Union Of India vs H. C. Goel

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 645 of 1962

Decision Date: 30 August 1963

Coram: N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo, J.R. Mudholkar

In the matter titled Union of India versus H C Goel, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 30 August 1963. The opinion was authored by Justice N Rajagopala Ayyangar and was pronounced by a bench comprising Justices N Rajagopala Ayyangar, P B Gajendragadkar, K N Wanchoo and J R Mudholkar. The case is reported in the 1964 volume of the All India Reporter at page 364 and also appears in the 1964 Supreme Court Reports (4) 718. Subsequent citator references include reports from 1965 through 1992, citing the decision in various law reports. The dispute concerned the applicability of the Civil Service disciplinary provisions, specifically the rule that permits an enquiry officer to propose actions, the question of whether a dismissal order could be based on an absence of evidence, the principle of the Government acting in good faith, and the jurisdiction of a High Court to interfere under Articles 226 and 311 of the Constitution of India. The relevant procedural framework was provided by Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules.

The factual background described that, upon receiving a complaint, the Government decided to convene a departmental enquiry against the respondent, H C Goel, and simultaneously suspended him. The Government served a notice requiring Goel to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken on four specific charges: first, that he had visited the residence of the Deputy Director of Administration, C P W D, without obtaining the necessary permission; second, that he had voluntarily expressed regret for not having brought sweets from Calcutta for the Deputy Director’s children; third, that he had offered a currency note, which in size and colour resembled a one‑hundred‑rupee note, as a bribe with the intention of persuading Deputy Director Shri Rajagopalan to support his claim for seniority before the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission; and fourth, that he had violated Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules. Goel provided his explanation, and the enquiry concluded that none of the charges were proved. Despite this finding, the Government provisionally decided that dismissal was appropriate and issued a second notice, to which Goel again responded. The matter was then referred to the Union Public Service Commission, which advised that no penalty could be imposed on Goel. The Government reconsidered the case, sent it back to the Commission for a fresh examination, and the Commission reaffirmed its earlier view. After reviewing the Commission’s advice, the Government dismissed Goel from service. Goel challenged the dismissal by filing a writ petition in the High Court under Articles 226 and 311, seeking to quash the order; the petition was dismissed by a single Judge. He subsequently filed a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court, and that appeal was allowed, resulting in the setting aside of his dismissal. The Supreme Court then identified two legal questions for determination: whether the Government may depart from the factual findings recorded by an enquiry officer appointed under Rule 55, and whether a High Court, in hearing a writ petition by a dismissed Government officer, may hold that the Government’s conclusion of misconduct lacks any evidential support.

The Court identified two principal questions for consideration. The first question asked whether the Government possessed the authority to depart from the factual findings recorded by an enquiry officer who was assigned, under Rule fifty‑five of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, to conduct a departmental enquiry against a delinquent government servant. The second question concerned whether, in a writ petition filed by a government officer who had been dismissed, the High Court was empowered, under Article two hundred twenty‑six of the Constitution, to declare that the Government’s conclusion regarding the officer’s misconduct was unsupported by any evidence. The appellant primarily argued that, if it acted in good faith, the High Court should not be permitted to interfere with the Government’s conclusions, even though the High Court might consider those conclusions to be devoid of evidential basis.

The Court held, as a matter of principle, that neither the findings of fact recorded by the enquiry officer nor the officer’s recommendations bind the Government, and therefore the constitutional protection guaranteed by Article three hundred eleven clause two was not violated by the appellant’s actions. The Court referred to the authorities Secretary of State for India v. I. M. Lal, [1945] F.C.R. 103; High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I. M. Lal, 75 I.A. 225; Khem Chand v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 1080; State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 1; and A. N. D. Silva v. Union of India, [1962] 1 Supp. I S.C.R. 968. In dealing with writ petitions by public servants who have been dismissed or otherwise subjected to proceedings invoking Article three hundred eleven clause two, the High Court, pursuant to Article two hundred twenty‑six, has the jurisdiction to examine whether the Government’s conclusion, upon which the impugned dismissal order rests, lacks any evidential support. The Court emphasized that it cannot be said that, in the absence of an allegation of bad faith and with an assumption of good faith in favor of the appellant, a factual conclusion of the Government is insulated from challenge merely because it appears to be unsupported by evidence. In the present case, the record contained no evidence to uphold the appellant’s finding that charge number three had been proved against the respondent.

The judgment proceeded under the heading “Civil Appellate Jurisdiction: Civil Appeal No. 645 of 1962.” The appeal was filed by special leave from the judgment and order dated August second, 1960, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Letters Patent Appeal No. 27‑D of 1959. The Attorney‑General for India, assisted by counsel, represented the appellant, while counsel for the respondent were also listed. The judgment was delivered on August thirtieth, 1963, by Justice Gajendragadkar. The Court reiterated that two short questions of law arose for decision in the appeal: first, whether the Government could differ from the factual findings recorded by the enquiry officer entrusted with a departmental enquiry under Rule fifty‑five of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules; and second, whether the High Court, in a writ petition filed by a dismissed government officer, could hold that the Government’s conclusion regarding misconduct was unsupported by any evidence.

In the appeal, the Court considered whether a High Court, while dealing with a writ petition filed by a Government Officer who had been dismissed from service, could hold that the Government’s conclusion about the officer’s misconduct was unsupported by any evidence. The Court indicated that it would answer both of the legal questions presented in the affirmative. Accordingly, the Union of India succeeded on the first question but failed on the second. During the hearing, the learned Attorney‑General explained that the Union was treating the appeal as a test case, not primarily to sustain the dismissal order against the respondent, but to obtain a determination of the two points of law articulated in the appeal. The factual background recorded that the respondent, H C Goel, entered the Central Public Works Department on 26 November 1941 and was later selected for a Class I appointment around 1945‑46. In January 1956, he was posted as Surveyor of Works in Calcutta. Dissatisfied that his seniority had not been properly fixed, he lodged a representation on that matter with the Union Public Service Commission. Around the middle of January 1956, he travelled to Delhi and on 19 January 1956 visited the residence of Mr R Rajagopalan, the Deputy Director of Administration, with the intention of explaining the merits of his case. During the conversation, it was alleged that he apologized for not having brought “rasagullas” for Mr Rajagopalan’s children; the Deputy Director is described as having frowned and expressed displeasure at the implied suggestion. A short time later, the respondent is said to have taken a wallet from his pocket and produced what appeared to Mr Rajagopalan to be a folded one‑hundred‑rupee note. The Deputy Director showed stern disapproval of this act, after which the respondent is reported to have said “No” and returned the wallet to his pocket. After a few minutes, the interview concluded and the respondent left the Deputy Director’s residence. Shortly thereafter, Mr Rajagopalan reported the incident to Mr Ananthakrishnan, the Director of Administration of the CPWD, and, on his advice, submitted a written complaint. In that complaint, Mr Rajagopalan narrated the events as he understood them and added that, at the end of the interview, the respondent had asked whether he could meet Mr Rajagopalan again the next day to learn the result of his representation. Mr Rajagopalan replied that the respondent might inquire when he happened to visit Delhi again. Upon receipt of this complaint, the appellant decided to convene a departmental enquiry against the respondent, suspended him from duties, and served a notice on 9 February 1956 setting out the charges and inviting his explanation.

The notice served on the respondent enumerated four specific charges and required him to explain why disciplinary action should not be imposed. The first charge alleged that the respondent had met the Deputy Director of Administration, C.P.W.D., at the Deputy Director’s residence without obtaining the permission that was required for such a visit. The second charge stated that the respondent had voluntarily expressed regret for not having brought sweets from Calcutta for the Deputy Director’s children. The third charge accused the respondent of offering a currency note that, by its size and colour, appeared to be a one‑hundred‑rupee note, with the purpose of bribing the Deputy Director, Sri Rajagopalan, so that the Deputy Director would support the respondent’s representation concerning his seniority before the Union Public Service Commission. The fourth charge alleged a violation of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules contained in the Civil Service Regulations. The respondent answered the notice by tendering his explanation, and the matter was investigated in accordance with Rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules by an Enquiry Officer named Mr Kapoor. Mr Kapoor examined both Mr Rajagopalan and the respondent, considered all the evidence presented before him, and concluded that the charges framed against the respondent had not been proved to a satisfactory degree. Mr Kapoor recorded his findings in a report dated 10 April 1956. The appellant reviewed this report and, provisionally, decided that the respondent ought to be dismissed from service; consequently, a second notice was issued to the respondent on 14 June 1956. The respondent again submitted a written explanation in response to the second notice. At that point, the appellant referred the respondent’s case to the Union Public Service Commission for its opinion. In its report dated 30 October 1956, the Commission advised that the first charge should be dropped, that the second charge did not constitute a sufficient ground for framing a charge against the officer, that the third charge could not be proved on the basis of the evidence available, and that, as a result of these conclusions, the fourth charge failed automatically. Accordingly, the Commission recommended that none of the penalties prescribed under Rule 49 of the Civil Service Rules be imposed on the respondent. The appellant reconsidered the matter in light of the Commission’s report, but it persisted in the position it had provisionally adopted before issuing the second notice. The appellant therefore asked the Commission to revisit its findings and remitted the case to the Commission on 8 December 1956. Upon re‑examination, the Commission affirmed its earlier conclusions and communicated the same to the appellant on 15 January 1957. After reviewing the entire file once more, the appellant concluded that a case existed for the respondent’s dismissal and, by an order dated 13 March 1957, formally dismissed him from his service. The respondent subsequently filed a writ petition, numbered 201‑D of 1957, in the Punjab High Court, seeking to quash the dismissal order on the grounds provided by Articles 226 and 311 of the Constitution. A learned Single Judge of that High Court considered the petition and held that the respondent had not made out a case for setting aside the dismissal order.

The single Judge of the Punjab High Court had held that the respondent had failed to establish any basis for quashing the order of dismissal that had been passed against him. Following that decision, the respondent filed an appeal under the Letters Patent, and a Division Bench of the same High Court heard the Letters Patent appeal. The Division Bench allowed the respondent’s appeal, holding that because the Enquiry Officer had prepared a report favorable to the respondent, the appellant could not disregard the officer’s findings. The Bench further observed that the dismissal order issued by the appellant was based on the conclusion that the Enquiry Officer’s findings were erroneous, and therefore that dismissal order violated the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed and his dismissal was set aside.

After the judgment of the High Court, the appellant sought a certificate from that Court, but the application for the certificate was refused. The appellant then applied to this Court for special leave to appeal, and this Court granted such special leave, thereby permitting the present appeal to be heard before this Court.

The primary issue that this Court was asked to determine was whether the appellant possessed the competence to adopt a view different from the evidence presented against the respondent and to proceed on the ground that the factual conclusions recorded by the Enquiry Officer were unsound and erroneous. The Court noted that if it were held that the appellant was prohibited from diverging from the Enquiry Officer’s conclusions, then the subsequent actions taken by the appellant would be consistent with Article 311 of the Constitution. Conversely, if the Court were to find that the appellant’s power to differ from the officer’s conclusions could not be seriously questioned, then the contention that the appellant had violated Article 311 by issuing a second notice to the respondent would fail.

Article 311 comprises two sub‑articles, and their operation is now well settled. The safeguards afforded to public servants regarding dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank under Article 311 have been examined by this Court on numerous occasions. It is now firmly established that a public servant protected by Article 311 is entitled to two opportunities to defend himself. First, the servant must receive a clear notice of the charge that he is required to meet before any departmental enquiry commences. Second, after receiving such notice, the servant must be given a reasonable opportunity to present his explanation. The enquiry itself must be conducted in accordance with the applicable rules and must observe the requirements of natural justice. Upon completion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer evaluates the evidence, records his findings, and submits a report to the concerned Government. This constitutes the first stage of the enquiry, which may only validly begin after the charge has been served on the delinquent public servant. After the report is received by the Government, the Government

The Government was authorized to examine the enquiry report together with the evidence presented against the public servant who was alleged to have committed misconduct. After reviewing the report, the Government could either accept the conclusions in their entirety, reject them completely, or accept them only in part. In the circumstance where the enquiry report concluded in favour of the public servant and the Government concurred with those conclusions, no further action was required; consequently, any suspension that had been imposed on the public servant would be lifted and the servant would be restored to his position along with any other reliefs that followed from reinstatement. In a different scenario, where the enquiry report still favoured the public servant but the Government disagreed with those findings and held that the charges were prima facie established, the Government was required to make a provisional determination of the appropriate punishment and to issue a second notice to the servant for the purpose of that determination. Similarly, when the enquiry officer’s findings were mixed—some points supporting the servant and others adverse—the Government was permitted to consider the entire set of findings. If, after such consideration, the Government believed that any or all of the charges were prima facie proved, it likewise had to provisionally decide the punishment and serve a second notice specifying the contemplated penalty. The purpose of this second notice was therefore two‑fold: it gave the public servant an opportunity to demonstrate that he was innocent of the charges and, alternatively, to argue that any punishment that might be imposed on the basis of proved charges would be excessive or unwarranted. This procedure, as outlined in Article 311 of the Constitution, closely mirrored the earlier regime that operated under section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The breadth and operation of section 240 of that Act, as well as the scope of Article 311, have been examined repeatedly by the courts; consequently, the present discussion does not need to repeat those earlier decisions, which include The Secretary of State for India v. I M Lal, High Commissioner for India and High Commissioner for Pakistan v. I M Lal, and Khem Chand v. Union of India & Ors. Those authorities consistently indicate that the findings of an enquiry officer do not terminate the matter, and that the appointing Government is not bound to accept those findings as final nor is it prohibited from revisiting the conclusions. Nevertheless, the High Court observed that certain observations made by the Federal Court in I M Lal and by this Court in Khem Chand have been interpreted by the respondent as supporting the view that the appellant was bound by the findings recorded by the enquiry officer.

In its analysis, the Court explained that the enquiry officer conducted the departmental enquiry as a delegate of the Government, which was the appellant in the matter. The officer’s role inevitably arose because the Government had ordered a departmental enquiry to investigate charges framed against a public servant. The purpose of the enquiry, according to the Court, was straightforward: it allowed the Government to examine the evidence presented, determine whether the charges were proved, and then decide what action, if any, should be taken. The Court stressed that the existence of a duly appointed enquiry officer did not alter the legal reality that the charges were originally framed by the Government and that only the Government possessed the authority to impose punishment on a delinquent public servant.

The Court then turned to the respondent’s claim that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer were binding on the Government. It held that, on principle, such a contention was difficult to sustain. If the respondent’s position were accepted, the result would be illogical and essentially absurd. For example, where the enquiry officer found the public servant guilty, the Government would be barred from reconsidering the matter even if it later believed the findings to be erroneous; the Government would nevertheless be compelled to treat the servant as guilty and impose a penalty. The Court observed that this outcome conflicted with the constitutional rights of the appointing authority, namely the Government, which retained the power to decide on punishment. Conversely, if the enquiry officer’s findings were in favour of the public servant, the respondent argued that those findings would be final even if they were illogical, erroneous, or unsound. In that scenario, the Government would be powerless and would have to accept the servant’s innocence, again creating an anomalous situation that ignored the Government’s constitutional prerogative and the limited scope of the enquiry officer’s function.

The Court noted that in many cases several charges are framed and the enquiry officer records findings on each charge separately. In such circumstances, the Government may accept certain findings and reject others, and it must then proceed to the next step based on its own conclusions. The Court referred to the earlier decision in The State of Assam and Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Pandit (1), where it had held that a second notice issued after the enquiry must clearly specify the grounds on which the Government provisionally intends to act in imposing the proposed punishment. This requirement, the Court affirmed, ensured that the public servant was informed of the basis for any contemplated disciplinary action.

In this case the Court observed that if the argument advanced by the respondent were accepted, the second notice would lose almost all of its significance. The respondent contended that once the enquiry officer had recorded his findings, the Government would be compelled to accept those findings and could not modify them. If that were true, the purpose of issuing a second notice – namely, to give the public servant a chance to show cause not only against the punishment being proposed but also against the findings themselves – would be frustrated, because the Government, according to the respondent, would be powerless to alter the recorded findings. The Court therefore concluded that the respondent’s contention was manifestly untenable and had to be rejected. The Court further clarified that, unless a specific statutory provision or an order creating the enquiry expressly requires it, the officer conducting the enquiry is not obligated to recommend any particular punishment when the charges framed against the officer are proved. Even when the enquiry officer does make a recommendation, that recommendation, like the officer’s findings on the merits, is intended solely to provide material for the Government’s consideration. The Court noted that neither the findings nor the recommendations bind the Government, referring to the authority in A. N. D'Silva v. Union of India (1).

Turning to the observations relied upon by the respondent, the Court examined the reasoning in The Secretary of State for India v. I. M. Lal (2), where Spens C.J. interpreted section 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Spens C.J. held that the provision requires that, when an enquiry results in a definite proposal for dismissal or reduction in rank, the officer concerned must be informed in full, or in an adequately summarized form, of the enquiry’s results and the findings of the enquiring officer, and must be given an opportunity to show cause on the basis of that information why the proposed dismissal or reduction should not be imposed. Counsel for the respondent suggested that these observations meant that a second notice could be issued only on the basis of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. The Court rejected this view as completely misconceived. In the case of I. M. Lal, the findings were adverse to the officer, and Spens C.J.’s observations must be read in that context. When the findings are adverse and the Government, after examining the evidence, provisionally accepts those findings, it is appropriate to serve the second notice on the basis of those findings, thereby giving the public servant a clear understanding of the substance of the findings. The Court emphasized, however, that such acceptance does not render the enquiry officer’s findings or any accompanying recommendations binding or conclusive. The same principle applies to the observations made by S. R. Das C.J. in the later case, which the Court considered next.

The Court referred to the decision of Das C.J. in the matter of Khem Chand (1) and summarized the Chief Justice’s conclusions. The learned Chief Justice had observed, among other points, that a public servant was entitled to a second opportunity only when the competent authority, after the enquiry had been completed and after carefully considering the seriousness of the charges that had been proved against the servant, tentatively proposed to impose one of the three prescribed punishments and communicated that tentative proposal to the servant. The Court noted that the Chief Justice’s reference to “charges proved against the Government servant” was not intended to imply that the findings made by the enquiry officer were final or conclusive. Rather, the enquiry report together with the evidence recorded formed the material on which the Government was required to act. The purpose of the enquiry conducted by a competent officer was solely to produce such a report, and that report was not intended to be binding on the Government.

Consequently, the Court held without hesitation that the High Court had erred in concluding that the appellant was not justified in differing from the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. The Court explained that if the report of the enquiry officer was not binding on the Government, then the constitutional safeguards provided by Article 311(1) and Article 311(2) could not be said to have been violated by the appellant, and therefore the grievance raised by the respondent must fail. The Court also clarified that this finding did not finally dispose of the appeal. It remained necessary to consider the respondent’s contention that, in the facts of the present case, the Government’s conclusion was based on no evidence at all. The Court described such a conclusion as perverse and argued that it suffered from an obvious and patent error apparent on the face of the record, which would justify the High Court in setting aside that conclusion.

The Court further observed that, in dealing with writ petitions filed by public servants who had been dismissed or otherwise subjected to proceedings that attracted Article 311(2), the High Court exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine whether the Government’s conclusion, on which the impugned dismissal order rested, was unsupported by any evidence. While acknowledging that an order of dismissal issued against a Government servant for misconduct could be characterized as an administrative order, the Court emphasized that the proceedings conducted under statutory rules to determine the servant’s guilt were of a quasi‑judicial nature. Accordingly, there was little doubt that a writ of certiorari could be invoked by a public servant who could demonstrate to the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government, which formed the basis of his dismissal, was founded on no evidence. The Court noted, in the interest of fairness, that these principles applied to the present case.

In evaluating the submissions of the learned Attorney‑General, the Court noted that he did not seriously challenge the legal position that had already been set out. Nevertheless, he advanced an argument that if the appellant had acted in good faith, the High Court would have no justification for interfering with the appellant’s conclusion, even though the High Court might be of the view that the conclusion was unsupported by any evidence. He contended that situations where a governmental body reaches a conclusion without any evidential basis can, in law, be distinguished from situations involving malice or bad faith. Accordingly, he suggested that a perverse factual conclusion may be attacked only on the ground that it is the product of malice, and because malice was not alleged in the present case, the respondent could not argue that the appellant’s view was subject to correction in a writ proceeding. The Court rejected this line of reasoning. It held that an exercise of power done with malice can be challenged on the separate ground of malice itself, and such an exercise is always liable to be set aside because it is not a bona‑fide exercise of authority. However, the Court declined to accept a proposition that, in the absence of an allegation of malice and on the assumption of good faith in favour of the appellant, a factual conclusion could not be successfully challenged even when it is clear that no evidence supports that conclusion. The Court emphasized that the two defects – lack of evidence and malice – are distinct, although they may sometimes coincide. It observed that there may be cases in which no evidence exists to support a governmental conclusion even though the government acted in good faith; likewise, the defect of no evidence may also arise where the government acted with malice, and in such circumstances the lack of evidential support may be a result of that malice. Nonetheless, the Court stated that proving the absence of evidence does not require a further finding of malice in order to issue a writ of certiorari. Consequently, the Court was not persuaded by the Attorney‑General’s argument that, because no malice was alleged against the appellant in the present matter, a writ of certiorari could not be granted in favour of the respondent. Turning to the merits of the respondent’s claim that the appellant’s finding that the third charge against the respondent was proved was unsupported by any evidence, the Court recalled that the Attorney‑General had stressed the need to keep in mind that the appellant was determined to root out corruption. He argued that if the appellant’s view was at least reasonably possible, the Court should not re‑examine that decision to decide whether it would have arrived at the same view. The Court accepted that this particular observation was sound, but it proceeded to examine the core issue of whether any evidence existed on which a finding that the third charge was proved could be based.

In order to decide the portion of the respondent’s case that is before this Court, the appropriate test is whether any evidence exists that would permit a finding that charge number three was proved against the respondent. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court is not empowered to assess the sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence supporting a particular conclusion; that assessment belongs to the authority that originally made the finding. However, the High Court must determine whether any evidence at all underlies the impugned conclusion. In other words, assuming that the entire body of evidence collected during the enquiry is taken as true, does the conclusion that the charge is proved logically follow? This method avoids a de facto weighing of the evidence; it merely accepts the evidence as presented and asks whether, on that evidence, the legal conclusion is justified. Applying this approach, the Court is inclined to accept the respondent’s grievance as well‑founded because the finding implicitly contained in the appellant’s order—that charge number three is proved against the respondent—appears to rest on no evidentiary foundation. The factual material relevant to this narrow issue is very limited. The record shows that the respondent expressed regret to Mr Rajagopalan that he had not brought rasagullas for the officer’s children. There is a dispute as to whether the respondent made this remark at the beginning of his interview with Mr Rajagopalan or at its conclusion. The complaint filed by Mr Rajagopalan indicates that the interview commenced with the respondent’s expression of regret about not having supplied sweets for the officer’s children. Conversely, Mr Rajagopalan’s testimony states that the respondent uttered the remark at the close of the interview. One point is indisputable: the respondent did, in fact, convey regret that he had not taken sweets to Mr Rajagopalan’s residence. If the respondent’s version—that he made the statement at the start of the interview—is accepted, especially when it is corroborated by the complaint, it could be inferred that the stern disapproval expressed by Mr Rajagopalan upon hearing the comment might have functioned as a warning to the respondent; however, that observation pertains to a separate matter. Regarding the alleged hundred‑rupee note that Mr Rajagopalan says the respondent removed from his wallet, the officer admitted that the note was folded double, that it was blue in colour and larger than the ordinary ten‑rupee or five‑rupee notes. Mr Rajagopalan, who appears to be a straightforward officer, gave his evidence in a candid manner and plainly stated that it could not be concluded that the hundred‑rupee note he believed the respondent had taken from his wallet was offered to him by the respondent.

The Court observed that the officer admitted that his observation should be considered within the overall context of the matter and that his visual acuity was not perfect. In contrast, the respondent explained that, when questioned by the officer, he removed several papers from his pocket in order to locate his appointment letter, and that he returned the paper to his pocket when the officer seemed to discourage him. On the basis of this evidentiary record, the Court found no basis for concluding that the respondent had attempted to offer a bribe to the officer. The officer expressly stated that no bribe had been offered; his only comment was that the paper taken from the respondent’s wallet resembled a double‑folded one‑hundred‑rupee note. The officer certainly harboured suspicion regarding the respondent’s conduct and lodged an immediate report. Nevertheless, the Court held that such suspicion, even when expressed by an officer regarded as honest and straightforward, could not be treated as legal proof against the respondent. While the Court fully appreciated the appellant’s desire to eradicate corruption from public service, it emphasized that suspicion alone must not replace proof, even in internal enquiries. The Court noted that procedural rules governing criminal trials might not be identical to those applying to disciplinary proceedings, yet the fundamental principle that only the guilty should be punished and the innocent protected applied equally to both contexts. After a careful examination of the evidence presented and consideration of the argument raised by the Attorney General, the Court concluded that the record did not contain any evidence capable of sustaining the appellant’s assertion that charge number three was proved against the respondent. The Court also mentioned, in passing, that the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Service Commission had examined the matter on two occasions and had firmly concluded that the principal charge against the respondent was not established. Consequently, although the appellant succeeded on the legal point raised in the appeal, the appeal failed on its merits because no case was established for punishing the respondent. The Court ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs and dismissed the appeal.