Hamdard Dwakhana (Wake), Delhi and Anr vs Union Of India And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 934 of 1964

Decision Date: 23 November 1964

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, S.M. Sikri, R.S. Bachawat

In this case, the Supreme Court of India examined a petition brought by Hamdard Dwakhana (Wake), Delhi and another applicant against the Union of India and additional respondents. The judgment was delivered on 23 November 1964. The bench comprised Chief Justice P B Gajendragadkar and Justices M Hidayatullah, J C Shah, S M Sikri and R S Bachawat. The decision is reported in 1965 AIR 1167 and 1965 SCR (2) 192 and also appears in the 1974 Supreme Court reports at page 175. The dispute centred on the Fruit Products Order of 1955, which had been issued under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Clause 11 of that order prescribed qualitative standards for beverages containing fruit juices. The appellants manufactured a medicated syrup known as “Sharbat Rooh Afza” according to a specific formula that incorporated some fruit juices. An amendment made in September 1956 to the Fruit Products Order raised the minimum fruit‑juice content required in a fruit syrup from ten per cent to twenty‑five per cent, and this amendment was duly notified to the appellants. After a factory inspection by the Marketing Development Officer, the officer issued an order directing the appellants to cease the manufacture and sale of Sharbat Rooh Afza immediately because the product did not satisfy the newly prescribed minimum fruit‑juice percentage. The appellants challenged the officer’s order by filing a writ petition, contending that the Fruit Products Order did not apply to Sharbat Rooh Afza, that the order and the underlying Fruit Products Order were invalid because they should have been issued under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 rather than the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and that the officer’s order infringed the appellants’ trademark rights. The High Court rejected these arguments, upheld the validity of the Fruit Products Order and dismissed the petition.

The appellants argued that Sharbat Rooh Afza was a medicinal product and therefore fell outside the definition of “fruit product” contained in clause 2(d) of the Fruit Products Order. They also submitted that the Fruit Products Order could be validly made only under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and that the officer’s order interfered with their trademark rights. The Supreme Court held that Sharbat Rooh Afza was a fruit product within the meaning of clause 2(d)(v) of the Fruit Products Order because the residual wording of that clause covered any beverage containing fruit juice or fruit pulp, and consequently its production could be regulated by the order. The Court further observed that section 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act authorised the Central Government to regulate both qualitative and quantitative aspects of essential commodities, and that the substance of the Fruit Products Order was to regulate the qualitative production of fruit products, which fell within the statutory authority. Accordingly, the order was not invalid for being issued under the Essential Commodities Act rather than the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and both the order and the legislation underpinning it were upheld as constitutionally valid restrictions that were reasonable and served the public interest.

In this case the Court rejected the appellant’s argument that the Sharbat should be treated as a medicinal product simply because the appellants had not sought exemption from the Fruit Order by complying with clause 16(1)(c) of that order. The Court observed that the failure to claim such an exemption did not convert the product into a medicinal article. Next, the Court considered the scope of section 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act, which empowers the Central Government to regulate both the qualitative and quantitative production of essential commodities. It held that the core purpose of the provisions of the Fruit Order was to regulate the qualitative aspects of the fruit products covered by the order, and therefore the regulations issued under the Fruit Order fell squarely within the authority granted by section 3(1). Consequently, the contention that the order was ultra vires because it addressed adulteration and ought to have been issued under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, was rejected. The Court further affirmed that both the Fruit Order and the legislation under which it was made were constitutionally valid, because the restrictions they imposed were reasonable and served the public interest. The impugned order merely required the appellants to observe the reasonable restrictions prescribed by the Fruit Order, and although compliance might incidentally affect the appellants’ trademark rights, such an incidental impact could not render the order invalid. Turning to the definition of “synthetic beverage” in clause 2(k) of the Fruit Order, the Court found that it did not clash with clause 11(2), which mandates that beverages containing less than twenty‑five per cent fruit juice be labeled as synthetic products. Clause 11 contains a positive requirement, and its mandatory nature could not be weakened by any alleged inconsistency with the definition in clause 2(k). The Court also cited the decision in Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1959, dated 30‑November‑1960, as relevant authority. Finally, the judgment noted that the appeal arose from a civil appeal (No. 934 of 1964) against an order of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) dated 13 January 1964, and identified the parties as the Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf), Delhi, and its Mutawalli, Haji Hakim Hameed, an institution founded around 1906, which operates dispensaries, clinics, and manufactures Ayurvedic and Unani medicines, including medicated syrups that contain fruit juices.

The Court noted that the product manufactured by appellant No. 1 was a medicated syrup prepared for medicinal purposes and that it was produced according to a formula that the appellant itself had devised. The syrup, known as “Sharbat Rooh Afza,” was described as being composed of the following listed ingredients: Kasni seeds, Khus, pumpkin juice, watermelon juice, chharila, ripe grapes, spinach, nilofar, sandal, gul gao‑zaban, coriander, carrot, mint, kulfa, keora, rose, citrus flower, orange juice, pineapple juice, water and sugar. The Court explained that the specific ratio and proportion applicable to each of these ingredients had been developed by appellant No. 1 through a series of experiments carried out over an extended period of time. Production of the Sharbat began in the year 1920, and the Court recorded that the intended use of the product was to treat common ailments that occur in the hot season, such as loss of appetite, sun‑stroke, nausea and sleeplessness. The Court further observed that the appellants maintained that Sharbat Rooh Afza was not a foodstuff and therefore could not be classified as an essential commodity within the meaning of section 2 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (No. 10 of 1955), hereinafter referred to as “the Act.” This factual position was the same as the one set out by the appellants in their petition.

Turning to the regulatory framework, the Court explained that, invoking the powers granted by section 3 of the Act, the Central Government had issued the Fruit Products Order, 1955, hereinafter called “the Fruit Order,” by way of Notification No. S.R.O. 1052 dated 3 May 1955. Under clause 3 of that Order, the Central Fruit Products Advisory Committee, identified as respondent No. 4, was established. The Court noted that on 22 September 1956 the Central Government, again purporting to act under section 3 of the Act, amended the Fruit Order. One of the amendments required that the minimum percentage of fruit juice in a fruit syrup, as specified in Part 11 of the Second Schedule to the Fruit Order, be increased from ten per cent to twenty‑five per cent. The Court recorded that this amendment was communicated to the appellants by respondent No. 2, the Marketing Development Officer, Fruit Products, Central Zone, Delhi, on 29 January 1957.

Following that notice, the Court observed that a series of correspondences ensued between the appellants and respondent No. 2. In those letters, the appellants contended that Sharbat Rooh Afza was outside the ambit of both the Essential Commodities Act and the Fruit Order. On 25 March 1957, respondent No. 3, the Agricultural Marketing Adviser to the Government of India, New Delhi, invited a representative of the appellants for discussions. As a result of those discussions, Mr Sood, the Marketing Development Officer, Delhi, inspected the appellants’ factory and observed the manufacturing process of Sharbat Rooh Afza on 29 April 1957. Subsequently, on 10 May 1957, the appellants received a communication from Mr Sood directing them to cease the manufacture and sale of Sharbat Rooh Afza immediately, on the ground that the product did not meet the newly prescribed minimum fruit‑juice percentage under the relevant clause of the Fruit Order. The communication further stated that the appellants had previously been specifically instructed to comply with the specifications of the Fruit Order.

In the present case, the authorities had ordered the appellants to cease manufacturing and selling Sharbat Rooh Afza because the product allegedly failed to meet the minimum fruit‑juice percentage required by the Fruit Order. The order stated that the appellants had been instructed to prepare fruit syrups strictly according to the specifications prescribed, but that, in clear disregard of those instructions, the appellants had wilfully continued to violate the provisions of the Fruit Order. Consequently, invoking the powers granted under clause 13(f) of the Fruit Order, the officer served the appellants with the order dated 10 May 1957. The appellants challenged this order by filing a writ petition before the Punjab High Court on 18 May 1957 (Writ Petition No. 258‑D of 1957). In that petition they asked that the impugned order, together with the several preceding orders, be set aside and that a writ of mandamus be issued restraining the respondents from enforcing the material provisions of the Fruit Order against their product, Sharbat Rooh Afza. The appellants contended that the Sharbat was not a foodstuff but a medicinal product, and therefore its production could not be regulated under section 3 of the Act. They further argued that the Sharbat was neither an essential commodity nor a “fruit product” as defined by clause 2(d) of the Fruit Order. Additionally, they claimed that the order violated their fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and was inconsistent with clause 16(1)(c) of the Fruit Order, which permitted medicinal products to be exempt. On these grounds they sought relief in the form of an appropriate writ or order quashing the order dated 10 May 1957. The Union of India was impleaded as respondent No. 1.

The respondents opposed the petition on several grounds. They asserted that the Sharbat fell within the scope of both the Act and the Fruit Order. They pointed out that Hamdard Dawakhana had applied for and obtained a licence in 1955 as a manufacturer of fruit products for sale, and that it had held that licence since 1955. The bottles containing the Sharbat did not bear any label stating “for medicinal use only.” The respondents further noted that the Dawakhana had earlier obtained a licence for the year 1952 under the Fruit Products Order 1948 for manufacturing the same Sharbat. An examination revealed that the Sharbat did not actually contain fruit juice, although it was marketed as fruit juice, and that its label displayed pictures of fruits. Under the 1948 Order, synthetic syrups containing no fruit juice were required to be clearly marked as “synthetic” and were prohibited from using fruit‑image labels. In 1954, when it was discovered that the Dawakhana had failed to renew its licence, the appellants were directed either to obtain renewal or to obtain an exemption by complying with the necessary conditions. The appellants did not comply with those directions, leading to the detention of some bottles in the market and subsequent litigation, which formed the background to the present writ petition.

The authorities had directed the appellants to either secure renewal of their licence or to obtain an exemption by fulfilling the conditions prescribed in the regulatory scheme. The appellants failed to obey these directions, and consequently a number of bottles containing the Sharbat were seized in the marketplace. In response to the detention of the bottles, the appellants filed a writ petition identified as No. 11‑D/1954 in the Punjab High Court in the year 1954. When the petition eventually reached the stage of a final hearing, the appellants did not press the matter further, and the court dismissed the petition on 5 June 1954. After this dismissal, Hamdard Dawakhana instituted a suit seeking an injunction against the detention of its product. However, the suit became ineffective because the Fruit Products Order of 1948, under which the dispute arose, expired on 25 January 1955. A new Fruit Order was promulgated on 3 May 1955, and the Dawakhana filed a second suit for injunction. While that suit was pending, the appellants applied for and were granted a licence under the new Fruit Order, leading them to withdraw the second injunction suit on 18 October 1955. Despite obtaining the licence, the appellants did not adhere to the provisions of the Fruit Order that required a minimum percentage of fruit juice in the product, a failure that resulted in the issuance of the impugned order. These factual and procedural developments constitute the background against which the present writ petition was filed.

In the writ petition now before the court, the respondents contended that the Sharbat at issue was not marketed for medicinal purposes but was produced and sold purely as a fruit product. The appellants did not claim any exemption under clause 16 of the Fruit Order. The respondents further argued that the Sharbat qualified as “foodstuff” within the meaning of section 2 of the governing Act and therefore fell within the scope of the Fruit Order. The respondents maintained that the impugned order was not unconstitutional because its restrictions were consistent with the relevant provisions of the Act and the Fruit Order, and because those provisions represented a reasonable limitation intended to protect the public interest. The writ petition was scheduled for final disposal before the Punjab High Court on 13 January 1964. The High Court rejected all of the appellants’ contentions and dismissed the petition, holding that there was no substantive basis to challenge the validity of the Fruit Order. In reaching that conclusion, the High Court relied on a precedent set by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The High Court also rejected the appellants’ argument that the Sharbat was prepared or sold as a medicinal product, noting that the label on the bottles did not bear the declaration “for medicinal use only,” which is required under clause 16(1)(c) of the Fruit Order. Accordingly, the High Court observed that clause 11 of the Fruit Order covered the appellants’ Sharbat, rendering the impugned order justified, and found no substantive grievance in the appellants’ claim.

The Court observed that the appellants alleged that the order under challenge had adversely affected the label bearing their registered trade‑mark. The Punjab High Court subsequently considered whether the provisions of the Fruit Order could be declared invalid. It concluded that the provisions were fully valid because the restrictions they imposed were reasonable and served the public interest. On that basis the High Court dismissed the appellants’ petition. Following this dismissal the appellants applied to the High Court for a certificate permitting them to appeal to this Court, and the certificate was issued on 22 July 1964. After the appeal was duly admitted, the appellants filed a petition on 26 October 1964 seeking a continuation of the stay that had been in force throughout the seven‑year pendency of the writ petition before the High Court. The appellants argued that the stay should remain effective until the final determination of the present appeal. Recognising that the writ petition had endured an unusually protracted period in the Punjab High Court, this Court directed that the stay be maintained in favour of the appellants while scheduling the hearing of the appeal for 9 November 1964, thereby expediting the matter. Before addressing the submissions raised by counsel for the appellants, the Court briefly outlined the legislative scheme and the pertinent provisions of the Essential Commodities Act and the Fruit Order. The Act, enacted in 1955, was intended to control the production, supply, distribution, and trade of certain commodities for the benefit of the general public. The Act defined “essential commodities” under section 2(a), a definition that includes foodstuffs such as edible oilseeds and oils specified in clause 2(a)(v), as well as any other class of commodity that the Central Government may, by notification, declare essential for the purposes of the Act. Such a declaration is supported by the constitutional authority under entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, a point noted in Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1959 decided on 30‑11‑1960 and reflected in clause 2(a)(xi). Section 3(1) empowers the Central Government, when it is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient to maintain or increase supplies of an essential commodity or to ensure its equitable distribution at fair prices, to issue orders regulating or prohibiting the production, supply, distribution, and trade of that commodity. Sub‑section 3(2) enumerates categories of orders, set out in clauses (a) through (h), that the Central Government may promulgate without limiting the broad authority conferred by subsection (1). It was thus clear that the legislative framework granted the Central Government wide powers to regulate essential commodities.

The Court observed that the Act gave the Central Government authority to control the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities. This authority was expressed in a broad and general manner by section 3(1). The Court noted that the power to regulate production necessarily covered both qualitative and quantitative aspects of essential commodities. In other words, the Central Government could direct the manner in which certain essential commodities were to be produced and could also determine the quantities to be produced. However, the Court emphasized that this power could be exercised only when the condition stated in section 3(1) was satisfied, namely that the Central Government must be of the opinion that it was necessary or expedient to regulate the production of an essential commodity for one of the purposes listed in the provision. The Court said that this requirement was not contested before it. The Court then referred to the earlier decision in M/s Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd., where, dealing with the Vegetable Oil Products Control Order of 1947 made under section 3(1) of the Act, it had clearly held that a qualitative restriction on the production of an essential commodity was permissible under that section. Turning to the Fruit Products Order dated 3 May 1955, the Court explained that the Order was issued by the Central Government under the powers conferred by section 3 of the Act. Clause 2 of the Fruit Order defined “fruit product”. Under clause 2(d)(1) the definition included synthetic beverages, syrups and sharbats; clause 2(d)(v) embraced squashes, crushes, cordials, barley water, barreled juice and ready‑to‑serve beverages or any other drinks containing fruit juices or fruit pulp; and clause 2(d)(xiv) captured any other unspecified items relating to fruits or vegetables. Clause 2(j) defined “sharbat” as any non‑alcoholic sweetened beverage or syrup containing non‑fruit juice or flavored with non‑fruit flavours such as rose, khus, kewra, etc. Clause 2(k) defined “synthetic beverage” as any non‑alcoholic beverage or syrup, other than aerated water, that contained no fruit juice but possessed an artificial flavour or colour resembling fruit. The Court then described clause 7 of the Fruit Order, which required every manufacturer to produce fruit products in compliance with the sanitary requirements and the appropriate standard of quality and composition specified in the Second Schedule to the Order. It added that any other fruit or vegetable product not covered by that schedule had to be manufactured according to the standard of quality and composition prescribed by the Licensing Officer. Finally, the Court read clause II of the Order in full, noting that it provided: (1) any beverage containing less than twenty‑five per cent fruit juice could not be described as a fruit syrup, fruit juice, squash, cordial or crush and had to be labeled as a synthetic syrup; and (2) every synthetic syrup had to be clearly and conspicuously marked on its label as a “synthetic” product.

The Fruit Order required that any product labelled as “SYNTHETIC” must bear that description prominently on its container, and it prohibited any label, whether affixed or printed on the wrapper, that could cause a consumer to believe the product was a fruit item. The Order further barred the use of the word “FRUIT” in describing such a product and forbade the sale of the product under a label that displayed any picture of fruit. In the same vein, aerated water that contained no fruit juice or pulp was not permitted to carry a label suggesting it was a fruit product. Part II of the Second Schedule to the Fruit Order set out the specifications for fruit juice and related beverages, and, inter alia, stipulated that a fruit syrup must contain at least twenty‑five percent fruit juice in the finished product. The respondents argued that the Sharbat manufactured by the appellants failed to meet this twenty‑five percent requirement and therefore violated the mandatory provision of clause 11(1). Conversely, Part IV of the Second Schedule laid down the specifications for synthetic syrups and sharbats and did not impose any minimum fruit‑juice content on those products. Clause 16 of the Fruit Order dealt with situations to which the Order did not apply; clause 16(1)(c) stated that the Order would not apply to syrups sold in bottles labelled “For medicinal use only” provided no fruit picture appeared on the label. It was established that the appellants did not sell the Sharbat in bottles bearing the “For medicinal use only” label, so clause 16(1)(c) offered no exemption. Counsel for the appellants, Mr Pathak, attempted to argue that the Sharbat was not an essential commodity and therefore lay outside the scope of the Act and the Fruit Order. That contention had not been raised before the Punjab High Court, which had previously considered and rejected the claim that the Sharbat was a medicinal product. Consequently, the High Court had treated the Sharbat as an essential commodity within the meaning of section 2 of the Act, and the appellants could not now introduce the issue for the first time before this Court. Mr Pathak also suggested that the Sharbat was not a fruit product and thus fell outside the Fruit Order. The Court found this argument unconvincing, referring already to clause 2(d)(v) of the Fruit Order, which enumerated several categories of beverages and, in its residual clause, captured any other beverage containing fruit juice or pulp.

In the present case the Court observed that the clause in question could not be interpreted by applying the rule of ejusdem generis because an examination of the listed beverages revealed that there was no common genus from which the rule could be properly invoked. The Court further noted that the context of the clause clearly indicated that it was intended to encompass all beverages not specifically mentioned earlier, provided that such beverages contained fruit juice or fruit pulp. Accordingly, the Court found no difficulty in holding that the Sharbat under consideration fell within clause 2(d)(v) of the Fruit Order and that, consequently, its manufacture could be regulated pursuant to the relevant provisions of that Order.

The Court then turned to the argument advanced by counsel that the Fruit Order was invalid on the ground that it failed to state that, prior to its issuance, the Central Government had formed the opinion that issuing the Order was necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing supplies of the commodity. Counsel relied on the first part of section 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, describing it as a condition precedent to the exercise of the power to make a regulatory order. The Court held that this contention could not be raised for the first time on appeal, because it had not been presented before the High Court, thereby depriving the respondents of an opportunity to meet it. While accepting that, in the absence of an explicit statement in the Fruit Order, no presumption of a prior opinion could be drawn, the Court observed that the respondents would have been entitled to prove that such an opinion had indeed been formed at the relevant time. The Court therefore concluded that the omission of an express reference to the opinion in the Fruit Order did not bar the respondents from establishing the fact independently, and consequently the argument could not be allowed at this stage.

Finally, counsel contended that the Fruit Order was invalid because its substantive provisions suggested that it could appropriately have been issued under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (No 37 of 1954). To support this, counsel pointed to Entry 18 in List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, which relates to the adulteration of foodstuffs and other goods, arguing that the provisions of the Fruit Order, which primarily prevented the adulteration of fruit products, fell within the legislative competence of that Act. Conversely, counsel argued that the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 related to Entry 33 in List III, and that an Order issued under that Act would be inappropriate given the object of the Fruit Order. Counsel maintained that the two powers were distinct and separate, and that the Fruit Order could not properly be said to have been issued under the Essential Commodities Act. The Court noted these submissions for further consideration.

In this case, the Court observed that it would be inappropriate to consider the order in light of its intended purpose. The counsel argued that the two statutory powers were distinct and separate, and that the Fruit Order under consideration could not properly be said to have been issued under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The Court acknowledged that the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act indeed deals with the prevention of food adulteration, but it rejected the counsel’s assumption that a regulatory order of the kind before the Court, which imposes qualitative regulations on the production of essential goods, could be issued under that Act. The Court further noted that, irrespective of that argument, section 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act authorises the Central Government to regulate both the qualitative and quantitative production of essential commodities. Therefore, it was idle to contend that the regulations imposed by the Fruit Order on fruit products fell outside the scope of section 3(1). The Court explained that the pith and substance of the relevant provisions of the Fruit Order was clearly to regulate the qualitative production of the fruit products covered by the order. This purpose was illustrated by the specification contained in Part II of the Second Schedule to the Fruit Order, which required manufacturers of fruit syrups to include at least twenty‑five percent fruit juice in the final product. By exercising the powers under section 3(1), the Central Government deemed it necessary to ensure that only a product meeting that quality standard could be marketed as fruit syrup and not any other type of product. The Court held that this objective fell squarely within the ambit of section 3(1), and consequently rejected the contention that the Fruit Order was invalid because it sought to address the problem of adulteration of fruit products. Subsequently, the counsel raised the issue of a possible inconsistency between the definition of “synthetic beverage” in clause 2(k) and the provisions of clause 11(2) of the Fruit Order. The Court recalled the effect of clause 11(1), which provides that any beverage containing less than twenty‑five percent fruit juice must not be described, among other things, as “fruit syrup” but must instead be described as a “synthetic syrup”. Clause 11(2) further requires that any syrup that, by virtue of clause 11(1), must be described as a synthetic syrup, when placed on the market, be clearly and conspicuously labelled as a “Synthetic” product. The Court explained that the purpose of this labelling requirement was to bring to the attention of consumers that the product does not contain the minimum fruit‑juice content prescribed by the Fruit Order, and that the producer must affix a label stating “Synthetic” without attempting to portray the product as a fruit‑derived item.

In this case, the Court explained that the law prohibited describing a product as if it were a fruit product. Therefore sub‑clause (2) expressly forbidden the use of the word “Fruit” in the description of such a product and also prohibited any label that displayed a fruit picture. The provision additionally exempted aerated water, because the legislature presumed that consumers would never confuse aerated water with fruit juice. Considering this scheme of clause 11, the Court found it difficult to identify any inconsistency between clause 11 and the definition of a ‘synthetic beverage’ provided in clause 2(k). The definition described a synthetic beverage as one that contains no fruit juice, while clause 11 positively required that any beverage containing less than twenty‑five percent fruit juice be labelled as a ‘synthetic’ product. Consequently, the Court held that the definition of ‘synthetic beverage’ did not clash with the requirement that products covered by clause 11(2) be sold as synthetic products. Moreover, because clause 11 itself contained a positive provision, the Court concluded that the mandatory requirements of clause 11 were not impaired. The Court further held that no alleged inconsistency with the definition of ‘synthetic beverage’ in clause 2(k) of the Fruit Order could affect the validity of clause 11. The final argument advanced by counsel for the petitioner, identified as Mr. Pathak, claimed that the impugned order was invalid because it interfered with the appellants’ trade‑mark right. The Court observed that this contention was not easy to accept. The Court had previously held that the Act and the Fruit Order issued by the Central Government under section 3(1) of the Act were valid. Accordingly, an order that was fully justified by the provisions of the Act and the Fruit Order could not be struck down as invalid. The Court reasoned that the constitutional validity of the Act and the Fruit Order rested on the view that the restrictions they imposed were reasonable and served the public interest. The impugned order merely required the appellants to obey the reasonable restrictions laid down in the Fruit Order. Although compliance with the Fruit Order might incidentally affect the appellants’ trade‑mark right, the Court held that this effect did not render the impugned order void. In this regard, the Court noted that a trademark, which is intended to distinguish one manufactured article from another, cannot be used in a manner that is likely to mislead consumers or violate another law. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the impugned order did not force the appellants to alter their trademark. If the appellants wished to place the disputed Sharbat on the market without obeying clause 11(1), all that they

The Court observed that the appellants could satisfy the requirement of clause 11(2) of the Fruit Order. In doing so, even if the appellants’ trademark right might be affected, the Court held that such impact did not make the impugned order invalid, because the restriction that was being enforced was regarded as reasonable and aimed at the public interest. The Court further noted that, had the appellants wished to press the trademark argument earnestly, they ought to have presented more documentary evidence concerning the alleged trademark right. The appellants had claimed in their writ petition that the Sharbat they marketed was a medicinal product; accordingly, the Court explained that they could have sought exemption by complying with clause 16(i)(c) of the Fruit Order. After considering these points, the Court was satisfied that the Punjab High Court had correctly concluded that the appellants had not established any case for setting aside the impugned order.

Before concluding the appeal, the Court reflected on the unusually protracted nature of the proceedings. It recalled that the writ petition had been filed by the appellants in the Punjab High Court on 18 May 1957 and that the High Court finally disposed of it on 13 January 1964, a delay the Court found regrettable. Because of the long pendency, the appellants had enjoyed the benefit of a stay order throughout, even though the petition was eventually found to be without merit. The Court emphasized that writ petitions involving stays or injunctions should be resolved promptly. Consequently, when the Court became aware of the extraordinary delay in the High Court, it directed that the matter be listed for hearing within fourteen days after a motion for stay was presented. In the end, the Court held that the appeal failed, dismissed it with costs, and entered an order of dismissal.