University of Delhi and Anr vs Ram Nath

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 650 and 651 of 1962

Decision Date: 1 April 1963

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta

In this matter, the petitioners were the University of Delhi and an affiliated college, Miranda House, while the respondent was Ram Nath, who had been employed as a bus driver by Miranda House. The petition was decided on 1 April 1963 by a bench consisting of P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. N. Wanchoo and K. C. Das Gupta. The case was reported in 1963 AIR 1873 and 1964 SCR (2) 703, with subsequent citations in several later reports. The central question was whether the bus‑driving staff of a university could be treated as “workers” in an “industry” within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether the respondents were therefore entitled to retrenchment compensation under section 33 (c) (2) of that Act.

At the relevant time, the respondents were dismissed from their positions after the appellants gave each a notice of termination and paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice. Each respondent then filed a petition before the industrial tribunal seeking the compensation prescribed for retrenchment. The appellants opposed the petitions on two preliminary grounds. First, they argued that the university and its affiliated college did not constitute an “industry” as defined in section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Second, they contended that the bus drivers were not “employees” under section 2 (g) of the same Act, and consequently the respondents’ applications under section 33 (c) (2) were legally infirm.

The industrial tribunal rejected the appellants’ contentions. It held that the definition of “industry” in section 2 (j) should be given its widest possible meaning and that there was no basis for limiting it. Accordingly, the tribunal found the respondents to be employees of an industry and ordered the appellants to pay each respondent a retrenchment compensation of Rs 1050. The appellants appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, obtaining special leave to be heard.

In the appeal, the petitioners argued that the tribunal had erred by applying a mechanical and literal construction to the term “industry” and that the legislative intent of the Act was to exclude educational institutions from its coverage. They maintained that education, being primarily a mission carried out by teachers, should not fall within the industrial ambit of the statute. The respondents, on the other hand, maintained that section 2 (j) deliberately used broad language and that there was no justification for imposing an artificial restriction on the meaning of “industry.” The Court, after considering the submissions, held that because the core activity of a university is the imparting of education—an activity fundamentally dependent on teachers—the inclusion of the entire class of teachers within the definition of “industry” would contradict the purpose of the legislation. Consequently, the work of education, together with the minor and subsidiary functions performed by subordinate staff such as bus drivers, could not be characterized as an industry under the Act. This reasoning formed the basis of the Court’s decision on the matter.

The Court observed that it would be unreasonable to treat the work of education as an industry for the benefit of a very small and insignificant number of persons who might be employed by an educational institution as subordinate staff. By reading sections 2(g), 2(j) and 2(s) of the Act together, the Court found it reasonable to hold that the educational activities carried out by an institution such as the University of Delhi do not fall within the meaning of “industry” as defined in the statute. In the overall scheme of imparting education, the functions performed by subordinate staff, whose roles are comparable to those of the respondents, are minor, subsidiary and insignificant. Consequently, it would not be reasonable to allow the work of this subordinate staff to lend an industrial character to the principal activity of the University, which is the imparting of education. From a rational perspective, the Court considered it inappropriate to describe education even as a profession. Education, in its true aspect, is more accurately described as a mission or vocation rather than a profession, trade or business, regardless of how broadly the latter terms may be defined under the Act. Accordingly, the appellants could not be regarded as carrying on an industry within the meaning of section 2(j), and therefore the applications made by the respondents against them under section 33C(2) of the Act were held to be incompetent.

The Court reviewed the following authorities: State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha [1960] 2 S.C.R. 866; Lalit Hari Ayurvedic College Pharmacy Pilibhit v. Lalit Hari Ayurvedic College Pharmacy Workers Union, Pilibhit A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1261; The Ahmedabad Textile Industry Research Association v. The State of Bombay [1961] 2 S.C.R. 481; The Federated State School Teachers’ Association of Australia v. State of Victoria [1929] 41 C.L.R. 569; and The Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees [1960] 2 S.C.R. 942. The judgment was delivered in the civil appellate jurisdiction concerning Civil Appeals Nos. 650 and 651 of 1962, which had arisen by special leave from the order dated 22 September 1961 of the Labour Court, Delhi, in L.C.A. No. 479 of 1961. Counsel for the appellants and counsel for the respondents were instructed to appear, with additional counsel representing interveners. The Court noted that the two appeals by special leave stemmed from petitions filed against the University of Delhi and the Principal of Miranda House, University College for Women (appellants 1 and 2), by two of their employees, Ram Nath and Asgar Masih (respondents 1 and 2), under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Appellant 2, which is the University College for Women, is operated by appellant 1; therefore, the substantive claim of the two employees was essentially against appellant 1. The Court proceeded to consider the merits of the applications in light of the statutory definitions and the case law reviewed.

Ram Nath was engaged as a driver by appellant No. 2 in October 1949. On 1 May 1961 he received a notice stating that his services were no longer required and that his employment would be terminated, with the employer offering one month’s salary in lieu of notice. A similar claim was made by Asgar Masih. The record shows that Masih was originally hired by appellant No. 1 as a driver, but on 1 October 1949 he was transferred to appellant No. 2. His employment was also terminated by a notice dated 1 May 1961, and he was offered one month’s salary in advance in place of the notice period. Both parties agree that appellant No. 1 had determined that operating the bus service for the benefit of the female students of the college run by appellant No. 2 was causing a financial loss, and consequently the decision was taken to discontinue the service. As a result, the positions of the two drivers became redundant, and both parties acknowledge that the retrenchment was genuine, without any element of bad faith or unfair labour practice.

The parties also concur that, assuming the two employees qualify as “workmen” within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the activities carried out by the appellants constitute an “industry” under section 2(j) of that Act, the procedural requirements of section 25F have not been observed and the statutory retrenchment compensation due under that provision has not been paid to the respondents. The respondents’ petitions were contested by appellant No. 1 on the preliminary ground that appellant No. 1 did not fall within the definition of “employer” under section 2(g), and that the work undertaken by appellant No. 1 did not qualify as an “industry” under section 2(j); consequently, the applications filed under section 33C(2) were argued to be incompetent. The Tribunal rejected this preliminary objection, examined the merits of the case, and subsequently issued an order in favor of the respondents, directing the appellants to pay a retrenchment sum of Rs 10.50 to each respondent. The present challenge before this Court concerns only the validity of that award, specifically the contention that the work performed by appellant No. 1 does not amount to an “industry” within the meaning of section 2(j). Although the issue presented by these two appeals appears limited in scope, its implications are far‑reaching. If the Court were to hold that the provision of education by institutions such as the University of Delhi falls within the ambit of “industry” under section 2(j), then all educational institutions across the nation could be brought within the scope of the Act. Accordingly, disputes between such institutions and their employees would be classified as industrial disputes, capable of referral for adjudication under section 10(1) of the Act, and employees could, where appropriate, invoke the remedies provided in section 33C(2). The appellants argue that the Tribunal erred by interpreting the term “industry” in its broadest sense through a mechanical and literal construction, and they maintain that the legislative policy intends to exclude educational institutions from the Act’s coverage.

The respondents argued that the purpose of the Act was not to exclude education and educational institutions, and that section 2(j) deliberately used the broadest possible language to define “industry,” so no artificial limitation should be placed on that definition. To support this view they relied on the decision of this Court in State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (1). In that case the Court observed that “as a working principle, it may be stated that an activity systematically or habitually undertaken for the production or distribution of goods or for the rendering of material services to the community at large or a part of such community with the help of employees is an undertaking. Such an activity generally involves the co‑operation of the employer‑ and the employees; and its object is the satisfaction of material human needs. It must be organised or arranged in a manner in which trade or business is generally organised or arranged. It must not be casual nor must it be for oneself, nor for pleasures.” The respondents contended that the term “service” expressly included in the definition of “industry” should not be limited to material services but ought to encompass educational or cultural services, and accordingly the educational work performed by the University of Delhi should be treated as an industry. They noted that the definition of “industry” in the Act covered any calling, service or employment, and therefore saw a prima facie case for their argument. However, testing this argument required an examination of whether the work carried out by an educational institution could be said to be performed with the assistance of labour or the cooperation of teachers. The principal function of educational institutions was to impart education to students; if “imparting education” were classified as industry, the institution would be the employer and the teachers who assisted in delivering education would be its employees, thus ordinarily entitling them to the benefits of the Act. The respondents further claimed that the cooperation between the institution and its teachers corresponded to the cooperation between capital and labour that industrial adjudication normally references. Although it might appear unusual to describe education as industry and teachers as workmen within the meaning of the Act, the respondents maintained that a literal construction of the statute would inevitably lead to that conclusion, and if the scheme of the Act and other relevant considerations supported such a result, the judges would have to accept the respondents’ position despite its departure from the commonly understood sense of the word “industry.”

The respondents argue that once the interpretation they propose is accepted, a particular result must necessarily follow. The Court observes that if the structure of the Act and the other relevant considerations inevitably lead to that result, then the Court must accept the respondents’ argument even though it does not correspond with the ordinary meaning of the term “industry”. The Court then asks whether treating the relationship between teachers and their institution as analogous to the relationship between labour and capital fits within the purpose of the Act. This question naturally becomes the next issue to be examined, and in doing so the Court must keep three statutory definitions in mind. Section 2(g)(i) defines “employer” as, with respect to an industry carried on under the authority of any department of the Central Government or a State Government, the authority prescribed for that purpose, or, where no authority is prescribed, the head of the department. Section 2(g)(ii) adds that, with respect to an industry carried on on behalf of a local authority, the employer is the chief executive officer of that authority. Accordingly, if the work of imparting education is deemed an industry, the University of Delhi could be regarded as an employer within the meaning of Section 2(g). Section 2(j) defines “industry” as any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. The Court notes that it need not discuss this definition in detail because the precise scope of the definition is the very point in dispute. The definition of “workman” under Section 2(s) follows. That provision states that a workman means, inter alia, any person, including an apprentice, employed in any industry to perform any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward. It is a matter of common agreement that teachers employed by educational institutions—whether those institutions provide primary, secondary, collegiate or postgraduate education—are not “workmen” under Section 2(s). Consequently, the entire class of employees whose cooperation enables the work of imparting education to be carried out by educational institutions does not fall within the ambit of Section 2(s), and any disputes between those employees and the institutions that employ them lie outside the scope of the Act. In other words, even if education were classified as an industry under Section 2(j), most employees would be excluded from the Act, and only disputes involving the subordinate staff who might qualify as workmen under Section 2(s) could be brought within its purview. The Court, after considering that education is carried out primarily and exclusively with the assistance and cooperation of teachers, observes that the omission of the entire class of teachers from the definition of “workman” is a significant factor in the analysis.

The provision prescribed by section 2(s) was considered to have important bearing on the issue before the Court. The Court observed that it could not have been the intention of the Act to treat education as an industry merely for the advantage of a very small number of persons who are employed by educational institutions to perform duties of subordinate staff. By reading sections 2(g), 2(j) and 2(s) together, the Court was inclined to hold that the work of education carried out by institutions such as the University of Delhi does not fall within the meaning of “industry” under the Act. After reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that it was not surprising that the Act excluded education from its scope, because the distinctive purpose and object of education made it difficult to compare it with any trade, business, calling or service contemplated in section 2(j). The Court explained that education aims to develop the personality of the pupil by fostering physical, intellectual, moral and emotional growth. Describing this educational process in terms of industry therefore appeared wholly incongruous, and the Court was not surprised that the Act deliberately defined “workman” in section 2(s) so as to exclude teachers.

The Court further observed that, across traditional, conservative, modern and progressive social outlooks, teaching and teachers are accorded a high place of honour and it is necessary that they receive the respect due to them. While esteem for teachers does not necessarily involve power or wealth, the concept of social justice is broad enough to include teachers and the requirement that they receive proper remuneration and other amenities. However, the Court pointed out that the exclusion of teachers from section 2(s) merely means that the remedies for improving their financial conditions do not lie within the Act. It is well known that the education departments of State Governments, the Union Government and the University Grants Commission carefully examine this problem and assist teachers by prescribing appropriate pay scales and insisting on reasonable terms and conditions of service for teachers engaged in primary, secondary and collegiate education within their jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed that any issues relating to teachers and their salaries are outside the reach of the Act. Since teachers constitute the sole class of employees whose cooperation is essential for the imparting of education by educational institutions, their exclusion from the Act supports the conclusion that education itself falls outside the Act’s scope. In this connection,

It was considered necessary to examine the make‑up of the University of Delhi. The University was created and incorporated as a teaching and affiliating institution by the Delhi University Act of 1922, which is numbered as Act 8 of 1922. The structure of the University comprises the officers of the University – for example the Chancellor, the Pro‑Chancellor, the Vice‑Chancellor, the Treasurer, the Registrar, the Deans of the various faculties and other officers – together with its governing bodies, which include the Court, the Executive Council, the Academic Council, the Finance Committee, the various faculties and other bodies as referred to in sections 8 and 17 of the Act. These governing bodies are made up of the University’s teachers, who are classified as Professors, Readers, Lecturers and other persons who have an interest in education. In other words, the officers of the University and the members of its various authorities together constitute the organisational framework of the University of Delhi. It is well established that this organisational framework does not itself provide capital for the conduct of higher‑education activities. The University receives financial assistance from the Central Government, from the University Grants Commission, from charitable donors and charitable institutions, and also derives a portion of its income from tuition fees paid by students. Consequently, it is difficult to argue that the University contributes any capital of its own in the process of delivering education. The educational work is carried out by the University with the cooperation of all its teachers, and it would be inappropriate to characterise that work as a trade or business, or to treat it as a service that could be classified as an industry under the Act. The observations made concerning the University of Delhi are equally applicable to all educational institutions that are primarily established for the purpose of imparting education. While, like other educational institutions, the University employs subordinate staff who perform tasks assigned to them, the role of this subordinate staff in the overall scheme of education is minor, subsidiary and insignificant. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to allow the limited, ancillary activities performed by the subordinate staff to give the University’s principal activity – the imparting of education – an industrial character. The promotion of education is undertaken by the University and its teachers, and if the teachers are excluded from the scope of the Act, it would be illogical to deem the educational activity as an industry merely because its minor, subsidiary functions might appear to have the character of a service that could fall within section 2(j). It is also well known that the University of Delhi and most other educational institutions are not formed or operated for the purpose of making a profit; although the lack of a profit motive does not, by itself, remove an activity from the definition contained in section 2(j) if the other criteria of that definition are met, the reference to the absence of profit motive is made simply to emphasise that the work undertaken by such educational institutions differs from the ordinary notion of trade.

In this case, the Court observed that describing education as a profession would be inappropriate from a rational standpoint. It stated that education, in its true sense, is more a mission and a vocation than a profession, trade or business, even though the latter terms have a broad meaning under the Act. Consequently, the Court found it unreasonable to consider educational institutions as employers within the meaning of s. 2(g), or to treat the work of teaching carried out by them as an industry within the meaning of s. 2(j). The Court explained that the purpose of education is to produce a well‑educated, healthy young generation equipped with a rational and progressive outlook on life, and that this purpose cannot be likened to an industrial process. Accordingly, the Court was satisfied that the University of Delhi and the Miranda College for Women operated by it are not engaged in an industry under s. 2(j), and therefore the applications filed by the respondents against those institutions under s. 33C(2) of the Act were held to be incompetent. The Court then turned to the authorities cited by the parties. The first authority mentioned was the case of Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (1). In that decision, the Court examined at length the meaning of the definition contained in s. 2(j), but expressly noted that it was not expressing an opinion on whether the operation of an educational institution falls within the definition of an industry under the Act. A similar reservation was made in the judgment of Lalit Hari Ayurvedic College Pharmacy Pilibhit v. Lalit Hari Ayurvedic College Pharmacy Workers Union, Pilibhit ( ), where the Court held that the appellant’s activity was an undertaking within s. 2(j) but added that it was not called upon to decide the question of whether an educational institution constitutes an industry under the Act. The Court also referred to Ahmedabad Textile Industry’s Research Association v. The State of Bombay (2). While analyzing the character of the work undertaken by the Research Association, the Court observed that its activities bore little resemblance to those of a purely educational institution. The Court emphasized that, although it held the Research Association to be carrying on an industry, its work was distinct and separate from the work of an institution devoted solely to education. The Court noted that the present appeals raise the unresolved question of whether the operation of an educational institution can be classified as an industry under the Act. The respondents, however, argued that in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case (3) the Court had, in certain terms, approved of

In this case, the Court considered an argument that relied on the minority judgment of Isaacs J in The Federated State School Teachers’ Association of Australia v The State of Victoria (4). The argument asserted that because Isaacs J had held that the dispute raised by the teachers in that Australian case amounted to an industrial dispute, the present Court, by implication, had concurred with Isaacs J’s conclusion. The Court noted that this line of reasoning was not well founded. It observed that although in the Hospital Mazdoor Sabha case (1) the Court had expressed general approval of the social philosophy articulated by Isaacs J in his dissent, the Court had expressly cautioned that such approval of his general views did not amount to agreement with his final conclusion regarding the nature of educational activities carried on by educational institutions. The Court explained that the earlier judgment deliberately left the question open in order to prevent any future claim that the judgment implicitly endorsed Isaacs J’s conclusion. Consequently, the Court held that the approval of Isaacs J’s general observations did not mean that his ultimate conclusion was adopted. The Court then turned to a brief examination of the effect of the Australian High Court decision in the Federated State School Teachers’ Association of Australia case (2). In that case, the dispute concerned the wages and conditions of service of teachers employed by the States under various national education schemes. A central issue for determination was whether the educational activities undertaken by the States, pursuant to the statutes and regulations governing education in each State, fell within the meaning of “industry” under section 4 of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904‑28. The majority of the Australian High Court held that the occupation of teachers employed in this manner was not an “industrial” occupation, and consequently the dispute between the States and the teachers was not an “industrial dispute” within section 51 of the Constitution. The majority reasoning included the statement that if the operation of a system of public education was not within the sphere of industrialism, then persons whose efforts were confined to that activity could not be said to be engaged in an industry or an industrial occupation or pursuit (pp. 575‑576). The Court also addressed the contention that if a private person carried out the same activity, it might be described as a business, trade, or industry. The Court rejected this contention, observing that a private person could not carry on a system of public education in the same manner as the State, and therefore the activity could not be treated as an industry.

In the passage under discussion, the Court observed that it was unreasonable to suggest that a private individual could manage the system of public education in the same way that His Majesty’s Treasury or any other executive department of the Government might operate it, and that even if such authority were imagined, the State itself does not “carry on an industry.” The Court quoted the observation from page 575 to illustrate this point. Justice Rich, who agreed with the majority view, further stated that teaching does not, unlike banking and insurance, form part of the nation’s industrial activity, as recorded on page 591. He rejected Justice Isaacs’s earlier suggestion that education directly contributes to industrial promotion, arguing that an industrial system could function without a national education programme. Justice Rich added that while human existence is unquestionably necessary, it is absurd to claim that every element that contributes to the making of a person belongs to a community organised industrially for the production and distribution of wealth, a view expressed on page 592.

Justice Isaacs, however, articulated a strong dissenting opinion. Although the Court had previously agreed with many of his general observations regarding the scope of industrial disputes, it found it difficult to accept his theory that state‑provided education, in itself, constituted an independent industrial operation rendering a service to the community, as noted on page 588. A similar criticism was made of his remark that educational establishments should be included in constitutional powers to the same extent as labor services or that insurance companies should be classified as capital services. Justice Isaacs also observed that two facts emerge concerning education: first, industrial education is increasingly moving away from apprenticeship systems; second, a worker’s efficiency is generally directly affected by his education, comments recorded on pages 588 and 589. The Court found that Justice Rich’s criticism of Justice Isaacs’s reasoning possessed some merit.

Another important aspect considered by the Court was the definition of “employee” under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904‑34, which is broader than the definition of “workman” found in section 2(s) of the Indian Act. Under the Australian legislation, an employee means any person employed in any industry and includes anyone whose usual occupation is that of an employee in any industry. Accordingly, teachers would fall within this definition of employee, and the terms “industry,” “industrial disputes,” and “industrial matters” would naturally extend to cover disputes involving teachers concerning wages, working hours, retrenchment and similar industrial questions. Consequently, the Court noted that the principal difficulty arising from the definition of “workman” in our own statute does not arise under the broader Australian definition of “employee,” a distinction of considerable importance. For this reason, the Court concluded that the minority opinion of Justice Isaacs offers limited assistance in resolving the issue presented by the appellants in the present appeals.

The Court observed that the definition of “workman” in section 2(s) of the Indian Act did not arise from the broader definition of “employee” used in the Australian legislation, and this distinction was significant. Consequently, the Court concluded that the minority opinion of Isaacs J. offered little assistance in resolving the issue presented by the appellants in the present appeals. The respondents, however, argued that a recent decision of this Court supported the Tribunal’s view that the activities carried out by the appellants qualified as an “industry” under section 2(j). The cited case, The Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Its Employees, dealt with whether the municipal functions of the Nagpur Corporation fell within the meaning of “industry” as defined by section 2(14) of the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947. Disputes had arisen between the Corporation and employees across various departments, and the State Industrial Court held that the Corporation and all its departments were covered by the definition of “industry” in that section. The Corporation challenged this award before the High Court by filing a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court rejected the Corporation’s claim that its activities were not an industry and sent the matter back to the Industrial Court to ascertain which specific departments fell within the definition. Upon remand, the Industrial Court concluded that all departments constituted an industry except five. The Corporation appealed the award to this Court by special leave, while the excluded five departments were not contested by the employees. The Court dismissed the Corporation’s appeal and noted that the portion of the Industrial Court’s finding that excluded five departments need not be reviewed because it had not been challenged by the employees. The primary argument raised by the Corporation was that its activities were regal or governmental in nature and therefore fell outside the scope of the Berar Act. The Court examined this contention carefully, acknowledging that primary, inalienable functions of the State—legislative, judicial, and law‑administrative powers—are indeed outside the Act’s ambit and, if delegated to a corporation, would be excluded from section 2(14). However, the Court held that such regal functions are limited to those core powers, and the broader activities of the Corporation did not fit within that narrow category, leading to the rejection of the Corporation’s main argument. In assessing the work performed by the various departments, the Court proceeded to analyze the nature of the services provided, distinguishing industrial from non‑industrial functions.

The Court observed that when a service performed by an individual or a private person qualifies as an industry, the same service would also be regarded as an industry when carried out by a corporation. Accordingly, the Court held that if a municipal department undertakes many functions, some of which fall within the definition of industry under the Act and others that are non‑industrial, the predominant functions of that department must be the decisive criterion for the purposes of the Act. Among the departments examined was the education department, under which the corporation administered primary education for citizens within its jurisdiction. In relation to this department, the Court noted that the services provided could be performed by private persons; therefore, the lower‑level, menial employees of the department fell within the definition of “employees” and were consequently entitled to the benefits conferred by the Act. A careful reading of the judgment as a whole showed that the specific question of whether educational work conducted by institutions such as the University of Delhi—institutions created primarily and solely for the purpose of imparting education—constituted an industry under section 2(14) was never argued before the Court, nor was it raised in that precise form. The principal challenge to the award was based on the contention that the corporation’s activities through its various departments were regal or governmental in nature and therefore excluded from the Act; that contention was rejected. Another relevant point was the test laid down by the Court that, if a department predominantly carried on industrial activities, the existence of some non‑industrial activities would not affect its classification. Applying the same test to the corporation as a whole, the Court examined the inclusion of the education department in the award and upheld it. Consequently, if the same test of predominant character were applied to the University of Delhi, the result would be unfavorable to the respondents, because the university’s main activity—teaching and the work of teachers—lies outside the scope of the Act, and the minor, incidental activities of subordinate staff that might fall within the Act cannot alter the institution’s dominant character. The Court recalled that in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (1) the issue concerning educational institutions was expressly left unresolved, and that had the matter been intended for resolution in Corporation of the City of Nagpur (2), more detailed arguments would have been presented and the problem examined in full. It was also noted that the Bench which left the educational question open in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (1) was the same Bench that heard the Nagpur case, and the two matters were argued in close succession.

The same three‑judge Bench that delivered the judgment in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (1) also heard the petition concerning the Corporation of the City of Nagpur, and the two matters were argued in close succession. Although the decision in Hospital Mazdoor Sabha was reported on 29 January 1960, the award in the Nagpur case was released on 10 February 1960, as recorded in the citations (1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 866, 879 and (2) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 942 respectively. The Court makes these observations to stress that the specific issue presented for determination in the present appeals was neither raised nor debated in the Nagpur judgment. Consequently, it cannot be said that the matter was even incidentally settled merely because the education department of the Corporation had been listed among the departments properly included in the award. If the Court had been convinced that the earlier decision had finally resolved this point, it would either have applied that precedent or, alternatively, referred the question to a larger Bench for consideration. In view of the foregoing analysis, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the orders issued by the Industrial Tribunal, and dismissed the respondents’ petitions filed under section 33C(2) of the Act. No order as to costs was made, and the appellate court recorded that the appeals were allowed in the final order.