Bhikhi Lal And Ors. vs Tribeni And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 18 November 1964

Coram: K. Subba Rao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

In the matter of Bhikhi Lal and others versus Tribeni and others, decided on 18 November 1964, the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgment authored by Justice K. Subba Rao, with the bench consisting of Justice K. Subba Rao and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The Court explained that the present appeal originated from a fresh preliminary decree dated 24 May 1961, which had been issued by the Senior Civil Judge of Ajmer in compliance with directions previously given by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 383 of 1956 and by the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 181 of 1956. The Court recalled the facts set out in the earlier decision of Gyarsi Bai v. Dhansukh Lal, Civil Appeal No. 257 of 1963, where it had observed that the Senior Subordinate Judge of Ajmer, when rendering the earlier preliminary decree, had refused to allow interest to the appellants on a mortgage of Rs. 25,000 for the period from 14 September 1936 to 13 March 1950. The appellants responded by filing Civil Appeal No. 71 of 1953 challenging the part of that decree that denied the interest, while the respondents filed cross‑objections contesting the award of costs against them. On 25 August 1954, the Judicial Commissioner of Ajmer dismissed both the appellants’ appeal and the respondents’ cross‑objections. The appellants subsequently obtained special leave to appeal the Judicial Commissioner’s dismissal to this Court. On 16 December 1960, this Court allowed the appeal, ordering the trial court to issue a new preliminary decree that would incorporate the interest accrued up to 13 March 1950. The Court further directed that, in view of its judgment, a fresh preliminary decree should be drawn up in the proper form and that the ordinary period of redemption prescribed by the Code should be observed. After the Supreme Court’s decision, the Rajasthan High Court also permitted the appellants’ revision petition against the Subordinate Judge’s refusal to amend the earlier preliminary decree; the High Court instructed the Subordinate Judge to include a direction in the new decree requiring the appellants to account for rents and profits received from the mortgaged properties, as mandated by this Court. Consequently, the matter returned before the Senior Civil Judge of Ajmer for issuance of a fresh preliminary decree in accordance with the directives of both the Supreme Court and the High Court. Both parties presented extensive arguments before the Civil Judge concerning the credit and debit items that should be considered in the decree, taking into account the directions of the two higher courts. The Civil Judge, after consideration, held in broad terms that, based on this Court’s judgment, the appellants were entitled to interest accrued up to 18 March 1950, although they would not be entitled to an amount exceeding that claimed in the plaint.

In the case before the Senior Civil Judge of Ajmer, the judge observed that the appellants could not recover an amount greater than the sum claimed in the plaint. He further held, in accordance with the directions of the High Court, that the appellants were required to present accounts of the receipts derived from the mortgaged properties starting from 10 August 1950, which was the date on which the suit was filed, up to the date when they actually transferred possession of those properties to the respondents. The judge also determined that the appellants would be entitled only to interest on the principal sum of Rs 30,000 at the rate of six per cent per annum, calculated from the filing date of the suit until 17 August 1953. This entitlement to interest was made conditional upon the appellants furnishing the accounts of the usufruct receipts as stipulated. Consequently, a fresh preliminary decree was issued that incorporated all the directions articulated in the judgment. The plaintiffs‑appellants chose not to file an appeal against this preliminary decree; instead, they submitted an application seeking to amend the decree. In support of their application they contended that the Supreme Court had altered the earlier preliminary decree solely with respect to the interest accruing before 13 March 1950, and therefore the new preliminary decree, which imposed additional obligations on the appellants, was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s judgment. The Civil Judge rejected this contention, holding that the fresh preliminary decree conformed with his own judgment and that there was no error in the decree that warranted correction through amendment. The appellants’ revision petition was also dismissed on the ground that the fresh preliminary decree represented a new adjudication of the parties’ rights, that an appeal lay against that decree, and consequently a revision was not permissible. Regarding the direction in the decree concerning profits, the High Court affirmed that the direction was issued in accordance with its own order and, given that a new preliminary decree had been framed, the Court possessed jurisdiction to issue that direction.

The Court further explained that where a decree fails to conform with a judgment, the appropriate duty of the Court is to amend the decree so that it aligns with the judgment. However, the argument presented by the appellants was misplaced because the fresh preliminary decree prepared by the Senior Civil Judge was not a decree issued by this Court. Acting on the combined directions of this Court and the High Court, the Civil Judge heard new arguments and rendered a considered judgment. The decree that resulted from that judgment could not be disputed, as it faithfully reflected the terms of the judgment. That judgment became final because the appellants did not lodge an appeal against it; instead, they filed an application for amendment. Accordingly, the High Court was correct in holding that the fresh preliminary decree was in conformity with the Civil Judge’s judgment and that there was no scope for amendment. The order was therefore deemed proper, and there was no ground for interference.

In the judgment of the Civil Judge the decree was held to be in conformity with that judgment, and consequently there was no scope for any amendment; the order was described as perfectly correct and without any ground for interference. Nonetheless, the Court observed that one of the directions contained in the preliminary decree required amendment because, in light of subsequent events, that direction no longer matched the judgment of the Senior Civil Judge. The Court referred to its recent decision in Civil Appeal No 257 of 1963, wherein it had concluded that the High Court had erred in holding that the respondents were entitled to an account of the rents realized by the appellants for the period between the filing of the plaint and the issuance of the preliminary decree. Pursuant to the High Court order, which the Court now found to be erroneous to that extent, the learned Civil Judge had directed that the appellants should provide accounts of the receipts derived from the usufruct of the mortgaged properties from 10 August 1950, the date on which the suit was filed, until the time they handed over possession of those properties to the defendants, and that the amount so accounted for should be adjusted against the decretal sum. The Court held that this particular direction was wrong, and therefore the order of the learned Civil Judge was also wrong to that same extent, rendering the decree defective in that respect. Accordingly, the Court held that the High Court ought to have modified the decree to bring it into conformity with the judgment as altered by the earlier judgment of this Court. The Court therefore substituted, in paragraph 13 of the fresh preliminary decree, the words “from 10 August 1950 the date of the filing of the suit” with the words “from 25 April 1953, the date of the original preliminary decree”. With this modification, the appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded.