Haridas Das And Anr vs State Of West Bengal And Ors

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1961

Decision Date: 16 March 1964

Coram: A.K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled Haridas Das and Anr. versus State of West Bengal and Ors., the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 16 March 1964. The judgment was authored by Justice A K Sarkar, who was joined on the Bench by Justice M Hidayatullah and Justice J R Mudholkar. The petitioners, Haridas Das and the other appellant, challenged an order that had directed proceedings against them under sections 193, 199 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Their appeal was filed under a certificate of appeal granted pursuant to Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. The central issue before the Court concerned the interpretation of section 211 of the Penal Code, which penalises the act of falsely charging a person with the commission of an offence. The petitioners contended that, for a person to be liable under that provision, the false charge must relate to a criminal offence, meaning that the offence alleged must give rise to a criminal proceeding, or the accused must have instituted or caused such a proceeding. They argued that the charge the appellants had made was for contempt of court, a matter they claimed did not constitute a criminal proceeding, and therefore section 211 should not apply.

The Court, delivering its reasoning through Justice Sarkar, first considered the hypothetical that a proceeding for committal for contempt of court might not be classified as a criminal proceeding within the meaning of section 211. Even assuming that premise, the Court held that the language of section 211 clearly encompassed the act of falsely charging a person with any offence, without limiting the offence to one that necessarily leads to a criminal proceeding. The Court examined the definition of “offence” in section 40 of the Penal Code, which includes any offence under the Code itself or under any special law. Section 41 further defines a special law as one applicable to a particular subject matter. Accordingly, the Court concluded that an offence under the Contempt of Court Act fell within the ambit of the definition of offence in sections 40 and 41, and therefore a false charge of contempt could be punished under section 211. By falsely invoking a charge of contempt of court, the appellants had thus made themselves liable to prosecution under that provision. The Court distinguished the earlier authorities of Empress v. Jamoona (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 620, Karim Buksh v. Queen Empress (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 574 and Queen Empress v. Karigowda (1895) I.L.R. 19 Bombay 51, indicating that those cases did not control the present circumstance.

Justice Hidayatullah added that there could be no doubt that the initiation of contempt of court proceedings constituted the institution of criminal proceedings, since contempt of court is punishable by imprisonment and fine. Consequently, a false accusation of contempt amounts to a false charge of an offence punishable under the Penal Code, and section 211 was applicable. Justice Mudholkar further observed that a false charge made before any competent authority, irrespective of whether that authority could try the accused, fell within the scope of section 211. He emphasized that the provision was not limited to false charges made to a person who alone possessed the power to try the accused, thereby reinforcing the Court’s conclusion that the appellants could be prosecuted under section 211 for their false contempt allegations.

The Court observed that the term “criminal proceedings” appearing in section 211 of the Penal Code includes proceedings for contempt of court. The Privy Council had described such proceedings as quasi‑criminal because they are not conducted under the Criminal Procedure Code. The Court noted that the Criminal Procedure Code does not exhaustively define all criminal proceedings, and that punishments for contempt by summary procedure before superior courts constitute special criminal proceedings which the Code of Criminal Procedure does not regulate. Consequently, the Court held that the Calcutta High Court possessed jurisdiction to order a prosecution under section 211 of the Penal Code, a view expressed by Justice Mudholkar. The Court further explained that making a false charge before any person, irrespective of the person’s identity, falls within section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 211 applies where an accused makes a false charge against another before a person competent to investigate, and either the accuser himself initiates proceedings or causes them to be initiated. The provision is not confined to false charges made to a person who also has the power to try the accused or to commit him for trial before another court. The Court rejected a narrow construction of the words “falsely charges” limited by the phrase “institute or cause to be instituted any criminal proceeding”. It explained that the legislature deliberately distinguished between the act of instituting proceedings and the act of making a false charge, and there is no justification for reading the section as limited only to the institution of a complaint based on a false charge. Moreover, the Court clarified that the word “offence” in section 211 also embraces acts punishable under a special law; since the law of contempt is a special law, an offence under the Contempt of Court Act qualifies as an offence under section 211, and therefore the High Court’s order was upheld.

The judgment was recorded under the heading “Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction – Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1961”. The appeal arose from the judgment and order dated 5 January 1959 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Revision No. 3 of 1957. Counsel for the appellants were Sarjoo Prasad and P. K. Chatterjee. Counsel for respondent No. 1 were Niharendu Dutt Majumdar, P. K. Chakravarty and P. K. Bose. Counsel for respondents Nos. 2 to 4 was S. C. Majumdar. The order was pronounced on 16 March 1964. Justice Sarkar delivered the judgment. The Court recounted that the Calcutta High Court had ordered the Registrar to lodge a complaint before a magistrate against the appellants under sections 211, 199 and other appropriate sections of the Indian Penal Code. Acting on that direction, the Registrar filed a complaint against the appellants invoking sections 193, 199 and 211 of the Code. The appellants subsequently challenged the High Court order by invoking a certificate granted under article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The Court noted that the appellants had earlier approached the High Court seeking committal for contempt of court against certain respondents, hereinafter referred to as the Mondal respondents, alleging breach of an injunction issued in a suit that prohibited the respondents from disturbing the appellants’ possession.

The appellants asserted that the Mondal respondents had tried to forcefully enter the property that was subject to the injunction and, in the course of such attempt, had broken open the gate, cut down one tree and also broken down the gate. The High Court therefore referred the matter to a Sub‑ordinate Judge for a report on the alleged breach of the injunction. After considering that report, the High Court concluded that the appellants “could not reasonably be believed” and concurred with the Sub‑ordinate Judge’s view that “the allegations made by the petitioners are not true”. Accordingly, the petition for committal for contempt of court was dismissed. Subsequently, the Mondal respondents approached the High Court and obtained an order directing that a complaint be lodged, as previously mentioned. Their contention was that the appellants had made deliberate false statements in affidavits filed in connection with the application for committal of the Mondal respondents for contempt of court. Counsel for the appellants, Mr Sarjoo Prasad, first argued that the order directing a complaint under sections 193 and 199 of the Indian Penal Code could not be sustained because the order dismissing the contempt application did not contain a definite finding that any false statement had been made. The Court noted that it had earlier set out the relevant parts of that order and believed that the order indeed contained such a finding, holding that “the allegations............ are riot true”. The Court found it unnecessary to pursue this point further, observing that Mr Sarjoo Prasad’s contention was clearly untenable. Mr Sarjoo Prasad then submitted that there was no basis for lodging a complaint under section 211 of the Code, contending that commission of an offence under that provision required either the institution of a criminal proceeding, causing such a proceeding to be instituted, or the false charging of a person with an offence. He maintained that the appellants had done none of these, because the proceedings they had initiated were for committal for contempt of court and, in his view, such proceedings were not criminal in nature. Assuming that a contempt‑committal proceeding is not a criminal proceeding within the meaning of section 211, it follows that the appellants neither instituted nor caused the institution of any criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, section 211 also makes it an offence to falsely charge a person with the commission of an offence, and the Court was of the opinion that the appellants had indeed charged the Mondal respondents. In response, Mr Sarjoo Prasad argued that the charge contemplated by the section must be one that would give rise to

The Court examined the argument that the phrase “falsely charging a person with the commission of an offence” in section 211 required the alleged offence to give rise to a criminal proceeding. The submission relied on three authorities, none of which, in the Court’s view, supported that proposition. The first authority was Express v. Jamoona (1881) T.L.R. 6 Cal. 620, where it was held that a charge must be made against a person who possesses the competence to act on it and the power to investigate and commit the matter to trial. The second authority cited was Karim Buksh v. The Queen Empress (1890) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 574, which held that a false complaint to the police concerning a cognizable offence constituted the institution of a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the second paragraph of section 211 and attracted a higher punishment. The third authority referred to was Queen Empress v. Karigowda (1895) I.L.R. 19 Bom. 51, where the court described the words “falsely charging’’ in section 211 as technical terminology and observed that an imputation made in evidence before a departmental enquiry did not amount to a charge in the sense intended by the statute. In each of those cases the alleged charge related to an offence triable in a criminal proceeding, and the judgments consequently discussed the institution of criminal proceedings in connection with the charge. None of the precedents considered the question before us, namely whether a false charge could be made in respect of an offence that could be tried by a proceeding which was not a criminal proceeding. The Court therefore concluded that those cases did not endorse the contention advanced by counsel. Relying on principles of statutory construction, and in the absence of any contrary authority, the Court agreed with the High Court’s interpretation that the provision does not require the offence to be one that necessarily gives rise to a criminal proceeding. This view is reinforced by the definition of “offence’’ in section 40 of the Code, which states that an offence under section 211 means an offence punishable under the Code or under any special or local law as defined in section 41. Section 41 defines a special law as one applicable to a particular subject, and the Contempt of Courts Act, being a special law dealing with contempt, falls within that definition.

In this matter the Court observed that the Contempt of Courts Act deals specifically with the subject of contempt of courts and, consequently, qualifies as a special law. The Act prescribes that a person may be punished for contempt by simple imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, subject to the conditions outlined in sections three and four. Because a charge of contempt of court falls within the definition of an offence under section two‑one of the Code, such a charge constitutes an offence within the meaning of that provision. The Court noted that the charge in question had indeed been brought in the present case and that it had been presented to the only authority empowered to act on it, namely the High Court, since without the High Court’s sanction no complaint for lodging a false charge of contempt could be entertained. Accordingly, the order directing the lodging of the complaint with respect to an offence under section two‑one was found to be proper, leading the Court to conclude that the appeal lacked any substantive ground and should be dismissed.

Justice Hidayatullah then explained that the High Court of Calcutta had directed its Registrar to file a written complaint against the appellants for alleged violations of sections one‑ninety‑three, one‑ninety‑nine and two‑one of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court had nevertheless certified that the matter was suitable for appeal under article one‑three‑four, clause one, sub‑clause (c) of the Constitution, and the present petition before this Court arose from that certification. The appellants, having previously obtained a temporary injunction from the High Court restraining respondents numbered two to four from disturbing their possession of certain properties, filed an application before the High Court alleging that the respondents, in contravention of the injunction, had trespassed on the property, broken down a gate and cut down a tree. In that application they sought relief under the Contempt of Courts Act. The High Court remitted the issue for enquiry, and the enquiry reported that the allegation was false. Consequently, the High Court arrived at a similar conclusion and ordered the Registrar to file a complaint for the prosecution of the appellants. During the hearing, preliminary objections concerning the competence of the appeal were raised but later withdrawn after the Court indicated it was not inclined to interfere with the merits of the High Court’s order.

The Court stated that, in cases of this nature, it ordinarily limits its review to whether the High Court has fairly considered the matter and reached a prima facie view that there exists a good reason to commence prosecution, that a reasonable prospect of conviction exists, and that proceeding with prosecution serves the interests of justice. Having examined the matter from that perspective, the Court was satisfied that the High Court had correctly assessed the case. Nonetheless, a contention was raised that section two‑one of the Indian Penal Code could not apply because, at the time the appellants made the application that gave rise to the prosecution, no offence under that section could be said to have been prima facie committed by them. The Court then quoted the full text of section two‑one, which provides that a person who, with the intent to cause injury to another, institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge, shall be punished accordingly.

The provision of section 211 of the Indian Penal Code provides that any person who falsely charges another with having committed an offence, while knowing that there is no just or lawful basis for such a charge or proceeding, shall be punished either with imprisonment for a term that may extend to two years, or with a fine, or with both. If the false charge relates to an offence that is punishable with death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for seven years or more, the offender shall be liable to imprisonment for a term that may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to a fine. The Court observed that, on the face of it, the appellant’s intention appeared to be to cause injury to the respondents should their report to the High Court have been false. The Court noted that the essential issue to be resolved was whether the appellant’s action amounted to instituting a criminal proceeding.

The Court explained that an application filed under the Contempt of Courts Act can undoubtedly be regarded as causing a criminal proceeding to be instituted. It rejected the contention that the application neither charged the respondents with any offence nor instituted a criminal proceeding against them. While acknowledging that there might be a dispute about whether the respondents were expressly charged with an offence, the Court stated that it would not opine on that point. However, the Court affirmed that there could be no doubt that the application amounted to the institution of a criminal proceeding because contempt of court is punishable by imprisonment and fine, and that such an accusation falls within the wide term “criminal proceedings.” The Court further noted that the Privy Council had described such proceedings as “quasi‑criminal” because they are not tried under the Criminal Procedure Code, but that this description does not negate their criminal character. The Court clarified that the Criminal Procedure Code does not exhaust the definition of criminal proceedings, and that punishments for contempt by summary procedure before superior courts are special criminal proceedings that the Code does not seek to regulate. Consequently, if there was no just or lawful ground for commencing the contempt proceeding in the High Court—as held by that Court—the requirements of section 211 were deemed prima facie satisfied. In the Court’s opinion, the High Court possessed jurisdiction to order a prosecution under section 211 in the present case. The appellants, the Court added, remained free to raise any pleas of law or fact, and the observations made by the High Court or by this Court regarding the facts should not impede them from advancing such pleas. Accordingly, the Court agreed to dismiss the appeal.

In the present case the High Court directed that a complaint be lodged against the appellants for offences punishable under sections 199 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code. The dispute originated when respondents numbered two, three and four purchased, at a public sale conducted for the recovery of rent, the parcel identified as plot number three‑six‑five in the village of Jagdispur, situated in the district of Twenty‑four Parganas, on or about the seventh of April, 1951. They obtained a court decree conveying possession of the land, although the possession they acquired was essentially only on paper. On the twenty‑fifth of September, 1951, appellant number one, Haridas Das, instituted a suit before the Munsif Court at Sealdah seeking a declaration that his legal right, title and interest in the land had not been transferred by the sale, a confirmation of his possession of the land, and a permanent injunction restraining respondents two, three and four from disturbing his possession. He also applied for a temporary injunction to prevent any disturbance by the respondents. The Munsif dismissed the temporary injunction application, and the dismissal was upheld on appeal by the Third Additional District Judge at Alipore. Unsatisfied, the appellant then filed an application for revision of the Additional District Judge’s order before the High Court. By an order dated the third of May, 1954, Justice B. K. Guha granted a temporary injunction in favour of appellant one, restraining respondents two, three and four from disturbing his possession until the final disposal of the suit. The judgment observed that the respondents would not suffer serious inconvenience if they were, in substance, required to possess the property jointly with appellant one.

Subsequently, around the twelfth of June, 1956, appellant one filed an application under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, alleging, among other matters, that on the seventh of June, 1956 respondents two, three and four, together with other persons, attempted a forcible entry into the plot that was protected by the injunction previously granted by the High Court. During this alleged attempt the respondents are said to have broken open the gate and to have felled a tree standing on the plot. The appellant further asserted that police officers arrived at the scene and restored peace. He claimed that the conduct of respondents two, three and four amounted to a breach of the injunction issued by the High Court. The application was verified by an affidavit signed by the second appellant, Jyotish Kumar Seal, who declared that, to the best of his knowledge, the factual statements contained in each paragraph of the application were true. Following the filing of the application, the Court issued a rule directing respondents two, three and four to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court and punished for violating the injunction. The matter was heard on the twenty‑fifth of July, 1956, when the Bench ordered the Subordinate Judge of Alipore to conduct an enquiry and submit a report. In compliance with that direction, the Subordinate Judge examined the witnesses presented by the appellants and also examined, as a court witness, the Officer‑in‑charge of Rajarhat Police Station, to whom a report

The Subordinate Judge forwarded his report to the High Court after completing his inquiry. Upon receiving the report, the High Court convened a hearing, listened to the submissions of the parties, and examined the contents of the report on 30 August 1957. After this consideration, the High Court issued an order that discharged the earlier rule which had required the respondents to show cause for contempt. While issuing that order, the High Court made several observations. The Court noted that the allegations advanced by the petitioner were not supported by the evidence. The Court affirmed that it had examined the material itself and concurred with the conclusions reached by the learned Subordinate Judge. The Court accepted, as stated by Jyotish Kumar Seal, that certain individuals belonging to the opposite side had visited the garden to inquire about the authority authorising the construction of a hut, which was indeed being erected. However, the Court held that the claim that members of the opposite side forcibly opened the gate and felled a tree could not be sustained on reasonable grounds. The Court further observed, in line with the Subordinate Judge’s findings, that the report filed by the Officer‑in‑charge of Rajarhat Police Station did not mention any disturbance, looting, or damage to the garden or its trees.

Subsequently, on 17 September 1957, respondents numbered two to four filed an application before the High Court under Section 466 read with Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking to lodge a criminal complaint against the appellants under Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code or any other appropriate provision in connection with the contempt proceedings pending before the High Court. The High Court issued a rule directing the appellants to appear and heard their response to the application. After hearing them, the Court concluded that, in the interests of justice, it was appropriate to proceed with a criminal complaint. Accordingly, the High Court made the rule absolute and instructed the Registrar of the Appellate Side to file a complaint against the appellants under Sections 211 and 199 of the Indian Penal Code, or any other suitable provision, before the Chief Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta. Following this directive, the Registrar entered a complaint on 16 January 1959 invoking Sections 193, 199 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code in the court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta. The appellants then moved the High Court for a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court, invoking Articles 133(1)(c) and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. By an order dated 8 May 1959, the High Court granted the certificate, overriding the objections raised on behalf of the respondents. The High Court based its decision on the fact that the precedent set in The Empress v. Jamoona, where it was held that a conviction under Section 211 requires a false charge to be made before a court or an officer with jurisdiction to investigate and refer for trial, had not been considered by the Court. The Court also addressed the respondents’ contention that the High Court’s order directing the lodging of a complaint was not a final order, a point that was subsequently examined by this Court.

The High Court had examined whether the order in question qualified as a final order and concluded that certainty on that point was lacking; consequently, it directed that any doubt should be resolved in favour of the appellants. Counsel for the appellants, Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, relied upon the authority cited in the High Court’s order granting the certificate of fitness, and also invoked the judgment of Ranade, J., rendered in Queen Empress v. Karigowda (2). The earlier authority involved a case in which Jamoona presented a complaint before Captain Simpson, who served as Adjutant of the 11th M.N.I. and as Station Staff Officer, accusing a non‑commissioned officer of rape. Captain Simpson conducted an enquiry, discovered that the accusation was false, and the Commanding Officer nevertheless ordered that the appellant be tried in a criminal court under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant was committed to trial and subsequently convicted by the Judicial Commissioner for that offence. Upon appeal, the High Court held that because the Station Staff Officer possessed neither magisterial nor police authority, the provisions of section 211 could not be invoked against him.

During that appeal, Mitter, J., observed that “We do not think it unduly refining the words to say that the false charge must be made to a Court or to an officer who has powers to investigate and send up for trial.” Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code then reads: “Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any person, institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely (1)(1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 620. (2) (1895) I.L.R. 19 Bom. 51. charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; and if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” The section, when parsed, requires proof of three elements: (a) the accused intended to cause injury to another person; (b) with that intention, the accused instituted or caused the institution of a criminal proceeding against that person, or alternatively, falsely charged that person with having committed an offence; and (c) the accused acted with knowledge that there was no just or lawful basis for such proceeding or charge. The Court considered whether the provision applied to a false charge made before any individual or only to a charge made to a person occupying a specific position. It observed that because making a false charge before any person, regardless of status, is already covered by section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, it would be appropriate to construe the provision accordingly.

The Court observed that the provision should be understood to apply only in situations where the accused makes a false accusation against another person before an authority who is competent to investigate the matter and who either can commence proceedings himself or can cause proceedings to be started. The Court further held that the provision was not confined to false accusations made to an authority who also possessed the power to try the accused or to commit him for trial before another court. This narrow construction was considered sufficient to avoid any overlap between the provisions of the present section and those of section 500, and the Court saw no need to extend the interpretation beyond this point.

In a separate case, the factual background involved an individual named Karigowda who was tried for an offence punishable under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code. Karigowda had allegedly given false testimony in a bribery enquiry conducted by a District Magistrate, claiming that he had paid a bribe of Rs 300 to a magistrate in the Bijapur district named Jehangir. After the enquiry concluded, Jehangir obtained governmental permission to prosecute Karigowda under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. Simultaneously, a complaint was lodged against Karigowda under section 211 of the same code. At the conclusion of the trial, the presiding magistrate dismissed the charge under section 500 and convicted Karigowda solely under section 211. On appeal, the Joint Sessions Judge set aside the conviction under section 211. The Government then appealed to the High Court, which reversed the earlier acquittal under section 500 and upheld the conviction under section 211.

Judge Jardine, one of the two judges hearing the appeal, referred to Jamoona’s case (1881 I.L.R. 6 Cal. 620) and held that the precedent was inapplicable. He further observed that the present case appeared to fall outside the scope of section 211 because Karigowda did not intend to set criminal proceedings in motion. Jardine noted that Karigowda had been produced before Mr Monteath against his will and that his statements, though characterised as “information” under section 191(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and as “defamation” under the Penal Code, did not amount to a “false charge” after considering the Full Bench decision (I.L.R. 17 Cal. 574).

Judge Ranade, however, made observations that were heavily relied upon by counsel Sarjoo Prasad. Ranade stated that the phrase “falsely charging” in the statute must be read together with the words referring to the “institution of proceedings.” He emphasized that these latter words were used in a technical and exclusive sense, and, by parity of reasoning, the same restricted meaning should be applied to the words relating to a false charge. Ranade also concurred with Judge Jardine that Karigowda had not voluntarily lodged a complaint; rather, his statements were responses to questions posed during the departmental enquiry. In the Court’s judgment, it was held that it would be erroneous to interpret the words “or falsely charges” as being limited solely to the situation where a false charge is accompanied by the institution of proceedings.

The Court observed that the language of the statute should not be read as being limited by the words “institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding.” It noted that the legislature deliberately created two separate categories of conduct: first, the act of instituting criminal proceedings, and second, the act of making a false charge. There was no persuasive reason to construe the provision as applying only when a false charge gave rise to the institution of a complaint. Such a narrow construction would exclude criminal proceedings where no formal charge of an offence is ever made. Accordingly, the Court concurred with the view expressed by the Full Bench in Karim Bux’s case, to which Justice Jardine had referred, and cited the authorities (1) (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 620 and (2) I.L.R. 17 Cal. 574. Turning to the interpretation of the two expressions used in section 211, the Court quoted the observations of Justice Wilson, who had delivered judgment in that earlier case. Justice Wilson explained that the legislature did not intend the two phrases—“institutes criminal proceedings” and “falsely charges”—to be identical in meaning; rather, it recognized that situations could arise in which one phrase would apply without the other. He illustrated proceedings in which no offence is formally charged by referring to actions taken under sections 107 and 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As an example of a false charge that does not amount to instituting a criminal proceeding, Justice Wilson cited a charge made before a civil‑court judge to obtain sanction for prosecuting another person, a step that was required before the amendment effected by Act 18 of 1923. The Court therefore concluded that the argument advanced by counsel for the appellant on this point could not succeed.

Beyond the offence described in section 211, the Court noted that the complaint against the appellants also encompassed two additional offences: the offence of giving false evidence, punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and the offence of making a false statement in a declaration that is admissible as evidence, punishable under section 199 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court held that there was no legal barrier to instituting a complaint on the basis of either of these two sections. Counsel for the appellant, however, contended that the High Court, after receiving the report of the Subordinate Judge, had not held the report to be wholly false but only partly false. He urged the Court to consider the High Court’s observations, which he quoted as follows: “It may be, as stated by Jyotish Kumar Seal, that some parties did go to the authorised him to construct the but which he was doing but that the members of the opposite parties broke open the gate, an cut down the tree, cannot reasonably be believed.” The Court acknowledged that the High Court had not expressly ruled that respondents 2 to 4 had never visited the plot, but it also observed that the injunction issued by the High Court did not prohibit them from visiting the plot. Consequently, the Court found that the High Court’s findings did not preclude a prima facie case for proceeding against the appellants under section 211 as well as under sections 193 and 199 of the Indian Penal Code.

In this matter, the Court observed that the injunction directed the respondents not to disturb the possession of appellant No. 1 concerning the plot, and therefore merely visiting the plot did not make the respondents liable for contempt. The Court explained that the essential allegation in the contempt proceeding filed by appellant No. 1 was not the simple act of entering the plot, but rather that the respondents had actually interfered with his possession and had caused damage to property. The Court noted that this allegation formed the core of the contempt charge and that the High Court had examined the evidence and found that the allegation of disturbance and damage was not proved. Consequently, the Court held that a prima facie case existed for proceeding against the respondents not only under section 211 of the Indian Penal Code but also under sections 193 and 199 of the same Code.

Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, appearing for the respondents, contended that he could demonstrate, by reference to the material recorded by the Subordinate Judge during the enquiry, that the statement of the Station Officer on which the High Court had relied was inaccurate. He asserted that the Station Officer’s report made to him contained no reference to any “golmal, looting, or damage to the garden or to the trees.” The Court clarified that it was not reviewing the High Court’s order that had discharged the rule committing respondents 2 to 4 for contempt; rather, the appeal before it concerned a different order directing that a criminal complaint be filed against the appellants.

Mr. Sarjoo Prasad further argued that the “false charge” mentioned in section 211 must relate to an offence defined under the Indian Penal Code, and that the application made by appellant No. 1 did not charge respondents 2 to 4 with any penal offence. The Court examined the definition of “offence” in section 40 of the Indian Penal Code, which provides that, except for the matters listed in clauses 2 and 3 of that section, the term denotes anything made punishable by the Code. The definition continues to state that in Chapter IV, Chapter VA and in sections such as 64, 65, 211, 213, and others, the word “offence” includes anything punishable under the Code or under any special or local law as defined thereafter. From this provision, the Court inferred that the term “offence” used in section 211 also embraces conduct punishable under a special law.

The Court then referred to section 41, which defines a “special law” as legislation applicable to a particular subject. The Court held that contempt of the High Court constitutes a special subject and that the High Court possesses inherent authority to punish a person for the contemptuous act of disobeying an injunction it has issued. Accordingly, the disobedience of a High Court injunction does not fall within the jurisdiction of sections 24 or 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but is punishable as contempt under the Court’s inherent powers.

In this case the Court observed that although a remedy under the Code of Civil Procedure might have been available, the matter involved contempt of an order issued by the High Court, and such contempt could be punished by the High Court itself exercising its inherent jurisdiction. The statutes only limited the extent of the punishment that the High Court could impose on a contemnor, and did not restrict the Court’s power to adjudicate the contempt. Having examined the record, the Court was satisfied that the order pronounced by the High Court was correct, and consequently dismissed the appeal. On the basis of that conclusion, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the proceedings before the High Court should be characterised as criminal in nature. Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, had relied upon the Privy Council decision in S. N. Bannerjee v. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Co., Ltd., in which the Lords held that a committal for contempt for violating an injunction was not a criminal proceeding, and he also referred to the authorities in Radha Krishna Das v. Rai Krishn Chand and Scott v. Scott. Because the Court had not heard full arguments on that specific point, it declined to express any opinion on whether the High Court proceeding was criminal. Before concluding the appeal, the Court noted that two preliminary objections had been raised. The first objection, presented by counsel for respondent No. 1, asserted that the order of the High Court was not a final order and was supported by an extended argument. The second objection, raised by counsel for respondents 2 to 4, claimed that the appellants had failed to file their appeal within the time prescribed by the Court’s rules, and that they had made false allegations in support of their application for condonation of delay, thereby seeking revocation of the condonation. Both objections were heard at length. After the petitioner’s arguments were completed, the Court informed the respondents that it would not require them to answer on the merits and asked whether they wished to pursue their preliminary objections. Both respondents indicated that, under the circumstances, they did not wish to press those objections. Accordingly, the Court found that no separate order on the preliminary objections was required and dismissed the appeal.