the validity of the resolution on three principal grounds. First, he contended that the statutory requirement of giving at least three clear days’ notice to all members had not been complied with, rendering the meeting invalid. Second, he argued that the meeting was not properly conducted because he was not permitted to preside, contrary to section 24(1)(a) of the Act. Third, he claimed that the requisition to move the resolution failed to satisfy the proviso to section 23(9), which demands fifteen days’ notice of the intention to move such a resolution. The High Court dismissed the second and third contentions but addressed the first. The trial court held that although the notices were dispatched on 10 October 1963, they were actually served on the 11th, 12th and 13th of October, and therefore the court deemed the notices to have been given on the date of dispatch. Moreover, the High Court expressed the view that the statutory requirement of three days’ notice was merely directory rather than mandatory, and consequently concluded that the failure to give proper notice did not affect the validity of the resolution.

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the High Court on the question of what constitutes “giving” notice. The Court observed that there is no legal authority or principle that equates the mere dispatch of a notice with its legal effect of being given, and therefore held that the High Court’s approach was erroneous. Consequently, the Court determined that for those councillors who received the notice after the stipulated period, the statutory requirement of three clear days’ notice had not been satisfied. Turning to the significance of the notice requirement, the Supreme Court examined section 27(3) of the Act and held that the provision requiring notice for any motion or proposition is merely directory and not compulsory. As a result, the Court concluded that the fact that some councillors received less than three clear days’ notice did not, by itself, render the proceedings of the meeting or the resolution passed therein invalid. Such proceedings would be invalid only if the irregularity in notice had caused a prejudicial effect on the conduct of the meeting. In the absence of any demonstration of such prejudice, the Court declined to set aside the resolution on the basis of the notice deficiency alone.

In the case before the Court, nineteen of the twenty councillors were present at the meeting and, of those nineteen, fifteen cast votes in favour of the resolution of no confidence that was directed against the appellant. Because a substantial majority of the councillors participated and supported the resolution, the Court found no basis to conclude that the conduct of the meeting had been prejudicially affected by the alleged irregularity in the service of notice. The Court referred to the decision in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lai Srivastava, [1958] S.C.R. 533, to support the view that such procedural defects do not, by themselves, invalidate the proceedings unless they cause actual prejudice. Upon reviewing the material placed on record, the Court observed that the Vice‑President assumed the chair only after the appellant had left the meeting, and that the motion of no confidence was thereafter moved and passed. Consequently, there could be no breach of the statutory requirement contained in section 24(1)(a) of the Act, which mandates that the President preside over the meeting. The Court also held that the proviso to section 23(9) of the Act had not been violated, because the provision merely requires that the President receive at least fifteen days’ notice before a resolution is moved. In the present circumstances, the meeting took place on 14 October, and the appellant had been served with notice on 25 September, thereby satisfying the fifteen‑day notice requirement. The judgment proceeded to note that the appeal was filed under civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 223 of 1964, having been taken on special leave from the Mysore High Court order dated 6 December 1963 in Writ Petition No. 2273 of 1963. Counsel for the appellant and for the respondents were listed, and the judgment was dated 1 April 1964. The Court identified the principal issue for determination as whether the requirement of three clear days’ notice for convening a special general meeting, as set out in section 27(3) of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act 1951, constitutes a mandatory provision. The factual background disclosed that the appellant had been elected President of Holenarsipur Municipality on 11 September 1962. At a special general meeting of the Municipal Council held on 14 October 1963, the council passed a resolution stating, “This Council has no confidence in the Municipal President of Holenarsipur Municipality.” On 2 November 1963, the President, Mr Narasimhiah, filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Mysore, seeking a writ to set aside the proceedings that led to the adoption of the no‑confidence resolution, and also sought ancillary reliefs. The municipality comprised twenty councillors, of whom thirteen submitted a request to the President on 25 September 1963 urging the convening of a special general meeting to consider a resolution expressing no confidence in him. Since the President failed to act on this request, the Vice‑President took the initiative to call a meeting for the purpose of discussing the no‑confidence resolution and issued a notice signed by the Vice‑President proposing to hold the meeting.

In this case, a notice was issued for a special general body meeting of the Municipality that was scheduled to take place on 14 October 1963 at ten o’clock in the morning inside the municipal office premises. The notice required the members to be present in time and, in compliance with clause 27(3) of the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951, a copy of the notice was also affixed in the Municipal Office. The notice itself bore the date 10 October 1963. On that same date the notice was personally delivered to fifteen of the twenty councillors. The remaining councillors received the notice on later dates: the President, Narasimhiah, together with Mr. Dasappa and Mr. Sanniah were served on 13 October; Councillor Mirza Mohammad Hussain was served on 12 October; and Councillor R. G. Vaidyanatha was served on 11 October 1963. When the meeting convened on 14 October 1963, nineteen of the twenty councillors were present, including the President, Mr. Narasimhiah. The President initially claimed the chairmanship of the meeting, but he subsequently left the proceedings. After his departure the Vice‑President, Mr. Singri Gowda, assumed the chair. During the meeting a motion of no confidence against the President was moved and it was carried, with fifteen councillors voting in favour of the resolution.

The petitioner challenged the legality of the proceedings of that 14 October meeting and the validity of the no‑confidence resolution on three principal grounds. First, the petitioner argued that the statutory requirement of three days’ notice had not been complied with for all members, rendering the meeting invalid. Second, the petitioner contended that the meeting could not be said to have been properly held because the President was not permitted to preside, alleging a breach of section 24(1)(a) of the Act. Third, the petitioner asserted that the requisition to move the resolution of no confidence failed to satisfy the proviso to section 23(9) of the Act, since fifteen days’ notice of the intention to move the resolution had not been provided. The High Court observed that, based on the material before it, it could not determine the exact circumstances under which the Vice‑President presided, and therefore it dismissed the allegation of a breach of section 24(1)(a). The argument concerning the fifteen‑day notice was not pressed at the hearing and did not appear in the judgment. On the issue of the alleged failure to give three days’ notice to all councillors, the High Court relied on its earlier decision in Writ Petition No. 2280 of 1963 and rejected the petitioner’s contention. The earlier judgment indicated that, because the notices were dispatched on 10 October, they must be held to have been given on that date despite the later personal service dates.

The High Court had held that although the notices were dated 10 October, they were actually served on 11, 12 and 13 October, the Court nevertheless considered the statutory requirement of three days’ notice to be merely directory and not mandatory, and therefore concluded that the failure to give such notice did not invalidate the resolution. All three grounds raised in the petition were again presented before this Court in support of the appeal. With respect to the petitioner’s allegation that the meeting was unlawful because he was not permitted to preside, the Court examined the material on record and found that the Vice‑President assumed the chair only after the petitioner had left the meeting, and that the no‑confidence resolution was thereafter moved and adopted. Consequently, there was no breach of the statutory requirement that the President should preside at the meeting. The Court also determined that the petition’s claim of contravention of the proviso to section 23(9) lacked merit. The proviso provides that no resolution shall be moved unless the notice of the resolution is signed by at least one‑third of the total number of Councillors and at least fifteen days’ notice of the intention to move the resolution has been given. The record shows that the notice was indeed signed by more than one‑third of the Councillors. Although the petitioner asserted that the fifteen‑day notice requirement had not been satisfied, this argument, presented by counsel for the petitioner, was not raised before the High Court and was based on the premise that the fifteen‑day notice must be given not only to the President but also to all the Councillors. The Court rejected that premise, holding that the statutory requirement is satisfied only when the President receives the fifteen‑day notice of the intention to move the resolution. In the present case, the meeting was held on 14 October and the President had received the notice on 25 September, thereby receiving more than the required fifteen days’ notice.

The principal contention before this Court was that the three‑day notice of the special general meeting had not been given, rendering the meeting invalid. The Court expressed difficulty in accepting the High Court’s view that the mere act of “sending” a notice constitutes “giving” it. In ordinary English usage, “giving” is not complete until the notice reaches the hands of the intended recipient. Yet, under legal principles, “giving” may be deemed complete where a notice has been tendered to a person even if that person has not accepted it. Accordingly, the Court held that the act of tendering a notice is legally equivalent to giving the notice, regardless of whether the recipient actually receives or acknowledges it.

The Court observed that when a person to whom a notice is tendered refuses to accept it, the notice is nevertheless considered given. The Court further noted that it could find no authority or principle supporting the proposition that the mere dispatch of a notice to the addressee’s address, by a person who has a legal duty to give the notice, completes the act of giving. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court was mistaken in concluding that notices had been given to all the Councillors on 10 October. In the Court’s view, the notice that had been sent to five of the Councillors did not satisfy the requirement of three clear days because the period between dispatch and the meeting was less than three days. The Court then framed the pivotal question: whether the statutory provision that three clear days’ notice is required is mandatory, and consequently whether a failure to observe that period renders the meeting’s proceedings and any resolution passed therein invalid. The Court explained that the presence of the word “shall” in the provision is not decisive on this issue. As with all matters of statutory construction, the answer depends on discerning the legislature’s intention. The Court asked whether the legislature intended that non‑compliance with the notice requirement would automatically make the action taken invalid under law. To determine that intention, the Court said it must examine the purpose of the statute, the consequences that would follow from a strict observance of the notice requirement, and the overall scheme of the related provisions. The Court referred to the decision in State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, where the question was whether Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution imposed a mandatory duty to consult the Public Service Commission on certain disciplinary matters. In that case, the Court emphasized that the proviso to the Article allowed the President or Governor to make regulations specifying circumstances in which consultation would not be necessary. Speaking for the Court, Justice Sinha observed that if the provisions of Article 320 were truly mandatory, the Constitution would not have left it to the discretion of the head of the executive to override those provisions by regulation. That reasoning led the Court to conclude that the provisions of Article 320(3)(c) were not mandatory. The respondents relied heavily on that precedent. The Court also noted that while the statute required three clear days’ notice of a special general meeting to be given to the Councillors, it simultaneously provided that in cases of great urgency a shorter, reasonable period of notice could be given. This dual language suggested that the legislature did not intend the three‑day notice to be an absolute, mandatory requirement, but rather a benchmark of reasonableness, allowing flexibility when urgency dictated a shorter notice period.

In this case the question of whether a meeting fell within the category of “great urgency” was placed entirely in the discretion of the President or the Vice‑President who, under section 27(2), bears the responsibility for convening such a meeting. The counsel for the petitioner argued that, had the legislature intended to make the service of three clear days’ notice mandatory, it would not have retained the power to allow a shorter notice period for certain special general meetings. The Court found that this line of reasoning carried considerable weight. It observed that the very fact that the statute does not require three clear days’ notice for every special general meeting, and instead permits a shorter period that is deemed reasonable, demonstrates that the reference to “three clear days” was intended only as a benchmark of reasonableness rather than as an absolute requirement.

The Court also noted that the principal purpose of providing notice is to enable councillors to arrange their other affairs so that they can be present at the meeting. For an ordinary general meeting the statute prescribes seven clear days’ notice, a period considered sufficient to achieve that purpose. By contrast, a reduced period of three clear days’ notice is deemed adequate for special general meetings in general. The rationale for this shorter period is that special meetings are regarded as more important, and councillors are expected to make themselves available for them even if it causes some inconvenience. In situations where a special general meeting must address a matter of great urgency, the legislature contemplated that a notice period of less than three clear days would be appropriate.

Considering the object of the provisions and the manner in which that object is to be fulfilled, the Court concluded that while the legislature intended that the ordinary notice period should normally be observed, it could not have meant that a failure to give the full period of notice, thereby affording councillors less time than is ordinarily reasonable to adjust their other commitments, should automatically render the proceedings of the meeting invalid. The Court then turned to section 36 of the Act, which states: “No resolution of a municipal council or any committee appointed under this Act shall be deemed invalid on account of any irregularity in the service of notice upon any councillor or member provided the proceedings of the municipal council or committee were not prejudicially affected by such irregularity.” The Court interpreted the phrase “service of notice” in this provision to refer to the act of giving notice to the councillors. Accordingly, any irregularity in the manner in which notice is given falls within the scope of this provision.

The Court explained that the phrase “irregularity in the service of the notice upon any Councillor” was intended to cover not only defects in the manner of delivering the notice but also the failure to give notice for the full period required by law. It observed that English law concerning meetings of borough and county councils contained a specific rule that the absence of a summons— which must be served on every council member— would not invalidate the meeting. The Court inferred that the legislature which enacted the Mysore Town Municipalities Act, 1951, was likely aware of those English provisions. Rather than stating that a meeting would be invalid if the notice were not served, the Act stipulated in section 36 that any irregularity in the service of notice would not render a council resolution invalid, provided the proceedings were not prejudicially affected by that irregularity. The Court found that this reasoning gained strength when the shortness of the notice period was regarded as an irregularity. It further noted that the existence of section 36 supported the view that the requirement in section 27(3) that notice be given for any motion or proposition was a directory requirement, not a mandatory one. Accordingly, the Court held that the fact some councillors received less than three clear days’ notice did not, by itself, invalidate the meeting or the resolution passed therein. Such a resolution would be invalid only if the irregularity had prejudicially affected the proceedings. The Court recorded that nineteen of the twenty councillors attended the meeting and that fifteen of those nineteen voted in favour of the no‑confidence resolution against the appellant. Consequently, there was no basis to conclude that the proceedings were prejudicially affected by the irregular notice. The Court therefore concluded that the failure to give three clear days’ notice to certain councillors did not affect the validity of the meeting or the no‑confidence resolution, and it dismissed the appeal with costs.