C. Periaswami Goundan And Ors vs Sundaresa Iyer And Ors

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 646-652 of 1960

Decision Date: 31 July 1964

Coram: K. Subbarao, S.M. Sikri, Subba Rao

In the matter titled C. Periaswami Goundan and Others versus Sundaresa Iyer and Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the 31st day of July, 1964. The opinion was authored by Justice S. M. Sikri, and the bench comprised Justice K. Subbarao together with Justice S. M. Sikri. The citation for this decision appears in the 1965 All India Reporter at page 516 and in the 1964 Supplement to the Supreme Court Reports, volume 8, page 347. The case concerned an inam grant and a suit for ejectment, where the defendant raised the plea of a lost grant. The legal questions addressed included the circumstances in which the presumption of a lost grant arises, whether the grant covered only melvaram or both varams, the rights of the archakas, and whether the archakas could claim remuneration within a suit for ejectment.

The appellants, who were the trustees of certain temples, instituted suits seeking recovery of specific properties that were then occupied by the respondents. The respondents comprised the archakas and the alienees of the properties that formed the subject of the suits. These proceedings were based upon the parties’ respective claims to title, and the relief sought by the trustees was the eviction of the archakas from the disputed lands on the ground that, according to the appellants, the archakas possessed no lawful title to continue in possession. The trustees maintained that the properties in dispute were owned by the deity and that the respondents had no right of ownership or occupancy. In response, the archakas contended that the deity’s title was limited solely to the melvaram portion of the lands listed in the plaint schedule, asserting that they held title to the Kudivarani portion. Both the trial court and the High Court affirmed that the deity’s title extended to both interests, known as the varams, and consequently rejected the archakas’ claim of title. Moreover, the High Court concluded that the archakas were entitled to a portion of the said properties as remuneration for the services they rendered to the temples. Acting on that conclusion, the High Court issued a decree that divided the properties into two equal halves, granting the archakas possession of one half while the trustees retained the other half.

Both the archakas and the trustees were dissatisfied with the High Court’s decree and each filed a cross‑appeal before this Court. The principal issue that required determination was whether the High Court, having found that the title to the suit property vested in the deity, possessed the jurisdiction to order the trustees to allocate a specified portion of the property to the archakas for the purpose of their remuneration.

The Court held that the doctrine of a lost grant may be invoked only where there is an absence of acceptable evidence concerning the terms of the original grant. In the present case, the Court observed that there was no scope for applying the doctrine of a lost grant because the terms of the grant were clearly set out in the recitals of the inam register and the accompanying inam statement. These documents conclusively established that both varams had been granted to the deity. The Court relied upon the authorities of Sankaranarayana Pillayan v. H.R.E. Board, Madras I.L.R. 1949 Mad. 585; Buddu Satyanarayana v. Konduru Venkatapayya [1953] S.C.R. 1001; Maginiram Sitaram v. Kasturbai Manibhai (1921) L.R. 49 I.A. 54; and Mohamed Muzafar Ali Musavi v. Jabeda Khatun (1930) L.R. 57 A. 125. Further, the Court found that the High Court erred in allocating the lands between the trustees and the archakas in a suit for ejectment because the pleadings and the evidence presented contained no material that justified such an apportionment. The Court explained that the appropriate remedy was to grant possession to the plaintiffs, who had successfully established their title to the suit properties. While a court may, in a suit for framing a scheme for temple lands, appropriately place an archaka in possession of a portion of the temple lands as remuneration for his services, such considerations are misplaced in a suit for ejectment. The Court cited Brahmayya v. Rajaswaraswami Temple, A.I.R. 1953 580 and Venkatadri v. Seshacharlu, I.L.R. 1948 Mad. 46 to support this view.

In the present case the Court observed that there was no material in either the pleadings or the evidence that could justify an apportionment of the suit property between the archakas. Consequently the High Court had no option but to grant possession to the plaintiffs, who had successfully established their title to the suit lands. The Court further explained that although in a suit for framing a scheme for a temple a court may, in appropriate circumstances, assign a portion of temple lands to an archaka as remuneration for temple services, such considerations are irrelevant in a suit for ejectment. The Court cited Brahmayya v. Rajaswaraswami Temple, A.I.R. 1953 at page 580, and also referenced Venkatadri V. Seshacharlu, I.L.R. 1948 Mad. 46, to support this principle.

The Court then turned to the specific facts of the case and held that the conduct of the archakas was consistent with the entries in the inam register, which showed that the land, including both the melvaram and the kudivaram, had been granted to the deity. The archakas had enjoyed the land in their capacity as de facto trustees. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the archakas could not, by mortgaging or otherwise alienating the property, claim any right that would diminish the deity’s title. Moreover, the fact that the archakas’ names appeared alongside the deity’s in the inam register did not confer any independent right, because their names were recorded only to indicate possession in their role as de facto trustees. The Court relied on the authorities Arunachalam Chetti v. Venkata Chalapathi Guruswamligal, (1920) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 253; Secretary of State for India v. Vidhya Thirta Swamiga, I.L.R. 1942 Mad. 893; and Narayanamurthi v. Achaya Sastrulu, A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 411. Following these findings, the judgment was entered in the Civil Appellate Jurisdiction under Civil Appeals Nos. 646‑652 of 1960, arising from the judgments and decrees dated 28 November 1962 of the Madras High Court in the respective appeals. Counsel for the appellant and counsel for the respondents were listed for each appeal. The judgment was delivered on 31 July 1964 by Justice Subbarao. These five appeals by certificate originated from Original Suits Nos. 183, 184 and 185 of 1945 filed before the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, Madras State, the first of which concerned the recovery of properties claimed on behalf of Sri Chowleswaraswami temple, where the plaintiffs, Periaswami Goundar and Samana Goundar, acted as trustees and sought recovery of the scheduled properties from the defendants.

The plaintiffs in Original Suit No. 183 of 1945 were the trustees of the Sri Chowleswaraswami temple. They sued the defendants, who were the temple archakas and the persons to whom the archakas had transferred the property, asserting that the lands in question belonged to the deity and that the defendants possessed no right to them. The plaintiffs also demanded mesne profits for the three‑year period preceding the filing of the suit. In their written statement the defendants acknowledged that the deity held a melvaram interest in the lands, but contended that the archakas owned the kudivaram portion and that certain lands had been lawfully transferred to the alienees. Original Suit No. 184 of 1945 was filed in the same court by the trustees of the Sri Pongali Amman temple, located in the village of Vengambur, seeking recovery of the properties listed in the schedule annexed to their plaint. The defendants, again identified as the archakas and the alienees, pleaded that only the melvaram portion of the properties had been granted to the deity, while the archakas possessed the kudivaram portion and had validly alienated their interest in favour of the alienees. Original Suit No. 185 of 1945 was similarly instituted by the trustees of the Sri Varadaraja Perumal temple, also situated in Vengambur village, with the plaintiffs asking for recovery of the schedule‑listed properties from the archakas and their alienees on the same legal basis, and the defendants raising comparable pleas. The Court noted that other defences raised in the written statements of the three suits were not material to the present appeals and therefore need not be discussed. The principal question across all three suits was whether the inam grants made to the three temples comprised both the melvaram and kudivaram portions or only the melvaram portion. The learned Subordinate Judge, who tried these suits together with two additional suits, delivered a common judgment. He held, in each of the three suits, that the grants to the deities included both varams. He further determined that alienations effected by the archakas before 16 May 1931 were binding upon the temple trustees, whereas alienations made after that date were liable to be set aside. Consequently, the Subordinate Judge decreed possession of the schedule‑listed properties to the plaintiffs in each suit, except for those portions that had been alienated before 16 May 1931. He also ordered the defendants to pay mesne profits to the plaintiffs for the three‑year period preceding the suits and to continue paying profits from the date of the suits until possession was delivered, at a rate fixed by the Court.

The defendants appealed the Subordinate Judge’s decisions to the High Court of Madras, filing Appeals Nos. 259, 260 and 385 of 1947. These appeals were heard by a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of Judges Satyanarayana Rao and Rajagopalan. The High Court affirmed the findings of the trial judge concerning the nature of the grants to the temples, holding that the grants comprised both melvaram and kudivaram. For the first time, and without any pleading, issue, or contention having been raised at trial, the High Court concluded that the archakas were entitled to a portion of the property as remuneration for their services to the temples and accordingly issued a decree dividing the property into two halves, placing the archakas in possession of one half. The High Court did not disturb the Subordinate Judge’s determination regarding the alienations; it upheld the validity of alienations made before 16 May 1931. The High Court agreed with the trial

In the appeals before the High Court, the judges concluded that the grants to the temples included both the melvaram and the kudivaram portions. Although no pleading, issue, or contention concerning this question had been raised in the trial court, the learned judges nevertheless held that the archakas were entitled to receive a portion of the properties for their remuneration in service of the temples. Consequently, the High Court issued a decree that divided each of the disputed properties into two equal halves, directing that one half be placed in the possession of the archakas. The court did not overturn the Subordinate Judge’s findings on the alienations, and it upheld the validity of all alienations that had been made before 16 May 1931. Against the decree in appeals identified as A.S. No. 259 of 1947 and A.S. No. 385 of 1947, both the archakas and the trustees filed appeals before this Court, challenging the correctness of the High Court’s order insofar as it affected them. In the appeal designated A.S. No. 260 of 1947, the archakas chose not to appeal, but the trustees lodged an appeal contesting the part of the decree that assigned a portion of the properties to the archakas’ possession.

Representing the archakas in the various appeals, counsel identified as Mr. Desai and Mr. Tatachari argued that the lower courts, observing the long‑standing and uninterrupted enjoyment of the properties by the archakas as absolute owners, should have applied the doctrine of lost grant, especially because the precise terms of the original grant were not clearly established by convincing evidence. Alternatively, they submitted that a fair interpretation of the recitals in the inam statements and the inam register would indicate that only the melvaram had been granted to the deity. Counsel for the trustees, identified as Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, countered this position by asserting that the doctrine of lost grant could not be invoked, since the recitals in both the inam register and the inam statement—documents of considerable evidentiary weight—clearly demonstrated that both varams had been granted to the deity, and that the majority of documentary evidence concerning the archakas’ conduct supported that conclusion. For the benefit of the Court, counsel for the appellants briefly outlined the scope and limitations of the doctrine of lost grant, relying heavily on the Judicial Committee’s exposition in Sankaranarayana Pillayan v. H.R.E. Board, Madras. The cited case involved a temple with four kattalais, each managed by a special trustee, and the Committee explained that the presumption of a lawful title to support long‑standing possessory rights is applicable only when actual proof of title is absent; where ample and convincing evidence exists regarding the nature of the grant, its purpose, and the capacity of the claimants, the doctrine cannot be applied.

In that case the surplus that remained after meeting the expenses was claimed by the trustees for their personal use, and the trustees were in fact appropriating the surplus for the benefit of their families. The appellants asserted that they owned the properties that were the subject of the suit, and that those properties were burdened only by a charge in favour of the kattalai to enable the performance of worship according to the prescribed scale. The Judicial Committee, after referring to earlier authorities, stated that a presumption of an origin in some lawful title is frequently employed by courts to support possessory rights that have been long and quietly enjoyed, but that such a presumption arises only when no actual proof of title is available and the rule must be invoked because of the failure of actual evidence. The Committee further observed that in the present case there existed ample and convincing proof of the nature of the grant, the purpose of the endowment and the capacity of the persons who claimed the use and enjoyment, and therefore the presumption could scarcely be applied. Consequently the Judicial Committee held that the properties had been granted solely to the deity and that the trustees possessed no right to any surplus income. This principle was later adopted by this Court in Buddu Satyanarayana v. Konduru Venkatapayya. A similar question was then considered, where the archakas, relying on the doctrine of lost grant, contended that the original inam grant had conveyed only the melvaram interest to the deity. Speaking for the Court, Das, J. rejected that contention and observed that while authorities accept that a presumption of origin in a lawful title may be made to support long‑standing possessory rights where no proof of title is forthcoming, the same presumption cannot be applied where there is sufficient evidence and convincing proof of the nature of the grant and of the persons to whom it was made. The basis of this doctrine was illustrated by two judgments of the Judicial Committee. Lord Buckmaster, delivering the judgment in Maginiram Sitaram v. Kasturbhai Manibhai, explained that after a lapse of one hundred years, when all parties to the original transaction had died and it became impossible to determine the circumstances of the original grant, courts follow the policy of securing quiet possession for those who appear to hold the estate lawfully, and therefore assume that the grant was lawful. Similarly, Viscount Sumner in Mohamed Muzafar Ali Musavi v. Jabeda Khatun affirmed that the presumption of an origin in some lawful title is readily employed to support possessory rights that have been long and quietly enjoyed where no actual proof of title is forthcoming.

The Court observed that the presumption of lawful title is not a simple branch of the law of evidence, and it is employed only when there is a failure of actual evidence, as illustrated by the authorities cited at (1) [1921] L.R. 49 I.A. 54 and (2) [1930] L.R. 57 I.A. 125. Consequently, the principle may be invoked solely in situations where acceptable evidence of the precise terms of a grant is unavailable. In the present appeals, the trustees submitted copies of the pertinent extracts from the inam register together with statements that had been filed by ancestors of the archakas during the inam enquiry, to support their claim that both varams were granted to the deity. The Court noted that the Judicial Committee has repeatedly emphasized the evidentiary significance of the recitals contained in the inam register. In the case of Arunachalam Chetti v. Venkata Chalapathi Guruswamigal, the Judicial Committee explained that although the register was originally prepared to determine whether lands were exempt from tax, its preparation represented a substantial act of state. The register’s contents were the result of exhaustive reports, minutes, on‑site investigations, hearing of evidence, and examination of documents by the Inam Commissioners and their officials. As a result, the Government obtained not only the conclusion regarding tax exemption for each property but also a detailed statement of the history and tenure of each property. While the Judicial Committee acknowledged that such a report would not supplant authentic evidence in individual cases, it emphasized that where such direct evidence is lacking, the Board must attach the utmost importance to the information set forth in the inam register as part of the property’s historical record (see [1920] I.L.R. 43 Mad. 253). In the more recent decision reported in Sankaranayana Pillayan’s case, the Judicial Committee reiterated this position, stating that title deeds and entries in the inam register constitute evidence of the true intent and effect of the transaction and of the character of the right that was recognized and continued. The entries in the register and the description of the inamdar were accepted as indications of the nature, extent and interest created in the land. The Court further observed that this view of the Judicial Committee has been consistently adopted and applied by the Madras High Court in numerous decisions, particularly when adjudicating conflicting claims between a trustee and an archaka concerning properties recorded in the inam registers. The documents relating to Sri Pongali Amman

The records that relate to the temple consist of two exhibits, designated as Ex P‑2 and Ex P‑3. Exhibit P‑2 is a statement that was filed in the year 1862 by an ancestor of the present archakas before the Inam Commissioner. Exhibit P‑3 is an extract taken from the inam register. The Judicial Committee has observed that the entries recorded in the inam register are the product of a thorough enquiry that relied upon oral testimony, on‑site investigation and a careful examination of the accounts and records that were available. Consequently, the inam statement represented by Ex P‑2 is only one of the pieces of evidence that the Inam Commissioner may have considered while preparing the inam register. Accordingly, the narrations contained in the statement must be given effect to in the register, although, where feasible, an attempt should be made to reconcile the two sources. Before turning to the particulars set out in Ex P‑3, it is necessary to note the point that both the archakas and the trustees agree that Ex P‑3 concerns solely the portion of land that was allotted to the deity. The controversy, however, concerns the extent of the interest in that land that was granted to the deity, that is, whether the grant comprised only the Melvaram of the property or both the varams. The dispute is framed in the citations (1) I.L.R. [1948] Mad. 585 and (2) I.L.R. [1942] Mad. 893, 908 (P.C.).

A detailed examination of the columns in Ex P‑3 follows. The first major heading in the register is “class, extent and value of inam,” which is further divided into seven sub‑headings. In column 2, under the sub‑heading “General class to which the inam belongs,” the entry reads “religious.” Column 3, which records “the survey number and the name of the field or fields comprised in the grant – dry, wet or garden,” provides the specifics of the lands involved. This entry demonstrates that, apart from a small garden area, the remainder of the property consists of dry land. Such a description is more consistent with a grant that includes both varams rather than a grant limited to the Melvaram alone, because if only the Melvaram were granted the character of the field would be largely irrelevant. Columns 4, 5 and 6 indicate that the total area covered approximately 18 acres and 99 cents and that the fiscal assessment of the land was Rs 24‑14‑5. These figures give the impression that the parcel was dry land with a modest assessment, and that any income derived from it would have been relatively small at the time. The second principal heading, “description, tenure and documents in support of the inam,” contains entries that establish that the dry lands described in columns 3 through 6 were granted permanently as Devadayam to the deity Pongali Amman by Madurayar Paligar of Midura. Although the exact date of the grant is unknown, the accounts of 1209 F also record the deity’s name as the grantee. The narrative then proceeds to the third heading, which is left incomplete in the present record.

In the register, the major heading was “name and relationship of the original grantee and of subsequent and present heirs‑length of possession.” In columns thirteen and fifteen, only the name of the deity was entered. Column sixteen, titled “name and age,” and column seventeen, titled “place of residence,” likewise recorded only the deity’s name. Beneath the deity’s name, the record noted the pujari named “Pujari Muttandi, age 45.” Columns eighteen and nineteen, which were labelled “relation to original grantee or subsequent registered holders” and “surviving heirs of the present incumbent,” contained no entries. The absence of entries under these sub‑heads was explained by the fact that a deity cannot have human relations. The appearance of the pujari’s name together with the other entries indicated that he was the person who administered the temple. If the pujari’s name had been entered because he possessed a proprietary interest in the land, the register would have required additional entries concerning his relatives in the appropriate columns. In reality, the pujari, as an archaka, had no interest in the melvaram; consequently, the document concerning only the melvaram would have left no room for his name. His name was entered solely because he performed the actual management of the deity’s properties on a day‑to‑day basis, acting as the de facto trustee of the temple lands.

Column twenty‑one, under the heading “Deputy Collector’s opinion and recommendation,” contained the observation that the grant should be confirmed permanently to the Pagoda provided that it was well maintained, subject to the existing jodi of Rs 3‑1‑7. Column twenty‑two recorded the confirmation of the inam to the Pagoda. Interpreting the recitals in the document led to the conclusion that the Inam Commissioner was addressing the whole interest in the land, with all particulars set out therein. No evidence was presented to show that, at the time of the grant, the archakas or any other persons were recognized as kudivaramdars. Nevertheless, the evidence labelled Ex P‑2, the inam statement filed by the then archakas, was cited to argue that only the melvaram had been granted. In column two of that statement, under the heading “Name of the inamdar entered in deed and names of the present enjoyer,” the entry read: “Pongaliamman poosari Kuppaiyandi Muthuveeran as per paimash entry. For fields Nos. 595 and 597 no poosari’s name is mentioned. Present (enjoyer) Pongaliamman poosari Muthandi.” The argument was that the pujari was shown as the enjoyer, implying that the deity itself did not enjoy the land. In fact, the deity was represented by the pujari, who functioned as the de facto trustee and held possession of the property in that capacity. Therefore, describing the pujari as an enjoyer meant that he possessed the land on behalf of the temple, and any ambiguity in the recital was resolved by this understanding.

In this case, the Court observed that any uncertainty regarding the nature of the grant was removed by the entry recorded in Column 12 under the heading “Particulars of present enjoyment”. The entry stated: “By directly cultivating this land selling the produce derived therefrom and applying the sale proceed to the service of the deity and my agnates have been performing pooja and enjoying the said land according to the conditions of the grant”. The Court described this statement as clear and unambiguous. It explained that the passage set out precisely how the archaka enjoyed the land: he cultivated the land, sold its produce, and used the proceeds to perform services for the deity, all in compliance with the grant’s terms. The Court further reasoned that if the deity’s right were limited only to the melvaram, the recital would be inconsistent, because the language indicated that the whole land formed the subject‑matter of the grant in favour of the deity and that its entire produce was directed toward deity‑related services.

The Court then turned to the entry in Column 13 under the heading “Income derived from the manibam; whether sarvadambla or jodigai, if jodigai, how much”. That entry read: “Income Rs. 24‑14‑5; Jodigai Rs. 3‑1‑7”. Relying on these figures, the opposing argument claimed that Exhibit P‑3 showed an assessment of Rs. 24‑14‑5 on the land, while Exhibit P‑2 recorded the same amount as income from the inam. Consequently, the argument concluded that the inam could have conveyed only the assessment amount, i.e., Rs. 24‑14‑5. The Court rejected this contention as far‑fetched and based on a weak foundation. It explained that a primary purpose of the inam enquiry was to determine whether the alienated lands were exempt from tax. The archaka, who held the land on behalf of the deity, was required to disclose the tax payable on the land he possessed. In that context, the phrase “income derived from the manibam” could only refer to the tax assessment fixed on the land. After declaring that the full assessment amounted to Rs. 24‑14‑5, the archaka further stated that he paid only the jodigai portion of Rs. 3‑1‑7. The Court held that these recitals aligned with the other statements in the same document and with the figures found in Exhibit P‑3.

The Court noted that a similar argument had been advanced before this Court in Buddu Satyanarayan’s case and had been rejected. It quoted Das, J. at page 1006: “Apart from these points of distinction the decision relied on by the learned Attorney‑General appears to us to be of doubtful authority. As will appear from the passages quoted above, the decision rested mainly, if not entirely, on the fact that the amount of assessment and the amount of income were the same and the conclusion was drawn that the Inam grant comprised only of the revenue assessment, i.e., of melvaram rights. We are unable to follow the reasoning.” Accordingly, the Court held that, based on the recitals in the two documents, the grant to the deity encompassed both the melvaram and the jatvaram.

The Court observed that the grant made to the deity comprised both the melvaram and the nadi varam. Counsel for the archakas argued that the long‑standing possession and enjoyment of the suit lands by the archakas and their ancestors supported their claim that only the melvaram could have been granted to the deity. The Court noted that such lengthy enjoyment could also be explained by an arrangement that the original grantor might have entered into with the then‑functioning archaka or archakas, taking into account the conditions that existed at the time. The lands in question were relatively small in size and were dry, so that the income they generated in those days must have been very modest. Moreover, there was no appointed trustee for the temple. In that context, the Court found it more likely that the grantor placed the land in the archaka’s possession so that the archaka could, from the produce of the land, maintain the temple, perform the puja, meet the expenses connected with the puja, and also receive remuneration for his services. The Court described this as a convenient arrangement that was commonly adopted in many small temples in that region of the country. This practice had been recorded clearly by the Madras High Court in Narayanamurthi v. Achaya Sastrulu (1). Referring to a similar argument, the learned judge had observed that evidence of user and enjoyment, however long, uninterrupted and unquestioned, would constitute proof of the grant only in the absence of any reliable or cogent evidence regarding the terms of the grant itself, or where the grant was ambiguous. The Court further recognized that, until very recently, the suit lands yielded merely enough to meet the nitya naivedyam or daily worship needs. It was evident that, in such circumstances, not only the original founders of the temples and the donors of the endowments but also successive generations of worshippers allowed the archakas to cultivate the lands and retain the income while performing the puja, as this was the most convenient way to ensure worship of the deities and payment of the archaka’s remuneration. The Court added that when the income from the lands grew substantial and the archakas, following the habits of their forefathers, claimed ownership of the lands and surplus profits, it was natural for the worshippers to take steps to secure the surplus income for the religious institutions. These observations, the Court held, aptly described the circumstances under which the archakas were permitted to possess temple lands. If the archakas obtained possession under those circumstances, they functioned as de facto trustees and therefore could not, by mortgaging or otherwise alienating the properties, assert any right that would diminish the deity’s title. Indeed, the documents on which counsel relied contained

The records show an unmistakable admission by the archakas that the land in question belonged to the deity. Exhibits numbered P‑12, P‑13, P‑14 and P‑15 are copies of mortgages that the archakas executed. In each of these mortgage documents the land that they possessed was described as “paditharam Manyam,” and the documents further reveal that the amount of paditharam paddy earmarked for payment to the temple exceeded the kist that was payable on the same land to the Government. In the earlier proceedings, specifically the applications filed by the archakas seeking a declaration that the temples were excepted, they never asserted that only the melvaram portion had been granted to the deity. In other litigation the archakas described the lands as service inams, but even in those cases they did not raise the present contention that the grant to the deity consisted solely of the melvaram. Moreover, in 1939 the pattas for the lands that are the subject of this suit were transferred in the name of the deities without any objection from the archakas, and the archakas continued to make contributions to the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board on the basis that both the melvaram and the kudivaram belonged to the deity. This pattern of conduct by the archakas aligns with the statements in the inam register, which record that the grant to the deity comprised the whole land—that is, both varams—and that the archakas were placed in possession and enjoyment of that land in their capacity as archakas and de facto trustees. Counsel for the appellants relied on an order issued by A.R.C. Westlake, the Collector of Coimbatore, dated 14 April 1941, in which the Collector held that only the melvaram had been granted to the deity. That order arose from a specific set of circumstances. The trustees appointed by the Coimbatore District Temple Committee had filed an application before the Revenue Division Officer under section 44‑B11(a) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments (Amendment) Act, 1934, seeking a declaration that the alienations of portions of the inam land attached to the temple were void and that the land should be resumed and re‑granted to the deity. One of the questions raised in that application was whether the inam comprised merely the melvaram or both the melvaram and the kudivaram. The Revenue Division Officer ruled that the inam included both varams. On appeal, however, the Collector reached the opposite conclusion. A careful reading of the Collector’s order reveals that his finding was based on pure conjecture; he did not cite any document or piece of evidence to support his view. The trustees subsequently instituted suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, asking for a declaration that the inam grant in favour of the plaintiff temple comprised both varams. The Subordinate Judge held that section 44‑B of the Act was inapplicable because the grant was made to the deity and therefore did not constitute a service inam. Consequently, the litigation did not produce a final determination as to whether the grant covered both varams or only the melvaram. As a result, those earlier proceedings cannot be given any evidentiary weight in the present case. On a

On consideration of the entire evidence, the Court agreed with the conclusion reached by the High Court that the grant made to the deity comprised both the melvaram and the kudivaram portions of the land that formed the subject of the suit. Turning to the appeals that involved the Chowleswara Swami temple, the Court observed that the factual and legal position was exactly the same as that which had arisen in the dispute concerning the Pongaliamman temple. Exhibit P‑2 was identified as the statement delivered before the Inam Commissioner by the archaka who was then in office, and Exhibit P‑3 was the extract taken from the relevant Inam register. The register entries set out, in detail, the survey numbers, the extent, the quality and the assessment of the property that formed the basis of the grant. The land was described as “Devadayam” and was recorded as having been granted for the support of the pagoda of Chowleswara Swami. The nature of the grant was described as permanent, although the exact date of the grant could not be ascertained. The grantor’s name was recorded as “Maduraiyar Paligar of Madura” and the original grantee’s name as “Chowleswara Swami”. The grant of the land was confirmed permanently to the pagoda provided that the pagoda was kept in good condition and subject to the existing jodi of rupees 24‑8‑2. The only mention of an archaka appeared in column 17 under the heading “Particulars regarding present owner”, where the entry read “Chowleswara Swami, stanika Muttaiyan”. The columns that would normally record the relationship of the present owner with previous owners were left blank, the Court noting that such columns were irrelevant in a case involving a deity. The archaka’s name was recorded in addition to the deity’s name because the archaka held the land in his capacity as de facto trustee, the deity necessarily being represented by a person, and that representative could only be the stanika who managed the temple and its properties.

The Court found that the entries in the Inam register did not support any contention that only the melvaram interest in the land had been granted and confirmed to the deity; if the grant had been limited to the melvaram, the recitals would have been expressed differently. The corresponding Inam statement, Exhibit P‑2, was practically similar to the entries relating to the Pongaliamman temple, with only slight variations. Column 2 of the register made a clear distinction between ownership of the land and enjoyment of its produce. The owner was shown as “Chowleswara Swami”, while the “present” enjoyer was shown as “Chowleswara Swami’s stanika”. Column 2 further described the nature of the enjoyment: “The said lands are leased out for varam cultivation and I cultivate the same myself sometimes and the income (masul) therefrom is enjoyed by me and co‑sharers (Pangali) and used for Swami Viniyogam.” From this recital, the Court concluded that the land was the subject‑matter of the grant and that the income derived from the land, whether through direct cultivation or leasing, was enjoyed by the archaka and applied for temple purposes. The Court also noted that the interest of the predecessor to the present holder was relevant to the overall analysis.

In this case, the archaka admitted that the produce from the land was used for the services of the deity. That admission was found to be inconsistent with the claim that the grant concerned only melvaram. The entries recorded in column thirteen were noted to be similar to those in the corresponding Exhibit P‑2 relating to the Pongaliamman temple, and, for the reasons previously explained, those entries did not support the contention that the assessment of Rs. 74‑1‑5 was granted solely to the deity. A combined reading of the two documents led to the conclusion that both the varams had been granted to the deity. In the same manner as the Pongaliamman temple, the later conduct of the archakas of the Chowleswaraswami temple contradicted their assertion that only a melvaram interest in the land had been given to the deity. The records identified as Exhibits D‑1 of 1867, D‑2 of 1868, D‑3 of 1870 and D‑4 of 1883 were mortgages executed by the archakas of the Chowleswaraswami temple, while Exhibits D‑5, D‑6 and D‑7 were sales. In every one of these documents the property was described as “Chowleswaraswami manyam”. If the kudivaram truly belonged to the archakas, they would not have described the land they were alienating as Chowleswaraswami manyam. The description of the property as belonging to the deity was therefore consistent with the title of kudivaram also being in the deity. Further, as in the other case, the pattas were transferred in the name of the deity in 1939 and contributions were paid to the Hindu Religious Endowments Board on the basis that the entire interest in the lands belonged to the deity. In other proceedings the archakas did not argue that the grant to the deity was limited to melvaram; rather they characterised the lands as service‑inam lands. Although the archakas dealt with the properties by mortgaging or otherwise alienating them, they never denied the deity’s title. For these reasons the Court held that, even in the case of the Chowleswaraswami temple, the original grant made to the deity comprised both varams. With respect to the Sri Varadaraja Perumal temple, the archakas filed no appeal and they allowed the High Court’s judgment on title to become final, so no further discussion of the title of that land was required. Turning to the cross‑appeals filed by the trustees against the portion of the High Court decree that apportioned the deity’s property between the deity and the archakas, the issue presented was whether the High Court, having held that title to the suit property vested in the deity, possessed jurisdiction to require the temple trustees to place the archakas in possession of a specified extent of property for their remuneration. The High Court had observed that “On these findings, it is no doubt true that the decree in favour of the plaintiffs for possession of the properties on behalf of the deity has to be upheld subject to the consideration set forth below.”

After determining the title of the suit lands, the High Court examined whether any division of land should be made between the archakas and the trustees. In doing so, it surveyed the relevant decisions and noted that the authorities were almost uniform, except for the rulings in A. S. No. 2 3 7 of 1950(1) and in Venkatadri v. Seshacharlu(2). The court observed that these decisions had upheld an allocation of lands between the archakas and the trustees, for example in Brahnyya v. Rajeswarawami temple (A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 580) and in I.L.R. 1948 Mad. 46. The proportion of land allotted varied according to the extent of the lands and the amount of income they generated. None of the judges expressed the view that such an arrangement should be permanent or immutable; rather, it was to remain open to revision or alteration according to the circumstances of each case, either at the instance of the trustees or at the instance of the archakas, if the allocation proved detrimental to either side. The High Court concluded that, in the cases before it, the most suitable scheme would be to allocate one‑half of the lands in each suit for the remuneration of the archakas, to be divided equally between them after taking into account wet and dry portions, and to leave the remaining one‑half to the trustees, who would use it to meet the costs of daily worship and to retain any surplus, since it belongs to the deity.

The Supreme Court held that, on principle, the conclusion reached by the learned judges of the High Court was untenable. The suits were grounded in questions of title, and the relief claimed was the eviction of the archakas from the suit property on the basis that, according to the plaintiffs, the archakas possessed no title to remain in possession. The archakas contended that the deity’s title was confined only to the melvaram described in the plaint‑schedule lands and that they themselves held title to the kudivaram. Both the lower courts confirmed the deity’s title to both interests and rejected the defendants’ claim of title. In those circumstances, the Court had no alternative but to grant possession to the plaintiffs who had established their title to the suit properties. While a court, in an appropriate case involving a scheme for a temple, may place an archaka in possession of a portion of temple lands as remuneration for services, such suits are distinct from suits for framing a scheme. Moreover, there was absolutely no material in the pleadings or evidence that could justify any such apportionment, because determining a specific share for the archaka would require knowledge of the total income from the lands, the value of articles required for worship, the amount of reasonable remuneration intended, and other similar circumstances. An allocation could not be made merely by reference to allocations in other cases that were decided on facts and circumstances peculiar to those cases. Indeed, this Court

In the earlier judgment concerning Buddu Suryanarayana’s case, the Court had already stated a clear view on the issue that was now before it. The opinion, recorded on page 1008, was delivered by Justice Das, who observed that in a proceeding that sought to frame a scheme for a temple it might be permissible to consider the moral, if not legal, claims of the archakas and to provide some protection for their rights. However, Justice Das added that such considerations were wholly inappropriate in a suit for ejectment based on proof of title. The Court affirmed that it fully concurred with those observations. Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court had erred when it allocated portions of the temple lands between the trustees and the archakas in a suit that was fundamentally an ejectment action. Counsel representing the archakas then made an earnest and impassioned request that the Court direct the appropriate authorities to apportion the properties in the manner suggested by the High Court, citing the long‑standing enjoyment of the temple lands by the archakas as a reason for such a direction. The Court noted that the prolonged enjoyment of the temple lands by the archakas was not a unique circumstance of the present case, and that the authorities concerned had already established suitable arrangements for remuneration in other temples. The Court expressed confidence that the authorities would likewise make a reasonable provision for the archakas in the present matter, consistent with the law. As a result, the Court allowed Civil Appeals Nos. 648 and 650 of 1960, which had been filed by the trustees, but ordered that they be allowed without any award of costs. The Court also allowed Civil Appeal No. 649 of 1960, filed by the trustees, without costs, except with respect to the fourteenth respondent. The appeal against the fourteenth respondent was withdrawn on the ground that his interest as a mortgagee no longer existed, and the Court dismissed the withdrawn appeal without costs. Finally, the Court dismissed Civil Appeals Nos. 651 and 652 of 1960, filed by the archakas, and ordered that the costs be borne by those appellants. A single hearing was conducted on these matters, and the Court issued the orders as set out herein.