Idol Of Thakurji Shri Govind Deoji... vs Board Of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer and...

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 326 of 1962

Decision Date: 24 August 1964

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.C. Shah

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India examined a dispute between the idol known as Thakurji Shri Govind Deoji Maharaj, which acted as the petitioner, and the Board of Revenue of Rajasthan, Ajmer, together with other respondents. The judgment was delivered on 24 August 1964. The case was recorded under the citation 1965 AIR 906 and also appeared in the Supreme Court Reports at volume 1, page 96. The bench that heard the matter comprised Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Chief Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar and Justice J. C. Shah. The issue before the Court arose from the application of rule 5 of the Jaipur Matmi Rules of 1945, specifically concerning whether a “state grant” made in favour of the idol gave rise to any liability for the payment of Matmi dues. The headnote of the judgment explained that the grants involved were made to the idol itself and not to the individuals who served as its Shebaits. Consequently, the Court held that the death of a Shebait or the succession of a new Shebait did not create any right for the Board of Revenue to claim Matmi dues from the idol. Although the order for payment of the dues had been formally addressed to the Shebait, the Court clarified that the order was intended to be enforced against the property of the idol, and therefore the writ petition filed by the idol was maintainable.

The appeal under consideration was Civil Appeal No. 326 of 1962, which challenged the decision of the Rajasthan High Court dated 10 September 1959 in relation to Civil Writ Petition No. 10 of 1957. Counsel representing the appellant included B. K. Bhattacharya and S. N. Mukherjee, while the State of Rajasthan was represented by G. C. Kasliwal, the Advocate‑General, assisted by K. K. Jain and R. N. Sachthey on behalf of the respondents. The judgment was pronounced by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar. The central question presented to the Court was whether the idol, as the grantee of certain lands under rule 4 of the Jaipur Matmi Rules, was obligated to pay the Matmi amount claimed by the Board of Revenue. The Board had issued an order on 6 November 1956 directing that a Matmi amount of Rs. 15,404 ¼ 6 be recovered from the Shebait of the appellant’s temple. The appellant contested the validity of this order and consequently filed a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the petition, leading the appellant to seek relief before the Supreme Court with a certificate of appeal.

The Rajasthan High Court had held that the sum claimed by the revenue authority could not be recovered from the appellant. That judgment dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant, and the appellant subsequently approached this Court, presenting a certificate issued by the High Court affirming the dismissal. In the petition presented before this Court, the appellant argued that multiple parcels of land had been allocated to it over various periods, and each allocation had been made in the name of the Idol of Thakurji Shri Govind Deoji Maharaj. The petition further asserted that ever since the Idol was transferred from Brindaban to Jaipur, the responsibility for performing the Seva Pooja and managing the temple’s assets had been entrusted to a line of Goswami custodians. After the death of the ninth Shebait, Goswami Shri Krishna Chandra assumed the Shebaitship in 1888 and continued to manage the affairs of the temple until his death in 1935. Following his demise, his eldest son, Goswami Bhola Nath, succeeded as Shebait and oversaw the Seva Pooja throughout his lifetime. Upon the death of Goswami Bhola Nath in 1945, his eldest son, Goswami Pradumna Kumar, became the Shebait and has since administered the temple’s property and conducted the Seva Pooja. It was during the tenure of Goswami Pradumna Kumar that respondent No. 1 issued the impugned order. That order stipulated that a Matmi levy of Rs 15,404/14/6 was sanctioned “in favour of Goswami Bhola Nath on the death of Krishna Chandra Deo and in favour of Pradumna Kumar Deo on the death of Bhola Nath.” The appellant’s petition specifically claimed that the land in dispute had been granted to the Idol itself and that the successive Shebaits merely performed the religious rites and administered the temple property in their capacity as Shebaits. Based on these allegations, the appellant prayed for a writ, order, or direction prohibiting respondent No. 1, the Collector of Sawai Madhopur (respondent No. 2), and their nominees or agents from taking any steps to recover the Matalaba Matmi imposed by the impugned order against the appellant’s estate. The appellant also sought a directive quashing both the impugned order and the earlier order dated 20 April 1954 on which the former was based. Respondents 1, 2 and the State of Rajasthan (joined as respondent No. 3) contested the appellant’s claim and raised several defenses. Regarding the appellant’s assertion that the properties had been granted to the Idol, the respondents replied that they could not admit the allegation because the original grant documents were unavailable and could not be traced. The respondents further maintained that the Matalaba Matmi had been correctly levied against the Shebaits and that the appellant’s grievance that the properties were exempt from liability was unfounded. The High Court had

The High Court examined the dispute by initially assuming that the appellant, identified as the Idol of Thakurji Shri Govind Deoji Maharaj, held legal title to the lands in question. However, the Court also concluded that because the Shebaits administered those lands and performed the religious services for the Idol, the relationship of Shebaitship itself constituted a form of property interest that attracted the application of the relevant statutory rules. In particular, the Court held that the beneficial interest enjoyed by the Shebaits could be characterised as a “State grant” within the meaning of rule 4(1). On that footing, the Court interpreted the Matmi Rules as dealing with the succession of a Shebait rather than with a succession of an ordinary proprietor. To support this view, the Court pointed out that the ancestors of the current Shebait had previously applied for Matmi, and that the present Shebait had also filed a similar application on his own behalf. The Court explained that, according to the plain meaning of the definition of “Matmi”, the liability arises at the moment when the successor Shebait is formally recognised. The Court further observed that the writ petition had been brought by the Idol, while the Shebait appeared only as the Idol’s agent; consequently, the petition was not technically a petition filed by the Shebait themselves. Since the impugned order had been directed against the Shebait, the Court held that the Idol’s grievance was not properly founded. Nevertheless, the Court was persuaded that, because of the beneficial interest that the Shebaits possessed in the temple property, the order against the Shebait was correctly issued under the existing rules. After considering the substance of the writ petition, the Court dismissed the petition and ordered the appellant to pay costs. The principal judgment was delivered by Justice Bhandari, and Justice Modi concurred with Justice Bhandari’s conclusions. In a succinct order, Justice Modi outlined the main reasons for his agreement and stated that the Court was powerless to provide relief to the appellant given the current state of the Rules. Justice Modi suggested that the only possible remedy for the appellant would be to approach respondent No 3 and request the exercise of its discretion under clause (xvii) of rule 20 in order to obtain an exemption from the amount claimed. The appellant, dissatisfied with that decision, sought review before this Court. The Court then defined “Matmi” as the change of name of the successor to a State grant upon the death of the preceding holder. The individual whose name is entered as the successor is termed the “matmidar,” and the sum payable upon his recognition is called “matalba matmi.” Rule 4(4) further defines “Nazrana” as an additional sum payable, over and above matalba matmi, by an adopted son or by a successor who is not a direct male lineal descendant of the last holder. Accordingly, rule 4(1) clarifies that a “State grant” includes, among other things, an interest in land that is conferred by the sovereign authority.

The Court observed that the grant in question originated from the ruler of the Jaipur State and that it comprised either a charitable or a religious grant. It noted that the High Court had examined the present writ petition on the premise that the grant had been made in favour of the idol itself. The Court affirmed that the two grants highlighted by the High Court fully supported this interpretation. The first grant was evidenced by a copy of a Patta dated the twenty‑first day of Ramzan in the year 1123, annexed as Exhibit 4, which showed that the villages of Dehra and Salampukh Balahadi located in Pargana Hindaun and allotted to Baseshu Prasad had been designated for the “Punya Bhog” of Thakurji Sriji. The second grant was shown by a copy of a Patta dated Katik‑Badi 8 of the year 1808, annexed as Exhibit 5, which indicated that the village of Govindpur in Bas Hathyod, Tehsil Oasaba, Sawai Jaipur, had been allotted for the Bhog, meaning food offerings, of Thakurji Sriji. On the basis of these documents, the Court expressed no difficulty in dealing with the present appeal on the same footing adopted by the High Court in its judgment.

The Court then explained that the grants at issue had been made directly in favour of the idol and not in favour of the shebaits who manage the temple property. It reiterated the well‑known principle that a religious grant may be made either directly to the idol as a juridical entity or to a person who is burdened with the duty of performing the necessary services to the temple. The present appeal concerned the former category, namely a grant made to the idol itself. Accordingly, any management of the granted property by the shebait was undertaken solely by virtue of his shebaitship and not because the shebait was a grantee of the State. The Court then turned to the statutory framework. Rule 5 stipulated that every State grant was subject to Matmi, subject to certain exceptions, none of which were relevant to the present case. Rule 6 required persons claiming succession to a grant to submit a death report. Rule 7 prescribed a penalty for a successor who failed to file such a report. Rule 8 allowed for the attachment of State grants while Matmi issues were pending. Rule 9 dealt with the payment of Bhograj expenses during the attachment of a bhog grant. Rule 12 provided that a claim for succession made more than one year after the death of the last holder would be barred as time‑expired and the grant would be resumed. Rule 13 addressed the determination of persons entitled to succeed, while Rule 14 dealt with succession where there was no direct male lineal descendant. The proviso to Rule 14 stated, inter alia, that for a grant intended for the maintenance of a temple other than a lain temple, the Government could, at its discretion, select any male lineal descendant of the original grantee as successor, taking into account his suitability for performing worship. The Court clarified that the remaining rules were not pertinent to the present appeal. Finally, the Court identified the key issue as whether the grant made to the appellant attracted the operation of Rule 5, which mandated the levy of Matmi in respect of State grants.

The Court observed that if rule 5, which governs the levy of Matmi on State grants, were to apply to the present grant, the appellant would have no viable claim. Consequently, the Court examined whether the appellant’s estate was liable to pay Matmi under rule 5, which required an analysis of the nature of Matmi and whether a demand for it could be made against the appellant. The Court reiterated that Matmi denotes the mutation, or change, of the name of the successor to a State grant upon the death of the last holder of that grant. It then noted that where a grant is made to an idol or a temple as an entity, there is no issue of the death of the grantee and, therefore, no issue of a successor arising.

The Court explained that an idol, being a juridical person, is not subject to death because Hindu belief holds that an idol endures forever. Accordingly, it is impossible to assert that the idol, which is the grantee in this case, died at any point, and that any successor’s claim could be evaluated. Because of this, the Court found it difficult to sustain any claim for Matmi against the appellant. This conclusion implied that no monetary recovery could be obtained from the property belonging to the idol on the basis that Matmi could be claimed against a person asserting themselves as the successor of the shebait of the appellant. The learned Advocate‑General could not refute this reasoning. He attempted, however, to argue that not all grants relating to the appellant’s properties were before the Court, and therefore it might be improper to assume that every property of the appellant had been granted in the appellant’s own name.

The Court was not persuaded by that argument. It pointed out that the appellant had specifically averred in paragraph 3 of its writ petition that all State grants made to the appellant over time were in the name of the idol. Although the respondents did not expressly admit this averment, they contended that the original grant documents were unavailable and consequently required the appellant to prove its case. The appellant produced two grant documents, and, as the High Court’s judgment indicated, the matter proceeded on the basis that the idol was the grantee of all the properties involved. On that footing, the Court concluded that the Advocate‑General could not now maintain that some of the properties might have been granted to the shebaits, even though the shebaits would unquestionably be burdened with the duty of performing services for the idol.

The Court further noted that the High Court appeared to adopt the view that because a shebait possesses a certain beneficial interest in temple property, that beneficial interest could itself be regarded as a State grant. The Court indicated that this was the basis on which the High Court had reached its conclusion.

The High Court had concluded that the order issued by respondent No. 1 and challenged in the present proceedings was legally valid. In the matter before us, the question of whether a succeeding Shebait could be required to pay a Matmi by the respondents was not open for determination; however, the High Court had placed particular emphasis on the proposition that the Shebait possessed a beneficial interest in the properties that had been granted to the appellant. It was therefore necessary to clarify that, although a Shebait, by virtue of the special status conferred upon him under Hindu law, may assert a certain beneficial interest, such an interest does not arise from any grant made by the State. Rather, the interest is founded upon the provisions of Hindu law, on established custom, or on the usage prevailing in the temple or in the locality where the temple is situated. In the case of Tilkayat Shri Govindalalji Maharaj etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (1964) 1 S.C.R. 561, the Court incidentally examined the position of the Shebaits and adopted with approval the observations of Mr. Justice Ameer Ali recorded in Vidva Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Balusami Ayyar 2 48 I.A. 392, 311. Justice Ameer Ali observed that, in almost every instance, the Mahant is accorded a right to a portion of the usufruct, the manner of enjoyment and the quantum of the usufruct being determined again by usage and custom. He further noted that the property was never conveyed to or vested in the Mahant, nor was he a trustee in the English sense, although, because of the obligations and duties incumbent upon him, he is answerable in the general sense of a trustee for any mis‑administration. Consequently, it appears that the High Court erred in treating the Shebait’s beneficial interest in the properties granted to the appellant as equivalent to a State grant. That error renders the order impugned by the appellant invalid, and the order of respondent No. 1 is therefore correctly set aside. The incidental effect of the High Court’s conclusions may be understood to mean that, assuming the order of respondent No. 1 were valid, the amount claimed could be recovered from the appellant’s properties. This point required clarification. By way of a Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 1081 of 1964, the appellant informed the Court that it had lodged a compensation claim because lands granted to it had been resumed by the State of Rajasthan by notification No. F.(388)/REV/1.A/53 dated 1 January 1959 and that an annual annuity to the Deity had been sanctioned by the State under an order dated 24 April 1962. The later order, however, directed that the sum of Rs. 15,404 14 6 ordered by respondent No. 1 to be recovered as Matmi should be deducted, a deduction the appellant argued could not be effected. This circumstance clearly demonstrates the appellant’s apprehension that, although the Matmi order is formally directed against the present Shebait, it may in reality be enforced against the properties belonging to the appellant.

The Court observed that although the order had been nominally passed against the present Shebait, it could be enforced against the properties belonging to the appellant. The Court had previously held that the properties granted to the appellant were State grants within the meaning of rule 4(1), but that those grants did not become liable to pay Matmi dues under rule 4(3). On that basis, the Court concluded that the appellant’s writ petition was justified because it sought an appropriate direction restraining the respondents, their nominees or agents, from recovering the amount in question from the appellant’s estate. Accordingly, the prayer made by the appellant in paragraph 16(1) of the writ petition was ordered to be allowed. The Court further noted that it was not concerned with the validity of the order passed by respondent No. 1 against the present Shebait, and therefore chose not to express any opinion on the merits of the prayer contained in paragraph 16(2) of the writ petition. As a result, the appeal was allowed, the order passed by the High Court was set aside, and the appellant’s writ petition was granted with costs. The appeal was thereby allowed.