Jagdev Singh Sidhanti vs Pratap Singh Daulta

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 936 of 1963

Decision Date: 12 February, 1964

Coram: J.C. Shah, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the matter titled Jagdev Singh Sidhanti versus Pratap Singh Daulta, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 12 February 1964. The opinion was authored by Justice J. C. Shah and the bench comprised Justice J. C. Shah, Chief Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. N. Wanchoo, Justice K. C. Das Gupta and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, had been declared elected to the House of the People from a parliamentary constituency, while the respondent, Pratap Singh Daulta, challenged that election.

The respondent’s petition alleged that the petitioner, together with his election agents, had engaged in multiple corrupt practices defined under section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The principal accusation was that the petitioner and his agents appealed to voters to cast their ballots for him or to abstain from voting for the respondent on the basis of the petitioner’s religion and language. In addition, the respondent contended that the petitioner’s campaign employed a religious symbol—a flag known as “Om Dhwaj”—at every election meeting, thereby violating the statutory prohibition.

The petitioner denied that the flag constituted a religious symbol and asserted that the flag had never been used by him or his agents. He argued that the flag was carried only by a single individual who habitually kept it on his motor car. Moreover, the petitioner submitted that an appeal to the electorate on the grounds of language or religion did not fall within the definition of a corrupt practice under section 123 of the Act.

Procedurally, the election petition filed by the respondent was dismissed by the Tribunal. On appeal, the High Court reversed that decision, holding that the petitioner’s election was void under section 100(1)(b) of the Act, and consequently the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that for an appeal to national or religious symbols to constitute a corrupt practice, the act must be carried out by the candidate or his election agent, or by another person with the consent of the candidate or his agent; only then may it serve as a ground for voiding an election. The Court observed that the syllable “Om” is regarded by Hindus as possessing high spiritual or mystical efficacy and is traditionally used at the commencement of religious prayers. However, the Court clarified that such spiritual significance does not automatically confer on a flag bearing the symbol the character of a religious symbol within the meaning of section 123. A symbol, the Court explained, represents something material or abstract, and to be classified as a religious symbol it must be a visible representation of a thing or concept that is religious in nature.

In the present matter the Court examined whether the symbol “Om” could be treated as a religious emblem for purposes of clause (3) of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act. Although the syllable “Om” is widely regarded as possessing high spiritual or mystical significance, the Court held that its placement on a flag does not, by itself, convey any religious meaning or represent a religious concept. Consequently, the High Court was found to have erred in concluding that the “Om” flag constituted a religious symbol and that its use in the election fell within the ambit of clause (3) of section 123. The Court further explained that clause (3) of section 123 must be interpreted in conformity with the fundamental right guaranteed by article 29(1) of the Constitution, which protects the right of citizens to conserve their language. This constitutional protection includes the right to campaign for the preservation of a language. Accordingly, political agitation aimed at conserving the language of a particular community cannot be characterised as a corrupt practice under section 123(3). The Court distinguished the earlier decision in Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhi Ram, emphasizing that the present case involved a different factual matrix.

The Court clarified that a corrupt practice under clause (3) of section 123 arises only when a person appeals to the electorate to vote for or abstain from voting on the basis of a candidate’s language. It is the personal appeal concerning the candidate’s language that triggers the prohibition contained in section 100 read with section 123(3). Therefore, a corrupt practice is deemed committed solely when voters are urged to support or reject a candidate because of the candidate’s particular language. By contrast, when appeals are made to the electorate for the purpose of conserving the language of a community, and when promises are offered that steps will be taken to protect that language, such conduct does not amount to a corrupt practice. The judgment concerned Civil Appeal No. 936 of 1963, an appeal from the Punjab High Court’s order dated 31 May 1963. Counsel for the appellant included Purshotham Trikamdas and others, while counsel for the respondent comprised G.S. Pathak and others. The appeal was heard on 12 February 1964. The factual background was that in the February 1962 general elections five candidates contested the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency, and on 27 February 1962 Jagdev Singh Sidhanti was declared elected. Subsequently Pratap Singh Daulta filed a petition with the Election Commission seeking a declaration that Sidhanti’s election be set aside on the ground that Sidhanti, his agents, and persons acting with his consent had allegedly engaged in corrupt practices during the election.

In the petition, Daulta asserted that the appellant, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, had been placed as a candidate by the Harding Lok Samiti and that he, together with six individuals—Piare Lal Bhajnik, Ch. Badlu Ram, Pt. Budh Dev, Prof. Sher Singh, Mahashe Bharat Singh and Achilles Bhagwan Dev—were leaders and active workers of the Gurukul Section of the Arya Samaj. According to the petition, these persons had organised a political movement called “the Hindi agitation” in 1957 with the real purpose of fostering hostility between the Sikh and Hindu communities in Punjab on the grounds of religion and language, thereby improving their electoral chances in the 1962 general elections. To achieve that aim, they held meetings in the Hariana region, appealed to voters to support Sidhanti on the basis of his religion and language, and displayed a flag identified as “Om Dhwaj” at all such gatherings. The petition further alleged that the appellant himself made similar appeals, urging the electorate not to vote for Daulta, whom he described as an enemy of the Arya Samaj and of the Hindi language. It was stated that fifteen meetings were convened between 10 December 1961 and 18 February 1962, and at each of those meetings the crowd was urged to vote on religious and linguistic considerations, while attempts were made to promote enmity between Sikhs and Hindus. The petition also contained allegations of undue influence exerted over voters, and a detailed schedule annexed to the petition listed the specific corrupt practices alleged.

The appellant denied that the six persons named in the petition ever acted as his agents in the election campaign, contending instead that they were merely interested in the success of candidates promoted by the Hariana Lok Samiti and acted independently, not on his behalf. He further submitted that the Hariana Lok Samiti had no connection with the Arya Samaj, describing it as a political organisation founded by Prof. Sher Singh, a prominent political leader in the Hariana area. While Sidhanti admitted that he had attended the meetings to canvass votes, he maintained that he was not responsible for convening the meetings or for the speeches delivered by others at those gatherings. Regarding the “Om” flag, he asserted that it was not a religious symbol and denied that it had been used by him, his agents, or the six individuals named by Daulta, except for Bhagwan Dev, who habitually carried a pennant bearing the word “Om” and his own name on his motor vehicle. The appellant claimed that the presence of such a flag on Bhagwan Dev’s vehicle during the election period occurred without his consent and therefore did not constitute a corrupt practice as defined under the Representation of the People Act.

In the proceedings, it was argued that the actions complained of did not constitute a corrupt practice under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The argument noted that the residents of the Hariana area were predominantly Hindi‑speaking, while the Government of Punjab had imposed Punjabi language in the Gurmukhi script as a compulsory subject at various levels of school education. This governmental policy had produced widespread agitation in the region. To oppose the implementation of that policy and to alleviate the hardships experienced by the people of Hariana, a political organization called the Hariana Lok Samiti had been formed. The organization’s purpose, as articulated, was to resist the Government’s policy in the administrative, economic and developmental spheres and to obtain redress of the grievances of the local population. Consequently, an appeal to the electorate seeking a reversal of the Government’s policies was presented, but it was contended that the appeal was not based on language or religion and therefore did not amount to a corrupt practice as defined in section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

The Election Tribunal, after examining the evidence, held that the “Om flag” was not a religious symbol of the Arya Samaj. The Tribunal found that no satisfactory proof had been produced to show that the Om flag had been used as a symbol of the Arya Samaj, nor that any appeal to the electorate to secure votes with the aid of the flag had been made by Sidhanti or by anyone else with his consent. Moreover, the Tribunal observed that there was no satisfactory evidence establishing that appeals had been made to the voters on the grounds of religion or language, either to vote for Sidhanti or to refrain from voting for other candidates. The Tribunal also concluded that the petitioner, Dautla, had failed to demonstrate that any appeal based on caste, community, religion or language had been directed to the electorate to further Sidhanti’s prospects or to prejudice the election of other candidates. On the basis of these findings, together with other matters deemed immaterial to the present appeal, the Tribunal dismissed Dautla’s petition.

Dautla subsequently filed an appeal against the Tribunal’s order before the High Court of Judicature for Punjab. The High Court held that the term “Om” represented a religious symbol of Hindus generally and of the Hindus belonging to the Arya Samaj in particular, and that a flag bearing the inscription “Om” therefore qualified as a religious symbol. The Court observed that the “Om Dhwaj” had been flown during the election campaign on the offices of the Hariana Lok Samiti, especially at Sampla and Rohtak. It was noted that Sidhanti had used the Samiti office for his election campaign and that the Hariana Lok Samiti generally employed the “Om Dhwaj” to promote the prospects of its candidates. The High Court further found that among the agents and supporters of Sidhanti, Bharat Singh at least once and Bhagwan Dev invariably used the Om flag on their vehicles while attending meetings convened by the Hariana Lok Samiti in furtherance of Sidhanti’s election campaign. Additionally, the Court recorded that the Om flag had been flying on the pandal of a meeting held at Majra Dubaldhan on 19 January 1962.

In this case the Court recorded that the appellant, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, together with his agents and supporters, had delivered speeches in support of his election campaign. At a meeting held in Rohtak town, Piare Lal Bhajnik sang a song in the presence of Sidhanti; the content of the song praised the honour of the Om flag and asserted that Bhagwan Dev was using the Om flag with Sidhanti’s consent. The Court also noted that the same singer, Piare Lal Bhajnik, performed a song honouring the Om flag at the Rohtak meeting, again with Sidhanti’s consent. The High Court further found that the appellant had addressed the electorate at Majra Dubaldhan in a pandal on which the Om flag was flying. It held that even a single instance of using or appealing to the Om flag could amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Act, and therefore it concluded that corrupt practices by Sidhanti, his agents and his supporters, carried out with his consent, were established. The Court also observed that Sidhanti had appealed to voters on the basis of language, urging the electorate to refrain from voting for Pratap Singh Dautla because of Dautla’s language, and that such language‑based appeals constituted a corrupt practice. Accordingly, the High Court allowed the election‑tribunal’s appeal, declared the election of Sidhanti void under section 100(1)(b) of the Representation of the People Act, and ordered the appropriate relief. An appeal against that order was filed, with a certificate of appeal granted by the High Court. The appeal raised two principal questions: first, whether a religious symbol had been used in the course of the election by the appellant, his agents or others with his consent to further his electoral prospects; and second, whether appeals had been made to the electorate by Sidhanti, his agents or others with his consent, urging votes for him on the basis of his language and urging avoidance of votes for Dautla on the basis of language. To appreciate the arguments presented by counsel for the parties, the Court considered the political background of the Hariana region and the constituency where the alleged corrupt practices had occurred. The Court explained that the State of Punjab was divided into a Hindi‑speaking region, predominantly Hindu, and a Punjabi‑speaking region, where Hindus and Sikhs were almost equally represented. Prior to partition, Urdu and English had been the official languages of Punjab; after partition, a controversy arose concerning the official language. The Government of Punjab decided to replace Urdu and English with Hindi in the Hindi‑speaking region and Punjabi in the Punjabi‑speaking region, implementing a scheme known as the ‘Sachar formula’, which required every student to be proficient in both Hindi and Punjabi by the time of his matriculation examination.

Two Regional Committees were created, one called the Hindi Regional Committee and the other the Punjabi Regional Committee, and each committee was tasked with advising the local government on financial matters and other related issues. The formation of these committees and the implementation of the Sachar formula generated considerable resentment among sections of the population, which in turn sparked a movement popularly known as the “Hindi agitation.” The agitation against the government’s language policy grew in strength, and by 1957 a large‑scale mass movement had spread throughout the whole State of Punjab. In the final week of December 1957 the organizers of the movement reached a settlement with the State Government, and the agitation was formally called off. After the settlement, some of the movement’s leading figures attempted to convert the popular unrest into political advantage by positioning themselves as probable candidates for the forthcoming election. Within the Arya Samaj in Punjab, two major divisions existed: the Gurukul Section and the College Section, and the Gurukul Section was further split into the Hariana Section and the Mahashe Krishna Section. It was the Gurukul Section of the Arya Samaj that, relying on religious and linguistic differences, sought to make electoral appeals based on religion and the use of religious symbols at the time of the election. The petitioner, Daulta, challenged the election on the ground that the respondent, Sidhanti, his election agents, and other associates had committed multiple corrupt practices. Before the Election Tribunal Daulta limited his case to the corrupt practices enumerated in clauses (2), (3) and (3A) of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Daulta’s allegation of undue influence under clause (2) was rejected by the Tribunal and subsequently by the High Court, and it was not raised before this Court. Likewise, his claim that Sidhanti, his election agents and others had attempted to promote enmity or hatred between different classes of citizens on the bases of religion, race, caste, community or language was dismissed by both the Tribunal and the High Court and therefore does not fall for determination here. Daulta further alleged that Sidhanti and his agents appealed to the electorate to vote for Sidhanti or to refrain from voting for Daulta on the basis of Sidhanti’s religion and language, and that they employed religious symbols such as the Om flag to advance Sidhanti’s election prospects and to prejudice Daulta’s chances. The contention concerning the use of religious symbols and the appeal to language by the two candidates is the specific issue on which the Tribunal’s and the High Court’s conclusions differed, and it is the point that requires examination in the present proceeding. It is therefore appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act before addressing the matters in dispute.

Before addressing the issues that are contested, the judgment first examined the relevant statutory provisions. Section 100(1) of the Act enumerates the grounds on which an election may be declared void. The portion of that section that is material to the present appeal reads: “Subject to the provisions of sub‑section (2) if the Tribunal is of opinion— (a) … (b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by the returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent; (c) … (d) … the Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.” Sub‑section (2) provides an exception whereby, if the Tribunal is satisfied that a returned candidate was guilty of a corrupt practice through an agent who is not the election agent, but that (a) no such corrupt practice was committed by the candidate or his election agent at the election and every such practice was carried out contrary to orders and without the consent of the candidate or his election agent, (b) …, (c) the candidate and his election agent took all reasonable steps to prevent corrupt practice, and (d) in all other respects the election was free from corrupt practice by the candidate or any of his agents, then the Tribunal may decide that the election of the returned candidate is not void. The judgment then turned to Section 123, which defines what constitutes a corrupt practice for the purposes of the Act. Clause (3), as amended by Act 40 of 1961 and the only part of Section 123 that is material in this appeal, states: “The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground of his religion, race, caste, community or language or the use of, or appeal to, religious symbols, such as the national flag or the national emblem, for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate.” The provision can be understood as containing two distinct elements. The first element requires that an appeal to vote or abstain be made by the candidate, his agents, or any other person acting with the consent of the candidate or his election agent, and that the appeal be grounded on the religion, race, caste, community or language of the person whose vote is sought or withheld. The second element concerns the use of, or appeal to, religious symbols, national symbols or national emblems to advance the electoral prospects of a candidate or to prejudice the election of another candidate. The wording of the first element expressly makes the consent of the candidate or his agent a condition for liability, whereas the second element contains no explicit reference to the identity of the person who employs the religious or national symbols.

The Court observed that the statute permits the use of, or an appeal to, religious or national symbols such as the national flag or the national emblem only when such use or appeal is employed to promote the electoral chances of a candidate or to prejudice the election of any other candidate. However, the Court noted that section 123(3) must be read together with section 100, which together imply that the use of or appeal to such symbols must be carried out by the candidate himself, by his election agent, or by any other person acting with the consent of the candidate or his election agent; only then can the ground be invoked for declaring an election void. Consequently, the Court held that if the evidence on record fails to demonstrate that the returned candidate, his election agent, or any other person with their consent was responsible for the use of or appeal to the religious or national symbols, the petition cannot establish a ground for setting aside the election.

The Court then turned to the first issue, namely whether the “Om flag” could be classified as a “religious symbol” within the meaning of section 123(3). This issue was broken down into two sub‑questions. The first sub‑question concerned whether the term “Om” possessed any special religious significance. The Court noted that the syllable “Om” is widely respected by Hindus and holds a distinctive place in Hindu scriptures. It is traditionally recited at the beginning of Hindu religious works. Reference was made to Macdonell’s A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary, which describes “Om” as the sacred syllable employed in invocations, at the start of prayers, at the opening and closing of Vedic recitations, and as a respectful salutation, and it is the subject of many mystical speculations. Monier‑Williams’ Sanskrit‑English Dictionary similarly characterises “Om” as a sacred exclamation uttered at the commencement and conclusion of Vedic readings or before any prayer, and as a particle of auspicious salutation. The Court, however, expressed difficulty in treating “Om” as having religious significance merely because it serves as a preliminary to an incantation or to religious texts. While acknowledging that “Om” is regarded as possessing high spiritual or mystical efficacy and is used at the start of religious prayers, the Court held that such spiritual attributes do not automatically confer the status of a religious symbol on its use on a flag. In other words, the mere presence of “Om” on a pennant does not necessarily transform the flag into a religious symbol for the purposes of the statutory provision.

The Court explained that a symbol is any representation that stands for a material object or an abstract idea. For a symbol to be classified as religious, it must visibly depict a thing or concept that is recognized as religious. While the syllable “Om” is undeniably attributed with high spiritual or mystical efficacy, the Court held that its placement upon a flag does not convey a religious meaning, nor does it embody a religious symbol. Consequently, the Court found it difficult to regard an “Om” flag—simply a pennant bearing the word “Om”—as a religious symbol. Even assuming, for argument’s sake, that the “Om” flag could be treated as a religious symbol, the Court observed that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to show that the petitioner, Sidhanti, his election agents, or any individual acting with their consent, used or displayed the “Om” flag, nor that such use was intended to advance Sidhanti’s electoral prospects. The Court reiterated that, in an election petition trial, the burden of establishing that a successful candidate’s election should be set aside on the ground of corrupt practices lies heavily on the petitioner. The petitioner must prove both that the acts complained of constitute corrupt practices under the law and that the successful candidate is responsible for those acts directly, through agents, or with consent. Such proof must be more than a mere preponderance of probability; it must be established by cogent and reliable evidence that overcomes any reasonable doubt. Applying this standard, the Court examined the evidence. Between 10 December 1961 and 18 February 1962, fourteen meetings were held in the constituency as part of Sidhanti’s election campaign, at locations including Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Akheri, Madanpur, Sampla, Ladpur, Majra Dubaldhan, Pakasma, Assaudha, Jhajjar, Badli Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh. The petitioner also alleged an additional meeting on 4 February 1962 at Rohtak town, which lies outside the Jhajjar constituency. The Tribunal found that the evidence did not establish that the “Om” flag was exhibited at the meetings in Beri, Barhana, Dighal, Sampla, Ladpur, Pakasma, Assaudha, Jhajjar, Badli, Dulehra, Sisana and Bahadurgarh to further Sidhanti’s election prospects, a conclusion that the High Court endorsed. The Tribunal also concluded that there was no reliable evidence that the “Om” flag was used as a religious symbol at Majra Dubaldhan on 19 January 1962 or at Rohtak town on 4 February 1962. However, the High Court disagreed with the Tribunal regarding the Rohtak location, noting that while Rohtak town lay outside the constituency, the Rohtak suburban area was within the constituency contested by Daulta and Sidhanti. Accordingly, the only meeting within the constituency where the “Om” flag was alleged to have been used was the gathering at Majra Dubaldhan on 19 January 1962.

According to the High Court, the only occasion on which the Om flag was displayed within the contested constituency was the meeting held at Majra Dubaldhan on 19 January 1962. Six witnesses gave direct testimony concerning the particulars of that gathering, in addition to the statements made by Sidhanti. Sidhanti, in general terms, asserted that the evidence presented by the witnesses for Daulta regarding the events at Majra Dubaldhan and at three other meetings was false. The witnesses who were called by Daulta were Roop Ram, Sukhi Ram and Ramdhari Balmiki, while the witnesses who supported the appellant’s case were Piare Lal, Professor Sher Singh and Jug Lal. The record shows that the High Court did not rely on the testimony of Ramdhari Balmiki and that no submissions have been made before this Court challenging the reliability of his evidence. Roop Ram, a police constable, testified that at about midday on 19 January 1962 a political meeting was convened at Majra Dubaldhan. He stated that during the meeting Piare Lal sang a bhajan in praise of the Om flag and that he observed the Om flag flying on the pandal, which was attended by approximately four to five thousand persons. Another witness, Nanhu Ram, identified several individuals who delivered speeches at the same gathering, namely Badlu Ram, Jagdev Singh Sidhanti, Bhagwan Dev, Ramdhani Balmiki, Attar Singh, Professor Sher Singh and Acharya Bhagwan Dev. He further recounted that Acharya Bhagwan Dev, in his address, urged electors not to vote for Daulta but to support the candidate contesting on the Hariana Lok Samiti ticket. During cross‑examination, this witness admitted that he had been provided with a copy of the report he had prepared for the Director‑General of Police, C.I.D., Chandigarh, and that he had read that report two or three times before giving his evidence. The Tribunal, having observed the witness personally and assessed his demeanor, declined to rely on his testimony as well as on that of another police constable, Ganesh Dass, who claimed to have attended various political meetings. It appeared that the witness had merely memorised the so‑called reports, and those reports were not made available to counsel for Sidhanti for the purpose of challenging their truth. The High Court, however, did not provide sufficient reasons for accepting this testimony, despite the Tribunal’s explicit refusal to do so. Sukhi Ram, who served as sarpanch of Dubaldhan Panchayat for roughly two years, also gave evidence. He said he was present at the Hariana Lok Samiti meeting on 19 January 1962, which was organized to canvass votes for the Samiti’s candidates. He testified that Professor Sher Singh and Sidhanti arrived in a jeep that bore a flag bearing the Om symbol, that he observed several other vehicles displaying the same flag, and that the vehicle he travelled in to the meeting also carried the Om flag. The Tribunal concluded that, on cross‑examination, Sukhi Ram’s recollection of meetings other than the Majra Dubaldhan gathering was poor, whereas his memory of the Majra Dubaldhan meeting itself was clear, leading the Tribunal to doubt the reliability of his overall testimony.

In this case the Tribunal observed that the facts concerning the meeting held at Majra Dubaldhan were clear, and that the explanations offered by the witness for recalling the details of that particular meeting and not of other meetings could not be accepted. The Tribunal further concluded that the witness had a personal interest in Daulta, an inference that was reinforced by the fact that Daulta had sent the witness a copy of his election petition before the petition was even presented to the Election Commission. The Tribunal also noted that the witness’s evidence conflicted with the summary of the meeting recorded in Schedule D of the petition, and therefore held that the witness’s testimony did not inspire conviction and that it was unsafe to rely upon it. The High Court, after summarising the effect of the evidence, remarked that the deposition did not show that the witness was in any manner interested in Daulta. In reaching that observation, the High Court appear­ingly overlooked the reasons set out by the Tribunal. Witness Piare Lal stated that he had attended the meeting at Majra Dubaldhan and that none of the speakers had urged the electors to vote on the basis of caste, creed, religion or language. He further affirmed that at none of the meetings was any Om flag displayed either inside or outside the pandal. Professor Sher Singh, examined on behalf of Sidhanti, testified that the slogans shouted at the meetings were purely political, that he had not seen any Om flag in any pandal, and that he had instructed all candidates and members of the Hariana Lok Samiti not to use any flag or symbol other than the one allotted to them. Another witness, Jug Lal, also examined for Sidhanti, asserted that at the Majra Dubaldhan meeting on 19 January 1962 there were no Om flags visible either inside or outside the venue and that no vehicles bore any Om flag. The High Court discarded the testimonies of Piare Lal, Professor Sher Singh and Jug Lal on the ground that those witnesses were interested in Sidhanti. Even assuming that assessment of the three witnesses were correct, the evidence presented by Daulta through witnesses Sukhi Ram and Ramdhari Balmiki was found to be wholly unreliable, and the testimony of police constable Roop Ram could not be implicitly relied upon. Consequently, the Court could not agree with the High Court’s conclusion that it had been satisfactorily proved that an Om flag was flown at Majra Dubaldhan where Sidhanti and other speakers delivered election‑campaign speeches. The only other meeting at which the High Court found that an Om flag was used was a meeting in Rohtak town on 4 February 1962, a location that lay outside the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency from which Sidhanti and Daulta were contesting the election.

On February 4, 1962, the town where the meeting took place was agreed to be outside the Jhajjar parliamentary constituency that both Sidhanti and Daulta were contesting. Nevertheless, it was submitted that the suburban area of Rohtak lay within the Jhajjar constituency, that Rohtak town contained a grain market, and that a large number of voters from Jhajjar assembled there. In that setting Sidhanti conducted a meeting at which Om flags were displayed. The party supporting Daulta relied on the testimonies of four witnesses: Ram Nath Sapra, Dafedar Singh, K. K. Katyal, and Satyavrat Bedi. In contrast, the principal witnesses examined by Sidhanti concerning the same meeting were Piare Lal, Bharat Singh, Budh Dev, Prof. Sher Singh, and Bhagwan Dev. Ram Nath Sapra, identified as a correspondent for several newspapers, testified that he attended the Rohtak meeting at Anai Mandi roughly ten to twelve days before polling day. He stated that a large procession preceded the meeting, bearing flags bearing either the ‘Rising Sun’ emblem or the Om symbol, and that he reported on the proceedings and sent his report to all five newspapers for which he wrote. The Tribunal considered Sapra’s testimony unreliable because he could not recall details of any other meetings convened by other parties and was unable to name the speakers who participated in the Hariana Lok Samiti meeting. Consequently, the Tribunal described his testimony as far from convincing and found the testimonies of Sidhanti’s witnesses—Piare Lal, Bharat Singh, Budh Dev, Prof. Sher Singh, and Bhagwan Dev—to be more credible. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal compared Sapra’s statements with the details set out in Schedule D appended to the petition under the heading “Summary of the meetings” and observed a complete variance between the summary and Sapra’s recollection.

The High Court, however, held that Ram Nath Sapra was wholly disinterested and therefore ruled that his evidence should be accepted. The High Court did not address the infirmities identified in Sapra’s testimony, notably the inconsistencies between Daulta’s petition statements and Sapra’s account. Dafedar Singh, a police constable, testified that he had been deputed to report on the meeting’s proceedings; his version also differed from the version recorded in Schedule D. The High Court did not refer to Singh’s testimony in supporting its conclusion and offered no further comment on his evidence. K. K. Katyal, acting as a special correspondent for the Hindustan Times, Delhi, recounted that he attended the Rohtak meeting and remembered seeing flags bearing the Om symbol. He further stated that such flags were displayed on some vehicles, although he could not identify the vehicle owners, and that the flags and placards suggested an affiliation with the Hariana Lok Samiti. Katyal also testified to having visited the Hariana Lok Samiti office in Rohtak and observed a similar Om flag flying on the building, while admitting that he had not visited the Samiti offices at Bahadurgarh or Sampla, as his attention was confined to the central Rohtak office. The Tribunal judged Katyal’s testimony to be vague and unsuitable for reliance. While generally agreeing with this assessment, the High Court observed Katyal’s statement that an Om flag flew at the Hariana Lok Samiti office in Rohtak.

Katyal testified that he had observed flags bearing the symbol “Om” flying on several vehicles, although he could not identify the owners of those vehicles; from the flags and placards he inferred that the vehicles belonged to the Hariana Lok Samiti. He further stated that he had visited the Hariana Lok Samiti office in Rohtak and had seen a similar “Om” flag flying from the office building. During cross‑examination Katyal conceded that he had not visited any Hariana Lok Samiti office in Bahadurgarh or in Sampla, explaining that his attention had been limited to the central office at Rohtak. He also claimed to have seen shopkeepers in Sampla and Bahadurgarh displaying “Om” flags on their stalls. The Tribunal regarded Katyal’s testimony as vague and concluded that no reliance could be placed upon it. While generally agreeing with the Tribunal, the High Court noted that Katyal’s observation that an “Om” flag flew at the Hariana Lok Samiti headquarters in Rohtak and that several “Om” flags were seen in the procession led by Bharat Singh might be accepted. Satyavrat Bedi, a staff correspondent of the Indian Express, reported that during a one‑day survey of the election campaign he had visited Sampla, Bahadurgarh and Rohtak and had sent his observations to the newspaper. In his report he recorded that religious symbols were being used frequently to undermine Daulta’s electoral prospects, that many houses displayed a large number of fluttering flags, that the flag on the Hariana Lok Samiti office was the “Om” flag while other organisations had their own flags, that he had seen an “Om” flag on the office of Sidhanti in Sampla, but he could not recall whether an “Om” flag was displayed at the election office in Bahadurgarh. The Tribunal declined to accept Bedi’s testimony. The High Court, however, took a different view and observed that despite other infirmities in Bedi’s report, his statement that he had seen an “Om” flag flying on the Hariana Lok Samiti office and on a motor‑vehicle belonging to Bharat Singh could not be dismissed outright. The Court emphasized that the issue before it was whether “Om” flags were exhibited at the meeting held at Rohtak on 4 February 1962, and on that point Bedi’s evidence was of little assistance. Sri Ram Sharma, a candidate of the Hariana Front, testified that he had never attended any procession or meeting organised by the Hariana Lok Samiti, but he had observed motor‑vehicles used by the Hariana Lok Samiti bearing “Om” flags.

In the testimony of the witness, it was stated that the Om flag was employed by the candidates of the Hariana Lok Samiti. The witness further declared that he had written a number of articles for Hariana Tilak, a newspaper of Rohtak that he himself had founded. Among those articles, one dated 4 January 1962 contained a condemnation of the use of the Om flag for electoral purposes. The Court observed that an article published on that date could not be taken as evidence of the flag’s use at the meeting held in Rohtak on 4 February 1962. Consequently, the High Court placed no reliance on the testimony of this witness. This testimony represented the entire evidence presented on behalf of Daulta that the counsel for the parties had drawn the Court’s attention to, namely that at the Rohtak meeting on 4 February 1962 the Om flags were displayed and that appeals were made to the flag as a religious symbol.

The Tribunal, however, declined to admit the evidence of the witnesses on the ground that their statements deviated substantially from the summary recorded in Schedule D by the petitioner Daulta himself. Because of this inconsistency between the evidence produced before the Court and the allegations set out in the petition, the Court found it difficult to accept that, after discarding the evidence concerning a large number of meetings, it could still hold that the Om flags had been exhibited at the meeting in Majra Dubaldhan, which lay within the constituency, or at the meeting in Rohtak town, which lay outside the constituency, nor that any appeal had been made in the name of the Om flag to further the election prospects of Sidhanti. Accordingly, the Court was unable to agree with the High Court’s conclusion that the Om flag had been used for election purposes when Sidhanti delivered his speeches at Majra Dubaldhan or at Rohtak town, nor that the flag had been placed on the pandals at those gatherings.

Two additional matters that could influence the question of whether the Om flag was employed during Sidhanti’s election campaign were also considered. The High Court had found that Sidhanti utilised the office of the Hariana Lok Samiti in Rohtak town as his election office. On this point, however, the Court noted that it had not been invited to examine any specific evidence directly supporting that finding. The High Court’s observation rested merely on the common ground that Sidhanti did not possess his own office in Rohtak and therefore inferred that he was using the Hariana Lok Samiti’s premises for his campaign. The Court held that such an inference was not justified by the evidence, especially because Rohtak town lay outside the constituency. Moreover, Sidhanti conceded that Bhagwan Dev Sharma, an Arya Samaj leader, had for many years habitually displayed a pennant bearing the Om symbol together with his name on his motor‑vehicle. Bhagwan Dev Sharma testified that he had attended meetings of the Hariana Lok Samiti and had addressed those meetings, acting independently as a citizen with the right to vote, and that he approved of Sidhanti’s candidature over that of his opponent.

The witness testified that he attended meetings of the Hariana Lok Samiti because he shared their ideology and believed that the organisation served the interests of the Hindu religion. He stated that he was never requested to remove the Om flag that was displayed on his jeep when he arrived at those meetings. Moreover, the witness asserted that his attendance at the meetings was not at the behest of Professor Sher Singh or of Sidhanti; rather, he claimed to have participated in his “independent capacity as a citizen of India having a right to vote.” He also expressed that he preferred the candidature of Sidhanti over that of his opponent.

The Court observed that even though the witness had habitually displayed a pennant bearing the Om symbol on his vehicle for many years, there was no clear evidence establishing that he acted as an agent of Sidhanti, that he had Sidhanti’s consent, or that he had used the flag to make a political appeal on Sidhanti’s behalf. Consequently, the Court found it difficult to infer from the circumstances that, during the election campaign, the witness’s failure to remove the flag from his vehicle constituted an appeal by Sidhanti to the electorate through a religious symbol to enhance his electoral prospects. The evidence concerning the alleged use of the Om flag by Bharat Singh during a procession was also deemed unreliable.

After a careful examination of the testimony, the Court could not endorse the conclusions recorded by the High Court. Specifically, the Court disagreed with the High Court’s findings that: (a) Sidhanti had employed an office of the Hariana Lok Samiti on which the Om flag was flying for election purposes and had delivered election speeches at a pandal where the flag was fluttering to further his electoral chances; (b) agents and supporters had delivered speeches about the Om flag at the meeting held at Majra Dubaldhan on 19 January 1962, and that Piare Lal Bhajnik had sung a song whose purpose was to uphold the honour of the Om flag; and (c) the Hariana Lok Samiti, the party to which Sidhanti belonged, was using the Om flag as part of its election campaign, thereby committing corrupt practices.

The Court acknowledged that the use of the Om flag by Bhagwan Dev on his conveyance was admitted. However, the Court reiterated that this fact, for the reasons already explained, was insufficient to conclude that the flag was employed to further Sidhanti’s prospects of election.

In addressing whether any appeals were made to the electorate to vote for Sidhanti on the ground of his language, or to refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of Daulta’s language, the Court noted that the first step is to determine the precise meaning of the expression “on the ground of his language.” The Court referred to Section 123(3), which was introduced for the first time in its present form by Act 40 of 1961, which defines an appeal by a candidate or his agent to vote or to refrain from voting for a person on the ground of language as a corrupt practice.

The Court held that an appeal to vote for or to refrain from voting for a candidate on the basis of language is described as a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act. It emphasized that this provision must be interpreted in the context of the fundamental right guaranteed by article 29(1) of the Constitution, and that while determining the meaning of a corrupt practice the court must keep the citizen’s fundamental right constantly in view. The Court further explained that the provision cannot be read so as to infringe upon that constitutional right. Article 29(1) states: “Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve the same.” Accordingly, the Constitution has conferred upon Indian citizens, among other things, the right to preserve their language. The right to preserve language includes the right to agitate for the protection of that language. Consequently, political agitation aimed at conserving the language of a particular community cannot be classified as a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123(3). The Court observed that the wording of section 123(3) appears to have been deliberately and carefully chosen for this purpose. Unlike article 19(1), article 29(1) is not subject to any reasonable restriction, and the constitutional guarantee to preserve language is absolute. Therefore, the Court found the earlier decision in Jumna Prasad Mukhariya and others v. Lachhi Ram and others, which was relied upon by the High Court, to be of limited relevance. In that case the provisions of the Representation of the People Act were challenged on the ground that they infringed the fundamental freedom under article 19(1)(a); the Court held that the provisions merely set conditions for a candidate’s entry into Parliament and did not prohibit speech. Those observations, the Court said, do not bear on the protection of the fundamental right to conserve language. The Court clarified that the corrupt practice defined by clause (3) of section 123 arises when an appeal is made either to vote for a candidate or to refrain from voting for a candidate on the ground of that candidate’s language. It is precisely the appeal to the electorate on a personal ground relating to the candidate’s language that triggers the prohibition under section 100 read with section 123(3). Hence, only when voters are urged to vote for or against a candidate because of the particular language of the candidate can such an appeal be deemed a corrupt practice.

In this case, the Court observed that an appeal made to the electorate for the purpose of conserving a language does not constitute a corrupt practice. The Court therefore considered the correctness of the High Court’s findings that the petitioner, Sidhanti, was guilty of the corrupt practice of appealing for votes on the basis of his own language and of urging voters to refrain from voting for Daulta on the ground of Daulta’s language. The petition filed by Daulta on this point was found to be vague. In paragraph eleven of the petition it was alleged that Sidhanti and his agents made a systematic appeal to the audience to vote for Sidhanti and to abstain from voting for Daulta “on the ground of religion and language”. In paragraph twelve the same allegation was repeated, stating that in public meetings held to further Sidhanti’s electoral prospects, Sidhanti and his agents had again made systematic appeals to the electorate to vote for him and to refrain from voting for Daulta “on the ground of his religion and language”. A simple reading of the particulars of the alleged corrupt practice set out in paragraphs eleven and twelve, together with the documents labeled Schs. ‘C’ and ‘D’, clearly shows that Daulta’s case was that Sidhanti had said that if the electorate wanted to protect their language they should vote for the Hariana Lok Samiti candidate. Similar exhortations were said to have been made by other speakers at the various meetings. Sheet ‘D’ records that resolutions were passed at the meetings urging the Government to “abolish Punjabi from Hariana”, that many speakers declared that the Hariana Lok Samiti would fight for Hindi for Hariana, and that they were opposed to the teaching of Punjabi in Hariana. These exhortations to the electorate to induce the Government to change its language policy, or to claim that a political party would agitate for the protection of the language spoken by the residents of the Hariana area, do not fall within the definition of corrupt practices that involve appealing for votes on the basis of the candidate’s language or urging abstention from voting on the basis of the contesting candidate’s language. The Court stressed that speeches made at political meetings for canvassing votes must be examined in the broader context of a political campaign and the passions that are normally aroused in such a campaign. In determining whether an appeal is directed to the language of the candidate, the Court held that a meticulous examination of the speech text in the calm atmosphere of a courtroom, picking out isolated words or phrases to fashion an offending appeal, would not be permissible. Rather, a general and overall picture of the speeches delivered by Sidhanti and other speakers at the

The Court noted that the evidence indicated the public meeting presented merely a series of political promises, exhortations and inducements aimed at securing votes for Sidhanti in the forthcoming election. It was undisputed that in 1957 a widespread agitation had arisen throughout the State of Punjab against the enforcement of the education policy known as the “Sachar formula.” A large number of individuals were imprisoned or detained for acts committed during that agitation, yet the movement itself was not, and could not be, declared illegal. The Court further observed that Hindi constituted the predominant language of the people in the Hariana region, and that a segment of the population believed that compelling students in Hariana to learn Punjabi was contrary to their interests. When such a view was advocated during the election campaign, with promises that the elected candidate would take steps to preserve the regional language, the Court held that it would be difficult to classify that appeal as a corrupt practice. The Court affirmed that a candidate may, in the course of his election campaign, criticize government policies, including language policy, and may promise the electorate that, if elected, he will seek to reverse such policies or take legislative measures to counter any perceived danger—whether real, apprehended, or imagined—to the language of the people. The object of the Hariana Lok Samiti was clearly to resist the imposition of Punjabi in the Hariana area, and this objective was openly incorporated as a platform in the election campaign. Consequently, the Court concluded that it could not be said that voters were urged not to vote for Daulta on the basis of his language, assuming it differed from Hindi, nor could it be said that voters were urged to vote for Sidhanti on the basis of his language. The evidence referred to by the High Court concerning the speeches delivered by Badlu Ram and Harphul Singh on 10 December 1961 at Beri, on its face, demonstrated that the speeches attacked Daulta regarding his political conduct, behaviour and beliefs. The speeches made at meetings in Sampla, Ladpur and Majra Dubaldhan resembled political harangues addressed to the electorate, urging them to support the candidate who would protect the language of the Hariana people. At Bahadurgarh, Sidhanti was reported to have declared his opposition to the Government and to its supporter Daulta in the language movement. The evidence also showed that Sidhanti appealed to voters on the ground that he was actively associated with the Hindi agitation movement, championed the cause of Hindi, and resisted the imposition of the rival language Punjabi, thereby implying that Daulta was hostile to the Hindi cause and supportive of Punjabi. The Court observed that Sidhanti’s criticism of Daulta related to the latter’s political leanings and his support for the Government’s language policy, and was not personally directed against Daulta. Moreover, Sidhanti did not appeal to voters on the basis of his own language. Political speeches that advocate a particular language cause, promise measures, or ask the public to protest the Government’s language policy do not fall within the definition of a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Act. Accordingly, the Court declined to agree with the High Court’s finding that Sidhanti had committed a corrupt practice by appealing for votes on the ground of his language or by urging voters to refrain from voting for Daulta on the basis of language. The appeal was allowed, the order of the Tribunal restored, and costs were awarded, with the decisions of both the Tribunal and the High Court set aside.

In this case the Court observed that the arguments presented to the electorate concerned only the political orientation of Daulta and his support for the Government’s policy; they were not directed against Daulta as an individual. The Court further noted that Sidhanti did not request the voters to support him because of his own language preference. The Court explained that political speeches which promote a particular language, promise certain outcomes, or invite the public to protest the Government’s language policy do not fall within the definition of a corrupt practice under section 123(3) of the Act, a provision that addresses appeals to voters on the basis of language. Accordingly the Court was unable to accept the High Court’s view that Sidhanti had committed a corrupt practice under section 123(3) by seeking votes on the basis of language or by urging voters to withhold their votes from Daulta for language‑related reasons. The Court therefore concluded that the language‑based content of Sidhanti’s speeches fell outside the prohibited category. As a result the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the finding of corrupt practice, restored the order originally issued by the Tribunal and awarded costs to the parties in both this Court and the High Court. The appeal was consequently allowed.