Bisheshwar Dayal Sinha vs University Of Bihar and O.Rs

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 279 of 1964

Decision Date: 24 April, 1964

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

On 24 April 1964 the Supreme Court of India issued its judgment in the case of Bisheshwar Dayal Sinha versus University of Bihar and others. The opinion was written by Justice P B Gajendragadkar and the bench was composed of Justices P B Gajendragadkar, K N Wanchoo, M Hidayatullah, K C Das Gupta and N Rajagopala Ayyangar. The petitioner was Bisheshwar Dayal Sinha and the respondents were the University of Bihar together with additional respondents. The decision is reported in 1965 AIR 601 and 1964 SCR (7) 879. The matters under consideration arose under the Bihar State Universities (Patna, University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Act, 1960 (Bihar Act 14 of 1960), specifically sections 2(d), 4(10), 30(d) and 30(e). The Act was later amended by the Bihar State Universities (Amendment) Act, 1961 (Bihar II of 1962), which introduced section 35 and provision 60(a)(ii). The dispute also involved statutory provisions labelled 2(4) and 3(1) in the statutes framed thereafter, concerning an order issued by the Vice‑Chancellor to re‑constitute the Governing Body of an affiliated college and the validity of that order.

The factual background recorded that the Vice‑Chancellor of Bihar University, by an order dated 13 January 1963, directed the re‑constitution of the Governing Body of Rajendra College, Chapra. Rajendra College was a public institution founded by public charities and was affiliated to the University under section 2(d) of the 1960 Act. The order removed the petitioner, who at that time served as Secretary of the college, and nominated certain individuals as members of the newly constituted Governing Body. Subsequently, the 1960 Act was amended by Act II of 1962. Section 35 of the amending Act provided for the dissolution of the Senate, Syndicate and Academic Council that had been functioning before the amendment and authorised the establishment of new bodies in their place. It also empowered the Vice‑Chancellor, pending such re‑constitution, to exercise the powers of those bodies for a period not exceeding nine months. Acting under the authority conferred by section 35, the Vice‑Chancellor framed new statutes. Clause 2(4) of those statutes gave the Vice‑Chancellor the power to amend or revise the constitution of affiliated colleges, while clause 3(l) empowered the Syndicate, either on its own motion or at the instance of the Vice‑Chancellor, to dissolve and re‑constitute the Governing Bodies of such colleges. Clause 3(l) also authorised the cancellation of grants‑in‑aid to the colleges concerned, subject to a proviso that a reasonable opportunity must be given to the Governing Body before any action was taken.

The petitioner filed a writ petition in the Patna High Court seeking quashing of the impugned order and the statutes upon which it was based. He contended that the statutes were ultra vires and that, consequently, the order could not stand. The High Court examined the matter and held that the order could not be justified under clause 3(l) because the required proviso had not been complied with. However, the Court found that the order was valid under clause 2(4). Further, the High Court concluded that the statutes could be sustained by reference to section 60(a)(ii) introduced by the 1962 amendment, which empowered the Vice‑Chancellor to make adaptations or modifications in the pre‑existing statutes. The Court observed that the Bihar State University Act of 1960 made a clear distinction between two categories of collegiate institutions – those owned and maintained by the university and those admitted or affiliated to the university – as evident from sections 4(10) and 30(d) and 30(e) of the Act.

According to the Bihar State Universities Act, the university distinguished between two kinds of collegiate institutions. The first kind included those institutions that the university owned and maintained directly. The second kind comprised institutions that had been admitted to the university or were affiliated with it, a distinction that is clearly reflected in sections 4(10) as well as 30(d) and (e) of the Act. The university possessed an unquestionable authority to withdraw affiliation from an institution that fell within the second category whenever that institution failed to meet reasonable and legitimate conditions that were prescribed as a basis for the grant of affiliation. However, the university did not have the authority to dissolve the governing body of such an affiliated institution nor to re‑constitute that body on its own. Clause 2(4) of the university statutes attempted to give the university such power, but this clause conflicted with section 30(d) of the Act and therefore had to be declared invalid. Because the impugned order was issued under the authority of clause 2(4), that order was consequently invalid and could not operate. Likewise, clause 3(l) of the statutes was premised on the same concept that the university syndicate could dissolve the governing body and order its re‑constitution; this clause suffered from the same defect as clause 2(4) and was therefore also invalid. The provision in clause 3(l) that allowed the syndicate to dissolve and re‑constitute the governing body of an affiliated college and to cancel grants‑in‑aid for non‑compliance with its directions must likewise be held invalid. The power granted by section 60(ii) of the Act must be interpreted in harmony with the provisions of section 30(d) concerning affiliated colleges, and since clause 2(4) was itself void, section 60(ii) could not be used to legitimize the challenged order. In resolving disputes that arise between affiliated colleges and the university, the court emphasized that the autonomy of the colleges should be respected and that any supervisory powers exercised by the university must be balanced with the aim of promoting efficiency and progress within the higher education system.

The matter before the Supreme Court was a civil appeal, numbered 279 of 1964, filed by special leave from a judgment and order dated 23 December 1963 of the Patna High Court in criminal matter number 86 of 1963. The appellant, Bisheshwar Dayal Sinha, was represented by counsel for the appellant, while the respondents were represented by the Attorney‑General and other counsel for the various respondents and interveners, as listed in the record. The judgment of the Court was delivered on 24 April 1964 by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar. The appeal arose from a writ petition in which the appellant contested the validity of an order issued by the Vice‑Chancellor of Bihar University. That order directed the re‑constitution of the governing body of Rajendra College, Chapra, and was purportedly based on newly framed statutes prepared by the Vice‑Chancellor. The appellant argued that those new statutes exceeded the statutory authority of the Vice‑Chancellor, rendering both the statutes and the order issued under them ultra vires, illegal, inoperative and void.

The appellant asserted that the Vice‑Chancellor acted beyond his statutory authority when he issued the impugned order under the newly framed statutes, and consequently the order was illegal, inoperative and void. In addition to the appellant’s own petition, four further petitions were filed by other individuals who sought the same relief. The Patna High Court, in substance, rejected the appellant’s claim and dismissed both his writ petition and the four similar petitions filed by the other persons. On the appellant’s behalf, counsel argued that the High Court’s view on the validity of the statutes could not be sustained. He maintained that the statutes were ultra vires the powers of the Vice‑Chancellor and that, as a result, the order directing the reconstitution of the Governing Body of Rajendra College must also be declared invalid.

Rajendra College is an educational institution that has been admitted by Bihar University as a college under section 2(d) of the Bihar State Universities (Patna, University of Bihar, Bhagalpur and Ranchi) Act, Bihar Act XIV of 1960, hereinafter referred to as “the Act,” read with Article I of Chapter XII of the Statutes framed under the Act. The college is a public institution established by public charities and is administered by a Governing Body. The first Governing Body was created by the citizens of Chapra who gathered for that purpose on 31 July 1938, consisting of eighteen members. This body functioned until 24 July 1940, with its membership being periodically increased by co‑option. In 1941, the Governing Body adopted a constitution prepared at the request of the Principal, and this constitution governed the college’s administration. Further amendments to the constitution were made in 1950. After the University of Bihar Act 1951 (Bihar Act XXVII of 1951) and the framing of Chapter XIII of the Statutes under that Act, the university advised the Governing Body to align its constitution with the provisions of Chapter XIII. Accordingly, modifications were introduced, and the amended constitution remained in force at the relevant time. The appellant was elected Secretary of the Governing Body on 3 June 1961, his term being fixed for three academic sessions, thereby extending to 31 May 1964. However, by the order of the Vice‑Chancellor dated 13 January 1963, the appellant was removed from the secretaryship and a successor was appointed. This removal prompted the appellant to approach the Patna High Court, seeking a writ or order that would set aside the impugned order and the statutes upon which it was based.

In the petition filed by the appellant, eighteen respondents were impleaded, among them respondent No 1, the University of Bihar; respondent No 2, Mr Srivastava, who occupied the office of Vice‑Chancellor of the University of Bihar; and respondent No 3, the Chancellor of the University of Bihar. Before the Court examined the arguments raised by the appellant in this appeal, it found it necessary to refer briefly to the statutory provisions that govern the affairs of the University of Bihar and its constituent colleges. The primary statute to be considered is the University of Bihar Act, identified as Bihar Act XXVII of 1951, which received assent in August 1951 and was intended to furnish a comprehensive code for establishing and incorporating an affiliating‑cum‑teaching university in the State of Bihar, with its seat at Patna. Later legislation relevant to the case includes Bihar Act XIV of 1960, which the Court refers to as “the Act” for the purposes of this judgment; that Act was enacted to facilitate the establishment and incorporation of affiliating‑cum‑teaching universities at Patna, Muzaffarpur, Bhagalpur and Ranchi. The 1960 Act was subsequently amended by three amendment Acts—Act 11 of 1962, Act XIII of 1962 and Act XVII of 1962—coming into force on 1 March 1962, 21 April 1962 and 16 October 1962 respectively. For the present controversy, certain provisions of the Act are especially pertinent. Section 2(d) defines “college” as an institution admitted to or maintained by the University in accordance with the Act, where instruction is given to students up to and including a standard below the postgraduate level, subject to the conditions prescribed in the Statutes and to the requirements of clause (15) of section 4. This definition demonstrates that the Act differentiates two categories of colleges: those admitted to the University and those maintained by the University. Section 4 outlines the purposes and powers of the University, and clause 4(10) expressly provides that one purpose and power of the University is to institute, maintain and manage colleges and hostels, as well as to recognise colleges and hostels that are not maintained by the University. Accordingly, two kinds of collegiate institutions operate under the University—those it creates, maintains and manages, and those it merely recognises, subject to conditions imposed for such recognition. Recognising this distinction is necessary for addressing the main dispute between the parties in this appeal. Section 7 of the Act enumerates the officers of the University who,

In the judgment, the Court set out the statutory definitions of the officers and governing authorities of the University. Section 4 of the Act enumerated the officers as the Chancellor, the Vice‑Chancellor, the Treasurer, the Registrar, the Deans of the Faculties, the Finance Officer, and such other persons as might be declared officers by the Statutes. The Court then turned to Section 16, which defined six principal authorities of the University. These authorities were identified as the Senate, the Syndicate, the Academic Council, the Faculties, the Examination Board, and any other authorities that the Statutes might declare to be authorities of the University. The Court explained that Section 20 dealt specifically with the powers and duties of the Senate. Under subsection (1) of Section 20, the Senate was described as the supreme governing body of the University, vested with the entire management and superintendence of the University’s affairs, concerns and property. The Senate was further empowered to exercise every power of the University that was not expressly provided for elsewhere, in order to give effect to the provisions of the Act. Subsection (2) of Section 20 enumerated particular powers and duties of the Senate, expressly including the authority to make the Statutes and to amend or repeal those Statutes as it deemed necessary.

The Court proceeded to examine the other statutory provisions that related to the University’s governance. Section 21 dealt with the composition of the Syndicate, and Section 22 set out the powers and duties of that body. The judgment then focused on Section 30, which concerned the Statutes themselves. Sub‑paragraph (d) of Section 30 provided, subject to the provisions of the Act, that the Statutes could make provisions for the admission of educational institutions as colleges and could also provide for the withdrawal of privileges from colleges that had been admitted. Sub‑paragraph (e) of the same section authorized the Statutes to provide for the institution of colleges and hostels as well as for their maintenance and management. The Court observed that, when viewed against the broader classification of colleges that were either instituted by the University or merely admitted or recognised by it, Section 30 made two distinct sets of provisions: one set dealing with the admission or recognition of colleges and the possible withdrawal of such recognition, and another set dealing with the institution, maintenance and management of colleges that were created by the University itself. Section 49, the judgment noted, addressed the relationship between affiliated colleges and the University, mandating that such relations be governed by Statutes made for that purpose and enumerating the matters that those Statutes might cover. Finally, Section 60 dealt with the continuity of earlier legislation. Sub‑section (i) preserved the operation of Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations and Rules that were in force under the Bihar Acts XXV and XXVII of 1961. Sub‑section (ii) empowered the Vice‑Chancellor, with the Chancellor’s approval, to make adaptations or modifications to those Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations and Rules, provided that such changes were not inconsistent with the Act; any such adaptation or modification was to be deemed to have been made under the appropriate provisions of the Act. In effect, the Court explained that while the earlier Statutes continued to operate, the Vice‑Chancellor was given a specific authority to adapt or modify them within the framework established by the Act.

The provision mentioned earlier became effective on 1 March 1962 because of the amending provision contained in Act 11 of 1962. Another relevant provision is Section 35 of Act II of 1962, which deals with the dissolution of the Senate, Syndicate and Academic Council that were functioning before this Act came into force, and with the creation of new bodies to replace them. Section 35 states that, notwithstanding any provisions of Bihar Act XIV of 1960, the bodies that had been established under section 3 of that earlier Act for the universities covered by it shall be dissolved on the commencement of the new Act. The provision further requires that these bodies be reconstituted as soon as possible, and that, until such reconstitution occurs, the Vice‑Chancellor shall exercise the powers and perform the duties of those bodies for a period not exceeding nine months from the date the amending Act became operative. In effect, this clause authorises the Vice‑Chancellor to carry out the functions of the dissolved Senate, Syndicate and Academic Council for up to nine months, or until the new bodies are properly constituted. It is on the basis of this authority that the Vice‑Chancellor purported to frame new Statutes, some of which are now being challenged in the present proceedings, and that he issued the order under dispute pursuant to those new Statutes. This summarizes the statutory framework that governs the dispute that the appellate court is called upon to resolve. The two statutes that are presently contested may now be described. The body of new Statutes was promulgated on 18 November 1962. Following this promulgation, the Registrar of the University of Bihar sent a letter to the Secretaries and Principals of all admitted colleges, excluding constituent and government colleges, asking them what steps the Vice‑Chancellor or the Syndicate should take concerning the constitution of each college’s Governing Body and the appointment of its office‑bearers. The new Statutes contain twenty‑four clauses, but for the purposes of the current appeal only two clauses are material. Clause 2, sub‑clause (4) provides that, for the constitution of the Governing Bodies of admitted colleges (except those owned and maintained by the Government) that were framed before these Statutes were made, the Vice‑Chancellor shall have the power to amend or revise the constitution wherever necessary so as to bring it, as far as possible, into conformity with the provisions of the new Statutes. Clause 3(l) states that the Syndicate may, on its own motion or at the instance of the Vice‑Chancellor, dissolve and order the constitution of the Governing Body in admitted colleges, or cancel the grant‑in‑aid to the college concerned for the reasons that follow.

Clause 3(l) allows the Syndicate to dissolve a college’s Governing Body or to cancel the grant‑in‑aid for the college if one or more of the following conditions exist: the college has failed to obey directions issued by the Syndicate under university law within the time prescribed; the college has not observed the provisions of university law; the college has misused its various funds; or the college’s affairs have been grossly mismanaged. However, the provision also requires that, before the Syndicate orders the dissolution of a Governing Body or makes any similar order, it must give the Governing Body a reasonable opportunity to show cause why such action should not be taken. The Court noted that clause 2(4) of the new statutes expressly gives the Vice‑Chancellor the authority to amend or revise the constitution of affiliated colleges, while clause 3(l) empowers the Syndicate to dissolve and reconstitute the Governing Bodies of those colleges either on its own motion or on the Vice‑Chancellor’s initiative. Clause 3(l) further authorises the Syndicate to cancel its grant‑in‑aid to a college for any of the four reasons listed above, subject to the proviso that the Governing Body must first be afforded a reasonable chance to be heard. The High Court, in its assessment, concluded that both statutes and the order under challenge were valid. It held that the order could not be justified under clause 3(l) because the Governing Body of Rajendra College had not been given the opportunity mandated by the proviso. Nevertheless, the High Court found the order to be valid insofar as it relied on the powers conferred on the Vice‑Chancellor by clause 2(4). The High Court also expressed the view that the statutes could be justified by the power granted to the Vice‑Chancellor to make adaptations or modifications to existing statutes under section 60(ii). The matters before this Court therefore include determining whether clause 2(4) is constitutionally valid, and, if it is, whether the order in question can be upheld. The Court may also need to consider whether clause 3(1) is invalid in whole or in part. The question of whether the adaptation power under section 60(ii) can validate the order was deemed straightforward, because the Court has already concluded that clause 2(4) is itself invalid; consequently, the order must be set aside on that basis. When the statutory basis for an order is invalid, the power to make adaptations or modifications cannot rescue the order’s validity. Accordingly, the power granted to the Vice‑Chancellor by section 60(ii) must be interpreted in conjunction with the substantive provisions of the Act.

The Court observed that the provisions contained in section 30(d) of the Act, which deal with affiliated colleges, could not justify the challenged order when the challenged Statute 2(4) was itself invalid. The Court stated that this view was not open to dispute and therefore returned to the question of whether Statute 2(4) was valid. It held that deciding this question presented no difficulty because, on its face, the statute conflicted with the relevant provisions of the Act. The Court recalled that the Act draws a clear and well‑recognised distinction between two categories of collegiate institutions: those instituted by the University itself and those that are admitted to or affiliated with the University. This distinction is reflected in section 4(10) of the Act as well as in sections 30(d) and 30(e). Where the University institutes a collegiate institution, the act of instituting, together with the management and maintenance of that institution, falls within the University’s responsibility. By contrast, institutions that are started by other autonomous bodies and subsequently seek admission or affiliation to the University are not directly managed or maintained by the University; those duties remain with the autonomous educational bodies that sponsor, institute, manage and maintain them. The Court acknowledged that, when admitting or affiliating such institutions, the University may impose reasonable and lawful conditions in accordance with the Act. If a college fails to meet those conditions or breaches them, the University possesses the power to disaffiliate the college and withdraw its status as an admitted college. However, the Court emphasized that this disaffiliation power is distinct from any power to constitute the governing bodies of those autonomous educational bodies. The University may require that certain conditions regarding the composition of governing bodies be observed, but it cannot directly dictate the composition of those bodies. In institutions created by the University, the University decides who will constitute the governing bodies; in affiliated institutions, the University may only prescribe conditions and regulations that must be satisfied before the governing bodies are formed. The actual choice of who constitutes the governing bodies is left to the autonomous educational bodies that sponsor the colleges, and the principles and basis for their formation may be subject to conditions imposed by the University at the time of admission or affiliation. The Court considered this principle to be clear and essential for assessing the validity of the impugned Statute 2(4). It then proceeded to examine what the statute purported to accomplish.

In this matter, the Court observed that Statute 2(4) purported to give the Vice‑Chancellor authority to amend or revise the constitution of a college whenever it was deemed necessary. The Court noted that such authority conflicted with section 30(d) of the Act. Although section 30(e) permitted a power of amendment, that provision applied solely to collegiate institutions that had been created by the University itself and could not be extended to affiliated colleges. The Court explained that, had Statute 2(4) simply empowered the Vice‑Chancellor to prescribe conditions governing the composition of the Governing Bodies of affiliated colleges, the provision would have been permissible. Under the University’s existing powers, it could indeed influence the makeup of the Governing Bodies of affiliated colleges by laying down general conditions that the colleges must satisfy; failure to comply with those conditions could lead to disaffiliation. However, this method of prescribing conditions was fundamentally different from delegating to the Vice‑Chancellor the direct power to alter the composition of the Governing Bodies. Consequently, the Court held that the power conferred by Statute 2(4) was inconsistent with section 30(d) and therefore invalid. The Court then examined the impugned order, which sought to reconstitute the Governing Body of Rajendri College with immediate effect so that it would conform to the new statutes. The order effectively nominated members to the Governing Body: it retained two staff representatives, added five new persons, altered the three seats reserved for founders, donors, benefactors or sponsors by naming three individuals, allowed the co‑opted member, Mr Bishwanath Prasad Mishra, to continue until a fresh co‑option could be held, and appointed Mr Ganga Prasad Sinha, Advocate, Chapra, as Secretary of the College’s Governing Body. By doing so, the Vice‑Chancellor not only dictated the principle by which the Governing Body should be constituted but also selected specific individuals to occupy those positions. The Court emphasized that determining the basis for constituting a Governing Body is distinct from the act of nominating particular persons, and the latter had been undertaken by the Vice‑Chancellor. This exercise of power was found to be contrary to section 30(d) of the Act. Furthermore, the Court observed that the Vice‑Chancellor’s actions exceeded the scope of Statute 2(4) itself, which merely authorised amendment or revision of the constitution and did not empower the Vice‑Chancellor to appoint members. Thus, the order was doubly infirm: it violated both the statutory limitation in section 30(d) and the express terms of Statute 2(4).

Statute 2(4) permits the Vice‑Chancellor to amend or revise the constitution of the Governing Bodies of admitted colleges whenever such amendment is deemed necessary. The Court had already held that the very conferral of this power under Statute 2(4) exceeds the limits of the Statute and is therefore ultra vires. Nevertheless, the Vice‑Chancellor’s actions went beyond the scope of Statute 2(4) because he not only altered the constitution but also nominated specific persons to the Governing Body. Thus, the order suffers a double infirmity: it is inconsistent with Statute 2(4) and is purportedly made under a provision that the Court has held invalid. The High Court, however, failed to recognise the essential distinction between two categories of collegiate institutions and the separate powers that the University may exercise over each. By treating every collegiate institution, whether created by the University or merely affiliated, as completely subject to University management, the High Court erased that statutory distinction. Accordingly, the Court held that Statute 2(4) is invalid, and any order issued under it must be declared invalid and inoperative. Therefore, any directive issued by the Vice‑Chancellor under that invalid provision lacks any legal foundation.

Turning to Statute 3(1), the Court noted that the Syndicate may possess the power to withdraw grant‑in‑aid from the college concerned. However, clause 3(1)(a) appears to provide that if an affiliated college refuses to comply with a Syndicate order to dissolve and reconstitute its Governing Body, the grant‑in‑aid may be cancelled. The Court therefore held that the portion of Statute 3(1) dealing with such cancellation is invalid. The University may still direct that the composition of a Governing Body conform to conditions it can modify under its lawful powers, and may take permissible action if those conditions are not met. Nevertheless, insofar as Statute 3(1) allows the Syndicate itself to dissolve a Governing Body and order its reconstitution, that provision suffers the same infirmity as Statute 2(4). Consequently, the Court declared that the segment of Statute 3(1) granting the Syndicate power to dissolve and reconstitute a Governing Body, and to cancel grant‑in‑aid under 3(1)(a) for non‑compliance, is invalid. The Attorney‑General argued that the Vice‑Chancellor was compelled to issue the impugned order because severe mismanagement at Rajendra College had created a grave law‑and‑order situation. He drew the Court’s attention to statements in the impugned order describing the background circumstances that allegedly forced the issuance of that order. Those statements, however, were contested by the appellant in his writ petition, and the High Court did not examine whether the statements were proven true.

The appellant had raised the issue in his writ petition, and the High Court had not examined whether the statements contained in the impugned order were proved to be true. The Court therefore chose not to express any opinion on that particular aspect of the matter. Nevertheless, the Court was prepared to assume that the Vice‑Chancellor had felt compelled to issue the order and that he had acted in good faith for the benefit of the students studying at Rajendra College. The Court observed that it was quite possible for an affiliated college to be mismanaged and for a situation to arise in which either the University or the Vice‑Chancellor might feel justified in taking drastic measures to remedy the problem. In dealing with the efficient management of affiliated colleges, the paramount consideration had always been the interests of the students attending those colleges, and, in theory, there could be no objection to the University being empowered to take suitable and reasonable action to address emergencies caused by mismanagement that threatened the students’ uninterrupted academic progress. However, the question that the Court had to decide in the present appeal was not whether the University or the Vice‑Chancellor ought to possess such power, but whether such power could be claimed by the Statute under the provisions of the Act. The Court held that, under the Act as it stood, only one answer was possible, and that any amendment to the legislation would be a matter for the Legislature, which was beyond the scope of the present dispute. The Court also noted, incidentally, that autonomous bodies which establish colleges and promote higher education in the country were generally run by disinterested persons, and that the autonomy of such bodies should not be unduly impaired. When colleges founded by autonomous bodies sought affiliation with a University, the University undoubtedly possessed the right to impose reasonable conditions for affiliation, and the supervision exercised by the University over the affairs and administration of its affiliated colleges normally served the purpose of requiring those colleges to conform to the standards of management and education prevailing in Government colleges or in colleges directly instituted by the University. In resolving any potential dispute between affiliated colleges and the University, the Court advised that attempts should be made to respect the autonomy of the colleges while reconciling that autonomy with the supervisory powers of the University, which were intended to make the functioning of the affiliated colleges efficient and progressive. Both the University and the affiliated colleges aimed to serve the cause of higher education, and there should be no serious disagreement over the principles governing their mutual relations. Unfortunately, in the present case, the Vice‑Chancellor appeared to have acted with some haste, and he had exercised powers under statutes that were themselves hastily framed and plainly inconsistent with the provisions of the parent Act.

The Court observed that the Vice‑Chancellor had exercised the powers set out in the Linder Statutes, and that those statutes had been framed hurriedly. The Court further noted that the Linder Statutes were clearly at odds with the provisions of the parent Act governing the University. Before concluding the appeal, the Court indicated that there was another critical issue that required examination. The appellant had contested the validity of the Linder Statutes on an additional ground, namely that the authority by which the Vice‑Chancellor had issued those statutes had ceased at the time they were made. Specifically, the appellant argued that the power conferred on the Vice‑Chancellor by section 35 of Act 11 of 1962 had already come to an end. Section 35 empowered the Vice‑Chancellor to exercise the powers of the appropriate university bodies for a period not exceeding nine months, or until those bodies were reconstituted. The appellant maintained that once the Senate was reconstituted, the statutory authority of the Vice‑Chancellor under that section terminated, rendering any statutes promulgated thereafter invalid.

The appellant’s case before the High Court asserted that the Senate had been reconstituted in the first week of November 1962, and that notices had been issued calling the new Senate to meet on 30 November 1962. Accordingly, the appellant submitted that the reconstitution of the Senate ended the Vice‑Chancellor’s statutory power under section 35, and therefore the statutes promulgated on 18 November 1962 were void. The High Court rejected this argument, primarily on the ground that the Senate had not been properly constituted even as of 30 November 1962. The Court noted that the application of Mr Baleshwar Prasad Choudhary, filed in the High Court, was still pending, and the question of his entitlement to sit in the Senate as a donor of Dalsingsarai College had not yet been resolved. Because a stay order had been issued by the High Court, the Court held that no meeting of the Senate could take place on 30 November 1962, and that after the Chancellor’s address, the meeting was adjourned. The stay order, the Court observed, concerned the Chancellor’s direction barring Mr Choudhary from acting as a Senate member and might not directly affect whether the Senate had been properly constituted before 18 November 1962. The appellant argued that the issuance of a notice on 8 November 1962 calling a meeting for 30 November demonstrated that the Senate had been duly constituted before the notice date, and that an actual meeting was not a prerequisite for proper reconstitution. Conversely, the learned Attorney‑General contended that the record did not contain sufficient material to support a finding that the Senate had been duly constituted before 18 November 1962. The Court agreed with the Attorney‑General, finding the contention sound. On the material before it, the Court saw no evidence establishing that the Senate had been reconstituted on any specific date, and so, we

The Court indicated that it would not record any conclusion on that portion of the appellant’s case because the material before it did not permit a definitive finding. It further observed that the decision of the High Court on the same issue should not be treated as binding authority, and that any future litigation raising the same question would require a fresh examination of the merits. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order that had been issued by the High Court, and granted the relief sought in the appellant’s writ petition. Accordingly, an order was directed to be issued restraining the respondents from giving effect to the impugned order identified as Annexure A, on the ground that the impugned order, together with the provisions of Statute 2(4) and the relevant part of Statute 3(l) upon which it relied, were held to be invalid and inoperative. The judgment further provided that the appellant would be entitled to recover his costs from respondent No 1 for the entire duration of the proceedings. In summary, the appellate relief was granted, the lower court’s order was annulled, and the appellant’s costs were awarded against the first respondent.