D. S. Chellammal Anni vs Nasanan Samban

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 356 of 1963

Decision Date: 13 March 1964

Coram: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, S.M. Sikri

In the matter titled D. S. Chellammal Anni versus Nasanan Samban, the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgment on 13 March 1964. The judgment was authored by Justice K. N. Wanchoo and the bench comprised Justices K. N. Wanchoo, P. B. Gajendragadkar, J. C. Shah, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and S. M. Sikri. The petitioner was D. S. Chellammal Anni and the respondent was Nasanan Samban. The case is reported in 1965 AIR 498 and 1964 SCR (7) 197. The statutory provisions in issue were Section 3 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (XXV of 1955) and Section 7 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act (XXIV of 1950), concerning the scope of practice, the high‑court revisional jurisdiction and the power of the Supreme Court to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The factual background disclosed that the respondent was a cultivating tenant of the appellant. After completing the harvest, the respondent collected the grain and brought it to the threshing floor. The crops were then measured and the respondent offered to pay the landlord forty per cent of the produce as rent, which was the amount prescribed by law. The landlord, however, insisted on receiving sixty per cent of the crop. Repeated requests by the respondent for the landlord or his agent to accept the lawful forty‑per‑cent share were ignored. The respondent lodged complaints with the police and revenue authorities, but the landlord continued to refuse his lawful share. Fearing loss of the crop due to impending rain, the respondent removed and sold the grain to prevent spoilage. Subsequently, the respondent sent a money order to the landlord reflecting the market value of the forty‑per‑cent share. The landlord declined to accept this payment and instituted a petition under Section 3(4)(a) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, seeking the respondent’s ejectment before the Revenue Divisional Officer.

The Revenue Divisional Officer held that while the respondent was correct in insisting on the four‑tenths share, he was not justified in removing the crops. The officer observed that the respondent should have deposited the rent in court or paid it directly to the landlord as required by law. Because the respondent failed to do so, the officer denied the request for an extension of time to deposit the rent and ordered the respondent’s ejection. The respondent appealed this order by filing a revision petition before the High Court, which allowed the petition and set aside the ejectment order. The present appeal was filed before this Court on special leave.

The appellant argued that the respondent had violated Section 7 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956 by removing the produce from the threshing floor, and therefore could not claim protection under that Act. The appellant also contended that because the respondent had not paid the rent in the manner envisioned by Section 3(3) of the Protection Act, he was not entitled to the Act’s protection. Further, the appellant maintained that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the discretionary authority exercised by the Revenue Divisional Officer. The Court addressed these submissions, beginning with the observation that Section 7 can…

In the matter of the alleged breach of section 7 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956, the Court explained that the provision could be violated in two distinct ways: first, when a tenant fails to bring the harvested crop to the threshing floor, and second, when a tenant, having brought the crop to the threshing floor, removes any portion of it at a time or in a manner that prevents the crops from being divided at the proper time. The Court recorded that, in the present case, it was undeniably admitted that the respondent did bring the harvested crop to the threshing floor. The evidence showed that the respondent was consistently ready for the division of the crop. The obstruction to division arose because the appellant insisted on receiving sixty per cent of the crop and refused to accept the share to which the respondent was entitled. Consequently, the division could not take place. The Court further noted that the crops had been measured by the Revenue Inspector, and that the respondent removed the crop only to avoid deterioration, not to hinder division. From these facts, the Court concluded that the respondent’s removal of the crop was not intended to prevent the division and therefore did not constitute a transgression of section 7.

The Court then turned to the issue of rent payment under section 3 of the Protection Act. It observed that because the respondent failed to pay the rent within the time and in the manner prescribed by clause 3(3) of the Act, the matter fell under clause 3(2), which gave the appellant a cause of action to seek ejectment under clause 3(4). However, the Court emphasized that clause 3(4) confers a discretionary power on the Revenue Divisional Officer to allow the tenant additional time to pay the arrears, taking into account the circumstances of each case. The Officer had refused to exercise this discretion on the ground that the rent had not been deposited under clause 3(3). The Court held that the discretion under clause 3(4)(b) becomes relevant precisely when the rent has not been deposited under clause 3(3); consequently, the Officer was incorrect in refusing to use his discretionary power. Finally, the Court remarked that the Revenue Divisional Officer’s legal view was plainly erroneous, and that the High Court was justified in interfering with the Officer’s order, either under the Supreme Court’s special jurisdiction under article 136, which would not be disturbed, or under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because the Officer had failed to exercise his jurisdiction properly.

The appeal arose from a decision of the Madras High Court. In the present case the appellant owned land in the village of Idaikkal and acted as landlord, while the respondent occupied the same land as tenant. The disputed parcel had been let by the appellant to the respondent before the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, No. XXIV of 1956 – hereinafter called the Fair Rent Act – came into force, and the rent was stipulated to be payable partly in cash and partly in kind. Under the tenancy agreement the parties had agreed that the appellant would receive sixty per cent of the gross produce of the crop, with the remaining forty per cent to be retained by the respondent.

In 1959 the crop for that year was harvested, and the dispute that gave rise to this appeal began at that time. After reaping, the respondent brought the harvested produce to the appellant’s threshing floor for the purpose of division. The respondent contended that, pursuant to the Fair Rent Act, the appellant was entitled to only forty per cent of the produce, whereas the appellant’s agent insisted on the sixty per cent share that had been fixed in the original tenancy agreement. The disagreement persisted for approximately ten days while the harvested crop remained on the threshing floor.

During that period the respondent filed an application with the Circle Inspector of Police, alleging that the appellant was deliberately postponing the division of the produce, thereby preventing the respondent from removing his portion, and that such conduct might lead to a breach of the peace. The police conducted an inquiry and reported their findings to the Tehsildar. Their report stated that the harvested crop was still lying on the threshing floor, that the appellant’s agent refused to divide the produce according to the statutory provisions and insisted on adhering to the contractual agreement, and that the crop was deteriorating because the seeds had started to germinate after exposure to rain.

Following the police report, the Tehsildar ordered the Revenue Inspector to investigate the matter, to measure the quantity of the produce, to record the gross yield, and to submit a report. The Revenue Inspector went to the location on 27 September 1959 after issuing a notice to the appellant’s agent requiring his presence for the measurement. The appellant’s agent did not appear, but the Revenue Inspector proceeded to take measurements in the presence of the respondent and several prominent villagers. After completing the measurement, the Revenue Inspector forwarded a written report to the Tehsildar containing the results of his assessment.

Because the appellant’s agent was absent, the produce could not be divided at that time. The Revenue Inspector therefore instructed the respondent not to remove any of the crop. Nevertheless, the respondent removed the crop shortly after the Revenue Inspector departed. Subsequent to the removal, the respondent sent a money order to the appellant representing the monetary value of the appellant’s entitled share, which was calculated at forty per cent of the total produce. The narrative indicates that shortly thereafter further legal proceedings followed.

After the appellant lodged a criminal complaint accusing the respondent of theft, that complaint was dismissed. The appellant then filed a petition under section 3(4)(a) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, No XXV of 1955—referred to in the judgment as the Protection Act—seeking the ejectment of the respondent before the Revenue Divisional Officer. The Revenue Divisional Officer observed that, although the respondent was entitled under the law to insist that the appellant receive only forty per cent of the produce, the respondent was not entitled to remove the crop himself. The officer held that the respondent should have enforced his rights through the procedure prescribed by law rather than by taking the crop. Because the respondent did not follow the lawful procedure, the officer refused to exercise his discretion to allow the respondent additional time to deposit the arrears of rent in court and instead ordered the respondent’s ejectment. Dissatisfied with that order, the respondent filed a revision petition in the High Court. The High Court ruled that, given the circumstances, the Revenue Divisional Officer ought to have exercised his discretion in favour of the respondent. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the ejectment order, noting that the rent had already been deposited with the High Court. Following that decision, the appellant applied for special leave to appeal to this Court, and such leave was granted, bringing the matter before the present Court.

In the special leave petition, the appellant initially contended that both the Fair Rent Act and the Protection Act were unconstitutional because they imposed unreasonable restrictions on the appellant’s fundamental right to hold her property. However, during the arguments before this Court, counsel for the appellant abandoned the constitutional challenge to the two Acts and limited the contention to a claim that the High Court lacked jurisdiction under section 6‑B of the Protection Act to interfere with the Revenue Divisional Officer’s order. Before addressing that contention, the Court briefly summarised the relevant provisions of the two statutes. The Protection Act, as its title indicates, was enacted to protect cultivating tenants from eviction. It is undisputed that the respondent was a cultivating tenant. Section 3(1) of the Protection Act provides that, subject to the subsequent sub‑sections, no cultivating tenant may be evicted from his holding or any part thereof during the operation of the Act by or at the instance of his landlord, whether through a court decree, an order, or otherwise. The subsequent sub‑sections set out the conditions under which ejectment may be ordered. Sub‑section 2 of section 3 stipulates that a tenant does not enjoy the protection of sub‑section 1 if the tenant is in arrears of rent and fails to pay those arrears within the time specified. Sub‑section 3 of section 3 allows a cultivating tenant to deposit the rent, or, if the rent is payable in kind, its market value on the date of deposit, with the landlord’s account, after which the court, including the Revenue Divisional Officer, gives notice of the deposit and conducts an enquiry to determine whether the amount deposited is correct, hearing both landlord and tenant. The Court may then order the tenant to make up any deficiency, and if the tenant fails to do so, the landlord may seek eviction as provided in sub‑section 4.

In this case, the Court explained that when rent is payable in kind, the tenant may deposit the rent, or its market value on the date of deposit, with the Court to the account of the landlord. The Court further stated that after the tenant makes such a deposit, a notice of deposit is issued by the Court, which includes the Revenue Divisional Officer as a party to the notice. Subsequently, an enquiry is conducted to determine whether the amount deposited is correct. This enquiry is held after hearing both the landlord and the tenant. If the enquiry discovers that the amount deposited is deficient, the tenant is ordered to make good the deficiency, and should the tenant fail to pay the deficient sum, the landlord is then entitled to apply to the Court for eviction in accordance with the procedure set out in sub‑section (4). Section 3(4)(a) of the Protection Act prescribes the procedure for evicting a tenant. Under that provision, a landlord must first make an application to the Revenue Divisional Officer. Upon receipt of the application, the Revenue Divisional Officer is required to give a reasonable opportunity to both the landlord and the tenant to present their respective cases. After allowing this opportunity, the Revenue Divisional Officer conducts a summary enquiry and then decides whether an order of eviction should be made. Clause (b) of sub‑section (4) of section 3 confers further discretion on the Revenue Divisional Officer. The officer may allow the cultivating tenant such time as he considers just and reasonable, taking into account the relative circumstances of the landlord and the tenant, for the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent that are payable under the Act, and may also direct the tenant to bear any costs that the officer deems appropriate. The provision further provides that if the cultivating tenant deposits the sum as directed, the tenant shall be deemed to have paid the rent. Conversely, if the cultivating tenant fails to deposit the sum as directed, the Revenue Divisional Officer is mandated to pass an order of eviction. The Court then turned to the relevant provisions of the Fair Rent Act, which are material for the present appeal. It reiterated that, according to section 4(1) of that Act, the fair rent for wet land, which is the subject of the present appeal, is fixed at forty per cent of the normal gross produce or its monetary value. Section 7 of the Fair Rent Act provides that where the produce to be shared is grain, the sharing must be carried out at the threshing floor on which the threshing was performed, and that no portion of the produce may be removed from that floor at any time or in any manner that would prevent the proper division of the produce at the appropriate time. A combined reading of these provisions of the two Acts indicates that, for a tenant whose rent is payable in kind, the tenant is required to bring the crop to the threshing floor for division, and that the division must be effected at that floor without removing any part of the produce in a way that would hinder the due division. However, the Court noted that under section 3(3) of the Protection Act, a tenant is permitted to deposit with the Court, to the landlord’s account, the market value of the rent payable in kind on the date of deposit, and that this provision evidently presupposes the circumstances described.

Although the tenant had taken the produce to the threshing floor, the landlord failed to cooperate in its division. The Court observed that when the landlord does not cooperate, the tenant cannot permit the crop to remain on the threshing floor and deteriorate; consequently, Section 3(3) of the Protection Act permits the tenant to deposit the market value of the rent payable in kind with the court, and the court then determines whether the deposited amount is correct. The Court identified the first issue as whether the respondent acted in a manner prohibited by law. The appellant’s principal contention was that the respondent had violated Section 7 of the Fair Rent Act and therefore could not rely on the Protection Act. The appellant further alleged that the respondent had breached Section 3(2) of the Protection Act by failing to deposit arrears of rent within the prescribed time, which, in the appellant’s view, made the respondent liable to eviction under Section 3(4) of the same Act. Section 7 of the Fair Rent Act provides that the sharing of the crop must occur at the threshing floor where threshing takes place and that no portion of the produce may be removed at any time or in any manner that would prevent the proper division of the crop. The Court explained that a breach of Section 7 can occur in two ways: either the tenant does not bring the crop to the threshing floor at all, or, after bringing it there, the tenant removes any portion of the crop in a manner that prevents its due division at the appropriate time. In the present case, it was not disputed that the respondent brought the crop to the threshing floor intending to divide it between himself and the appellant, and it was also undisputed that, according to the Fair Rent Act, the tenant was required to give only forty percent of the crop to the appellant. The appellant, through her agent, continuously insisted that she should receive sixty percent as stipulated in the tenancy agreement. The subsequent events, as narrated earlier, involved the respondent approaching the police. The police inspector’s report indicated that he visited the site on two occasions; on the first visit the appellant’s agent informed the inspector that the matter would be settled after consulting the appellant and was asked to return the next day with the appellant’s instructions. When the inspector returned on the second day, no settlement was reached. Later, a revenue inspector dispatched by the Tehsildar found that the appellant’s agent failed to appear despite having been served notice.

The Revenue Inspector measured the standing crop and prepared a detailed report of those measurements for the Tehsildar. After the inspection and measurement were completed, the respondent proceeded to remove the crop. The Court considered that, given these facts, it could not be said that the removal was intended to obstruct the lawful division of the crop at the appropriate time. The respondent had consistently shown a willingness to divide the crop in accordance with the provisions of law, and the removal could not be characterized as an act meant to prevent such division, especially because the measurements had already been taken. The statutory provision concerning removal of crop by a tenant applies only when the removal is carried out for the specific purpose enumerated in that provision, and it is evident that the present removal was not for that purpose. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, on the facts before it, no violation of section 7 of the Fair Rent Act could be established. The appellant further argued that, even if the respondent was justified in removing his own allotted sixty percent of the crop, the removal of the appellant’s portion amounted to a breach of section 7. The Court rejected that argument, noting that section 7 expressly prohibits the removal of any part of the crop regardless of the share involved. Consequently, the question was not which party’s share was removed; either the removal of any portion contravenes section 7 or it does not, and that determination depends on whether the removal was intended to prevent the proper division of the crop. The Court had already found that the removal was not intended to impede division. The respondent remained ready to effect a lawful division, whereas it was the appellant’s agent who refused to accept division as prescribed by law. Hence, the present circumstances do not constitute a case of removal undertaken after measurement, with the aim of forestalling the due division of the crop. Accordingly, there was no transgression of section 7 of the Fair Rent Act, even though the appellant’s share was taken away. The appellant also contended that, irrespective of any finding under section 7, the respondent was not entitled to the protection afforded by section 3 of the Protection Act because he failed to pay rent within the time prescribed and did not comply with the requirements of section 3(3). The Court observed that, strictly speaking, the situation falls within section 3(2) of the Protection Act, since the rent was not paid within the stipulated period and was not deposited with the court as required by section 3(3). In the present case, the respondent’s course of action was to forward a money order to the appellant rather than to make a court deposit as mandated.

The Court observed that the respondent, instead of depositing the money in court as required by section 3(3) of the Protection Act, sent a money order. Although the appellant had refused to agree to the division of the crop, the respondent’s failure to make the statutory deposit gave the appellant a cause of action to seek relief under section 3(4) of the Protection Act. The Court noted that even if the appellant was entitled to invoke section 3(4), the Revenue Divisional Officer was not obligated to order eviction merely because of that entitlement. Section 3(4)(b) conferred a discretion on the Officer to grant the tenant additional time to pay arrears, after considering the relative circumstances of the landlord and the cultivating tenant. Accordingly, the Officer had to examine each case individually and decide whether to extend time in the tenant’s favour. In the present matter, the Court found that the Revenue Divisional Officer had refused to entertain this question, holding that he should not exercise his discretion because the respondent had not complied with section 3(3) by depositing the amount in court. The Court declared that view to be patently incorrect. It explained that, had the respondent made the proper deposit under section 3(3), the matter would have been addressed under that provision. The Court, together with the Revenue Divisional Officer, would then have been required to assess whether the deposited sum was adequate; if the sum were deficient, the Court would be bound to allow the tenant a further period to cure the deficiency. Only when the tenant failed to remedy the shortfall within the prescribed time could the landlord invoke section 3(4) to obtain eviction. Therefore, the discretion vested in section 3(4)(b) became relevant only in situations where the tenant had not made a deposit under section 3(3). The Court held that the Revenue Divisional Officer’s stance—that discretion could not be exercised because the respondent had failed to deposit under section 3(3)—constituted a clear violation of the discretion provided in section 3(4)(b). The Court also addressed an argument that, even assuming a misinterpretation by the Officer, the High Court could not interfere with the Officer’s discretion under section 6‑B of the Protection Act because that section granted revisional jurisdiction to the High Court only to the extent conferred by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court identified two responses to that contention, beginning with the observation that the Revenue Divisional Officer’s legal view was fundamentally erroneous.

In this matter the Court observed that the Revenue Divisional Officer had been clearly incorrect in his interpretation of the statute. Consequently, if the High Court chose to set aside the Officer’s erroneous exercise of discretion, this Court, exercising the power granted by Article 136, would decline to disturb the High Court’s decision because such a decision would serve the cause of justice. The Court further explained that the Officer’s stance—that he was prohibited from exercising his discretion when a tenant had not complied with section 3(3) of the Protection Act—amounted to a failure to exercise the authority that the law had expressly conferred upon him. In the Court’s view, that failure justified the High Court’s intervention, even when the High Court relied on the power conferred by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After considering these points, the Court concluded that the appeal possessed no merit and therefore ordered its dismissal, directing that costs be awarded to the prevailing party. The appeal was thus dismissed with costs.