K. Kankarathnamma And Others vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 325 of 1962

Decision Date: 23 January 1964

Coram: J.R. Mudholkar

In this case the Court recorded that the dispute concerned the amount of compensation payable to the appellants for land that had been acquired by the State. The Land Acquisition Officer, acting under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), had referred the matter to the court for the purpose of apportioning the compensation among the various claimants, as required by section 18(1)(2) of the Act. Six of the appellants were dissatisfied with the award of the Land Acquisition Officer and each applied to him seeking a further reference so that the court could determine the appropriate compensation. The Officer did not make any such reference in response to these applications.

When the matter subsequently came before the Subordinate Judge, the State did not object to the proceedings on the ground that there was no reference concerning the quantum of compensation. The High Court, on appeal, allowed the Government Pleader to raise the question of jurisdiction, arguing that without a specific reference the court could not entertain the issue of the amount of compensation. The High Court considered this argument, rejected the plea, and went on to modify the finding of the lower court regarding the compensation award. Before the High Court, the appellants argued that the State’s failure to raise the jurisdictional objection before the Subordinate Judge should be deemed a waiver of that point. The High Court accepted this argument, holding that the defect was not one of inherent lack of jurisdiction and could therefore be waived.

The Supreme Court then examined the relevant provisions of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It held that the court’s jurisdiction arose only when a valid reference was made to it, and that when a statute confers jurisdiction subject to specific conditions, those conditions must be fulfilled before jurisdiction can be said to exist. Consequently, the Court concluded that where the statutory conditions are not met, jurisdiction does not arise, and the case before it was one of lack of inherent jurisdiction. The Court further observed that the State’s failure to object to the proceedings could not amount to a waiver of the jurisdictional defect, because a defect of this nature could not be cured or waived by the parties. The Court therefore affirmed that it had no jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation and could not second‑guess the order of the Land Acquisition Officer.

The Court observed that the absence of inherent jurisdiction and the State’s failure to object to the proceedings on the ground that there was no reference could not be treated as a waiver or as acquiescence. It explained that when a court lacks inherent jurisdiction, the defect remains unwaivable and cannot be remedied by any subsequent acquisition. The Court further held that it possessed no authority to determine the quantum of compensation and therefore could not set aside the order of the Land Acquisition Officer.

In support of this view, the Court relied upon the decisions in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee and others v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan Wullud Meer Subroodeen Khan Bahadur (6 M.L.A. 134), Alderson v. Paliser and another ([1901] 2 K.B. 833) and Seth Badri Prasad and others v. Seth Nagarmal and others ([1959] Supp. (1) S.C.R. 769). The Court distinguished the earlier case of Venkata Krishnayya Garu v. Secretary of State (A.I.R. 1939 (P.C. 39‑60) M.L.J. 299). The judgment was recorded under civil appellate jurisdiction as Civil Appeal No. 325 of 1962, appealed from the judgment and decree dated 4 August 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal Suit No. 489 of 1954. Counsel for the appellants were K. Bhimsankaram and R. Ganapathy Iyer, while counsel for respondent No. 1 were P. Ram Reddy, T. V. R. Tatachari and B. R. G. K. Achar. The judgment was delivered on 23 January 1964 by Justice Mudholkar.

The appeal challenged the High Court’s order which had reduced the compensation awarded by the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada, to the appellants for certain lands acquired by the State. The lands comprised survey numbers 281/2, 339/1 to 8 and 338/1 to 3, situated near Vijayawada and adjoining the Vijayawada‑Eluru Road. The Land Acquisition Officer had initially fixed compensation at Rs. 3,500 per acre for the first two survey numbers and Rs. 4,000 per acre for the third survey number. The Subordinate Judge, however, awarded a uniform rate of Rs. 10,000 per acre for all the surveyed lands. Disputes arose concerning the entitlement to compensation for survey numbers 339/1 to 3, prompting the Land Acquisition Officer to refer the matter to the Court for apportionment among the various claimants. Six appellants, dissatisfied with the Officer’s award, submitted written applications within the statutory time limit requesting that the matter be referred for determination by the Court. It was established as a matter of common ground that the Land Acquisition Officer made no such reference in response to these applications. When the matter was presented before the Court, it proceeded on the assumption that the Officer’s reference was intended not only for apportionment but also for determining the amount of compensation. No objection was raised by the State on the basis that there was no reference concerning the quantum of compensation.

In the present case the Court observed that because the six appellants had filed applications concerning the quantum of compensation, the Court was not competent to adjudicate those matters. When the parties appealed the judgment of the Subordinate Judge before the High Court, the Government pleader contended that, in the absence of a reference by the Land Acquisition Officer on the issue of the amount of compensation, the Court lacked any jurisdiction to entertain the question at all. The High Court, while ultimately overturning the Subordinate Court’s determination of the compensation amount, first permitted the State to raise this plea but later, after reviewing certain precedents, rejected the plea. The Court regarded this development as regrettable because it was not a type of plea that the State ought to have pursued. It was clear that the persons interested in the lands that were being acquired had filed objections to the rates of compensation within the prescribed time limits, and the failure to obtain a reference lay with the Land Acquisition Officer, not with the claimants. The Court emphasized that whenever applications are made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is the duty of the Land Acquisition Officer to refer the matter to the Collector, except where a valid ground for rejection exists, such as the applications being time‑barred. When a State officer neglects this duty, the Court held that the State should not be allowed to profit from its own negligence. Moreover, the Court expressed the view that, after the plea was raised, the High Court should have adjourned the proceedings so that the appellants, who were respondents before the High Court, could take appropriate steps to compel the Land Acquisition Officer to make the required reference. Nevertheless, because the High Court had permitted the issue to be raised and the State had now revived the point before this Court, it was necessary to consider it. The appellants had argued before the High Court that the State’s earlier failure to raise the plea before the Subordinate Judge amounted to a waiver of the objection. The High Court accepted that argument, holding that the defect was procedural and therefore could be waived, and that there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction. The present Court disagreed with that conclusion. Section 12(1) of the Land Acquisition Act provides that once an award is filed in the Collector’s office it shall, except as otherwise provided in the Act, constitute final and conclusive evidence between the Collector and the persons interested as to the true area, value of the land and the apportionment of compensation. Accordingly, the Court noted that the sole avenue for challenging the finality of the award is by invoking the provisions of section 18 of the Act.

The Court began by referring to the provisions of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Sub‑section (1) of that section states that any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for determination of the Court, whether his objection relates to the measurement of the land, the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of compensation among the persons interested.

The proviso to sub‑section (2) of section 18 prescribes the time limit within which an application under sub‑section (1) must be filed. Section 19 then provides for the making of a reference by the Collector and specifies the matters that must be included in that reference. Consequently, the Court observed that a matter proceeds to the Court only after a reference has been made by the Collector, and only after such a reference is issued does the Court acquire the power to determine the objections raised by a claimant to the award.

Section 21 further limits the scope of the Court’s proceedings to consideration of the contentions of the persons affected by the objection. The Court concluded that these statutory provisions leave no doubt that the Court’s jurisdiction arises solely on the basis of a reference made to it. Although the Land Acquisition Officer had made a reference under section 30 of the Act, that reference concerned only the apportionment of compensation among the various claimants.

The Court held that a reference limited to apportionment does not confer jurisdiction on the Court to entertain matters that are not directly connected with that reference. It emphasized that this is not a mere technicality, citing the Privy Council decision in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee & Ors. v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan Wullud Meer Sudroodeen Khan Bahadoor(1), which declares that where jurisdiction is granted by a statute only upon compliance with specified terms, those terms must be complied with; otherwise the jurisdiction does not arise.

Accordingly, the Court characterized the present situation as a case of lack of inherent jurisdiction. It further noted that the failure of the Slate to object to the proceedings on the ground of an absent reference concerning the determination of compensation cannot be treated as a waiver or acquiescence. The Court explained that when inherent jurisdiction is absent, the defect cannot be waived nor cured by acquiescence.

Supporting this view, the Court quoted the authority in Alderson v. Palliser & Anr.(2), wherein the Court of Appeal held that a want of jurisdiction apparent on the face of the proceedings cannot be waived. The Court also referenced its own decision in Seth Badri Prasad & Ors. v. Seth Nagarmal and Ors.(3), which held that even where a bar of illegality was not pleaded in lower courts, it may be raised before this Court if it appears on the face of the pleadings.

The Court observed that the High Court had largely depended on the Privy Council decision in Venkata Krishnayya Garu v. Secretary of State, reported as (2) (1901) 2 K.B. 833 and (3) [1959] supp. (1) S.C.R. 769. In that precedent, the Collector had made a reference to the court, but the reference was not made on the application of the person who was legally entitled to compensation; rather, it was made on the application of a person whose claim to ownership of the property had been rejected by a civil court, although that person remained a party to the land‑acquisition proceedings. The Court held that the present case is distinguishable on the simple ground that, unlike the earlier case, there is no reference at all by either the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer. In the earlier case the Collector’s reference was an error of law because it was based on the application of a person who had been found to have no interest in the land. Disagreeing with the High Court, the Court therefore held that it possessed no jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation and consequently could not go behind the order of the Land Acquisition Officer. On this sole ground the appeal was dismissed. The Court, however, heard counsel for the appellant on the merits and expressed the view that there were no substantial grounds that would justify interfering with the conclusions reached by the High Court.

For the purpose of fixing the amount of compensation, seven sale deeds were placed before the Court, identified as Exhibits A‑1 to A‑4 filed on behalf of the State and Exhibits B‑1 to B‑3 filed on behalf of the appellants. The High Court had summarised these deeds, and the Court reproduced the summary as follows: Exhibit A‑1, dated 15‑2‑46, concerned 0 ‑ 40 ‑ ½ acres, valued at Rs 1,750 per acre, giving a total of Rs 4,240, and the land lay opposite to the suit land and abutted the main road. Exhibit A‑2, dated 25‑8‑46, covered 0 ‑ 65 ‑ ½ acres, valued at Rs 2,500 per acre, giving a total of Rs 3,800, and the land was some distance away from the site of the acquired land towards Eluru. (Reference: A.I.R. 1939 P.C. 39; 60 M.L.J. 399.) Exhibit A‑3, dated 9‑10‑46, comprised 1‑0‑04.5 acres, valued at Rs 4,500 per acre, and the land was very near the acquired land and sold to the same vendee. Exhibit A‑4, also dated 9‑10‑46, comprised 1‑0‑04.5 acres, valued at Rs 4,500 per acre, and formed part of the same site and was sold to the same vendee. Exhibit B‑1, dated 14‑10‑46, comprised 0 ‑ 70 ‑ 7,000 acres, valued at Rs 10,000 per acre, and lay five furlongs away from the suit site and nearer to Bezawada. Exhibit B‑2, dated 14‑2‑47, comprised 1‑09 acres, valued at Rs 12,000 per acre, and was just over five furlongs away toward Bezawada. Exhibit B‑3, dated 24‑1‑46, comprised 0‑36 acres, valued at Rs 1,850 per acre, with a total of Rs 5,000, and was a part and parcel of the same land that was sought to be acquired. The High Court rejected Exhibit A‑1 on the ground that it predates the notification date required by section 4 of the Act, and it rejected Exhibit A‑2 because the land described therein was at a distance from the land under acquisition and also farther from Vijayawada than the land in question.

In this case, the High Court rejected Exhibit B2‑2 because the sale had been concluded four months after the notification had been published, and also because the land in question lay in the direction of Vijayawada at a distance of five furlongs from the parcel that was being acquired. The Court also appears to have rejected Exhibit B3, even though the land conveyed by that deed formed a part and parcel of the same tract that the State sought to acquire; the reason given for the rejection of Exhibit B3 was that the area conveyed under that deed amounted to only thirty‑six cents. By contrast, the High Court accepted Exhibits A3 and A4 and, based on those two documents, fixed compensation at a rate of Rs 4,500 per acre for all of the lands involved. Regarding Exhibit B1, the High Court observed that although the deed bore the date 14 October 1946, the deed was actually registered on 13 February 1947 and several of the stamp papers used bore the names of persons who were unrelated to the transaction. The Court concluded that the document had been ante‑dated to make it appear to have been executed before the notification, and therefore rejected it. In the view of the present Court, the reasoning of the High Court concerning Exhibits B1, B2‑2 and B3 carries considerable weight and there was no substantial basis on which to reinterpret those transactions in any different manner. If the documents identified as Exhibits B1, B2‑2 and B3 are set aside, together with Exhibits A1 and A2 which had already been rejected, the only remaining evidence consists of Exhibits A3 and A4. Counsel for the respondents submitted that the lands covered by the rejected deeds did not have direct road access and therefore could not have commanded a high market price. The Court noted that all of the lands in question were agricultural in character and that a valuation of Rs 4,500 per acre could not, on its face, be deemed inadequate. Concerning the issue of access, the Court explained that although the specific parcels sold under the rejected deeds did not themselves touch the road, they formed portions of a larger field that abutted the road; consequently, a purchaser of any of those parcels would acquire a right of way across the unsold portion of the field in order to reach the road. In light of these findings, the Court concluded that the appeal raised no substantive questions. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the opposing party.