Vidyacharan Shukla vs Khubchand Baghel and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 815 of 1963

Decision Date: 20 December 1963

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled Vidyacharan Shukla versus Khubchand Baghel and others, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on the twentieth day of December, 1963. The opinion was authored by Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and the bench comprised Justices N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Raghubar Dayal, and J. R. Mudholkar. The parties before the Court were identified as petitioner Vidyacharan Shukla and respondents Khubchand Baghel together with other respondents. The case is reported in 1964 AIR 1099 and 1964 SCR (6) 129, with subsequent citator references including E 1969 SC 872 (17), R 1970 SC 1477 (6), F 1974 SC 480 (11, 3, 14, 16), RF 1977 SC 56 (6) and RF 1989 SC 1477 (12). The statutory context concerned an appeal to a High Court under section 116‑A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and raised the question of whether, for the purpose of computing the thirty‑day limitation prescribed by section 116‑A(3), the time allowed by section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 could be excluded. The Court also examined the applicability of section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act and the relationship between the two limbs of that provision, as well as the relevance of the First Schedule, Article 156, to the present appeal.

The headnote of the judgment recorded that the appellant, Vidyacharan Shukla, had been elected to the House of the People from a constituency in Madhya Pradesh. The respondents were the other candidates who had contested the election. The first respondent, identified as respondent No. 1, filed an election petition challenging the validity of the appellant’s election. That petition was dismissed by the Election Tribunal. Aggrieved by the tribunal’s order, respondent No. 1 exercised the right conferred by section 116‑A and preferred an appeal to the High Court, invoking sections 134‑159 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It was admitted that the appeal was lodged more than thirty days after the tribunal’s order. The appellant argued that the period required for obtaining a certified copy of the tribunal’s order should be excluded from the limitation calculation, which would render the appeal timely. The High Court rejected this contention, held that the appellant was guilty of two corrupt practices, and consequently set aside the election. The appellant then obtained special leave to approach this Court, raising the singular question of whether the provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act could be invoked to exclude the time spent obtaining the tribunal’s copy when computing the thirty‑day period prescribed by section 116‑A(3).

After hearing the parties, the Court dismissed the appeal. The judgment, delivered by Justices B. P. Sinha (Chief Justice), K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal, and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, held that the exclusion of time provided for by section 12 is permissible in computing the period of limitation for filing the appeal in the High Court. Moreover, although the right of appeal is conferred by section 116‑A of the Representation of the People Act, the appeal is nevertheless an appeal “under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the High Court,” and therefore the provisions of the Limitation Act, including section 12, may be applied. The judgment concluded with the observation that, while the statutory right of appeal originates in section 116‑A, the procedural framework governing the filing and adjudication of the appeal falls within the ambit of the Code of Civil Procedure, enabling the application of the limitation rules articulated in the First Schedule, Article 156.

In this case, the Court observed that although the right of appeal was conferred by section 116‑A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the respondent relied on that provision to file the appeal in the High Court, the appeal nevertheless qualified as an appeal “under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the High Court.” The Court explained that to bring the appeal within the ambit of Article 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, it was not essential that the right to prefer the appeal be granted by the Code of Civil Procedure itself. It was enough that the procedure for filing the appeal and the power of the court to deal with the appeal, once filed, were governed by the Code. Justice Raghubar Dayal and Justice Mudholkar, speaking for themselves, stated that there was no warrant for holding that an appeal not created by the Code of Civil Procedure could be treated as an appeal under the Code merely because its procedural machinery was governed by that Code. They further observed that where a right of appeal is granted by some other statute, the appeal must be regarded as one under that statute and not as an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the words “under the Code of Civil Procedure” could not be construed to mean “governed in the matter of procedure by the Code of Civil Procedure.” Justice B. P. Sinha, Chief Justice, together with Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and Justice Raghubar Dayal, held that the entire subsection (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act had to be read as an integrated provision, and that the conjunction “and” connected the two parts, making it necessary for clause (a) to be attracted only when the conditions expressed in the opening words of subsection (2) were satisfied. Justice Subba Rao and Justice Mudholkar added that the second limb of subsection (2) of section 29 was sufficiently wide to encompass a suit, appeal or application under a special or local law for which no limitation period was prescribed in the First Schedule. Justice Subba Rao further explained that the use of the word “any” demonstrated that the second part of subsection (2) operated independently of the first part, providing a separate category of proceedings to which the first part did not apply. Finally, the Court held that section 116‑A did not constitute an exhaustive or exclusive code of limitation for appeals against orders of tribunals, nor did it exclude the general provisions of the Limitation Act. Section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act required an express exclusion, which was absent in section 116‑A(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and the proviso to section 116‑A(3) did not imply any such exclusion; rather, the proviso simply restored the power that had been denied to the court under section 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act.

If the proviso that had been inserted into the statute had not been present, the provision s. 29(2)(b) would have barred the application of s. 5 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, even when a litigant could demonstrate a sufficient cause for the delay, the High Court would have been unable to grant any relief for that delay. The Court then considered s. 12(2) of the Limitation Act and held that it applied to an appeal filed before the High Court against an order issued by the Tribunal. The Court explained that an order made under s. 98 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which also contains the reasons for the order, constitutes a composite document. Such a document meets the statutory definition of both a judgment and an order, and therefore it falls within the ambit of the provisions of s. 12 of the Limitation Act. The wording of s. 12(2) does not limit the reference to an order that is defined only in the Civil Procedure Code. The Court observed that when a statute provides for the creation of an order and simultaneously confers on an aggrieved party a right to appeal that order within a prescribed period, the time needed to obtain a copy of the order may be excluded from the limitation period. Because the 1951 Act empowers the Tribunal to make an order and also grants a right of appeal against that order to the High Court, s. 12(2) was held to be directly attracted without any need to refer to the definition of an order in the Code of Civil Procedure. Per Mudholkar J., the first limb of s. 29(2) deals only with proceedings under special or local law for which a period of limitation is specified in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act. When the period prescribed in the First Schedule for such a proceeding differs from the period provided by the special or local law, the provision produces certain effects. The Court warned that no inconvenience should be caused by interpreting the legislative language of the first part of sub‑s. (2) of s. 29 literally and naturally, because other kinds of cases can readily fall under the second part of the provision. The judgment then referred to case law and recorded the heading “132 JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:” relating to Civil Appeal No. 815 of 1963, which was an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 23 April 1963 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in 1st Appeal No. 23 of 1963. The counsel for the appellant were G.S. Pathak, B. A. Musodkar, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, while M. S. Gupta appeared for respondent No. 1. The judgment was delivered on 20 December 1963. Justice Ayyangar, speaking on behalf of the Chief Justice and himself, stated that after reviewing the judgment of Justice Subba Rao, the appeal should be dismissed. However, he explained that a separate judgment was necessary because he could not agree with Justice Subba Rao’s construction of the relative scope of the two limbs of s. 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act. He noted that the facts of the case had already been set out in detail in Justice Subba Rao’s judgment.

It was unnecessary to repeat the factual background, because those facts had already been set out in the earlier judgment. The Court identified three principal issues that had been raised by both parties, and each of those issues depended upon the proper construction of section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act. For convenience, the Court reproduced the text of that provision: “29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law—(a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.” The learned Judges of the High Court had held that subsection 29(2)(a) applied to appeals filed under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and consequently they concluded that the appeal presented by the respondent was timely when the deductions permissible under section 12 of the Limitation Act were taken into account. The correctness of that conclusion is the point that the Court was invited to examine.

In order to decide whether the terms of section 29(2) were applicable to appeals under the Representation of the People Act, the first issue that required consideration was whether that Act qualified as a “special or local law” within the opening words of the sub‑section. Mr Pathak, counsel for the appellant, did not dispute this classification and expressly conceded that section 116A was a “special or local law.” It was also clear that this special or local law prescribed a period of limitation for an appeal. The second and more contentious question was whether the period of limitation prescribed by the special or local law differed from the period prescribed for the same appeal in the first schedule. Mr Pathak argued vigorously that a “different period” existed only when the first schedule contained a period for the identical appeal and that period was not the same as the one prescribed by the special or local law. He further submitted that if the Indian Limitation Act did not contain any provision for such an appeal, then section 29(2) and its clauses (a) and (b) could not be applied. Several authorities have addressed this point, but the Court noted that the decision of the Bombay High Court in the Canara Bank case was sufficient to illustrate the relevant principle.

In this case the Court examined the authority of the Bombay High Court decision in Canara Bank Ltd. v. The Warden Insurance Co. Ltd., Bombay, where Chief Justice Chagla rejected the view that a special or local law must merely prescribe a period of limitation absent any corresponding entry in the first schedule. Chief Justice Chagla held that even when the first schedule contained no provision for an appeal identical to that covered by the special law, the requirement of “a prescription of a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the First Schedule” was nonetheless fulfilled. The Supreme Court, relying on the judgment in State of U.P. v. Smt. Kaushaliya etc., affirmed this construction and expressly endorsed Chief Justice Chagla’s reasoning. The Court also agreed with the earlier observation of Justice Subba Rao that the condition of a “different period” prescribed by the special law, as compared with that in the First Schedule, was satisfied in the present matter. The next issue arose from the respondent’s counsel, who contended that even assuming the appellant’s interpretation of the phrase “different from” was correct, the requirement would be met only if the First Schedule itself provided for an appeal identical to that created by the special law. To support this contention, the respondent cited Article 156 of the First Schedule, which states that the limitation period for an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to a High Court commences ninety days after the decree or order, except where the appeal is covered by Article 51 and Article 153. The respondent argued that, although the right of appeal in the present case originated under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, the appeal was nevertheless an “appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to a High Court.” Counsel for the respondent relied principally on two decisions, one from the Calcutta High Court and another from the Madras High Court, both of which supported this position. In Aga Mohammad Hamdani v. Cohen and Ors., as well as in Ramasami Pillai v. Deputy Collector of Madura, the courts held that to bring an appeal within the ambit of Article 156 it was not essential that the right to prefer the appeal be conferred by the Code of Civil Procedure itself; it was sufficient that the procedural rules for filing the appeal and the powers of the court to hear it were governed by that Code. This interpretation was based on the reference in Article 156 to Article 151, which deals with appeals to the High Court from judgments rendered on the original side of that Court, wherein the right to prefer such appeals is derived from the Letters Patent and not from the Code, though the Code governs the procedure, jurisdiction and powers of the Court in dealing with those appeals.

Article 151 dealt with appeals to a High Court that were made against a judgment handed down by that Court in its original jurisdiction. The authority to file such appeals was granted by the Letters Patent that created each High Court, and not by the Code of Civil Procedure; nevertheless, the Code of Civil Procedure regulated the procedure, the jurisdiction and the powers of the High Court in hearing those appeals. Consequently, it would be necessary to carve out an exception for the cases covered by Article 151 only if the expression “under the Code of Civil Procedure” were interpreted to mean appeals whose disposal is governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be noted that, in addition to the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts, a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Daropadi v. Hira Lal (3) adopted a comparable construction of Article 151. The learned judges observed that a number of Indian statutes—namely the Indian Succession Act, the Probate and Administration Act, the Land Acquisition Act and the Provincial Insolvency Act—conferred a right of appeal under the respective statutes without prescribing any limitation period for filing the appeal, but they directed that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code be applied to such appeals. This clearly indicated that Article 156 was intended to supply the limitation period for those appeals. We hold that these decisions (1) 1 L.R. 13 Cal. 221, (2) 1 L.R. 43 Mad. 51, (3) 1 L.R. 34 Allahabad 496 correctly interpret Article 156, and we are not prepared to disturb long‑standing rulings upon which Indian legislation has been based. Counsel for the respondent, Mr Pathak, drew our attention to some judgments in which the word “under” was given a different meaning—interpreted as “by virtue of”—in other provisions of the Limitation Act, particularly in cases involving appeals in certain criminal matters. He was, however, unable to point to any authority that rejected the construction of Article 156 that we have set out. In the cases concerning the phrase “under the Criminal Procedure Code” that he cited, the situation is clearly different because the reference to Article 151 in Article 156 does not appear in those provisions, which would lead to a different result. If the construction of Article 156 adopted in the Calcutta and Madras decisions that we have discussed is upheld, there can be no dispute that an appeal filed under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act is “under the Code of Civil Procedure”, since section 116A(2) provides, in relevant part, that “116A. (2) The High Court”.

The Court observed that, subject to the provisions of the Act, a High Court must exercise the same powers, jurisdiction and authority, and must follow the same procedures with respect to an appeal under this Chapter as if the appeal were an appeal from an original decree passed by a civil court located within the local limits of the High Court’s civil appellate jurisdiction. In this view, even when the expression “different from those prescribed therefor in first schedule” in the opening part of section 29(2) is given its narrowest construction, the exclusion of the period of limitation provided for by Article 12 of the Limitation Act may be permitted in calculating the time limit for filing the appeal to the High Court in the present case. The Court noted that the remaining issue would become relevant only if the two points already considered were decided in the opposite manner. That issue concerned the relationship between the first and second limbs of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The Court explained that it could not agree with the construction placed by learned judges Subba Rao and Mudholkar on this sub‑section. Sub‑section (2) comprises two portions: the first portion sets out the conditions that a special law must satisfy in order to attract section 3, and it ends with the words “as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule”. This first portion is followed by the conjunction “and”, after which the second portion reads: “for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law—(a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only to the extent that they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.” The question before the Court was whether the condition stated in the first limb—that the special or local law prescribe a period of limitation for a suit, appeal or application that is different from the period prescribed in the first schedule—must be fulfilled before clause (a) can be applied. If the conjunction “and” were intended to make the two parts cumulative, meaning that both parts operate together for the same set of circumstances, then unless the opening words of sub‑section (2) were satisfied, there would be no basis for applying clause (a) to the period prescribed by the special or local law. Conversely, if the two parts could be read independently as addressing two separate situations, then the wording beginning with “for the purpose of determining any period of limitation…” would constitute an independent provision unrelated to the first part, and it could operate without being conditioned on the satisfaction of the opening requirement.

In examining the phrase “limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law” followed by clauses (a) and (b), the Court observed that this wording could be read as an independent provision separate from the first part of the sub‑section, thus allowing it to operate without being constrained by the condition set out in the first part. In other words, if this latter construction were adopted for every suit, appeal or application whose period of limitation was fixed by a special or local law, then the provisions contained in sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 would apply unless they were expressly excluded. Counsel urged that, in the context, the conjunction “and” should be interpreted only to make the second limb an integral part of the first, so that the provisions of the Limitation Act set out in clause (a) would not be attracted to determine the period of limitation prescribed by the special or local law unless the opening words of the sub‑section were satisfied. The significance and function of the conjunction “and” had previously been the subject of detailed consideration by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sehat Ali Khan v. Abdul Qavi Khan (L. R. [1956]2 Allahabad 252). The majority of those judges held that the two parts of the sub‑section were independent and that clause (a) would apply for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law unless it was excluded. However, Justice Raghubar Dayal, then a judge of that Court, dissented, holding that the entire sub‑section had to be read as a single integrated provision and that the conjunction “and” linked the two parts, making it necessary for the conditions in the opening words of the sub‑section to be satisfied before clause (a) could be attracted. Counsel recommended that the Court adopt the dissenting judgment of Justice Dayal. The Court agreed that Justice Dayal’s view on the inter‑relation of the two parts correctly reflected its own construction of the provision. Justice Dayal approached the question from several angles, including grammatical analysis, but the Court limited its own reasoning to a concise test: for the second part to be independent of the first, the first part must be complete and capable of operating on its own. If this test is not met, the conjunction “and” must be read as importing the conditions set out earlier into what follows, because otherwise the first part would be incomplete. The Court then examined whether the first part could function without reference to the second. The first part reads, “where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the first schedule, the provision of section 3 shall apply as if that period were prescribed therefor in that schedule.” The Court considered what this statement would signify when read alone.

The provision states that “period was prescribed therefor in that schedule.” The issue is to determine what that phrase means when it stands alone. If the conditions expressed in the opening words are fulfilled, then section 3 of the Limitation Act is triggered. Section 3 provides: “Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.” In other words, when a special or local law fixes a limitation period that differs from the period laid down in the first schedule, the first part of sub‑section (2) of section 29 enables the court to dismiss any suit, appeal or application that is filed after that period. If this were the sole effect of the provision, the provision would appear pointless and redundant, because the court’s jurisdiction to entertain a suit, appeal or application already depends on the case being filed within the prescribed period. Nevertheless, the reference to section 3 in section 29(2) can be read to mean that the power to dismiss a suit, appeal or application filed out of time is subject to the methods of computing the limitation period prescribed in sections 4 to 25, which are mentioned in the opening words of section 3. Under this construction, whenever the opening words of section 29(2) are satisfied, the entire range of sections 3 to 25 applies to determine the limitation period fixed by the special or local law. To test the second limb of section 29(2) as a separate and independent provision, we note that it begins with the words “for determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law.” Those words are perfectly general and therefore encompass every special or local law, including those that meet the conditions specified in the first limb of section 29(2). This leads to an anomalous situation: the first limb would cause sections 3 to 25 of the Limitation Act to apply to that class of special or local laws, whereas the second limb would exclude sections 3, 5, 6 to 8, 19 to 21 and 23 to 25 from applying to the same class of cases. Such a result is unacceptable. Consequently, the Court held that, subject to the construction already explained for sub‑section (2) of section 29, both limbs must be read together as a single whole, and that the words following the conjunction “and,” namely “for determining any period of limitation…,” are attracted by the conditions set out in the opening words of the sub‑section.

The Court observed that the words “for the purpose of determining any period of limitation” and similar expressions attracted the conditions laid down by the opening words of the sub‑section; the Court further noted that this observation did not alter the ultimate result. Consequently, the Court agreed that the appeal failed and ordered its dismissal with costs. The appeal, granted special leave, raised the issue of the correct construction of section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, as it applied to section 116‑A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The factual background was concise and undisputed. The appellant had been elected to the House of the People from the Mahasamund parliamentary constituency in Madhya Pradesh during the third general elections. The respondents were the other candidates who contested the election. Respondent 1 filed an election petition before the Election Commissioner of India under sections 80 and 81 of the Act, seeking to set aside the appellant’s election, and the petition was duly referred to the Election Tribunal. By an order dated 5 January 1963, the Tribunal dismissed the election petition. On 11 February 1963, the first respondent filed an appeal against that Tribunal order before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur. Under sub‑section (3) of section 116‑A of the Act, every appeal under Chapter IVA must be preferred within thirty days from the date of the Tribunal’s order under section 98 or 99. The appeal was filed after the thirty‑day period; however, if the time taken to obtain a copy of the Tribunal’s order were excluded, the filing would have been within the prescribed period, whereas if such time could not be excluded, the appeal was clearly out of time. The appellant contended before the High Court that the respondent could not lawfully exclude the period spent obtaining the copy, but the High Court rejected that plea. On the merits, the High Court held that the appellant had committed two acts of corrupt practice as defined in section 123(4) of the Act and consequently declared the appellant’s election void. The detailed merits of that decision were not examined in this appeal because the counsel confined his argument solely to the limitation issue. The present appeal was made by the appellant against the High Court’s order setting aside his election. The sole question before this Court was whether, for the purpose of computing the thirty‑day period prescribed under section 116‑A(3) of the Act, the provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act could be invoked.

Mr. Pathak, who appeared for the appellant, presented an extensive argument that addressed the various facets of the issue that had been raised before the Court. The Court indicated that it would consider the points raised by Mr. Pathak at the appropriate stage of the judgment. To begin the analysis, it was helpful to set out the relevant statutory provisions from the Representation of the People Act, 1951, together with the corresponding provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Under the Representation of the People Act, the Tribunal is required, at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition, to issue an order either dismissing the petition or declaring the election of one or more of the returned candidates to be void. Section 98 of that Act prescribes these possible orders. Section 116‑A creates a right of appeal against any order made by the Tribunal under section 98 or section 99. An appeal under this provision may be filed in the High Court of the State where the Tribunal is located. The High Court, while hearing such an appeal, is vested with the same powers, jurisdiction and authority as it would have if the appeal originated from an original decree of a civil court within its territorial jurisdiction, and it must follow the same procedural rules. The statute further mandates that an appeal under section 116‑A must be preferred within thirty days from the date on which the Tribunal’s order is made. However, the High Court is empowered to entertain an appeal that is filed after the expiry of the thirty‑day period if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the prescribed time.

The Indian Limitation Act, 1908, becomes relevant through its section 29, which deals with special or local laws that prescribe a limitation period different from that laid down in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act. When such a special law prescribes a different period, the provisions of section 3 are deemed to apply as if the special law’s period were specified in the First Schedule. For the purpose of determining the limitation period for any suit, appeal or application governed by a special law, the Act provides that the rules contained in sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 will apply only to the extent that they are not expressly excluded by the special law, and that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act will not apply. Section 12 of the Limitation Act further clarifies how the period of limitation for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal or an application for a review of judgment is to be computed. Specifically, the day on which the judgment that is the subject of the appeal is pronounced, together with the time required to obtain a copy of the decree, sentence or order that is being appealed or reviewed, must be excluded from the calculation. In addition, where a decree is appealed or reviewed, the time needed to obtain a copy of the judgment on which that decree is based is also to be excluded. These provisions of section 12 are therefore relevant to the computation of the thirty‑day period prescribed in section 116‑A of the Representation of the People Act. Consequently, the right of appeal conferred by section 116‑A must be understood in light of the limitation rules set out in sections 29 and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act.

The Court noted that sections 98 and 99 of the relevant Act provide a right of appeal, and that subsection (3) of those provisions sets a limitation period of thirty days for filing such an appeal. The Court then explained that section 29 of the Limitation Act, by operation of law, draws the provisions of section 3 of the same Act onto an appeal that is described in section 29 of the statute in question. Consequently, the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of section 12 of the Limitation Act become applicable to that appeal. When those subsections are attracted, the period required to obtain a copy of the decree, order or judgment on which the appeal is based must be excluded from the computation of the limitation period. Counsel for the appellant argued that section 29 of the Limitation Act should not apply to an appeal filed under section 116‑A of the Act. The first prong of that argument asserted that subsection (2) of section 29 can be invoked only when the First Schedule of the Limitation Act itself prescribes a limitation period for the appeal, and when a special law provides a different period for the same type of appeal. Since, according to the appellant, the First Schedule does not prescribe any limitation period for an appeal under section 116‑A against an order of the Tribunal, the appellant contended that subsection (2) of section 29 is therefore not attracted. The respondents’ counsel replied on two grounds. First, they claimed that the First Schedule of the Limitation Act does indeed prescribe a limitation period for such an appeal. Second, they maintained that subsection (2) of section 29 applies even where the First Schedule does not prescribe a period, provided that a special statute prescribes a limitation period for the appeal. The Court stated that it would examine each of these two limbs separately. The initial issue for determination was whether the First Schedule of the Limitation Act actually prescribes a limitation period for an appeal against an order of an Election Tribunal under sections 98 or 99 of the Act. The Court observed that article 156 of the First Schedule provides that an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to a High Court, except where articles 151 and 153 apply, must be filed within ninety days from the date of the decree or order appealed from. Article 151, which is referred to in article 156, deals with appeals against decrees or orders of any of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William, Madras, Bombay, or the High Court of Punjab when exercising original jurisdiction. The Court then questioned the meaning of the phrase “under the Code of Civil Procedure” in article 156: whether it signifies that the right of appeal is conferred by the Code, or whether it merely indicates that the procedural regime of the Code governs the appeal.

In examining the question of whether the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure is to be applied to an appeal mentioned in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, the Court first compared the wording of article 156 with that of article 151. The comparison revealed that the wording of article 156 places greater emphasis on the procedural aspects governing an appeal rather than on a right of appeal that might be created by any other enactment. The heading of the first column of the First Schedule is described as “Description of appeal,” which further indicates that the provision is intended to characterise the type of appeal for which a specific limitation period is fixed. Accordingly, the language of article 156 is understood to describe the nature of the appeal in relation to the procedure that applies to it, and not to confer a right of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure itself.

Although the term “under” in the expression “under the Code of Civil Procedure” could be interpreted to suggest that the right of appeal is created by the Code, the Court noted that the explicit reference to article 151 within article 156 weakens that interpretation. Article 151 functions as an exception to article 156, signifying that, save for the exception, article 156 would ordinarily govern the appeal covered by article 151. In other words, an appeal that falls within the scope of article 151 is treated as an appeal governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Even when the right of appeal originates from the Letters Patent, the Court explained that such an appeal is nonetheless deemed to be an appeal under the Code because the procedural rules of the Code of Civil Procedure regulate the conduct of that appeal.

The Court subsequently relied on the observation of Chief Justice Rajamannar in Kandaswami Pillai v. Kannappa Chetty, wherein it was stated that the Limitation Act and the Code of Civil Procedure must be read together because both statutes relate to procedure, are in pari materia, and therefore must be construed as a single coherent system that explains each other. By applying that principle, the Court concluded that article 156 should be interpreted as providing for an appeal that is governed by the procedural scheme prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure.

This interpretation had earlier been adopted by the Calcutta High Court in the 1886 decision of Aga Mahomed Hamadani v. Cohen. In that case, the Court considered section 49 of the Burma Courts Act (XVII of 1875), which stipulated that where the value of a suit or proceeding in the Recorder’s Court exceeded Rs 3,000 but was less than Rs 10,000, the appeal lay to the High Court. Section 97 of the same Act declared that, except as otherwise provided by the Act, the Code of Civil Procedure was deemed to be in force throughout British Burma from 15 April 1872. At the time, section 540 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 provided that, unless expressly provided otherwise by the Code or any other law then in force, an appeal lay from the decrees or any part of the decrees of courts exercising original jurisdiction to the courts authorised to hear such appeals. The Court noted that the effect of this provision of the Code on the Burma Courts Act was to make the procedural rules of the Code applicable to appeals unless a special statute expressly displaced them.

The Court explained that, in general, when no special statute expressly barred an appeal, the appeal could be taken to any court that, under the law then in force, was deemed the proper forum for such a matter. However, this general rule was displaced by the Burma Courts Act to the extent that the Act created a specific right of appeal from the Recorder’s Court to the High Court, subject to prescribed conditions. Section 49 of the Burma Courts Act removed the right of appeal for suits whose value fell below a certain threshold and simultaneously provided a right of appeal for suits whose value lay between two prescribed limits, directing that the decree of the Recorder’s Court could be appealed to the High Court. Consequently, it was incorrect, as argued by counsel, to say that the right of appeal arose under section 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. Once the Burma Courts Act was enacted, the right of appeal was established by section 49 of that Act and not by section 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The parties further contended, both before the Calcutta High Court and before the present Court, that article 156 of Schedule 11 of the Limitation Act did not apply to an appeal made under the Burma Courts Act because that appeal was not an appeal “under the Code of Civil Procedure.” The learned judges of the Calcutta High Court addressed this point at page 224, observing that the phrase “an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code” should be understood in its ordinary sense. They noted that the specific right of appeal had been created by the Burma Courts Act, which remains the sole statute that determines the appropriate court for that appeal. If the Burma Courts Act had not provided that right, then section 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure would have been sufficient to confer the right, provided that some other enactment identified the proper court to hear the appeal. The judges emphasized that the procedural aspects of every appeal are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the Limitation Act, Schedule 11, article 156, when it refers to the Civil Procedure Code, is speaking of the procedural code, not of substantive rights. Accordingly, the natural meaning of an “appeal under the Civil Procedure Code” is an appeal whose procedure, from commencement to disposal, is regulated by that Code. From this passage it is clear that the judges did not reject the contention on the basis that the right of appeal was conferred by section 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure; rather, they rejected it because the ordinary meaning of the expression in article 156 of Schedule 11 of the Limitation Act refers to an appeal that is governed procedurally by the Code of Civil Procedure. This reasoning was later adopted by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Ramaswami Pilai v. The Deputy Collector of Madura, where the learned judges followed the same interpretative approach.

In this case the Court noted that the two judges, Abdur Rahim and Oldfield, had held that article 156 of the Limitation Act of 1908 applied to appeals that were filed under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. The Court explained that although the right to appeal was created by the Land Acquisition Act, the procedural rules that governed the conduct of such an appeal were those contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. The same contention was raised before the present Court, but the Court rejected it. The Court then referred to the passage from the earlier Calcutta High Court judgment that had been quoted earlier, and reproduced the wording found on page 55 of that judgment, which read: “It seems to us that this is the correct interpretation of article 156. There seems to be no good reason for saying that an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code means only an appeal the right to prefer which is conferred by the Code itself. On the other hand it would not be straining the language of the article too much to hold that an appeal, the procedure with respect to which, from its inception to its disposal, is governed by the Civil Procedure Code, may rightly be spoken of as an appeal under the Code.” After quoting that passage, the Court turned to article 151 of the Limitation Act and observed that the earlier decision, reported in 1919 at 1 L. R. 43 Mad. 51, concluded that “that also tends to show that what is meant by the legislature is appeals, the hearing and disposal of which is governed by the rules of procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code.” The Court pointed out that although more than seventy‑seven years had elapsed since the Calcutta High Court decision and although the Limitation Act had been amended several times, Parliament had never expressed any dissent from that interpretation by amendment or any other means. No contrary authority was brought to the Court’s notice that either disagreed with or questioned the correctness of that earlier view. The Court further referred to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Dropadi v. Hira Lal, which observed that a number of Indian statutes – for example the Succession Act, the Probate and Administration Act, the Land Acquisition Act and the Provincial Insolvency Act – grant a right of appeal and mandate that the procedural provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to those appeals, yet they do not specify a time‑limit for filing the appeal, thereby implying that article 156 of the Limitation Act supplies the limitation period. Counsel for the appellant drew the Court’s attention to several decisions that considered the proper forum and the procedural steps for an appeal against an order made under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. One such decision was Nasaruddin Khan v. Emperor, in which an appeal under section 476‑B of the Code of Criminal Procedure from the Court of the Munsif was initially heard by the District Judge, and on the subsequent date of hearing the appellant’s pleader …

In a case where the counsel of the appellant was not present in court, the District Judge ruled that the appeal could be treated as abandoned and dismissed it under the provisions of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Allahabad High Court, in the matter of Mt Abida Khatoon v. Chote Khan, held under similar circumstances that an appellate court possessed the authority to set aside a dismissal of an appeal for default. The Nagpur High Court, referring to its earlier decisions reported in I L R 34 All 496 (1912), I L R 53 Cal 827 (1926) and A I R 155 All (1956) in Bholanath Balbhadra Sahai v. Achheram Puran Kurmi, affirmed that the appellate court could exercise its power under Order XLI, rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure in such an appeal. The Calcutta High Court, in Chandra Kumar Sen v. Mathuria Debya, applied to the same type of appeal the limitation period prescribed in article 154 of the Limitation Act. Collectively, these decisions were said to indicate that the procedural rules governing an appeal against an order made by a civil court under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are those laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, while the limitation period applicable to the appeal is the one prescribed for appeals under the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, counsel conceded that there exists a conflict of authority on the question whether, for an appeal against the order of a civil court made under section 476‑B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, civil procedure or criminal procedure should apply. Consequently, the only decision that might bear on the present question was identified as Chandra Kumar Sen v. Mathuria Debya. In that case, an application was presented before the Subordinate Judge seeking to file a complaint against the petitioner under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the application was rejected. The complainant then preferred an appeal to the District Judge more than thirty days after the date prescribed by article 154 of the Limitation Act. The District Judge held that the question of limitation did not arise because he could, of his own motion, lodge a complaint in the criminal court when an offence relating to the administration of civil justice came to his notice; on that reasoning he instituted a criminal complaint. The High Court, however, held that the appeal was filed before the District Judge under section 476‑B of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that, according to article 154 of the Limitation Act, it should have been filed within thirty days from the date of the Subordinate Court’s order. It was observed that no argument had been raised in that proceeding that the appeal was governed by the Code of Civil Procedure; consequently, the appropriate article of the Limitation Act was not article 154, as cited in the earlier authorities, but article 156, for the simple reason that the appeal fell within the definition of an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure.

In the present case the Court observed that whichever provision of the Limitation Act applied, the appeal was clearly barred by limitation, and therefore the Court could not read into the earlier decision the entire argument now advanced before it. The Court noted that the question presently before it had neither been raised nor argued in the earlier case, and consequently it could safely hold that for more than seventy‑five years the decision of the Calcutta High Court interpreting article 156 of the Limitation Act had remained authoritative. Although the Court admitted that the point was not entirely free from difficulty, it declined to depart from the construction originally given to the article in 1886, a construction that had never been dissentingly questioned during all those years. Accordingly, the Court held that the expression “appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure” in article 156 of the Limitation Act meant an appeal that was governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court then considered a contention advanced by counsel that, under section 116‑A(2) of the Act, the High Court, despite possessing the same powers, jurisdiction and authority as an appellate tribunal governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, was not empowered to follow the procedure prescribed by the Code for receiving appeals. The Court found this contention to be contrary to the explicit language of subsection (2) of section 116‑A. Subsection (2) provides that, subject to the provisions of the Act, the High Court shall have the same powers, jurisdiction and authority and shall follow the same procedure with respect to an appeal under that Chapter as if the appeal were an appeal from an original decree passed by a civil court within the local limits of the High Court’s civil appellate jurisdiction. The Court explained that the second part of subsection (2) creates a legal fiction: although section 116‑A(1) confers a right of appeal, for the purpose of subsection (2) the appeal is deemed to be an appeal from an original decree of a civil court situated within the High Court’s local jurisdiction. The first part of the subsection sets out the purposes of this fiction, namely to enable the exercise of the powers, jurisdiction and authority and to prescribe the procedure applicable to such an appeal. The powers, jurisdiction and authority encompass those exercisable by an appellate tribunal under the matters prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure. Turning to the meaning of “procedure,” the Court held that the term must necessarily refer to the procedure governing the appeal, which includes, among other things, the manner of receiving the appeal in the court, the preparation of the appeal record, the posting of the appeal and the manner of its disposal. The Court found it impossible to exclude the filing and receipt of an appeal from the meaning of “procedure”; otherwise, it would be unclear how the High Court could receive an appeal at all. The Court noted that the answer offered to this difficulty was that the Government might make rules under the relevant provision of the Act.

In this case, the Court observed that when section 168(2) gives the High Court a statutory authority to apply the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court cannot also rely on the general power of the Central Government to make rules under section 169(1) of the Act. Consequently, the procedure set out in Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, together with other relevant provisions of the Code, must also govern an appeal filed under section 116‑A(2) of the Act. This leads to the conclusion that, by operation of law, an appeal under section 116‑A(2) is treated as if it were an appeal instituted under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purposes of exercising the powers, jurisdiction and authority of the appellate tribunal, as well as for determining the procedural steps from the moment the appeal is received until its final disposal. For these reasons, the Court held that the special statute, namely the Act, provides a limitation period that differs from the period prescribed in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, within the meaning of article 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, section 12 of the Limitation Act becomes applicable, and the first respondent was permitted to exclude the time he spent obtaining a copy of the order. Even assuming that article 156 of Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act did not specify a limitation period for the category of appeal in question, the Court considered whether subsection (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act would still apply when the First Schedule does not prescribe any period for an appeal created by a special law but the special law itself sets a limitation period. The historical development of this provision was examined to illuminate the issue. The first Limitation Act, enacted in 1859 as Act XIV of 1859, contained section 3 which provided that if any law then in force or to be enacted later prescribed a shorter limitation period for a particular suit, that shorter period would apply notwithstanding the provisions of the 1859 Act. That Act was later repealed by the Limitation Act IX of 1871. Section 6 of the 1871 Act, relevant to the present enquiry, stated that when any law not listed in the annexed schedule, now or subsequently in force in any part of British India, prescribed a limitation period different from that of the 1871 Act for any suit, appeal or application, nothing in the 1871 Act would affect such law. The 1871 Act was subsequently replaced by Act XV of 1877, whose section 6 provided a similar rule: when any special or local law now or thereafter in force in British India prescribed a limitation period for any suit, appeal or application, the provisions of the Act would not affect that prescribed period.

The Court observed that the wording of the provision read “contained shall affect or alter the period so prescribed.” This language was preserved in the Limitation Act IX of 1908, but it was re‑drafted in the 1922 amendment to its present form. Prior to the amendment, the jurists were divided on two principal questions. First, they debated whether the general provisions of the Limitation Act, when they employed the term “prescribed” without expressly referring to any particular statute—or even when that term was absent—were intended to apply to special or local statutes. Second, they considered whether the general provisions were to be excluded altogether from the limitation periods that were expressly prescribed by special or local laws. Certain decisions concluded that the general provisions did not apply to limitation periods set by other statutes, basing that view on the phrase “affect or alter” as it appeared in the section at that time. To resolve this conflict, Section 29 of the Limitation Act was amended so that the general provisions would extend to the periods of limitation prescribed by special or local enactments. The Court noted that a comparison of the earlier statutory language revealed a gradual shift: Section 3 of the 1859 Act spoke of a “shorter period,” Section 6 of the 1871 Act used the term “differing,” and Sections 6 of the 1877 and 1908 Acts omitted both expressions. Consequently, Section 6 of the 1871 Act insulated all special or local statutes that set a distinct limitation period from the operation of the general Limitation Act provisions.

The Court further explained that, as the section then stood, it applied to every special or local law that prescribed a limitation period, irrespective of whether the Limitation Act itself prescribed any period for similar suits or appeals, and irrespective of whether the special period was shorter or longer than the period provided by the Limitation Act. The Court then addressed whether the 1922 amendment represented a deliberate legislative departure by imposing a condition on the application of sub‑section (2) of Section 29—that a limitation period must be expressly listed in the First Schedule for suits or appeals governed by special or local law. The Court found no evidence of such a departure. It held that, aside from removing the conflict, Parliament did not intend to exclude any particular category of proceedings governed by special or local statutes from the benefit created by sub‑section (2) of Section 29, and no justification for such an exclusion was presented. The Court suggested that the issue could be examined from another angle, summarising that the overall scheme of the Limitation Act, as reflected in its preamble, was to consolidate and amend the laws relating to limitation across the entire territory.

The Limitation Act governs the law of limitation for the proceedings mentioned in the statute and its application extends to the entire territory of India. The Act is organised into several parts. Part I, consisting of sections 3 to 11, deals with the limitation of suits, appeals and applications. Part III, containing sections 12 to 25, provides the rules for computing the periods of limitation. Part V contains provisions relating to savings and repeals. The second and third schedules of the Act have been repealed, and therefore they are not relevant to the present analysis. The First Schedule of the Act is divided into three distinct divisions. The first division stipulates the period of limitation applicable to suits. The second division sets out the limitation periods for appeals. The third division prescribes the limitation periods for applications. Within the first division, Article 120 provides a residuary provision for any suit for which no specific period of limitation is mentioned elsewhere in the Schedule. Similarly, Article 181 in the third division supplies a residuary provision for any application for which no period of limitation is prescribed either elsewhere in the Schedule or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Notably, the second division dealing with appeals does not contain any such residuary article. The purpose of the Limitation Act was to create an exhaustive code that prescribes a limitation period for every conceivable proceeding—whether a suit, an appeal or an application—subject only to the limited exceptions found in Part V. Consequently, if an appeal is not covered by any article in the second division, the Act supplies no limitation period for that appeal unless a special or local law provides one. In that situation, it can be reasonably said that, because the First Schedule does not impose a limitation on an appeal that falls outside Articles 150 to 157, the Limitation Act permits the filing of such an appeal without regard to any time limit. Having set out this background, the Court turned to the interpretation of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The question arose whether, when the First Schedule imposes no time limit on a particular appeal but a special law does prescribe a limitation, the First Schedule allows the appeal to be filed at any time while the special law imposes a different, shorter period. The Court observed that the First Schedule would indeed permit filing at any time, whereas the special law would restrict the filing to its prescribed period, making the two regimes distinct. This issue was examined by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, comprising Chief Justice Chagla and Justice Gajendragadkar, in the case of Canara Bank Limited v. The Warden Insurance Company, Ltd. (I.L.R. [1952] Bombay 1083). In that decision, Chief Justice Chagla, speaking for the Court, noted at page 1086 that the period of limitation may differ under two circumstances: it may differ when it modifies or alters a period fixed by the First Schedule, and it may also differ when it departs from the period fixed for various appeals under the Limitation Act, particularly where the First Schedule omits laying down a period.

The Court observed that when the First Schedule of the Limitation Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for a particular appeal but a special statute supplies such a period, the special statute must be regarded as distinct from the Limitation Act. The Court recognised that the legislative language was not perfectly clear, yet it was necessary to interpret it in a way that reconciled the difficulties created by other sections of the Limitation Act and gave effect to the legislature’s intended purpose. The Court warned that adopting the interpretation favoured by Mr. Adarkar for section 29(2) would lead to an undesirable consequence: even section 3 of the Limitation Act would cease to apply to that special law, resulting in a situation where an appeal could be time‑barred yet not subject to dismissal under section 3. The Court then referred to a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sehat Ali Khan v. Abdul Qavi Khan, which also examined this issue. The judges on that bench expressed divergent opinions. Chief Justice Mootham assumed that the first limb of the subsection did not apply where the schedule omitted any limitation period, and on that basis proceeded to analyse the second limb. Justice Dayal held that the first part of section 29(2) required the period of limitation to have been prescribed by the First Schedule. Justice Agarwala concurred with the view expressed by the Bombay High Court. Justice Bhargava agreed with the position taken by Chief Justice Mootham, while Justice Upadhya dissented from the Bombay High Court’s view.

A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Beharilal Chaurasiya v. Regional Transport Authority also adopted the Bombay High Court’s approach. Justice Dixit, speaking for that court, explained that a special law may provide a period of limitation even though Schedule I may omit such a provision, and nevertheless the special law remains distinct from the Limitation Act. He observed that the wording of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was not very satisfactory and must be construed to avoid absurd results. The expression “a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule” in section 29(2) could not be read as requiring Schedule I to also positively prescribe the limitation period. Such a reading would conflict with legislative intent and would create an absurdity. The learned Chief Justice then considered the anomalous position that would arise from a literal construction of the first part of the section. Finally, the Court noted that it had incidentally addressed the same question in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh while examining the application of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

An application for special leave to appeal against an order of acquittal was filed under sub‑section (3) of section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court examined whether the provisions of the Limitation Act applied to such an application. It held that section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to an application for special leave to appeal filed under the mentioned sub‑section of the Code. The Court observed that the Limitation Act did not prescribe any specific period of limitation for an application seeking special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal under that provision. On the basis of this observation, learned counsel for the appellant argued that section 29 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked. However, the Court rejected that contention and held that section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was applicable, while the same provision expressly excluded the operation of section 5 with respect to the present application. Speaking for the Court, the Chief Justice remarked, “Hence it may be said that there is no limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for an appeal against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private prosecutor. Thus, there is a difference between the Limitation Act and the rule laid down in section 417(4) of the Code in respect of limitation affecting such an application. Section 29(2) is supplemental in character insofar as it provides for the application of section 3 to cases that would not otherwise fall within its purview but for this provision.” This observation supported the view that section 29(2) applied even where the special law omitted a specific limitation period for a particular proceeding. Consequently, the Court held that in the present case the special law provided a period of limitation different from that prescribed by the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, and therefore the matter was governed by section 29(2). The Court added that even if its interpretation of the first limb of section 29 were incorrect, the appellant’s case would still fall within the scope of the second limb, and thus the decision would remain unchanged. For ease of reference, the relevant portion of the section was restated: “…and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or focal law.” Counsel for the appellant relied on the conjunction “and” to argue that the clause limited the first part of the section. He further contended that treating the clause as an independent statement would create an anomaly whereby sections 4 to 25 of the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings covered by the first part, while only certain provisions—namely sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22—would apply to the second part. The argument also touched upon grammatical construction, which was left incomplete in the record.

The Court examined the operation of sections four to twenty‑five of the Limitation Act and found no inconsistency in their application to the first limb of section twenty‑nine while only certain provisions applied to the second limb. For matters governed by the first limb, the period prescribed in a special or local law was, by legal fiction, treated as if it were prescribed in the First Schedule itself, and consequently the entirety of section three of the Limitation Act was applicable to those proceedings. By contrast, the Court observed that the same reasoning could not be extended to proceedings of a different character that were not covered by the First Schedule. Accordingly, the Legislature had expressly identified the provisions that would govern such proceedings and had omitted the general sections that dealt with legal disabilities, acknowledgments, part‑payments and other matters enumerated in the Act. The Court inferred that the Legislature possibly considered those general provisions unsuitable for special or local law remedies that were not listed in the First Schedule. Turning to the construction of the statutory language, the Court relied on the well‑settled rule that a construction which would render any part of a statute ineffective must normally be rejected, meaning that every word in the provision should be given effect. The Court considered whether the conjunction “and” rendered the latter clause a limitation on the former clause. No grammatical rule was found that required a sentence standing on its own, when linked by “and”, to limit the scope of the preceding sentence. The conjunction “and” can simply join two sentences dealing with the same subject without creating a dependency. If the counsel’s interpretation were accepted, the repeated use of the word “any” in the second part – “any period”, “any suit”, “any special or local law” – would lose its meaning, because the second part would be read as a limitation on the first. The Court noted that the phraseology actually suggests independence: the second part could have been written “for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for such suit, appeal or application by such special or local law” if it were meant to qualify the first part. Instead, the presence of “any” indicates that the second part does not depend on the first. The Court concluded that there was no justification for attributing a grammatical defect to the Legislature, as each word in the second part could be given full meaning. Consequently, the Court held that the second part of section twenty‑nine was an independent provision dealing with a category of proceedings to which the first part did not apply. This view aligned with the majority opinion of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sehat Ali Khan v. Abdul Qavi Khan, which the Court affirmed. The judgment then noted that section 116‑A of the Act...

In this case, the provision of the Act was said to provide an exhaustive and exclusive code of limitation for appeals against orders of tribunals, and reliance was placed on the proviso to sub‑section (3) of that section, which reads: “Every appeal under this Chapter shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the order of the Tribunal under section 98 or section 99. Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period.” The argument advanced was that sub‑section (3) of section 116‑A of the Act not only fixed the period of limitation for such an appeal but also set out the circumstances in which the delay could be excused, thereby implying that the general provisions of the Limitation Act were excluded. Two responses were given to this contention. First, section 29(2)(a) of the Limitation Act speaks of an express exclusion, and there was no express exclusion appearing in sub‑section (3) of section 116‑A of the Act. Second, the proviso from which an implied exclusion was sought to be inferred did not lead to any necessary implication of such exclusion. The proviso was introduced because, in the absence of the proviso, section 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act would have barred the operation of section 5 of that Act, resulting in a situation where even a sufficient cause for delay would leave the High Court powerless to excuse the delay. Accordingly, it was held that the proviso to sub‑section (3) of section 116‑A of the Act merely restored the power that had been denied to the court under section 29(2)(b) of the Limitation Act. I. L. R. [1956] 2 All. 252. Finally, it was argued that section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, on its express terms, would not apply to an appeal to the High Court against an order of the Election Tribunal under section 98 of the Act. The argument was elaborated by stating that, to exclude the time for obtaining a copy of the order appealed against, the original must be a decree or order within the meaning of section 12(2) or a judgment within the meaning of section 12(3) of the Limitation Act, and that the order under section 98 of the Act is neither a decree nor an order nor a judgment as defined in those subsections. Reference was made to the definitions of decree, judgment and order in sub‑sections (2), (9) and (14) of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, respectively, and it was contended that the order under section 98 of the Act does not fall within any of those three expressions as defined therein. Under sub‑section (9) of section 2 of the Code, “judgment” is defined to mean the statement given by the judge of the grounds of a decree or order. Sub‑section (14) of the same section defines “order” as the formal expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree. The argument therefore rested on the interpretation of these definitions in relation to the applicability of section 12 of the Limitation Act to the present appeal.

In this case, the Court observed that section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure defines “order” as the formal expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree. Consequently, the definition makes clear that a judgment is the statement of the reasons given by the judge, whereas an order is the formal expression of the decision itself. Section 104 of the Code provides that an appeal shall lie from the orders listed therein and, except as expressly provided elsewhere in the Code or by any other law in force, from no other orders. Order XX of the Code governs the manner of pronouncing a judgment and decree, and under Order XX, rule 20, certified copies of the judgment and decree must be furnished to the parties on application to the Court and at their expense. Section 141 of the Code further directs that the procedural provisions applicable to suits shall be followed as far as they can be made applicable in all proceedings before any civil court. These provisions together imply that a decree is a formal expression of adjudication that conclusively determines the parties’ rights concerning all or any of the controversies in a suit, while an order is a formal expression of any decision of a civil court that is not a decree. A judgment, on the other hand, is the statement by the judge of the grounds for a decree or order. Typically, judgment and order are recorded in two separate documents; however, the fact that both may be recorded in a single document does not remove their distinct characters as a statement of reasons and as a formal decision, respectively. With this background, the Court turned to the provisions of section 116‑A of the Act. Sub‑section (1) of that section provides that an appeal shall lie from every order made by a Tribunal under section 98 or section 99 to the High Court of the State where the Tribunal is situated. Section 98 of the Act stipulates that at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the Tribunal shall make an order either (a) dismissing the election petition; (b) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void; or (c) declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void and that the petitioner or any other candidate has been duly elected. Part VI of the Act deals with disputes concerning elections, and Chapter III thereof prescribes the procedure for trial of election petitions. Section 90 of that Chapter states that, subject to the provisions of the Act and any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal, as nearly as possible, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the trial of suits. The Court noted that the Act contains no provision defining the manner in which the Tribunal’s decision must be rendered.

The Court observed that it could not be said that the Legislature intended the Tribunal to be exempt from providing a statement of reasons for its decision. Section 90 of the Act directs the Election Tribunal to try election petitions in a manner that closely follows the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that directive imposes upon the Tribunal a duty to set out the reasons for its decision. The Tribunal therefore has the option of issuing two separate documents: one that contains the reasons for the decision, which would constitute its judgment, and another that contains the formal expression of the decision, which would be its order. The Tribunal may also combine both the judgment and the order in a single document; in such a case the document is a composite one that includes both the reasoning and the operative part of the decision. Consequently, an order issued under section 98 of the Act that also contains the reasons satisfies both the definition of a judgment and that of an order, and it attracts the provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act. The Court noted that an alternative line of reasoning arrives at the same conclusion. Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act does not limit the term “order” to the definition found in the Code of Civil Procedure. When a statute provides for the making of an order and confers upon an aggrieved party a right of appeal against that order within a prescribed period, sub‑section (2) of section 12 provides that the time required to obtain a copy of such an order is excluded from the limitation period. The Representation of the People Act empowers the Tribunal to make an order and grants a right of appeal against that order to the High Court; therefore, section 12(2) is directly applicable without reference to the Code of Civil Procedure definition of order. In either approach, section 12 of the Limitation Act applies and the time spent obtaining a copy of the order is excluded from the computation of the limitation period. As a result, the appeal was dismissed with costs. Justice Raghuvar Dayal agreed with the dismissal, but for different reasons. He held that the first part of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applies only where a special or local law prescribes a limitation period for an appeal and where that period is also listed in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, because the absence of a prescribed period cannot be treated as the presence of a positive limitation period. He further observed that the second part of section 29(2) is independent of the first part and may apply to cases where the first part does not. He also expressed the view that Article 156 of the First Schedule is relevant to the analysis.

The Court observed that the provision listed in the First Schedule relates only to appeals that arise because a special or local law grants a right of appeal, and it does not cover appeals that are made under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judge stated that he would not repeat his reasoning because he fully agreed with the analysis offered by his learned brother Mudholkar J. on the construction of the first part of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act together with article 156 of the First Schedule, and he also concurred with the interpretation given by his learned brother Ayyangar J. concerning the second part of section 29(2). The Court then turned to the proviso to section 116(a) of the Representation of the People Act, which empowers a High Court to admit an appeal that is filed after the prescribed thirty‑day period from the date of the Tribunal’s order, provided the Court is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for the delay in presenting the memorandum of appeal. The respondent had approached this Court seeking condonation of the delay in filing the appeal before the High Court. After examining the circumstances, the Court held that the case warranted condonation of the delay. It noted that different High Courts had expressed divergent views on whether section 12 of the Limitation Act applied to such appeals. In the present matter the delay was only a few days: the Election Tribunal issued its order on 5 January 1963, and the appeal was lodged on 11 February 1963. The Court recognized that a party may reasonably wish to obtain a copy of the judgment, study it, and then decide whether an appeal is justified and on what grounds. Accordingly, the Court was satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the respondent’s failure to present the appeal within the limitation period, and it therefore granted condonation of the delay and affirmed the order of the High Court.

Judge Mudholkar J., while agreeing with his brother Subba Rao J. that the appeal ought to be dismissed, expressed that he could not accept all of the reasons advanced by that judge. He stated that he need not repeat the facts that had already been set out in full by his learned colleague, but he wished to highlight the precise issue that required determination in this appeal. The issue, as framed by the Court, was whether, for the purpose of calculating the thirty‑day period prescribed by section 116A(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, within which an appeal may be preferred against the decision of an Election Tribunal, the provisions of section 12, sub‑section (2) of the Limitation Act—under which the time required to obtain a copy of the decree and the day on which the judgment was pronounced may be excluded—could be invoked. It was contended before the Court that the appeal should be treated as one filed under the Code of Civil Procedure, which would bring it within the ambit of article 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, even though a shorter limitation period is prescribed for such appeals by the Representation of the People Act. The argument further maintained that, notwithstanding this classification, the provisions of section 12(2) should still apply.

In this appeal it was submitted that the period of limitation prescribed by section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, for filing an appeal from the decision of an election tribunal, should be governed by section 12(2) of the Limitation Act because the appeal falls within clause (a) of section 29(2) of that Act. The contention relied upon the first limb of section 29(2) to support the view that the special provisions of the Representation of the People Act would trigger the operation of section 12(2). An alternative argument was advanced that even though the appeal under the Representation of the People Act does not fall within article 156 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, the first limb of section 29(2) should still apply. The reasoning was that a distinct period of limitation is prescribed for such an appeal, which differs from the period prescribed for an appeal listed in the First Schedule, and therefore clause (a) of that limb ought to attract the provisions of section 12(2). Finally, it was argued that even if the appeal could not be classified as one falling within the first limb of section 29(2), section 12 would nevertheless be applicable because the second limb of subsection (2) of section 29 is sufficiently wide in its scope to encompass a suit, an appeal, or an application for which no limitation period is specified in the First Schedule but for which a special or local law provides a limitation period.

The learned brother, in his judgment, held that an appeal provided for by section 116A of the Representation of the People Act constitutes an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure and consequently falls within the first column of article 156 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act. He also held that the wording “where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule” occurring in the first limb of subsection (2) of section 29 includes a suit or an appeal even though it is not of a type for which a limitation period is prescribed in the First Schedule, because it is sufficient that the special law prescribes a period that differs from any period prescribed in the First Schedule. The speaker expressed regret that he could not agree with either of those views. However, the speaker agreed with the learned brother’s construction of the second limb of subsection (2) of section 29, which reads “and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law.” The speaker accepted that this second limb is wide enough to include a suit, appeal, or application under a special or local law that is of a type for which the First Schedule provides no limitation period. The speaker stated that this conclusion alone sufficed to dispose of the appeal in the manner proposed by the learned brother. Since he disagreed with the conclusions reached on the first two points, the speaker indicated that he would briefly set out the reasons for arriving at different conclusions.

In support of the conclusion that article 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act applied, the learned judge relied on the decision in Aga Mahomed Hamadani v. Cohen (1). That decision had been followed by the Madras High Court in Ramasami Pillai v. the Deputy Collector of Madura (1). The first of these authorities arose in the jurisdiction of British Burma. Under section 49 of the Burma Courts Act, 1875 (XVII of 1875), an appeal lay to the High Court from a decision rendered by the Recorder’s Court in a suit or proceeding where the monetary amount involved was not less than Rs 3,000 and not more than Rs 10,000. Section 97 of the same Act provided that, “save as otherwise provided by this Act, the Code of Civil Procedure shall be, and shall, on and from the 15th day of April, 1872, be deemed to have been in force throughout British Burma.” At the same time, section 540 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, which was then in operation, declared: “Unless when otherwise expressly provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from the decrees or from any part of the decrees of the Courts exercising original jurisdiction to the Courts authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of those courts.” The citations to these authorities are recorded as (1) (1886) 1 L.R. 13 Cal. 221 and (2) (1919) 1 L.R. 43 Mad. 51.

The principal issue that the High Court was called upon to determine in that case was whether the appeal in question could be said to be time‑barred, that is, whether the period of limitation prescribed in article 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act governed the appeal. To resolve that question, the High Court examined the meaning of “an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure.” While analysing the matter, the Court observed: “A particular appeal was given by the Burma Courts Act and the Burma Courts Act is still the only Act which prescribes to what Court this appeal shall lie. If it had not been given by the Burma Courts Act then section 540 of the Civil Procedure Code would have been sufficient to give it, provided that some Court was by some enactment provided as the proper Court to hear the appeal. The procedure in appeals in every respect is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The Limitation Act, Schedule 1, Article 156 when it speaks of the Civil Procedure Code is, on the face of it, speaking of a Code which relates to procedure, and does not ordinarily deal with substantive rights: and the natural meaning of an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code appears to us to be an appeal governed by the Code of Civil Procedure so far as procedure is concerned.” Referring to this passage, the learned brother noted: “It is manifest from this passage that the learned judges did not repel the contention on the ground that the right of appeal was conferred by section 540 of the.”

In this case, the Court observed that the earlier observation that the natural meaning of the expression in article 156 of Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act was that the appeal mentioned therein was one governed by the Code of Civil Procedure was correct. However, the Court said that it was not necessary to decide whether the High Court was correct in holding that the appeal before it fell under the Burma Courts Act. Assuming that the High Court’s view was correct, the Court noted that section 29 of the Limitation Act, as then in force, had not been considered in that decision. The remaining issue, the Court explained, was whether an appeal that was not created by the Code of Civil Procedure could nevertheless be treated as an appeal “under the Code” for the purposes of article 156 of the Limitation Act. With due respect, the Court expressed the view that there was no justification for such a holding. The Court held that an appeal that is not granted by the Code of Civil Procedure must be regarded as an appeal under the statute that confers the right, and not as an appeal under the Code. Consequently, the Court found no valid reason to interpret the words ‘under the Code of Civil Procedure’ to mean ‘governed in the matter of procedure by the Code of Civil Procedure’, which was precisely the interpretation adopted by the High Court.

The Court further explained that reading article 156 in the manner adopted by the High Court would effectively treat it as a residuary provision capable of covering every appeal, regardless of the statute that created the right, merely because the procedural rules of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to the appeal. The Court considered that such an approach would be contrary to the clear intention of the Legislature. The Court observed that while the right to file a suit or an application is a broad entitlement, a right of appeal exists only when a statute expressly provides for it. For that reason, the Limitation Act contains specific residuary provisions—article 120 for suits and article 180 for applications. The First Schedule of the Act is divided into three divisions. The second division, which contains eight articles, deals with appeals, and article 156 is one of those eight. The first division deals with suits and includes provisions for various suits, some of which arise under special statutes; because it was impossible to list every possible suit, article 120 was inserted to cover “Suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule.” The third division deals with applications of different kinds. By contrast, the second division does not contain a provision analogous to article 120 or article 180 for appeals. The Court therefore concluded that article 156 should be read in the same limited manner as the other appeal‑specific articles, and should not be treated as a catch‑all provision.

Article 181 provides for applications for which the Schedule does not prescribe any period of limitation. In contrast, the second division of the Schedule, which deals with appeals, contains no provision comparable to Article 120 or Article 181. Of the eight articles in that division, four relate to appeals under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the remaining four relate to appeals that are not covered by the Code of Criminal Procedure. As previously noted, only one of those eight articles addresses ordinary civil appeals to the High Court; that article is Article 156. The language of Article 156 is not framed in the same way as the language used in Articles 120 and 181. The question therefore arises whether the first column of Article 156 may be interpreted to carry the same meaning as the first column of Articles 120 or 181. The Legislature was aware that various special statutes already provide mechanisms for appeal, yet it omitted any residuary provision for such appeals in the Schedule. The likely explanation for this omission is that a statute that creates a right of appeal is expected to specify the limitation period for that appeal, rendering a general residuary clause unnecessary. The first difficulty in adopting the respondents’ interpretation of Article 156 is that, where a special law expressly fixes a different limitation period for an appeal, Article 156 would not apply. To force such an appeal within Article 156 would contradict the clear legislative intention to limit that article to appeals governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. A second difficulty is that the entry in Article 156 refers to appeals “under” the Code of Civil Procedure, not to appeals that arise out of proceedings merely to which the Code applies, nor does it cover appeals that are deemed to be “under” the Code. It should be noted that, for proceedings under the Representation of the People Act, the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply in its entirety; only those portions expressly made applicable by the Representation of the People Act are operative. It was suggested that, if the provisions of Order XL I of the Code of Civil Procedure were inapplicable to an appeal under the Representation of the People Act, there would be no statutory basis for filing such an appeal. The Court, however, sees no such obstacle, because every High Court has formulated rules, partly on the basis of the Constitution and partly exercising its inherent power, to address this and related matters. The Calcutta High Court, nevertheless, does not appear to have given full consideration in Cohen’s case to the scope of Article 156, and that observation contributes to the Court’s inability to accept the view advanced by that decision.

The Court observed that the earlier decision had adopted a particular view and that counsel had urged the Court to accept that view on the basis of stare decisis. It was further pointed out that, to date, no other court had expressed dissent from that view and that the Madras High Court had fully embraced it in Ramasami Pillai’s case (1). The Court then explained the doctrine of stare decisis, quoting Dowrick in Justice According to the English Common Lawyers (1961 ed., p. 195) that the doctrine is essentially the notion that judicial decisions possess a binding character. The Court, however, clarified that the Indian situation differs from the English model. In India, a decision of a High Court is not absolutely binding upon that court itself because a full bench may revisit and overturn an earlier ruling. A High Court’s decision may bind courts that are subordinate to it and may bind judges sitting singly or in division benches of the same High Court. Moreover, while a division bench decision binds other division benches of that High Court, there are instances where a later full bench has reconsidered and altered the earlier division‑bench ruling. Consequently, the authority of a High Court decision, even if it has never been dissent‑ed, remains merely persuasive with respect to the Supreme Court. The Court held that, for the Supreme Court, true stare decisis consists only of its own prior judgments, yet even those can be departed from, as illustrated in The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar (3). The Court further noted that a decision which has long gone without dissent and has been followed does not become immutable, especially when it concerns a question of procedural or adjective law such as the law of limitation. While there may be arguments for preserving long‑standing substantive property decisions to avoid unsettling existing titles, such considerations do not preclude the overruling of an erroneous procedural ruling, no matter how antiquated. Accordingly, the Court expressed that it was not persuaded to treat the present appeal as falling within the first column of article 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act.

In this matter the Court observed that the issue under consideration fell within the first column of article 156 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act. To address the second ground raised by the learned brother, the Court found it necessary to set out the text of section 29, sub‑section (2) of the Limitation Act, which reads: “Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law— (a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.” The Court referred to the commentary in Allen, Law in the making (5th edn.) p. 209 fn. 3. While noting that the legislature had not expressed itself with great clarity in enacting this provision, the Court concurred with the view expressed in Canara Bank Ltd. v. The Warden Insurance Co., Ltd., Bombay (1) and subsequently adopted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Beharilal Chaurasiya v. Regional Transport Authority (1). In that case the Bombay High Court held that article 156 is attracted when the period provided by the special law differs from that contained in the First Schedule. With due respect to the learned judges, the Court found it difficult to construe the language of the first limb of section 29(2) in the manner suggested. The statute expressly speaks of situations where a special or local law prescribes for a suit, appeal or application a period of limitation “different” from that in the First Schedule. Consequently, the key inquiry is whether a suit, appeal or application under a particular special or local law is of a kind analogous to one for which the First Schedule fixes a limitation period. The first limb of sub‑section (2) of section 29 therefore concerns only those proceedings under special or local law that already have a prescribed period in the First Schedule. When the period in the First Schedule differs from that prescribed by the special or local law, the consequences laid down in the provision follow. The Court concluded that a literal and natural interpretation of the legislature’s expression in the first part of sub‑section (2) would not cause inconvenience, since proceedings of other kinds can readily be covered by the second part of the provision. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the learned brother’s observations regarding the second limb of sub‑section (2) of section 29.

In this proceeding the Court recorded that it had consulted with a learned brother concerning the observations that the brother had made about the second limb of sub‑section (2) of section 29. After considering the brother’s remarks on that particular portion of the provision, the Court held that the appeal before it should be dismissed. The dismissal was to be combined with an order that the costs of the appeal be awarded in the manner proposed by the learned brother. In reaching this conclusion the Court also referred to two earlier authorities. The first authority was reported in the Indian Law Reports, Bombay series, 1952, at page 1083, where the appellate court had also dismissed the appeal. The second authority was reported in the All India Reporter, 1961, Madhya Pradesh series, at page 75, which likewise involved the dismissal of an appeal. By reliance on those precedents and after the discussion with the learned brother, the Court therefore ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the costs be awarded as suggested.