Gurdatta Mal And Ors. vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 5 February, 1964

Coram: K. Subba Rao, J.R. Mudholkar

In this appeal, which was granted by special leave, the Supreme Court examined the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad that had set aside an earlier acquittal and had instead upheld the conviction of the accused by the Additional Sessions Judge of Kumaun, Nainital. That lower court had found the appellants guilty under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and had sentenced each of them to life imprisonment.

The prosecution’s case was summarized as follows. The deceased named Gurucharan Lal possessed legal title to and was in actual possession of Plot No. 57 in the village of Azadnagar. On the morning of 10 April 1960 he left his residence in Rudrapur, accompanied by Bhagwan Swarup, Amrit Lal, Nand Singh and Mohan Prakash, to harvest the crop standing on that plot. Bhagwan Das, who also owned a plot in the same village, set out at the same time to harvest his own crop. Anticipating possible trouble from the accused persons, the group stopped at the Kiccha police station, which lay on their route, and lodged two reports there, identified as exhibits Ka‑1 and Ka‑2. In those reports they alleged an apprehension of breach of peace on the part of the accused.

In response, the head‑constable of the Kiccha police station consulted the Sub‑Inspector and dispatched two constables, Khem Singh (identified as P. W. 2) and Chandra Singh (identified as P. W. 8), to accompany the party to the village. While proceeding, Gurucharan Lal’s party was joined by Gainda Mal, the father of Gurucharan Lal, and by a labourer named Kalyan. The assembled party reached Azadnagar at approximately eight o’clock in the morning and began cutting the crop on Plot No. 57. Roughly half an hour later, two of the accused, Baldeo Raj and Madan Lal, arrived at the scene and informed the two constables that they were wanted by the Station Officer at the police station. Initially the constables refused to accompany them, but subsequently Chandra Singh, one of the constables, agreed to go with the two accused to the police station. After travelling a short distance, the accused requested that Chandra Singh proceed to the police station alone, as they intended to return to their own homes.

About half an hour after that, a second group arrived at the field. This group consisted of Madan Lal (identified as Appellant No. 4), Baldeo Raj, Gurdatta Mal (Appellant No. 1), Harbans Lai (Appellant No. 2), Pyare Lal (Appellant No. 3) and Gopal Das. Among them, Gurdatta Mal, Pyare Lal and Madan Lal were carrying firearms; Harbans Lai was armed with a spear; and both Baldeo Raj and Gopal Das were equipped with lathis. When these men approached the field, constable Khem Singh ordered them to halt and instructed them not to proceed further. Despite this warning, the appellants entered the field and opened fire with their guns, resulting in the death of Gainda Mal, his

According to the record, the son of Gurucharan Lal and a man named Nanda Singh, who was a photographer engaged by the complainant’s side to take pictures of the accused in the event of an attack, were present at the scene. Bhagwan Swarup suffered an assault by individuals who were carrying lathis and sustained injuries as a result. Following the assault, Bhagwan Das together with the remaining persons fled the field while raising an alarm to alert others of the disturbance. The appellants, together with two other individuals named Baldeo Raj and Gopal Das, were subsequently placed before the Additional Sessions Judge at Kumaun. They faced charges of offences punishable under Sections 302 and 149, Sections 323 and 149, Section 147 and Section 140 of the Indian Penal Code. In addition, the first, third and fourth appellants were charged with an offence under Section 19(f) of the Arms Act for using firearms without a licence.

The defence put forward a narrative that Plot No. 52 was under the cultivatory possession of the appellants and that the crop growing there had been cultivated by them. On the morning of 10 April 1960 at about 8.30 a.m., they learned that Gurucharan Lal had arrived at the plot accompanied by twenty‑five persons intent on cutting the crop. To prevent what they perceived as a wrongful removal of their crop, the appellants proceeded to the plot armed with guns, spears and lathis, because they had been informed that Gurucharan Lal’s party also comprised twenty‑five individuals bearing deadly weapons. Upon reaching the plot, they demanded that Gurucharan Lal and his men refrain from cutting the crop. Contrary to this request, Bhagwan Das and his party advanced to attack them, and Bhagwan Das is said to have discharged a shot in their direction. Believing that their lives and property were in danger, the appellants’ party returned fire with their guns in defence of themselves and their property. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kumaun, examined the evidence and concluded that the appellants indeed possessed the plot and the standing crop at the time of the incident, and that Gurucharan Lal’s party were also armed with lathis, pharsa and sickles used for harvesting. The judge held that an assault by an armed party created a real risk of serious injury or death to the appellants, thereby granting them the right of private defence of their bodies, which could extend to causing the death of their assailants. He further determined that the appellants were entitled to private defence of their property. Consequently, the judge acquitted all the appellants of the murder charge. However, the judge convicted Gurdatta Mal and Madan Lal under Section 19(f) of the Arms Act for possessing unlicensed firearms and sentenced each to two years’ imprisonment. Two appeals were thereafter lodged in the High Court at Allahabad against the Additional Sessions Judge’s judgment: one appeal filed by the State challenging the portion of the order that acquitted the accused, and a second appeal filed by the accused seeking relief from the conviction under the Arms Act.

In the matter, one appeal had been filed by the State challenging the portion of the judgment that had acquitted the accused, and another appeal had been filed by the accused, namely Gurdatta Mal and Madan Lal, challenging the portion of the judgment that had convicted them under Section 19(f) of the Arms Act. The High Court affirmed the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the appellants were in cultivatory possession of plot number 52 and that they had cultivated the crop on that plot. However, the High Court held that the Additional Sessions Judge’s finding about the possession of lethal weapons by the deceased and his party was based on conjecture and speculation. After accepting the evidence presented by the prosecution, the High Court concluded that the only right available to the accused was to prevent the theft of property by Gurucharan Lal and his party. Consequently, the Court held that the accused did not have a right of private defence under Section 103 of the Indian Penal Code to cause the death of any members of Gurucharan Lal’s party. Regarding Nanda Singh, the photographer, who was completely unarmed, the High Court found that the appellants had neither a right of private defence of person nor a right of private defence of property. For the other victims, the Court held that the accused possessed only a right of private defence that permitted causing injury but not death, and therefore only those accused who caused gunshot or spear injuries were liable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

The High Court, based on the evidence, found that Gurdatta Mal, identified as Appellant 1, had shot Gainda Mal, resulting in his death; that Madan Lal, identified as Appellant 4, had fired at Nanda Singh and caused his instantaneous death; that Pyarelal, identified as Appellant 3, had fired at Gurucharan Lal, leading to his death; and that Harbans Lal, identified as Appellant 2, had attacked Gurucharan Lal with a spear to the head, an injury which, according to the doctor’s opinion, was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. On this basis, the High Court convicted all of those accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court upheld the acquittal of Baldeo Raj and Gopal Das. It also concurred with the Additional Sessions Judge that Gurdatta Mal and Madan Lal possessed guns without a licence and were therefore liable under Section 19(f) of the Arms Act. As a result, the State’s appeal was allowed in part, while the appeal filed by Appellants 1 to 4 was dismissed, leading to the present appeal. The counsel for the appellants, Mr Sethi, summarized the principal arguments as follows: first, that the Additional Sessions Judge, after considering the entire evidence, had correctly upheld the plea of private defence and acquitted the appellants, and that the High Court erred in overturning that finding; second, that the High Court was mistaken in concluding, based on the facts, that Gurucharan Lal and his party were not committing any offence.

In this case, the learned counsel argued that the appellants could not claim the right of private defence of property under Section 103 of the Indian Penal Code because the alleged incident did not constitute robbery; consequently, the appellants had no authority to voluntarily cause the death of the deceased. The counsel further asserted that the High Court erred by disregarding an essential element of robbery, namely the fear of immediate death or immediate injury. The counsel also contended that the High Court, after concluding that only those accused who had exceeded the scope of private defence should be liable under Section 302 read with Section 34, improperly overturned the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The Additional Sessions Judge had rejected the testimony of PW‑2 and PW‑6, yet the High Court held, without giving any weight to that testimony, that each appellant had performed a specific act against a specific deceased person. Moreover, the counsel submitted that even if the High Court correctly found that the accused had gone beyond the protection of private defence, the appropriate conviction should have been under the second exception to Section 300, resulting in a charge of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, rather than a murder charge. Additionally, the counsel maintained that the conviction of Gurdatta Mal and Madan Lal under Section 19(f) of the Arms Act was erroneous because the firearms used by them belonged to close relatives. The counsel then referred to recent Supreme Court decisions that have clarified the scope of an appeal against an acquittal. In Sanwant Singh v. State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court reviewing an acquittal may re‑examine the entire evidence and reach its own conclusion, provided it considers every relevant matter on record, the factual questions, and the reasons offered by the trial court for the acquittal, and that it sets out those reasons in its judgment to show why the acquittal was not justified. The Court also endorsed the principle articulated in Sheo Swarup v. Emperor (AIR 1934 PC 2271) regarding the approach of an appellate court in such appeals, a principle later reaffirmed in Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab. After hearing the extensive arguments of counsel, the Court observed that there was no basis for the suggestion that the High Court had ignored the principles articulated in Sheo Swarup and the subsequent decisions. The Court noted that the Additional Sessions Judge had based his conclusion on mere speculation, contrary to the evidence that the deceased were armed with lethal weapons, and that this error undermined his finding that the accused were justified in exercising private defence to the extent of killing the deceased. The Court therefore found justification for the High Court’s interference with the lower court’s order.

The Court explained that the acquittal pronounced by the learned Additional Sessions Judge would be examined in detail as the judgment proceeded. The arguments presented by counsel for both the appellants and the State focused on whether the right of private defence of property could justify causing death, and how that right related to the provisions of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. To clarify the issue, the Court found it necessary to set out the precise scope of Section 34 in the context of a claim of private defence. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code states: “When a criminal act is done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.” The Court then referred to Section 98, which provides: “Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.” Following that, Section 103 was quoted: “The right of private defence of property extends, under the restriction mentioned in Section 99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the wrong‑doer, if the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right, be an offence of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated….” The Court observed that these statutory provisions must be read together to understand how the right of private defence operates when several persons act with a common intent.

The Court further noted that settled law holds that Section 34 does not create a new offence; rather, it embodies the principle of joint criminal liability. For Section 34 to apply, two essential conditions must be satisfied: first, there must be a common intention among the accused to commit a particular offence; second, each accused must have participated in the act or acts that further the common intention. When both conditions are established, every participant is treated as if he had performed the act alone and is therefore liable for the offence. For example, if two or more persons share a common intention to murder and each of them takes part in the steps leading to the murder, all of them are guilty of murder under Section 34. However, Section 96 declares that any act done in the exercise of the right of private defence is not an offence. Consequently, although all the accused may be liable for murder on the basis of common intention, that liability is displaced if the act was committed in the lawful exercise of private defence that permits the voluntary causing of death. The Court emphasized that common intention relates solely to the criminal act itself and does not extend to the justification of private defence. Thus, an act that would otherwise be a constructive offence under Section 34 ceases to be an offence if it is performed as a legitimate exercise of private defence. To illustrate, the Court explained that a person who participates in a common intention to murder, but who can establish that he acted under the lawful right of private defence to cause death, may rely on that defence to avoid liability for murder.

In this case, the Court observed that a person could rely on the plea of private defence only by proving that he possessed a lawful right to cause the death of the other person. The Court noted that while evidence showing that a group shared a common intention merely to cause hurt may be relevant when the prosecution seeks to prove a joint intention to murder, once it is established that the common intention was in fact to commit murder, the issue of any individual right of private defence became irrelevant. Section 103 of the Indian Penal Code declares that the right of private defence of property, subject to the limitations set out in Section 99, extends to the voluntary causing of death only when the offence that triggers the defence falls within one of the categories expressly listed in that provision. Consequently, if the offence did not belong to any of those enumerated categories, the accused could not claim a right of private defence that allowed them to kill voluntarily. Applying this rule, the Court held that in the present matter the accused were unable to demonstrate that the alleged offence belonged to any of the categories specified in Section 103; therefore, each of them remained liable for murder because they all participated in the crime pursuant to the common intention to kill. The Court further explained that in many cases the evidence concerning the alleged offence and the evidence concerning the claim of private defence cannot be examined in isolation, since facts pertaining to one aspect inevitably influence the other. Accordingly, when determining whether the accused were constructively liable for murder, the Court must also consider the defence’s evidence that the group’s common intention was not to murder but merely to protect their rights and, if necessary, to cause only hurt.

The factual background, as outlined by the Court, showed that on 10 April 1960 the accused were in possession of the disputed field and were entitled to cut the crop growing there. It was also admitted that on 21 March 1960 the Munsiff had decided the suit filed by Gurucharan Lal, holding that the plaintiffs Madan Lal and Baldeo Raj had failed to establish possession of the plot. Following that decree, Gurucharan Lal obtained an order of relinquishment from J. B. Singh, the Colonisation Officer, based on the Civil Court’s decision. Counsel for the appellants informed the Court that an appeal had been lodged against the decree and that an interim order staying the execution of the decree had been secured. Notwithstanding the stay, on 10 April 1960 Gurucharan Lal possessed a substantial claim to the plot, grounded on the Civil Court’s decree and the relinquishment order. Acting on that claim, Gurucharan Lal, together with Bhagwan Das, Harnam Singh, Bhagwan Swarup, Nand Singh, Amrit Lal and Mohan Prakash, proceeded to the field with the purpose of harvesting the crop standing there.

Gurucharan Lal and his companions left his house in order to go to the field and harvest the crop that was standing there. Their desire to avoid any confrontation with the appellants was shown by their going to the Kichhe police station, filing two complaints there, and then taking two police constables with them to the field. In addition, they escorted a photographer – who was also one of the victims – to the plot so that he could record any untoward incident by taking photographs. It was established that the prosecution party, which included labourers, consisted of roughly ten persons, although the precise number was not considered material. Such conduct on the part of Gurucharan Lal and his group was indicative of a peaceful intention. No reasonable person would bring police officers and a photographer if the purpose was to use deadly weapons against opponents; it is therefore more reasonable to assume that their purpose was to cut the crop peacefully under police protection. The next crucial issue was whether they possessed any deadly weapons. The Additional Sessions Judge had held that they did possess such weapons, but the High Court observed that this conclusion was drawn only from conjecture. It is established that some weapons were found at the scene. According to the testimony of Sub‑Inspector D. P. Singh, identified as witness P‑W‑10, when he arrived at the location he observed, among other items, two wooden sticks (lathis), a knife known as a pharsa, and a spear blade lying on the ground. He further noted that the spear blade was twisted at its upper portion. The Additional Sessions Judge asked, if the prosecution’s case was that none of the accused carried a pharsa and that the accused had overpowered Gurucharan Lal’s party, whether the accused would have left weapons at the scene, and answered that the two lathis, the pharsa and the sticks found by the Sub‑Inspector belonged to Gurucharan Lal’s party. It is also established that the labourers carried some sickles for cutting the crop; however, there was no evidence that the prosecution party possessed lathis, a pharsa or spears. No prosecution witness testified that the prosecution party was armed with such weapons. The High Court further observed that the accused, in their statements, did not claim that the weapons had been left by the complainant’s party as they fled the field. Counsel for the prosecution argued that this statement was inaccurate and drew attention to a statement made by Gurucharan Lal before the Additional Sessions Judge, in which he alleged that the accused had taken weapons with them because they had become aware that Gurucharan Lal and his companions also possessed guns, a pharsa and lathis. The court noted that this allegation did not imply that the complainant’s party abandoned the weapons in the field while retreating. In fact, the claim that the complainant’s party possessed guns and spears had been found to be false. The presence of the twisted spear on the plot suggested that it had been used, and it could have been

The Court observed that the twisted spear found at the scene could only have been used by the accused, because none of the accused sustained any wound inflicted by a spear or a pharsa. Moreover, during the cross‑examination of the Sub‑Inspector and the police constables, no suggestion was made that Gurucharan Lal or any member of his party possessed any deadly weapons either when they arrived at the police station or when they reached the field. The Court considered it improbable that the complainant’s party would have been carrying such weapons, especially since they were under police protection while proceeding to the field. In addition, if the complainant’s party had indeed possessed deadly weapons and had employed the twisted spear, at least one of the accused would have shown injuries caused by that weapon. The fact that Gurucharan Lal’s party also brought a photographer to the field further reduced the likelihood of them carrying weapons, because the purpose of the photography would have been defeated had they been photographed holding deadly arms. For these reasons the Court held that the High Court was correct in setting aside the Additional Sessions Judge’s finding that the complainant’s party possessed deadly weapons.

The prosecution, in support of its case, examined six eyewitnesses designated as PW‑1 to PW‑6, together with other witnesses, whose testimony corroborated the prosecution’s version of events, as previously outlined in the judgment. The High Court accepted this evidence and highlighted several salient facts. First, the four appellants were closely related: appellants 2 to 4 were the sons of appellant 1, Gurdatta Mal. Second, criminal and civil proceedings were pending between the accused on one side and Gurucharan Lal on the other concerning Plot No. 57. Third, three of the accused entered the field armed with guns, while one of them was armed with a spear. Fourth, the accused attempted to drive away two constables by using a false pretext, but succeeded in sending away only one constable. Fifth, after entering the field, the appellants approached their victims at close range and shot them dead at point‑blank distance. Sixth, the medical examination of the victims revealed extensive gunshot injuries: Nanda Singh sustained three gunshot wounds—two entry wounds and one exit wound—located on the upper, middle and lower chest, accompanied by surrounding blackening and scorching, as well as an additional contused wound and two bruises. Gainda Mal, who also died, suffered five gunshot injuries—one entry wound and four exit wounds—together with a close‑range shot to the chest that caused a comminuted fracture of the left scapular bone and extensive laceration of the left shoulder joint. Gurucharan Lal, who also died, sustained eight gunshot injuries.

The forensic examination revealed that the deceased had eight gunshot injuries, of which five entered the body and three exited. All of these wounds were located close together within a four‑inch by four‑inch area on the left lumbar region. In addition to these ballistic injuries, the body bore four puncture wounds; one of these punctures was situated on the left forehead just above the eye and was associated with a fracture of the frontal bone beneath the skin. Internal inspection showed that the peritoneum was lacerated and fractured at five separate sites and was filled with clotted blood. The abdominal cavity contained a large quantity of blood, the small intestines were perforated in two places, and the large intestines were extensively lacerated. Investigators also recovered two bullets from the abdominal cavity. Further skeletal injuries included a depressed fracture of the left frontal bone measuring three inches by half an inch, and a fissured fracture extending three inches in continuation of the fifth injury, which was the puncture wound on the left forehead. The brain exhibited extensive laceration on its front left side, and a fracture was observed in the anterior fossa of the left base of the skull. The pattern and nature of these injuries demonstrated that both firearms and a sharp weapon had been employed, and that the firearms were discharged at a very short distance from the victims.

The Sub‑Inspector reported finding blood inside the field and discovered the bodies of the victims lying there, along with the corpse of a photographer who had also been shot. Relying on this forensic evidence and the surrounding circumstances, the High Court concluded that the appellants, sharing a common intention to commit murder, had prepared in advance, entered the field, and shot the deceased at close range without any resistance from them. Counsel for the appellants described the layout of the crop‑cutting operation as being distant from the location where the bodies were discovered. He argued that, had the accused intended to kill, they would have fired at the victims from a distance and the bodies would have been located nearer to the cutting site. The Court noted that this argument was based only on conjecture and on assumptions that were not supported by evidence. No clear testimony established the precise positions of the three victims at the moment the accused arrived, and it would be unreasonable to presume that the victims were situated at a particular spot and rushed the accused, a supposition contrary to the totality of the evidence. The fact that the bodies were found in the positions described, that the gunshots were fired from close range, and that none of the accused sustained injuries, aligned more closely with the factual record than with the speculative scenario presented by counsel. Consequently, the Court found no basis to disturb the High Court’s finding that the appellants, acting with a common intention to kill, armed themselves with guns and spears and attacked the deceased at close range.

In the factual findings, the Court observed that the accused approached the field, engaged the deceased at a very short distance and caused their deaths in the manner described by the prosecution witnesses. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the accused were guilty of the offense punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Having established this liability, the Court turned to the next issue, namely whether the accused could rely on a claim of private defence that would permit them to cause death voluntarily. The High Court had held that the accused possessed no right of private defence of property extending to the killing of the deceased, because the deceased had not, in the view of the High Court, attempted to cause instant death or instant injury to any particular accused. In other words, the High Court found that the conditions stipulated in Section 103 of the Indian Penal Code were not fulfilled and that the conduct of the deceased did not amount to robbery. Counsel for the appellants argued that the High Court had overlooked one element of the definition of robbery, namely that theft becomes robbery if the offender creates a fear of instant death or instant injury. The counsel further contended that, irrespective of whether the deceased had actually tried to cause instant death or injury, the circumstances were such that there was a reasonable apprehension of such danger, because more than ten persons were present, some were armed with sickles and were intent on cutting the crop and carrying it away, and the appellants must have reasonably feared that they would be killed or at least injured. The Court rejected this argument, noting that it was unsupported by the evidence. It pointed out that the deceased’s purpose was peaceful, that they were cutting the crops under police protection, and that none of them possessed any dangerous weapons. The sickles were used solely by labourers to harvest the crops. Consequently, the Court found no basis for a reasonable apprehension on the part of the appellants that the deceased would kill or hurt them, and affirmed that the High Court was correct in holding that the facts did not invoke Section 103 of the Indian Penal Code.

The Court further explained that the same conclusion would be reached even if the question were examined from a different perspective. Section 103 of the Indian Penal Code is qualified by Section 99 of the same Code. Section 99 provides that the right of private defence is unavailable in situations where the person had the opportunity to seek protection from public authorities, and it also stipulates that private defence must not involve the infliction of more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence. The Court therefore considered whether, in the present case, the accused had sufficient time to approach the police or other public authorities for protection, and whether the force they used exceeded what was necessary for legitimate defence. The analysis under Section 99 would, in turn, affect any claim of private defence that extended to the voluntary causing of death.

The Court examined whether the accused could successfully claim private defence in the circumstances that were presented during the trial. It noted that the accused knew in advance that the deceased intended to go to the field to cut the crop. The police station was located about two miles from the plot where the incident occurred and was therefore readily accessible to the parties involved. The Court observed that the accused could have gone to that police station, informed the appropriate authority of the deceased’s intentions, and requested police protection. However, the accused did not take that step, and therefore failed to seek assistance from the authorities available under the law. When the accused arrived at the field, they encountered two police constables who were already present and were performing their duties in the area. The Court held that the appellants should have informed constables of true situation, asked that the deceased be stopped from carrying away the crop, and sent a representative to Sub‑Inspector to file a report. The Court stated that such a reasonable approach by the appellants would have averted the tragic events that later occurred. Instead, the Court observed that the appellants attempted to use the two constables under a false pretext and succeeded in doing so with respect to one constable. The Court then considered whether it was necessary for the accused, given their position, to immediately employ their firearms upon reaching the field in order to kill three members of the complainant’s party. It noted that the deceased were unarmed, whereas the appellants were fully equipped with lethal weapons at the time of the confrontation. The Court observed that the deceased were cutting the crop while under police protection, which indicated their peaceful intent. It held that firing at close range without warning would inevitably cause more injury than necessary for the purpose of private defence. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellants could not invoke the right of private defence in this case. The Court dismissed the argument of counsel that the High Court had allocated the shots fired among the deceased without considering the evidence, stating that the matter did not arise for consideration. The Court noted that although the High Court’s judgment did not refer to the oral testimony, there existed oral evidence from witnesses numbered 2 and 6 indicating which weapon struck the deceased. It acknowledged that the Additional Sessions Judge had not accepted that testimony, but the High Court recorded that the prosecution had established the acts. The accused had also not disputed that each appellant performed the specific act attributed to him as described in the trial record. The Court explained that because of this admission, the High Court did not expressly re‑examine the witness evidence on this point, and therefore the finding should be accepted.

The Court then addressed counsel for the appellants who argued that the charge should be culpable homicide not amounting to murder rather than murder. The appellants relied on Section 300, Exception 2, which provides that a culpable homicide is not murder when the offender acts in good faith on the basis of a private‑defence right. The provision further requires that the offender exceeds the legal power granted, causes death without premeditation, and lacks intent to inflict more harm than necessary for that defence. The Court found that the facts did not satisfy this exception because the accused had shot the deceased with premeditation and with the intention to cause more harm than necessary. It reiterated that the accused shared a common intention to kill the deceased, approached the field at close range, and fired without warning while the deceased were peacefully cutting the crop under police protection. The Court concluded that both premeditation and the intention to cause more harm than necessary were present, and therefore the exception did not apply. Finally, the Court addressed the contention that two of the accused had used firearms belonging to close relatives who possessed licences, noting that the accused themselves lacked a licence and thus fell within the provisions of Section 19(f) of the Arms Act.

In considering the provision that states “than is necessary for the purpose of such defence,” the Court examined the factual findings and concluded that it could not be said that the accused had discharged their firearms at the deceased without pre‑meditation and without the intention of causing more injury than was required for legitimate private defence. The Court reiterated that it had previously found that the accused, sharing a common intention to kill the deceased, had fired upon them from a very short distance while the victims were peacefully harvesting the crop under police protection. The Court observed that both pre‑meditation and a deliberate intention to inflict greater harm than was strictly necessary were present at the time the accused performed those actions. Accordingly, the factual circumstances of the present case did not fall within the scope of the cited exception. The Court then turned to the argument that Gurdatta Mal and Madan Lal had merely used firearms belonging to close relatives who possessed licences for those weapons. The Court held that, once it is accepted that the accused themselves did not hold any licence to keep firearms, their possession of the weapons inevitably attracted the provisions of Section 19(f) of the Arms Act. Having examined all submissions and the evidence, the Court concluded that the appeal could not succeed. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appeal fail.