Brahma Nand Puri vs Neki Puri

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 813 of 1962

Decision Date: 24 November 1964

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Raghubar Dayal

In this matter, the case was styled Brahma Nand Puri versus Neki Puri and was decided on the twenty‑fourth day of November, 1964 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, who sat on the bench together with Justice Raghubar Dayal. The petitioner was identified as Brahma Nand Puri and the respondent as Neki Puri. The citation for the reported decision is 1965 AIR 1506 and 1965 SCR (2) 233. The substantive issue arose under the Hindu Religious Institutions Act concerning a dera of Sanyasi sadhus located in Punjab, specifically the question of whether succession to the office of Mahant in such a dera was governed by a general law applicable to all religious institutions or by a custom that entitled a Chela or a Gurbhai to succeed without any appointment or election by the fraternity.

The headnote records that, after the death of the last Mahant of the dera, the respondent claimed to be the Chela of the deceased Mahant and therefore asserted a preferential claim to certain properties belonging to the dera. He relied on an alleged appointment made to the office by the Bhekh and the people of the village. The appellant, Brahma Nand Puri, also laid claim to the same properties, asserting that, as the Gurbhai of the deceased Mahant, he was entitled to the Gadi and that he, not the respondent, had been appointed to it by the villagers and the Bhekh. In alternative, the appellant argued that even if he had not been formally appointed, the custom governing succession in the dera and the customary practice known as Rewaj‑i‑am of Deras entitled a Gurbhai of the deceased Mahant to succeed to the office of Mahant.

The trial court examined the evidence and concluded that the respondent was not the Chela of the deceased Mahant and that there was no proof that he had been appointed Mahant. Likewise, the trial court found no evidence that the appellant had been appointed Mahant. Nonetheless, without making a definitive finding on the custom pleaded by the appellant, the trial court held that, under Punjab law, in the absence of a Chela, a Gurbhai was entitled to succeed to the Gadi irrespective of any appointment by the Bhekh. Relying on this reasoning, the trial court decreed in favour of the appellant’s suit for possession of the dera’s properties.

The respondent appealed this decision to an Additional Sessions Judge, who allowed the appeal. However, a single‑bench of the Punjab High Court reversed the Additional Sessions Judge’s order and restored the trial court’s decree. The respondent then filed a Letters Patent Appeal before the Supreme Court. The Division Bench of the Supreme Court agreed with the High Court on all other issues but allowed the appeal on the ground that the plaintiff’s allegation of a custom permitting a Gurbhai to succeed without appointment by the Bhekh had not been substantiated by the evidence. The Court consequently held that there is no universal law governing religious institutions in Punjab; each institution is to be governed by its own distinct custom and practice. Accordingly, the appellant could not succeed as Mahant without demonstrating an appointment by the Bhekh or the fraternity, unless he could establish a specific custom that conferred upon a Gurbhai the right to succeed.

The Court observed that the appellant could not rely on a right to succeed merely because he was a Gurbhai. The judgment cited Rattigan’s Digest of Customary Law, referring to the decisions Jiwan Das v. Hira Das, A.I.R. 1937 Lah. 311 and Sital Das v. Sant Ram, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 606. On the basis of the evidence presented before the trial court, the appellant failed to prove the custom he alleged. The Court recorded this finding with reference to the citation Sup./65-16 234. Consequently, the appellant’s claim that he could inherit the Gadi by virtue of being a Gurbhai was not established.

The Court further held that because the appellant’s suit was an action for ejectment, the outcome depended wholly on the strength of the title he asserted. The Court stated that if the appellant could not succeed on the basis of his claimed title, the suit would fail even though the defendant in possession might have no title to the property. This principle was supported by a reference to Mukherjea’s Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust, 2nd Edition, page 317. The Court therefore emphasized that the necessity of a clear title could not be bypassed by the absence of a title in the defendant’s possession.

The appeal before the Court was Civil Appeal No. 813 of 1962, filed against the judgment and decree dated 13 July 1960 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 58 of 1958. Counsel for the appellant included senior legal representatives, while counsel for the first respondent was also engaged. The judgment was delivered by Justice Ayyangar. The matter concerned the appellant’s claim to possession of certain movable and immovable properties that belonged to the Dera of Sanyasi Sadhus situated in Mauza Kharak, Tahsil Hansi, District Hissar, Punjab. The appellant asserted that he was the rightful successor of the last Mahant of the Dera‑Kishan Puri, who had died on 15 February 1951. After the death of the Mahant, disputes arose regarding succession to the Dera. The original respondent, Neki Puri, who was then deceased, claimed to be a Chela of the deceased Mahant and alleged that he had been appointed to the position by the Bhekh and the village community. Acting on that alleged appointment, Neki Puri entered into possession of the Dera’s properties. In contrast, the appellant maintained that, as the Gurbhai of the deceased Mahant, he held a superior claim to the Gadi and thereby to the properties. Accordingly, the appellant instituted a suit seeking a declaration of his title and an injunction restraining Neki Puri from interfering with his possession. Neki Puri, in his defence, asserted possession of the properties and invoked his title as a Chela appointed by the Bhekh. An issue was raised in the suit as to which party was in actual possession of the properties. The trial court found that Neki Puri was in possession and consequently held that the suit for a mere declaration and injunction was not maintainable, leading to its dismissal. Nevertheless, the court also recorded evidence on the question of whether Neki Puri was truly a Chela of the late Mahant, and it made a finding adverse to Neki Puri’s claim. The appellate court dismissed the appeal against this judgment, rendering the decree final. The appellant then filed a fresh suit in the Civil Court at Hissar, seeking a decree for possession of the Dera’s movable and immovable assets, basing his claim on his status as Gurbhai under the custom governing succession and the general practice (Riwaj‑i‑Am) of Deras.

In the earlier suit the parties disputed which of them actually possessed the properties, and the trial judge found that the defendant, Neki Puri, was in possession; consequently the suit, which sought only a declaration of title and an injunction, was held to be not maintainable and was dismissed. Nonetheless, the court recorded evidence on the separate issue of whether Neki Puri was a Chela of the late Mahant Kishan Puri and entered a finding that was adverse to Neki Puri’s claim of such status. An appeal against that judgment was also dismissed, and that decree has now become final. Because the declaration and injunction suit was dismissed, the appellant, Brahma Nand Puri, instituted a new suit in the Civil Court at Hisar seeking a decree for possession of both movable and immovable property belonging to the Dera. The plaintiff’s claim was based on his alleged title, which he expressed in paragraph 5 of the plaint as follows: “According to custom regarding succession of the Dera and the Riwaj‑i‑Am of Deras the plaintiff being Gurbhai was entitled to Gaddi, as he is the eldest Chela of Shanker Puri and the people of the village and the Bhekh appointed him as Mahant after performing all the ceremonies on the 17th day of the death of Shri Kishan Puri and made him occupy the Gaddi of dera of Kharak.” An alternative basis for his title was set out in paragraph 8, stating: “If for any reason it is held that after the death of Shri Kishan Puri, the plaintiff was not appointed as Mahant of the Dera, even then according to the custom regarding succession of the Dera and Riwaj‑i‑Am, the plaintiff is entitled to become Mahant of the Dera as he is the Gurbhai of Kishan Puri deceased. It was held in the previous case that according to the Riwaj, in the absence of a Chela his (deceased Mahant’s) Gurbhai becomes Mahant of a Dera.” In the written statement filed by Neki Puri, two defenses were raised: first, that Neki Puri was a Chela who had been appointed by the Bhekh and other villagers to succeed Kishan Puri, thereby asserting a preferential title based on Chela‑ship followed by such appointment; second, that while acknowledging Brahma Nand Puri as the Gurbhai of the deceased Mahant, Neki Puri denied any Bhekh appointment of the plaintiff and contended that no custom existed allowing a Gurbhai who had not been appointed by the Bhekh to succeed as Mahant merely by virtue of being a Gurbhai. From these pleadings four principal questions arose for trial, namely: (1) whether Neki Puri was a Chela of the deceased Kishan Puri; (2) whether Neki Puri had been appointed by the Bhekh; (3) whether the plaintiff had been appointed by the Bhekh; and (4) whether any custom permitted a Gurbhai to succeed to the Mahantship without such appointment, the latter issue being pleaded in paragraph 8 of the plaint. Brahma Nand Puri conceded that a Chela possessed a right superior to that of a Gurbhai, and therefore if the first two issues were decided in favour of Neki Puri the plaintiff’s suit would necessarily fail.

In the trial the court framed four principal questions that needed resolution. The first two questions concerned the relative status of a Chela and a Gurbhai, and the court noted that if both of those questions were decided in favour of Neki Puri, the plaintiff’s suit would inevitably fail. The third question asked whether the plaintiff had been appointed by the Bhekh. The plaintiff did not make any serious attempt to prove such an appointment, and consequently the fourth question arose: whether a custom existed that permitted a Gurbhai to succeed to the Mahantship of the institution without an appointment by the Bhekh, as alleged in paragraph 8 of the plaint. The learned trial judge recorded findings on each of these matters. First, the judge found that the evidence presented did not establish that Neki Puri was the Chela of the last Mahant. Second, the judge did not record a definitive finding on the question of Bhekh appointment but expressed the opinion that there was no proof that the Bhekh could appoint a Mahant who was neither a Chela nor a Gurbhai, nor that such an appointment had been made in the present case. Third, a clear finding was made that the plaintiff had not been appointed by the Bhekh. Fourth, without deciding on the custom pleaded by the plaintiff in paragraph 8, the trial judge held that under Punjab law, when a Chela does not exist, a Gurbhai is entitled to succeed to the Gaddi irrespective of any appointment by the Bhekh, and on that basis decreed the plaintiff’s suit. The defendant appealed this decision to the Additional Sessions Judge. The appellate court reversed the trial judge’s finding on the first issue, holding that Neki Puri was indeed a Chela of the deceased Mahant. On the basis of evidence produced by the defence, the appellate court also made a definite finding that Neki Puri had been appointed by the Bhekh and the villagers to succeed the deceased Mahant. Because a Chela, by established hierarchy, holds a superior title to a Gurbhai in matters of succession, the District Judge allowed the defendant’s appeal and ordered the dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit. The plaintiff then took the matter to the High Court by way of a second appeal. The Single Judge hearing the appeal reversed the appellate court’s finding on the Chela issue, observing that the Additional Sessions Judge’s determination was vitiated by serious errors of law and a misappreciation of facts. By setting aside the claim that Neki Puri was a Chela, the High Court judge upheld the plaintiff’s claim on the ground that a Gurbhai could succeed to the Gaddi even without an appointment by the Bhekh, and consequently decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. Following this judgment, Neki Puri filed a Letters Patent appeal before a Division Bench.

The appeal was examined by a division bench. The judges on the bench concurred with the earlier single judge regarding the question of whether Neki Puri qualified as a Chela. They affirmed that the earlier single judge had correctly held that the first appellate court had erred seriously in its reasoning when it concluded that Neki Puri had proved his status as the Chela of the deceased Kishan Puri, and they restored the finding of the trial judge on that point. Turning next to the plaintiff’s claim to the Gaddi, the judges considered the allegation in paragraph eight of the plaint that a Gurbhai could succeed to the Gaddi without being appointed by the Bhekh. After evaluating the evidence, the judges concluded that the plaintiff had not established the existence of such a custom. Accordingly, they allowed the appeal and ordered the dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit. The appellant now challenges the correctness of that decision before this Court. Two contentions were advanced on behalf of the appellant. The first contention was that, apart from any special custom, the law governing Deras in Punjab permits a Gurbhai to succeed to a Dera even in the absence of an appointment by the Bhekh or the fraternity. The second contention was that, even if the law required a custom to support the claim, the appellant had produced sufficient evidence to prove the existence of such a custom in the present case. While addressing these submissions, the Court noted that counsel for the appellant also drew attention to the fact that, during the pendency of the appeal, Neki Puri had died and that persons whom the counsel described as having even weaker claims to the Mahantship were then in possession of the property. Counsel argued that, because the appellant was undeniably a Gurbhai, it would be improper to ignore his rights and to permit a stranger to occupy the property. The Court found this argument to be without merit. It observed that the plaintiff’s suit was an action for ejectment, and therefore the plaintiff must establish a valid title in order to succeed. If the plaintiff cannot establish such a title, the suit must fail, even if the defendant in possession lacks any title, assuming counsel’s premise is correct. The Court then quoted the authority of Mukherjea’s Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust, Second Edition, page 317, which states: “The party who lays claim to the office of the Mahant on the strength of any such usage must establish it affirmatively by proper legal evidence. The fact that the defendant is a trespasser would not entitle the plaintiff to succeed even though he be a disciple of the last Mahant, unless he succeeds in proving the particular usage under which succession takes place in the particular institution.” Relying on that principle, the Court dismissed the counsel’s argument concerning the plaintiff’s lack of title. Finally, the Court addressed the first contention and concluded that the counsel’s submission that, under Punjab law, a Gurbhai is entitled to succeed without reference to an appointment was not justified.

In this case, the Court considered whether a Mahant must be appointed by the Bhekh or the fraternity in order to hold the Gaddi. The Court quoted Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law, which observes that no general law governs religious institutions in Punjab and that each institution is regulated by its own custom and practice. The Digest further states that certain broad propositions have received general recognition in judicial decisions. Paragraph 84 of the Digest says that members of such institutions are governed exclusively by the customs and usages of the particular institution to which they belong. Paragraph 85 states that the office of Mahant is usually elective and not hereditary, although a Mahant may nominate a successor subject to confirmation by his fraternity. From paragraph 85 the Court inferred that, because the Mahantship is usually elective, any person who claims the office on the basis of a hereditary title such as Chelaship simplicitor or Gurbhaiship simplicitor must prove that claim with proper evidence. The Court noted the decision in Jiwan Das v. Hira Das as relevant authority. The Court also observed that the customs of one institution do not necessarily control another institution. However, the Court referred to its earlier judgment in Sital Das v. Sant Ram, where it had held that, for the Mahantship of a Thakurdwara belonging to the Ram Kabir sect of Hindu Bairagis in the Jullundur district, the prevailing usage required an appointment by the fraternity before a person could become a Mahant.

Based on the passage from Rattigan's Digest, the Court concluded that the first argument advanced by counsel for the plaintiff could not be sustained. The Court further observed that paragraph 5 of the plaint, extracted earlier, demonstrated that the plaintiff himself recognised the necessity of an appointment by the Bhekh to acquire the title to the Gaddi, in addition to his status as a Gurbhai. Although the plaintiff was indeed a Gurbhai, the Court found that he had not produced evidence of an appointment by the Bhekh or the fraternity. Consequently, in the absence of such an appointment under the law, and apart from any special custom that might apply to this particular institution, the appellant could not rely on his status as a Gurbhai to claim title to the Gaddi. The Court then turned to the second argument raised by counsel, which asserted that the plaintiff had established a special custom in this institution where no appointment by the Bhekh was required before a Chela or Gurbhai could succeed to the Gaddi. The Court reviewed the entire evidence presented. It noted that no documentary evidence or written material existed to support the alleged custom, and that the issue depended entirely on the testimony of witnesses. The Court recorded the testimony of the first witness, identified as PW‑4, who claimed to be a Bhekh of the Dera. In his chief examination the witness stated, “According…”

In the testimony of the first witness, reference was made to a customary rule that, according to the Bhekh, if a Mahant died without leaving a Chela, the Mahant’s Gurbhai would become the successor, whereas if a Chela existed, the Chela would be the successor. During cross‑examination the witness clarified that this rule was not recorded in any written form and was merely observed in practice. He further recounted examples from the villages of Bata and Guna, describing a situation in Bata where a Chela named Prabhu Puri was considered unsuitable and consequently Sunder Puri, a Gurbhai of the previous Mahant, was installed, and a case in Guna where a Sanyasi named Lachhman Gir died without a Chela and his Gurbbai Phag Gir succeeded to the Gaddi. However, the evidence did not specifically state that these instances occurred without any appointment, recognition, or confirmation by the Bhekh, which was the precise custom the plaintiff sought to prove. A second witness, identified as P.W. II, testified in his primary examination that the custom of the Bhekh dictated that when a Mahant leaves no Chela, his Gurbhai succeeds to the Gaddi. On cross‑examination he likened this custom to the general Hindu customary law and admitted that, although many such instances might exist, he could not presently recall any specific example. The thirteenth witness, who belonged to a different Dera, asserted that in his institution, when a Sadhu died without a Chela, the Gaddi passed to the Gurbhai, and he cited an instance in the Gurdwara of Kosli near his Dera and another at a Dera in Nangri, Rajasthan, where a Gurbhai succeeded a Mahant in the absence of a Chela. The sixteenth witness offered a similar statement, saying that his Guru had succeeded to the Gaddi as the Gurbhai of the former Mahant. Witnesses seventeen and eighteen repeated the same allegation that, according to the custom of the Bhekh, a Mahant’s Gurbhai succeeded when the Mahant died without a Chela. From this collective evidence the Court observed two deficiencies: first, the testimonies lacked detailed particulars about the cited instances; second, none of the witnesses indicated whether, in those instances, there was any recognition, appointment, or confirmation by the Bhekh, a factor identified by Rattigan as essential to the customary law of Punjab that confers title to the Mahantship. Consequently, the Court declined to accept that the appellant had established the special custom alleged in paragraph 8 of the plaint, which purported to override ordinary law by allowing a Chela, or in the absence of a Chela a Gurbhai, to succeed to the headship of a Dera without an appointment by the Bhekh or fraternity. Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiff’s suit should be dismissed as properly decided. The respondent’s counsel, Mr Naunit Lal, then urged further submissions.

In this case, the Court observed that the Single Judge had erred in overturning the finding of the first appellate Court that Neki Puri had established that he was a Chela of the deceased Mahant Kishan Puri. The Court noted that the Division Bench had agreed with the Single Judge’s criticism of the defects in the first appellate Court’s reasoning on that issue. Counsel for the appellant argued that the Single Judge had committed serious error by interfering with a factual finding. Although the Court was convinced that certain portions of the Single Judge’s judgment contained errors, it chose not to examine that issue because it was wholly unnecessary for the resolution of the present appeal. The Court explained that only if it were to accept the submissions of counsel for the appellant would the correctness of the reversal of the finding on the Chelaship of Neki Puri have become material to the decision. Since the Court had already expressed its view on the appellant’s title to the Gaddi, it considered it unnecessary and inappropriate to discuss what was essentially an academic question. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appeal failed, ordered its dismissal, awarded costs, and imposed them on the appellant.