G. S. Ramaswamy and Ors vs Inspector-General Of Police, Mysore

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. 972-977 of 1963

Decision Date: 21 January 1964

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the matter titled G. S. Ramaswamy and Others versus the Inspector‑General of Police, Mysore, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 21 January 1964. The opinion was authored by Justice K. N. Wanchoo and the bench comprised Justices K. N. Wanchoo, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. C. Das Gupta, J. C. Shah and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioners, identified as G. S. Ramaswamy and several others, were opposed by the respondent, the Inspector‑General of Police for Mysore. The case citation appears as 1966 AIR 175 and 1964 SCR (6) 279, with additional citations listed in the reporter and citator information.

The factual backdrop concerned the appointment of the petitioners as Sub‑Inspectors in the former Hyderabad State. Their names were entered in the eligibility list for promotion to the rank of Circle Inspector. When portions of the former Hyderabad State were merged into the State of Mysore, the petitioners were transferred to Mysore. By virtue of the eligibility list supplied by the Hyderabad authorities, the petitioners were subsequently promoted on an ad hoc basis to the position of Circle Inspector and served in that capacity for varying periods. Later, certain Circle Inspectors who had previously been confirmed but were absent on leave or deputation returned to the newly formed State, and the petitioners were ordered to revert to their former rank of Sub‑Inspector.

In response to the reversion orders, the petitioners instituted writ petitions before the Mysore High Court. Their claim asserted that inclusion of their names in the Hyderabad eligibility list created an indefeasible right to be promoted to Circle Inspector and to remain in that rank, and that the reversion amounted to an unlawful reduction in rank. They sought a writ, order or direction that would set aside the reversion orders, require the State Government to retain them as Circle Inspectors and confirm their appointments. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions, prompting the petitioners to approach this Court by way of special leave. In addition to the appeals, they also filed separate writ petitions in this Court. Two further petitioners, who had not appealed the High Court’s decision, also filed writ petitions here.

The petitioners’ arguments before this Court were multiple. They contended that placement of their names in the eligibility list gave them a non‑revocable right to promotion as Circle Inspectors; that once promoted, even on a temporary or officiating basis, they acquired a right never to be reverted; that having served more than two years on probation, they should automatically become confirmed under Rule 486; that the reversion orders constituted a reduction in rank in accordance with Rule 2(c); and that, consequently, they should enjoy seniority over other Circle Inspectors who were promoted after them and therefore should not be reverted, whereas those junior officers should be.

In this case the Court dismissed the appeals and the writ petitions. The Court held that merely having a Sub‑Inspector’s name placed once on an eligibility list does not confer an absolute right to be promoted to the rank of Circle Inspector. The Court further observed that a promotion granted on a temporary or officiating basis does not give the officer a guaranteed immunity from being reverted under any circumstances. Rule 486, the Court explained, does not provide for automatic confirmation after a two‑year probationary period; the rule’s language that officers will be confirmed at the end of the probation is qualified by the condition that they must have given satisfaction. Accordingly, the competent authority must be satisfied with the officer’s performance and must issue a specific order of confirmation. The Court found that the reversion of the petitioners in the present matter did not amount to a reduction in rank because the petitioners had never been formally confirmed as Circle Inspectors and therefore possessed no right to that post. Their reversion was due to the exigencies of service, not because of any fault on their part. Moreover, reversion caused by senior officers returning from deputation or leave also did not constitute a reduction in rank. The petitioners could not invoke Rule 2(c) in the unique circumstances that existed in the State after the re‑organisation, since promotions had been made on an ad‑hoc basis without regard to the inter‑seniorities of officers from different States. The Court concluded that the petitioners’ reversion could not be characterized as discriminatory. The judgment referred to the authority in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1711.

The matter before the Court was a civil appellate jurisdiction involving Civil Appeal Numbers 972‑977 of 1963, taken on special leave from the judgment and order dated 3 April 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition Numbers 1380, 1179, 1246, 1259 and 1312 of 1962, together with Writ Petition Numbers 64, 90‑94 and 173‑174 of 1963. The petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the appellants and petitioners in the civil appeals and the first group of writ petitions were represented by individuals appearing on behalf of the appellants and the petitioners. Counsel for the petitioners in the second group of writ petitions also appeared. The respondents were represented by counsel that included the Additional Solicitor General and other advocates. The judgment was delivered on 21 January 1964 by Justice Wanchoo. The Court noted that the appeals and writ petitions presented common questions of law and were therefore to be dealt with together, and that the appeals originated from six writ petitions decided by the Mysore High Court, while six of the writ petitions filed in this Court were by the same petitioners.

The petitioners had filed writ petitions in the Mysore High Court, and two additional writ petitions numbered 173 and 174 had been filed by two other individuals. Those two individuals also filed writ petitions in the High Court, although they had not filed any appeals against the High Court’s decision. For the remainder of the judgment all of these persons were collectively referred to as petitioners. The matter that came before the High Court was summarised as follows. All of the petitioners had been appointed as sub‑inspectors in the former Hyderabad State under section 6 of the Hyderabad District Police Act (No. X of 1329 Fasli). Under rule 399 of the Hyderabad District Police Manual, which had been issued by the Government of Hyderabad, and under section 10 of the Hyderabad District Police Act, the posts of circle inspectors were to be filled by promotion from the rank of sub‑inspector. Subsequent rules prescribed the procedure for carrying out such promotions. The names of those sub‑inspectors who were considered fit for promotion were forwarded by the Deputy Inspectors General of Police and the Commissioner of City Police of Hyderabad to the Inspector General of Police. A Board then was constituted, consisting of the Inspector General of Police, all the Deputy Inspectors General of Police, the Commissioner of City Police, Hyderabad, and the Assistant Inspector General of Police. This Board interviewed the candidates and prepared an approved list of sub‑inspectors who were deemed fit for promotion. The approved list was known as the eligibility list, and promotions to the post of circle inspector were made from that list. The petitioners argued before the High Court that their names had been included in the eligibility list that had been published in October 1956, which was before the States Reorganisation Act (No. XXXVII of 1956) came into force on 1 November 1956. They contended that, because their names appeared on the list, they were entitled as of right to be promoted to circle inspector whenever a vacancy arose. When the States Reorganisation Act became effective, certain territories from the States of Bombay, Hyderabad, Madras and the whole of Coorg were merged into the newly formed State of Mysore, in addition to the pre‑existing State of Mysore. Consequently, public servants belonging to those transferred territories, including the petitioners, were transferred to the new State of Mysore. Under section 115 of the States Reorganisation Act, such transferred public servants were deemed to be serving in connection with the affairs of the principal successor State. The Act also provided for the setting up of one or more advisory boards to assist with the division and integration of services among the new states and to ensure that all persons affected by the reorganisation received fair and equitable treatment. Section 115 further stipulated that the conditions of service that were applicable immediately before the appointed day, namely 1 November 1956, could not be varied to the disadvantage of any transferred person.

Section 115 of the States Reorganisation Act stipulated that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day, 1 November 1956, could not be altered to the disadvantage of any person transferred to the new State unless the Central Government gave its prior approval. Section 116(1) provided that public servants would continue in the same posts after the appointed day, but subsection (2) clarified that the competent authority of the successor State could, after that date, issue any order affecting a person’s continuance in such post or office, thereby recognising the successor State’s authority to transfer officers anywhere within the new State after 1 November 1956.

The petitioners continued to serve in the new State of Mysore and, being listed in the eligibility list referred to earlier, were promoted to the rank of circle inspector on various dates subsequent to 1 November 1956. The eligibility lists had been received in Mysore from all the States whose territories and officers had been transferred under the Reorganisation Act, and these lists were used whenever vacancies arose in the cadre of circle inspectors. It appeared that, pending full integration of services, promotions were made from these eligibility lists on an ad‑hoc basis, described in the orders as “out of seniority.” Accordingly, the petitioners were promoted ad hoc to circle inspectors from the eligibility list that originated with the former Hyderabad State and served in that capacity for varying periods.

Subsequently, the petitioners were ordered to be reverted to their former rank when certain confirmed circle inspectors, who had been on leave or deputation outside the State, returned to Mysore. In response, the petitioners instituted writ proceedings before the High Court, contending that because they had been placed on the Hyderabad eligibility list they possessed a vested right to promotion as circle inspectors and to remain in that rank, and that the reversion orders amounted to a reduction in rank. They sought a writ, order or direction to set aside the reversion orders dated 6 September 1962, to direct the State Government to continue them as circle inspectors and to confirm them in that post.

During the hearing before the High Court, the petitioners relied upon rule 2(c) of the Seniority Rules framed by the Governor of Mysore in 1957; the writ petitions principally invoked that seniority rule, which the Court would later examine. The State Government’s position was briefly summarized. It was admitted that after 1 November 1956 the officers, including the petitioners, had been transferred to the new State of Mysore and that eligibility lists had been received from all the States whose territories and officers were transferred. Because integration of the various services required time, the new State, exercising the powers conferred by the States Reorganisation Act, began to act on the received eligibility lists, promoting officers in accordance with those lists while the overall integration process proceeded.

In anticipation of the integration of services, the State promoted sub‑inspectors to the rank of circle inspector on an ad‑hoc basis using the eligibility lists, and the promotion orders explicitly described such appointments as being “out of seniority.” Subsequently, a provisional integrated seniority list that included all sub‑inspectors, including those who were temporarily acting as circle inspectors, was prepared in February 1958; this list is hereinafter referred to as the provisional list. In 1962, when senior circle inspectors returned to the State after deputation, a number of officiating circle inspectors—none of whom were the petitioners—were reverted to their former posts. The petitioners then instituted writ petitions before the High Court in 1962, arguing that despite having been promoted later, they should not have been reverted because the provisional list placed them in a senior position, and consequently the officers junior to them in that list should have been the ones reverted. The High Court accepted this contention, and following its view, reversions were carried out in accordance with the provisions of the provisional list. As a result, the junior sub‑inspectors who, according to the provisional list, were the lowest in seniority, and who were also named in the eligibility list while serving as officiating circle inspectors, were reverted. Because of this procedure, the petitioners themselves were also reverted when the senior officers re‑entered the State. It was further argued that the eligibility lists did not confer any absolute right of promotion to the sub‑inspectors whose names appeared on them, although it was undisputed that only persons named in those lists could be promoted to circle inspector. The argument emphasized that merely being listed did not create a statutory entitlement to promotion under the Rules. Additionally, it was contended that an officiating circle inspector could not claim automatic confirmation after serving a specified period; confirmation required a distinct order issued by the Government. In the present matters, the petitioners had never received a confirming order from the Government as circle inspectors, and therefore no question of reduction in rank arose. It was not contested that the petitioners were not reverted because of any fault on their part; the reversion occurred solely due to service exigencies as senior inspectors returned from deputation or leave. The petitioners maintained that such reversion could not be characterized as a reduction in rank but merely reflected ordinary service requirements. Regarding rule 2(c) of the Seniority Rules, the Government asserted that the rule governed the seniority of inspectors while they were acting as such, bore no relation to the issue of reversion, and, given that promotions had been made after 1 November, the rule did not create any entitlement for the petitioners.

In the facts before the Court, it was noted that the rule issued in 1956 on an ad hoc basis did not create any enforceable right for the petitioners, and the Government was therefore justified in relying on the provisional list, especially in view of the observations made by the High Court that had been referred to earlier. Consequently, the petitioners argued that they possessed no legal right to retain the posts from which they had been reverted, that no reduction in rank had occurred, and that they could not claim any advantage under rule 2(c). The High Court accepted the contentions presented on behalf of the State, dismissed the petitions, and thereafter six of the petitioners obtained special leave from the High Court, which gave rise to the six appeals now pending before this Court. Those six appellants have also instituted six writ petitions before this Court, and in addition, two further writ petitions have been filed by other petitioners who chose not to appeal the High Court’s decision. The matters that the Court is called upon to consider are, first, whether the mere inclusion of a sub‑inspector’s name in the eligibility list creates an indefeasible right to promotion, and second, whether a promotion granted on a temporary or officiating basis confers a right against reversion under any circumstances.

The Court is of the opinion that the presence of a sub‑inspector’s name in the eligibility list does not bestow the kind of right asserted by the petitioners. The relevant provisions are Rules 399 to 403 of the Hyderabad District Police Manual. Rule 399 states that vacancies in the rank of circle inspector must be filled by promoting selected sub‑inspectors, while Rule 403 expressly provides that no direct appointments to the rank of circle inspector shall be made. Rule 400 outlines the procedure for placing names on the eligibility list, and Rule 102 deals with sub‑inspectors serving in the CID. Rule 401 further directs that sub‑inspectors whose names appear on the approved list shall be interviewed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police during his cold‑weather tour, that each officer’s annual work shall be examined, and that a report shall be submitted to the Inspector General of Police indicating whether the officer has continued to meet the fitness criteria for promotion. Accordingly, Rule 401 makes clear that even after a name is entered on the eligibility list, the officer’s fitness for promotion is assessed each year and a report must be prepared to confirm whether fitness has been maintained. This mechanism implies that if a sub‑inspector fails to maintain the required fitness, his name may be removed from the eligibility list. Hence, the mere fact that a sub‑inspector’s name has once been placed on the eligibility list does not confer an indefeasible right to promotion as a circle inspector. In addition, Rule 486, which governs promotions in general, provides that promotion cannot be claimed as a matter of right, although officers and men of all ranks are...

The Court observed that Rule 486 expressly stated that an officer could be expected to receive promotion only when he possessed a good service record, demonstrated efficiency, and showed a thorough knowledge of his duties. This provision made clear that the mere inclusion of a sub‑inspector’s name in the eligibility list did not confer upon him an indefeasible right to be promoted to the rank of circle inspector. The rule further prescribed that every officer who was promoted would serve on a probationary basis for a period of two years. During this probationary period the authority that effected the promotion retained the power to revert the officer at any time if his conduct or work performance was found to be unsatisfactory or if he was deemed unsuitable for the appointed post. Consequently, even after a sub‑inspector had been promoted to circle inspector, he remained subject to possible reversion throughout the two‑year probationary term. The Court therefore rejected the petitioners’ argument that their placement on the eligibility list granted them a permanent right to promotion, and also dismissed the claim that, once they began performing the duties of circle inspector, they could not be reverted. The rule further provided that a promoted officer would be confirmed at the conclusion of the probationary period only if he had satisfied the requirements throughout that time. This demonstrated that confirmation depended upon satisfactory performance during probation, and that neither the eligibility list nor the fact of interim promotion created a guaranteed right to continue in the post.

In addressing the petitioners’ additional contention that having served more than two years on probation automatically conferred permanent status, the Court referred to the precedent set in Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab (1). That decision held that a probationer does not automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of the service upon the expiry of the probationary period unless the governing service rules expressly provide for such an outcome. Accordingly, even if a probationer continues to act in the appointed post beyond the initial two‑year term, he does not become a permanent servant solely by the passage of time. The Court found that the language of Rule 486, which states that “promoted officers will be confirmed at the end of their probationary period if they have given satisfaction,” does not create an automatic right to confirmation. The provision requires a positive assessment of the officer’s conduct and work during probation. Therefore, the petitioners’ reliance on the wording of Rule 486 to claim automatic confirmation after two years was rejected as untenable.

The Court observed that a probationer did not become a permanent member of a service unless the specific rules under which he was appointed expressly provided for such an outcome. Consequently, even if a probationer continued to perform the duties of the post for a period exceeding the initial probationary term, he could not acquire permanent status merely by the passage of time. Permanent confirmation could occur only if the applicable service rules specifically stipulated that a probationer would be automatically confirmed after the initial probationary period concluded.

The petitioners contended that the portion of rule 486 set out earlier expressly mandated automatic confirmation once the probationary period ended. The Court found no merit in this contention. It acknowledged that the language of the rule did not employ the usual phrasing that promoted officers would be eligible or qualified for promotion at the end of their probationary period, a formulation commonly seen in such rules. Nevertheless, the rule stated that “promoted officers will be confirmed at the end of their probationary period,” but this statement was qualified by the condition “if they have given satisfaction.” Accordingly, the Court concluded that the rule did not envisage automatic confirmation after the two‑year probationary period; a promoted officer could be confirmed only if he had given satisfactory service.

The Court explained that the requirement of giving satisfaction had to be satisfied before a promotion could be confirmed under rule 486. This requirement meant that the competent authority had to issue an order declaring that the probationary officer had given satisfaction and was therefore confirmed. The petitioners therefore could not claim that they should be treated as confirmed circle inspectors merely because they had served more than two years on probation. They could attain confirmation only if an order to that effect was passed by the competent authority, even under rule 486.

Based on this analysis, the Court rejected the petitioners’ first contention that they possessed an indefeasible right to promotion once their names appeared on the eligibility list and that they were entitled to continue as circle inspectors after being promoted on a temporary or officiating basis. The Court then turned to the question of whether the reversion in the present cases amounted to a reduction in rank. Having established that the petitioners could not be regarded as confirmed circle inspectors, the Court noted that it was undisputed that they had never been confirmed in that rank and that their reversion was not due to any deficiency in their work. The reversion had occurred solely because senior circle inspectors had returned to the State, either from deputation or from leave.

In this case, the Court observed that the reversion of the petitioners to lower posts occurred because senior circle inspectors had returned from deputation or from leave and required accommodation. The Court held that such a reversion could not be considered a reduction in rank for two principal reasons. First, the petitioners had never been confirmed as circle inspectors and therefore possessed no legal right to hold that position. Second, the reversion was prompted solely by the exigencies of service and not by any deficiency or misconduct on the part of the petitioners. Consequently, the Court concluded that a reversion caused by service exigencies, such as the return of senior officers, did not amount to a diminution of rank. The petitioners’ contention that the reversion resulted in a reduction of rank was therefore rejected as untenable.

The Court then turned to the petitioners’ argument that, until the final integration of service was completed, the State Government was not authorized to rely upon the provisional list of sub‑inspectors and could only effect promotions and transfers on a regional basis, using the eligibility lists of the former States from which the new State’s territories were derived. The petitioners asserted that, had the State acted in this manner, they—being senior in their region—could not have been reverted. The Court found this contention to lack merit. It acknowledged that, for a period, the State Government had proceeded on a regional basis because no integrated seniority list, either provisional or final, was available. However, the Court emphasized that the absence of a final list did not preclude the State from acting on a provisional list once it was prepared, nor did prior regional action create any legal estoppel. The Court noted that territories from four former States were merged into the old State of Mysore, creating a complex integration problem. In response, the State Government made ad hoc promotions either regionwise or out of the usual seniority order, as reflected in various government orders. Nonetheless, the Court reiterated that, for administrative purposes, the State must be treated as a single unit. Referring to section 116(2) of the States Reorganisation Act, the Court explained that after the appointed day the entire State is to be regarded as one entity, and the competent authority may issue orders affecting any officer allotted to the new State. Accordingly, the Court rejected the argument that the State was bound to act only regionally until a final integration list was prepared. The Court found no legal prohibition against the State Government proceeding according to the provisional seniority list once it was compiled. In its opinion, the view adopted by the Mysore High Court in earlier writ petitions, after the provisional seniority list was framed, was correct. The State Government, therefore, was entitled to act on that provisional list, subject to the condition that any necessary adjustments would be made when the final list was finalized.

In this case, the Court observed that if the provisional seniority list were to be altered when the final list was prepared, the State Government would be required to implement the final list. Consequently, the petitioners’ argument that the State Government should have continued to make promotions and transfers on a regional basis even after the provisional list had been prepared was rejected. The Court added that, after the appointed day, the State Government was both entitled and obligated to regard the State as a single administrative unit and to issue transfer orders as it deemed appropriate, treating the entire State as one whole.

Finally, the Court turned to the contention raised by the petitioners concerning rule 2(c) of the Mysore Seniority Rules, a rule that had been argued before the High Court at the hearing but had not been specifically raised in the earlier petitions, and which formed the principal basis of the present writ petitions. The rule, promulgated by the Governor of Mysore in February 1958, states: “Seniority inter se of persons appointed on temporary basis will be determined by the dates of their continuous officiating in that grade and where the period of officiation is the same the seniority inter se in the lower grade shall prevail.” The petitioners claimed that, in view of this rule, they should be regarded as senior to other circle inspectors who were promoted after they themselves were promoted to circle inspector, and therefore they should not have been reverted while the later‑promoted circle inspectors should have been reverted, based on the principle that the junior‑most officiating person must be reverted.

The Court examined the wording of rule 2(c) and held that the rule merely establishes seniority among officers who are temporarily serving in a higher grade while they are actually officiating in that grade. The rule does not expressly prescribe the method to be followed when reversions are required because of service exigencies. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the rule cannot be said to embody the “last‑come‑first‑go” principle familiar in industrial law. Because rule 2(c) does not address reversion, the petitioners could not successfully argue that the rule had been violated by their reversion.

Nevertheless, the Court recognised that, when reversions are necessitated by public service exigencies, the customary practice is to revert the junior‑most officers who are officiating in clear or long‑term vacancies, thereby creating space for senior officers returning from deputation, leave, or similar circumstances. Moreover, since promotions on an officiating basis are generally made according to seniority, subject to fitness, the officer who was promoted most recently is usually the one who is reverted. The Court noted that this general practice prevails unless extraordinary circumstances arise, as was the situation in the present case. The Court also recalled that the newly formed State of Mysore comprised the territories of the old State of Mysore, a point previously set out in the judgment.

The Court explained that the new State of Mysore was formed by merging the former State of Mysore with the territories of four other States. As a result, officers who had previously served in the old State of Mysore and those who came from the other four States all became officers of the newly created State. Their mutual integration had to be settled in accordance with section 115 of the States Reorganisation Act. Because determining the appropriate integration required time, the newly constituted State continued to make ad hoc promotions after 1 November 1956 in order to maintain administrative efficiency. Consequently, the usual rule that promotions should follow seniority, subject to fitness, could not operate in a situation where officers from different predecessor States were being combined. The Court therefore found that the State issued orders promoting sub‑inspectors drawn from several eligibility lists, attempting to observe seniority among officers originating from the various former States. A provisional list of sub‑inspectors was not prepared until 1958. When that provisional list was finally drawn up, it became apparent that many of the earlier ad hoc promotions, which had been made from the various eligibility lists, did not correspond with the seniority ordering set out in the provisional list. In numerous instances, sub‑inspectors who were senior according to the provisional list—and who also appeared on the earlier eligibility lists—were promoted only after sub‑inspectors who were junior in the provisional list, even though the latter were likewise on the eligibility lists. The Court observed that these special circumstances, which arose after the provisional list began to be applied post‑1958, created a situation where officers who had been serving as officiating inspectors for a longer period had to be reverted before officers who had served a shorter period, because the provisional list established a different seniority ranking. The Court therefore held that the early promotions of the petitioners and others who were, in fact, junior to other sub‑inspectors in the original eligibility lists occurred because no provisional list existed at the time and promotions were therefore made without regard to inter‑se seniority. Only after the provisional list was prepared did the relative seniority of officers from the various former States become apparent on its face. Accordingly, when reversions became necessary on account of service exigencies, the Court noted that, in view of the earlier ad hoc promotions, it was inevitable that some officiating inspectors who had been promoted earlier would be reverted in preference to those promoted later. The Court concluded that, given the special circumstances created by the States Reorganisation Act, the deviation from the normal method of reversion could not be deemed unjustified after the provisional list came into force. Consequently, the petitioners could not rely on rule 2(c) in these particular circumstances.

In the situation that existed in the State after the re‑organisation, the promotions of sub‑inspectors had been carried out on an ad hoc basis and had not taken into account the inter‑se seniority of officers who came from the different former States. Because of this special circumstance it appeared that rule 2(c) was being ignored in the matter of reversion, since the promotions themselves had been made without regard to an integrated seniority order and consequently sub‑inspectors who were junior in the integrated seniority list had been promoted before those who were senior. The Court therefore held that rule 2(c) could not be applied strictly to the present case.

Even assuming that the general principle required the junior‑most officer to be the first to be reverted when reversion was necessary because of exigencies of service, the Court found that the reversion of the petitioners could not be characterized as discriminatory. The affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government demonstrated that the petitioners were, in fact, the junior‑most officers according to the provisional list that had been prepared, although, under the exceptional circumstances previously described, they had acted as officiating circle inspectors for a longer period than some others who had not been reverted. Consequently, the Court concluded that the allegation of discrimination based on a breach of rule 2(c) could not be sustained in the special circumstances of this case, as there was no dispute that the petitioners occupied the junior position on the provisional list at the time the reversion orders were issued.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed both the appeals and the writ petitions. No order as to costs was made in the circumstances of this case, and the appeals and petitions were dismissed.