C. Channabasavaiah vs State Of Mysore and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 28 September 1964

Coram: M. Hidayatullah, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled C. Channabasavaiah versus State of Mysore and Others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the 28th of September, 1964. The decision was authored by Justice M. Hidayatullah and was pronounced by a bench consisting of Justices M. Hidayatullah, P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo, Raghubar Dayal and J. R. Mudholkar. The case is reported in the 1965 volumes of the All India Reporter at page 1293 and in the Supreme Court Reports (Special) at volume 1, page 360. The petitioners sought relief under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, invoking the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15 and 16, particularly the principle of equality of opportunity in matters relating to public employment set out in Article 16. The substantive question before the Court concerned whether the appointment of candidates who had obtained lower marks than other rejected candidates could be sustained when such appointments were made either on the basis of a compromise reached in High Court proceedings or on the recommendation of the State Government under the Mysore Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1957, Rule 4, foot‑note to sub‑rule (3).

The factual background revealed that the Mysore Public Service Commission had conducted viva‑voce examinations for direct recruitment to Class I and Class II posts in certain administrative services. After the examinations, the Commission published a list of ninety‑eight candidates who had secured marks above fifty‑six percent and who were subsequently appointed. Following this publication, the State Government submitted to the Commission a separate list of twenty‑four additional candidates. The Commission, invoking the foot‑note to sub‑rule (3) of Rule 4, approved these twenty‑four names and they were also appointed. Sixteen of the candidates who were excluded from the initial list filed petitions in the High Court alleging violations of Articles 14, 15 and 16. During the pendency of those proceedings, a compromise was reached, and the Government, before the High Court, gave an undertaking that the sixteen petitioners would be appointed. Subsequently, other unsuccessful candidates instituted similar High Court actions, but their petitions were dismissed summarily. Those dismissed petitioners then filed writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution in this Court. Acting on the Court’s direction, the Mysore State Government produced the mark‑lists prepared by the Public Service Commission after the viva‑voce tests. The lists showed that, apart from two Scheduled Caste candidates in the first list of ninety‑eight, all candidates in that list had secured marks exceeding fifty‑six percent. In contrast, some of the candidates appointed on the Government’s recommendation and those appointed pursuant to the High Court compromise (excluding three who were not interviewed at all) had obtained lower marks, and it was admitted that many of the rejected petitioners had achieved higher scores than some of those who were appointed. The Court consequently held that discrimination and unequal treatment were established in the case of the sixteen candidates appointed as a result of the compromise before the High Court; their appointments could not be sustained because most of them had obtained fewer marks than some of the rejected candidates, and three candidates had not attended the viva‑voce test at all, leaving no basis for their selection.

The Court observed that the High Court had to compare the remaining thirteen candidates with those who had failed to be selected, and it warned that the Court ought to be cautious in accepting compromises unless it was clearly shown that the compromise did not prejudice anyone else. The Court cited the passage at page 1364 E‑H and indicated that the principle required careful scrutiny before endorsing any settlement. The Court then turned to the foot‑note to sub‑rule (3) of rule 4 of the Mysore Public Service (Functions) Rules, 1957, which the Government had relied upon to justify the appointments of twenty‑four candidates suggested by the Government. The Court held that this foot‑note was not intended to circumvent merit‑based selection but only to address an exceptional case of merit. Because these twenty‑four candidates had also obtained lower marks than some of the rejected applicants, the Court concluded that their appointments could not be sustained, as doing so would constitute discrimination and unequal treatment, citing pages 365 D‑G.

The judgment originated from original jurisdiction over a large group of writ petitions numbered 81, 95 to 111, 113‑118, 140‑142, 150, 151, 153‑158, 159‑165, 167, 168, 169‑172, 178, 179, 183, 199 and 205‑207 of 1963, all filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental rights. The petitions invoked Articles 14, 15 and 16 against the State of Mysore and the Mysore Public Service Commission concerning appointments to certain state services. Counsel representing the petitioners included a senior advocate for petition 81, another counsel for petitions 95‑111, 113‑118, 169‑172, 183 and the intervener, as well as counsel for petitions 140‑142, 150‑158, 167‑168, and a further advocate for petitions 150‑158, 167‑168. The respondents were represented by the Attorney‑General and other counsel for respondents 1 and 2, by counsel for respondent 11, and by counsel for a series of other respondents listed in the record. The judgment was delivered by Justice Hidayatullah. The Court noted that the fifty‑five writ petitions challenged appointments made by the State and the Commission, with some petitioners being unsuccessful and others being appointed; in certain petitions the successful candidates were joined as respondents. The factual background began with a notification dated 26 September 1959, in which the Mysore Public Service Commission announced a competitive examination for direct recruitment to Class I and Class II posts in various Administrative Services, inviting numerous applicants including the petitioners. Subsequently, on 5 September 1960, the Commission amended the earlier notification, abandoning the written examination and declaring that selection would be determined solely by a viva voce test. The petitioners argued that this alteration contravened the Mysore Administrative Service Recruitment Rules, 1957, although the argument was later abandoned during the hearing.

In these petitions the complainants initially raised the issue that the Public Service Commission had altered the mode of selection, but they later dropped that line of attack, apparently because of subsequent developments. The Commission nevertheless proceeded to conduct the viva‑voce examinations and, on 29 July 1961, issued a list naming ninety‑eight persons as having been selected. After that announcement the State Government submitted to the Commission a list of twenty‑four additional candidates for its consideration; the Commission approved that list and those twenty‑four persons were consequently appointed on 7 March 1962. In granting its approval, the Commission relied on a foot‑note that had been added to sub‑rule (3) of rule 4 of the Mysore Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1957. Sixteen applicants who were not among those selected filed petitions in the High Court of Mysore invoking Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. On 26 November 1962 a compromise was reached whereby the Government agreed to appoint the petitioners before the High Court. Of these sixteen persons, thirteen had actually taken part in the viva‑voce test whereas three had never been called to appear. Thus three distinct groups of appointments were created: the first group comprised the ninety‑eight candidates initially selected, the second group consisted of the twenty‑four candidates appointed on the Government’s recommendation, and the third group included the sixteen petitioners appointed pursuant to the compromise.

Altogether, 1,777 applicants had been summoned to appear for the viva‑voce examinations. A substantial number of applicants, however, were never called to sit for the test. The High Court of Mysore, in response to a petition filed by the three individuals who had not been summoned, directed the Commission to call them. Following that order, the Commission called an additional 203 candidates who fell in the same category as the three petitioners before the High Court. It is noteworthy that, at the first viva‑voce session, eighty‑eight candidates were selected and, at the second session, ten candidates were selected, bringing the total to ninety‑eight. Encouraged by the outcome of the High Court proceedings, many other unsuccessful candidates filed writ petitions under Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. The High Court dismissed those petitions summarily, and the aggrieved candidates subsequently filed the present writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, resulting in the present collection of fifty‑five petitions before this Court.

During an earlier hearing, this Court ordered the State of Mysore, represented by the Attorney‑General of India, to produce the mark‑lists prepared by the Public Service Commission after the viva‑voce examinations. Although numerous allegations of nepotism were raised, the arguments before this Court were confined to an assessment of the merits of the selected and unselected candidates based on those mark‑lists. The mark‑lists revealed that the eighty‑eight candidates selected in the first round had scores ranging from fifty‑six percent to eighty‑seven percent, except for two candidates—identified as No. 87 L. Sharadamma and No. 88 R. Shamanaik—who belonged to scheduled castes and had obtained fifty‑one percent and fifty percent respectively. The ten candidates selected in the second round had scores ranging

In this case the Court observed that the candidates who passed the second viva voce examination had secured marks ranging between sixty per cent and eighty‑five per cent. By contrast, the persons who were appointed on the recommendation of the Government performed poorly in the examination. Only two of those appointed obtained scores of fifty‑one per cent and fifty‑three per cent respectively; the remaining appointed candidates received marks that fell between forty‑nine per cent and twenty‑two per cent. The detailed distribution of those scores was as follows: two candidates scored forty‑nine per cent; one candidate scored forty‑seven per cent; four candidates scored forty‑five per cent; three candidates scored forty‑four per cent; one candidate scored forty‑three per cent; three candidates scored forty‑two per cent; one candidate scored forty per cent; one candidate scored thirty‑seven per cent; one candidate scored thirty‑two per cent; one candidate scored thirty‑one per cent; one candidate scored twenty‑eight per cent; two candidates scored twenty‑three per cent; and one candidate scored twenty‑two per cent, making a total of twenty‑two appointed persons.

The Court further noted that among the sixteen candidates who had been selected by compromise in the High Court, three had not been interviewed at all, and the remaining thirteen had obtained marks ranging from forty‑eight per cent down to twenty‑two per cent. Their detailed breakdown was: three candidates not interviewed; one candidate scored forty‑eight per cent; one candidate scored forty‑seven per cent; two candidates scored forty‑five per cent; one candidate scored forty‑four per cent; one candidate scored forty‑three per cent; one candidate scored forty‑two per cent; one candidate scored thirty‑eight per cent; one candidate scored thirty‑seven per cent; one candidate scored thirty per cent; one candidate scored twenty‑four per cent; one candidate scored twenty‑three per cent; and one candidate scored twenty‑two per cent, giving a total of sixteen persons.

The Court recorded that it was admitted before it that many of the petitioners who had been rejected had obtained higher marks than some of the candidates who were selected. An affidavit filed on four August 1964 by the Public Service Commission explained the procedure followed and stated that seven of the petitioners had obtained marks below twenty‑two per cent, which were lower than the marks of the last candidate selected, and therefore those seven petitioners could not claim any right to appointment. The Court, however, observed that the petitions could not be dismissed outright because three candidates had been selected without undergoing the viva voce test, giving rise to a grievance, however slight, for the affected petitioners.

The State and the Commission had filed five principal affidavits in various petitions between eighteen July 1963 and seventeen October 1963, addressing the specific facts alleged by each petitioner, denying any nepotism, and challenging the validity of the petitions. Additional skeleton affidavits in other petitions incorporated these main affidavits by reference. The Court considered it unnecessary to refer to those documents because a clear affidavit was now before it. The mark‑lists had been provided to the counsel for the petitioners, and the marks shown in Schedules A to E of the last affidavit were accepted as correct by that counsel.

It was frankly admitted by the Attorney‑General that some of the candidates who were not selected had obtained higher marks than some of those who were selected. He pointed out that none of the petitioners had secured fifty‑six per cent or more, and argued that ninety‑eight candidates who had been selected in the first and second rounds were superior to any of the petitioners, so their selection could not be questioned. The two scheduled‑caste candidates referred to earlier were treated differently, and the counsel for the petitioners did not contest their selection. Consequently, the dispute centered on the twenty‑four candidates who had been selected on the Government’s suggestion and the sixteen candidates who had been selected by compromise before the High Court, three of whom had not even been called for the viva voce test.

The Court observed that the Government of Mysore had selected sixteen candidates on a compromise before the High Court, and that three of those sixteen individuals had not even been called to appear for the viva voce examination. The Court first examined the selection of those sixteen candidates and concluded that, because the majority of them had obtained lower marks than several candidates who had been rejected, their appointment could not be sustained. The Court further held that it was erroneous for the High Court to permit a compromise of this nature when it was clearly evident that three of the candidates had never attended the viva voce test and that the High Court possessed no material for comparing the remaining thirteen candidates with those who had failed the selection process. The Court noted that allegations of nepotism remained unwithdrawn and that, upon review, most of the sixteen candidates did not rank as highly as some of the rejected applicants. In such circumstances, the Court stated, a court should be reluctant to accept compromises unless it is clearly shown that the compromise does not prejudice any other person. To act otherwise, the Court warned, would expose the court itself to the accusation of committing an act as wrongful as the one alleged. Accordingly, the Court expressed the opinion that the appointment of the sixteen candidates could not be accepted and that the petitioners were entitled to have their marks compared with those obtained by the other candidates so that selection could be made solely on the basis of merit. For that purpose, the Court explained, the three candidates who had not been called for the viva voce test would have to be summoned and marks assigned to them; otherwise they could not be considered at all. Turning to the twenty‑four candidates who had been selected at the suggestion of the Government, the Court observed that reliance was placed upon a foot‑note appended to sub‑rule (3) of rule 4 of the Mysore Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules, 1957. The Court described that rule as appearing in a chapter titled “Recruitment by Selection” and explained that sub‑rule (3) provided that the Public Service Commission should consider all applications received, interview such candidates who satisfied the prescribed conditions when necessary, and advise the Government about those it considered most suitable for appointment. The foot‑note, the Court recited, stated: “Nothing contained herein shall preclude the Commission from considering the case of any candidate possessing the prescribed qualifications brought to its notice by Government, even if such a candidate has not applied in response to the advertisement of the Commission.” The Court held that, in its opinion, the foot‑note was not intended to circumvent the merit‑based selection process but was meant to address a situation of exceptional merit. The Court further noted that these twenty‑four candidates had all taken the viva voce test, and that some of them had obtained very poor marks. The Attorney‑General had attempted to justify the selection by indicating that twelve of the candidates were from backward classes and four were from scheduled castes. The Court rejected that justification, stating that it did not legitimize the manner in which the selection had been carried out. Finally, the Court expressed surprise that the Government had recommended as many as twenty‑four individuals for appointment under those circumstances.

In this case, the Court observed that the Commission should have approved every name on the list without a single exception, even though in its own assessment some of those candidates were ranked lower than others that had been rejected. The Court warned that such a manner of handling public appointments could engender a feeling of distrust in the functioning of the Public Service Commission, an institution that is meant to act fairly, impartially, and free from influence from any quarter. The Court did not permit counsel for the petitioners to present allegations of nepotism or similar improprieties because, in the Court’s view, it is not the practice of this Court to investigate such claims unless a clear and strong case is made out. Nevertheless, the Court held that the manner of selection and the respective ranking of the candidates alone justified judicial interference.

The Attorney‑General submitted that, except for the two candidates from the Scheduled Castes whose names had been identified earlier, any candidate who had obtained fifty‑six percent or more marks should not be disturbed. The Court agreed with this submission, noting that none of the petitioners achieved that percentage. The Attorney‑General could not justify disturbing the cases of those who scored below that mark, and the Court concurred that this was the only logical conclusion that could be drawn from the mark‑lists placed before it. Consequently, the Court allowed the petitions and ordered the cancellation of the appointments of the twenty‑four candidates listed in Annexure C and the sixteen candidates listed in Annexure D to the Public Service Commission’s affidavit dated 4 August 1964. The Court held that the selections were improper and must be set aside.

The Court expressed regret that these individuals would be removed after having been appointed, but affirmed that if the principles of equality and equal protection before the law are to have any meaning, and if public institutions are to inspire the confidence that is expected of them, the Court must act, even at the cost of considerable inconvenience to the Government and the selected candidates. The Court stated that any blame for the inconvenience could not be placed upon the petitioning candidates, the displaced candidates, or the Court itself. With these observations, the Court allowed the petitions to the extent indicated, directing that only one set of hearing fees be payable, and therefore the petitions were partly allowed.