Godavari Shamrao Parulekar vs State Of Maharashtra And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Criminal Appeals Nos. 109-111 of 1963

Decision Date: 29 January 1964

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In this matter, the Supreme Court recorded that the petition was brought by Godavari Shamrao Parulekar against the State of Maharashtra and several other respondents, and that the judgment was delivered on 29 January 1964. The opinion was written by Justice K.N. Wanchoo, who also sat on the bench together with Justices P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The case is reported in 1964 AIR 1128 and 1964 SCR (6) 446, and it appears in a number of citator references such as R 1966 SC 340 (5), R 1966 SC 816 (9), RF 1966 SC 1404 (7), E 1967 SC 241 (6), D 1967 SC 1797 (5), RF 1968 SC 327 (5), and RF 1986 SC 2177 (37). The central issues discussed involved a detention carried out under the Preventive Detention Act 1950, the subsequent revocation of that order by the State Government, a re‑arrest made under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, and questions concerning the validity of the re‑arrest, the proper authority required to issue a detention order, and whether a fresh allocation of the Governor’s business under Article 166(3) of the Constitution was necessary. The petitioners also argued that the State Government’s satisfaction that detention was required should have been that of the Governor rather than a Minister, that the State ought to have obtained a specific delegation from the Central Government before exercising the power under Rule 30, and that the detention order failed to reflect the consideration required by section 44 of the Defence of India Act. Additionally, they contended that unless the order plainly demonstrated that detention was the sole means to achieve the purpose of the Act and Rules, the order should be held invalid. The factual background set out that the appellants were initially detained on 7 November 1962 under the Preventive Detention Act 1950; that order was later revoked, leading to their release, but they were subsequently re‑arrested under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules and the new detention orders were served while they were already in jail. The appellants challenged those orders by filing habeas corpus petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the High Court; the High Court dismissed the writ petitions, and the appellants obtained a certificate to approach this Court. In their submissions before the Supreme Court, the appellants maintained that their detention was illegal on several grounds, including the service of the detention order while they were incarcerated, the absence of the Governor’s satisfaction, the lack of a fresh allocation of business by the Governor after the passage of the Defence of India Ordinance, Act and Rules, and the failure of the order to indicate that the State Government had considered that detention was the only effective method to fulfil the objectives of the legislation. After considering the arguments, the Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the detention orders issued by the State Government and their service on the appellants while they were in jail were perfectly valid and did not render the detention unlawful. The Court further observed that the appellants were detained not as under‑trials or convicted persons but as detenus, and therefore the procedural requirements raised by the petitioners did not apply.

In this case, the Court observed that the authorities cited in the decisions of Rameshwar Shaw and Makhan Singh Tarsikka were not relevant to the present dispute. By examining the detention order in its entirety, the Court found that the order plainly indicated that it was necessary to detain the appellants in order to prevent them from acting in a manner that could prejudice the Defence of India, public safety, and the maintenance of public order. The Court held that there was no distinction between the expression “so to do” used in Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules and the phrase “to make the following order” that appeared in the detention order; both conveyed the same operative meaning. Because the detention order expressly referred to both the defence of India and the maintenance of public order, the Court concluded that such an order could be issued on the satisfaction of a Minister who was responsible for both subjects, as prescribed by the Rules of Business issued by the Governor. Accordingly, it was not required that the Governor make a fresh allocation of business under Article 166(3) after the enactment of the Defence of India Ordinance, Act and Rules. The Court explained that it sufficed if the allocation of the subject matter to which the Defence of India Ordinance, Act and Rules pertained had already been made with reference to the three lists in the Seventh Schedule, and that any existing allocation could be utilised when the relevant legislation was passed. Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules provides that the power to make such a detention may be exercised by either the Central Government or the State Government; therefore, no additional delegation to the State Government is required for the exercise of power under Rule 30. The Court acknowledged that Section 44 of the Defence of India Act requires that orders made under the Act or the Rules interfere as little as possible with ordinary life, but it clarified that this requirement does not obligate a detention order to demonstrate on its face that the State Government had considered every clause of Rule 30(1) and concluded that detention was the sole means of achieving the purpose of the Act and the Rules. When the order states that detention is necessary to restrain the specified prejudicial activities, the Court interpreted this to mean that the State Government believed detention was the only appropriate measure to address the situation. The burden, the Court said, rested on the detainee to prove that the order exceeded the needs of the situation and therefore violated Section 44. The judgments cited for reference include Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 381; Keshav Talpade v. King Emperor, [1944] F.C.R. 57; Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 334; and Alakhon Singh Tarasikka v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1120. These authorities were considered in the Court’s analysis of the Criminal Appeals Nos. 109‑111 of 1963, which arose from the Bombay High Court’s judgment and order dated 31 May 1963.

In Criminal Applications numbered 217, 218 and 114 of 1963, the appellants identified in Criminal Appeals Nos. 109 and 110 of 1963 appeared in person before the Court. Additional representation for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 111 of 1963 was provided by Janardan Sharma together with the appellant himself. Counsel N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar appeared for the respondents in Criminal Appeals Nos. 109‑111 of 1963, while Purushottam Trikamdas joined R. H. Dhebar in representing the respondents in Criminal Appeal No. 110 of 1963. The judgment was delivered on 29 January 1964 by Justice Wanchoo. The three appeals, which were issued on certificates granted by the Bombay High Court, presented common questions of law and were therefore heard together. Each appeal originated from a habeas‑corpus petition filed by an appellant in the High Court under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking to challenge a detention made under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, hereinafter referred to as “the Rules.” A number of constitutional issues were raised in those petitions, and the High Court resolved those issues to the detriment of the appellants. The matters were slated for hearing in August 1963 alongside several other appeals from various High Courts, and the constitutional questions were finally decided by this Court on 2 September 1963, as reported in Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab. In that decision the Court held that applications under section 491(1) were incompetent where they attempted to attack the validity of the detention on the ground that the Defence of India Act and the Rules conflicted with the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 21 and 22(4), (5) and (7). The Court noted that the remaining issues raised in the present appeals had not been addressed at that time and therefore directed that those appeals be set down for determination before a Constitution Bench in accordance with law. Consequently, the present appeals have been placed before this Bench for consideration of those outstanding points. The State, however, raised a preliminary objection, contending that the detention orders underlying the appeals had been revoked by the State Government, that fresh detention orders had subsequently been issued, and that, as a result, the appeals had become moot. The State relied upon the Federal Court’s decision in Keshav Talpade v. King Emperor, in which the detenu was released while his appeal was pending before the Federal Court. It was argued in that case that, despite the release, the Court should still pronounce on the correctness of the High Court’s judgment. The Federal Court declined to do so and dismissed the appeal on the ground that no order could be made after the detenu’s release.

Generally, an appeal court would not find any useful purpose in deciding a habeas corpus appeal when the detained person had already been released before the appeal reached a final hearing. The Court, however, observed that the present circumstances differed from that general principle. In the case before it, the earlier detention order that formed the basis of the present appeals had been revoked by the Government of Maharashtra because of a technical defect. On the same day that the earlier order was revoked, the Government issued a fresh order of detention, and the appellants were immediately rearrested after being released from jail under the new order. By contrast, in the earlier Federal Court case, the detained individual was released and no fresh order of detention was made on the same day, so there was no re‑arrest. The appellants therefore argued that, although they had technically been released before the present appeals were ready for final hearing, they remained under detention in substance because the fresh order kept them in custody. Consequently, they contended that the legal points raised against the earlier order of detention should also apply to the fresh order. They further urged that the Court should decide the present appeals so that the law would be clarified and would assist the detainees if they later filed fresh applications under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the new detention order. The appellants also indicated that, after the emergency period ended, they intended to sue for damages for false imprisonment, and that the order of the Bombay High Court might impede such a suit. Therefore, they sought an authoritative pronouncement on the legal questions raised, even though the original order from which the appeals arose had been revoked. The Court expressed the view that the circumstances of the present cases were distinct from those in Keshav Talpade’s case, citation [1944] F.C.R. 57, and that justice required a decision on the points raised in the present appeals. The Court added that there was no legal bar to deciding appeals even when the initiating order had been revoked, although ordinarily it would refrain from doing so. In this situation, because the appellants had not been fully released and were still detained under a fresh order made under the Rules, it was just and fair to resolve the legal issues raised. The Court noted that the questions were of general importance and were likely to arise in many future cases. Accordingly, the Court over‑ruled the preliminary objection raised by the State. The Court then observed that the facts of the three appeals were substantially similar and therefore it would refer briefly to the facts of Appeal No. 110 for the purpose of considering the points raised.

In examining the matters presented on behalf of the appellants, the Court noted that the first detention of the appellants occurred on 7 November 1962 by an order issued by the Commissioner of Police for Greater Bombay, an order made pursuant to the Preventive Detention Act, No IV of 1950. After that order was issued, the incident was reported to the Government for further consideration. However, before the Government could act, the security situation of India deteriorated because of the Chinese invasion, and consequently an Emergency was proclaimed under article 352 of the Constitution. On 26 October 1962 the Defence of India Ordinance 1962 was enacted, and the Rules framed under that Ordinance came into force thereafter. When the Government reviewed the situation, it resolved that the original order of 7 November 1962 issued by the Commissioner of Police should be set aside, and the Government issued a revocation on 10 November 1962. On that same day the Government decided to place the appellants under detention and issued a fresh detention order invoking rule 30 of the Rules. The order declared that, in order to prevent the appellants from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, to safeguard public safety and to maintain public order, it was necessary to detain them, and therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by rule 30 of the Rules, the Government directed that the appellants be detained. The detention order was subsequently served on the appellants while they were already in jail. The appellants challenged that order by filing a habeas‑corpus petition under article 226 of the Constitution and under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court dismissed the petitions, but it granted the appellants leave to appeal to this Court. The constitutional questions that had been raised were decided by this Court on 2 September 1963; the present discussion therefore concerned the remaining issues advanced by the appellants. The principal argument advanced by the appellants was that the detention was unlawful because the detention order had been served on them while they were already in custody, and the appellants relied on the judgments of this Court in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan(1) and Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab(2). In those earlier decisions this Court held that when a person is already detained in jail as an under‑trial prisoner, an order of detention made under the Preventive Detention Act or under the Rules cannot be served on that person, because one of the essential elements required for the detaining authority’s satisfaction is absent. The Court in Rameshwar Shaw’s case observed that before an authority can validly conclude that detention is necessary to prevent a person from acting prejudicially, the authority must be satisfied that, if the person were not detained, he would be free to act in a prejudicial way; such satisfaction presupposes the person’s freedom of action at the relevant time. If a person is already confined, that presumption of freedom does not exist.

The Court observed that when a person is already in custody, it is difficult to rationally assert that his release would lead him to act prejudicially; therefore, at the moment an order of detention is to be served, it must be clear that the individual would act prejudicially if not detained, a consideration that is absent when the authority deals with someone already imprisoned. The Court noted that this principle was also restated in Makhan Singh Tarsikka (2). However, the Court highlighted a crucial distinction between the facts of those earlier cases and the facts of the present appeals. The two earlier decisions dealt with the service of a detention order under the Preventive Detention Act or the Rules on a person who was already in jail under one of two circumstances: (1) the individual was an under‑trial prisoner serving an indeterminate period of detention, or (2) the individual was a convicted person whose sentence still had a considerable duration to run. In those situations, serving a fresh order of detention in jail would be unlawful because one essential ingredient—demonstrating that it is necessary to detain the person—could not be satisfied; that necessity can be postulated only of a person who is not already in prison. In contrast, the appellants in the present matter were not detained as under‑trial prisoners for an indeterminate term nor as convicted persons serving a remaining sentence. Instead, they were detained under the Preventive Detention Act by an order dated 7 November 1962, an order that had been reported to the Government for approval and that could remain in force for only twelve days under s. 3 (3) of the Preventive Detention Act unless the State Government approved it in the meantime. The State Government, on 10 November 1962, chose to revoke the Commissioner’s order issued under the Preventive Detention Act and to issue its own order under the Rules. Consequently, the Court held that the principle from the earlier cases did not apply, because the appellants’ detention depended on State Government approval. The State Government’s revocation of the 7 November order and its simultaneous issuance of a new order under the Rules on 10 November meant that it would be a mere formality to release the appellants upon the revocation of the earlier order and to serve them with the new order as soon as they were out of jail.

In the present matter the Court observed that the detention in question did not fall within either of the two categories examined in the decisions of Rameshwar Shaw and Makhan Singh Tarsikka. Rather, the detention was made either under the Preventive Detention Act or under the Defence of India Rules, and its continuation depended on the discretion of the State Government. Accordingly, the Court found no justification for the proposition that, once the State Government chose to withdraw an earlier detention order, it was prohibited from issuing a new detention order on the same day and serving it upon the detainee while he remained in jail. The Court emphasized that both the revoked order and the subsequent order were of the same character and pursued the same objective. It further noted that the order issued by the Commissioner of Police on 7 November 1962 was conditional upon approval by the State Government and would have remained effective for only twelve days absent such approval. In the circumstances where the State Government, on 10 November 1962, revoked the earlier order and simultaneously issued a fresh order under the Rules, the Court held that the latter order was perfectly valid as to the time of its creation. Moreover, the service of that order upon the persons detained—who were held not as trial‑prisoners nor as convicted offenders but as detenues—could not be challenged on the same grounds that were employed in the rulings of Rameshwar Shaw and Makhan Singh Tarsikka. The Court concluded that the principle articulated in those two cases was inapplicable where a new detention order is promulgated after the cancellation or revocation of a prior order. Consequently, the contention that the issuance of the detention order on 10 November 1962, or its service in jail, rendered the detention illegal, was expressly rejected.

The Court then addressed the argument that the detaining authority had failed to satisfy the requirements prescribed by the Rules. That argument was founded upon the wording of the order dated 10 November 1962. The Court referred to Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, which provides that the State Government may, if satisfied that a particular person, for the purpose of preventing that person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, civil defence, public safety, maintenance of public order, India’s relations with foreign powers, peaceful conditions in any part of India, efficient conduct of military operations, or the maintenance of essential supplies and services, should be detained, issue an order directing such detention. The Court reproduced the text of the order of 10 November 1962, which began with the heading “No. S.B.III/DOR.1162‑IV Home Department (Special) … ORDER,” and continued: “Whereas the Government of Maharashtra is satisfied with respect to the person known as Shri Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar of Bombay that, with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of …” The Court observed that the order explicitly satisfied the condition set out in Rule 30, thereby confirming that the detention was lawfully made and could not be invalidated on the basis of procedural deficiency.

The order dated 10 November 1962 stated that, in order to protect India, public safety and public order, it was necessary to make the following order: “Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, the Government of Maharashtra does hereby direct that the said Shri Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar be detained.” The order was issued in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra and was signed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, Sachivalaya, Bombay.

The appellants argued that the first part of the order did not expressly state that detention was necessary. They pointed out that the wording of the first part said only that “it is necessary to make the following order,” and that the second part subsequently instructed the Government to detain the person. The Court held that the phrase “it is necessary to make the following order” effectively meant that it was necessary to take the action required by rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules. When the order was read as a whole, it clearly indicated that detention was required in order to prevent the individual from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, and for the purpose of maintaining public safety and public order. The Court noted that rule 30 uses the expression “so to do,” while the order uses “to make the following order,” and that both expressions convey the same meaning. Accordingly, the Court rejected the argument that the requisite satisfaction under rule 30 had not been reached by the authority issuing the order.

The appellants further contended that because the State Government is equivalent to the Governor, the Governor alone should be satisfied, not the Home Minister, as suggested by the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government. The State Government relied on the Rules of Business, a document framed by the Governor under Article 166 of the Constitution for the efficient conduct of government business and for allocating subjects among Ministers. The affidavit cited item 2(b) of the First Schedule to the Rules of Business, which assigns to the Home Department (Special) the power to make preventive detention orders for reasons connected with the security of a State, public order, or the maintenance of essential supplies and services. During the hearing, the Court’s attention was drawn to item 1 of the First Schedule, which allocates to the General Administration Department the power to order preventive detention for reasons relating to defence, foreign affairs, or the security of India. The Court observed that the Rules of Business clearly divided preventive‑detention powers between two departments, and that an order mentioning both the defence of India and public order could only be made by a Minister who was in charge of the subjects allotted to the General Administration Department.

The Court observed that the Rules of Business separate the power to order preventive detention into two distinct categories that are assigned to two different departments. When the purpose of preventive detention relates to the security of a State, the preservation of public order, or the continuity of supplies and essential services, the authority to make such an order resides with the Minister who is in charge of item 2(b), which concerns subjects allocated to the Home Department (Special). Conversely, when preventive detention is sought for reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs, or the security of India, the appropriate authority is the Minister who is in charge of item 1, which deals with subjects allotted to the General Administration Department. The Court noted that the detention order under consideration stated that its objective was to prevent the appellants from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, public safety, and the maintenance of public order. Because the order invoked both the defence of India and the maintenance of public order, the Court held that only a Minister who possessed responsibility for both item 1 of the General Administration Department and item 2(b) of the Home Department (Special) could validly issue such an order. The State’s affidavit attempted to justify the order on the basis that it had been made by the Home Minister who was in charge of item 2(b) concerning subjects allocated to the Home Department (Special). The Court expressed the view that, since the order also cited reasons connected with the defence of India, it could not be exercised solely under item 2(b), entry 7, which pertains exclusively to subjects of the Home Department (Special). Accordingly, the order required the signature of a Minister who was concurrently in charge of item 1 of the General Administration Department as well as item 2(b) of the Home Department (Special). The Court further observed that the original affidavit filed on behalf of the State did not clearly state whether the Minister who dealt with the detention orders also held responsibility for the subjects allotted to the General Administration Department. However, during oral argument it was asserted that the Minister who passed the order, on which the appellants’ detention was based, was indeed in charge of both item 2(b) of the Home Department (Special) and item 1 of the General Administration Department. In response, the Court directed the State Government to file an affidavit confirming this assertion. An affidavit was subsequently filed on 21 December 1963, wherein it was affirmed that the order dated 10 November 1962 had been issued by the Chief Minister, who at that time exercised authority over both the General Administration Department and the Home Department (Special). The Court reiterated that the detention order expressly relied upon three grounds: (i) the defence of India, (ii) public safety, and (iii) the maintenance of public order.

The order of detention listed three grounds, namely defence of India, public safety, and maintenance of public order. According to the Rules of Business, preventive detention for defence of India may be ordered only by the Minister responsible for the General Administration Department. Conversely, preventive detention for reasons related to maintenance of public order may be ordered solely by the Minister who handles subjects allocated to the Home Department (Special). Therefore, an order that combined the defence of India ground with the public order ground could be validly issued only by a minister who simultaneously headed both the General Administration Department and the Home Department (Special). The affidavit submitted later confirmed that, at the relevant time, the Chief Minister held charge of both departments, enabling him to issue the challenged order. Consequently, the argument that the order was invalid because the minister lacked authority on either department cannot succeed under the applicable rules. The appellants also contended that, after the Defence of India Ordinance and its Rules were enacted, the Governor had not issued an order of allocation under Article 166 of the Constitution. The appellants argued that the 1 May 1960 Governor's order allocating business could not extend to the preventive detention power created by the Defence of India Ordinance and its Rules. Accordingly, they maintained that the Governor should have passed the detention order himself, rather than relying on the earlier allocation. The Court held that this line of argument possessed no persuasive force and therefore must be rejected. Under Article 166(2), the allocation of business is not tied to any specific statute that may be in force at the time of allocation; rather, it is based on the three lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The executive powers of both the Centre and the State extend to matters on which Parliament and the State Legislature are competent to legislate. Thus, when an allocation of business is made, it is made with reference to the three constitutional lists, and the allocation thereby anticipates any contingencies that may arise in the exercise of executive authority. Such an allocation may be effected even before Parliament enacts legislation, allowing the State to use the allocation when a later law confers power concerning a matter listed in List I. Consequently, the Court concluded that a fresh allocation under Article 166(3) after the enactment of the Defence of India Ordinance, Act and Rules was unnecessary. It is sufficient that the subject to which the Defence of India Ordinance, Act and Rules refer has already been allocated under the three constitutional lists, and that existing allocation may be invoked when the relevant statutes come into force.

Preventive detention is listed in the Constitution under List I, item 9, for reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs and the security of India, and also under List III, item 3, for reasons related to the security of a State, the maintenance of public order, or the provision of essential supplies and services to the community. The allocation of executive business made pursuant to Article 166 is intended to implement these constitutional entries and therefore becomes available for use whenever any law that falls within those entries is enacted and its authority is vested in a State Government. Consequently, the claim advanced by the appellants that a fresh allocation under Article 166(3) should have been made by the Governor after the enactment of the Defence of India Ordinance, the Defence of India Act and the associated Rules cannot succeed. The appellants also relied upon Sections 40 and 44 of the Defence of India Act. Section 40 empowers the Central Government to delegate its powers under the Act or the Rules to any officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government, to any State Government, or to any officer or authority subordinate to such Government, or to any other authority. Their argument was that before a State Government could exercise the power conferred by rule 30, a delegation from the Central Government was required. This argument was held to be misguided. While Section 40 indeed authorises the Central Government to make delegations, rule 30 itself expressly provides that the power may be exercised by either the Central Government or the State Government; consequently no additional delegation under Section 40 was necessary for the State Government to act under rule 30. The appellants further contended that the order of detention did not demonstrate that Section 44 had been considered at the time it was made. Section 44 states that any authority or person acting under the Act shall interfere with a person’s ordinary pursuits of life and enjoyment of property as little as may be consonant with the purpose of ensuring public safety, the national interest, defence of India and civil defence. The appellants argued that detention completely interferes with a person’s ordinary life, and therefore, before such an order could be issued, Section 44 must be borne in mind, meaning that detention should be ordered only when it is the sole means of achieving the purposes of the Act. They further argued that rule 30(1) contains numerous clauses regulating conduct, and that the clause concerning detention, which amounts to total interference with the detainee’s life, could be invoked only if Section 44 shows that no other regulatory measure under the remaining clauses of rule 30(1) would satisfy the situation’s demands. Accordingly, they maintained that unless the detention order explicitly indicated that the State Government considered detention to be the only viable method to fulfil the Act’s objectives, the order would be invalid under Section 44. The Court found no merit in this contention. Although Section 44 requires that interference with ordinary life be kept to the minimum necessary, this requirement does not preclude the use of detention where the circumstances justify it, nor does it demand a specific statement in the order that detention was the only available option.

There are as many as eight separate clauses that are intended to regulate the conduct of an individual, and clause (b) of Rule 30(1) deals with detention, which results in a total interruption of the detainee’s normal way of life. Such a clause may be invoked only in accordance with Section 44 when it can be demonstrated that none of the other clauses within Rule 30(1) would adequately address the circumstances at hand. Consequently, the petitioner contended that unless the order itself plainly indicated that the State Government had concluded that detention was the sole method for achieving the objectives of the Act and the Rules, the order would be invalid under Section 44 of the Act. The Court considered this contention and held that it lacked merit. While it is correct that Section 44 requires that any order made under the Act or the Rules should interfere as little as possible with a person’s ordinary life and property, this requirement does not obligate a detention order to expressly state on its face that the State Government had examined every alternative clause of Rule 30(1) and had determined that only clause (b) could fulfil the purpose of the legislation. In the Court’s view, when an order declares that detention is necessary to restrain the prejudicial activities identified therein, it implicitly reflects the State Government’s belief that detention was the only reasonable means to address the situation. The burden, therefore, falls on the detainee to prove that the order exceeded what was required by the circumstances and thus violated Section 44. No such proof was presented in the matters before the Court, and the Court was satisfied that the orders under challenge did not exceed the necessities of the situation, even if Section 44 were interpreted as mandatory rather than merely directory. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed.